1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
436 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
437 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
438 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
441 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
442 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
443 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
444 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
445 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
446 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
447 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
448 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
449 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
450 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
451 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
452 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
453 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
454 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
455 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
457 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
458 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
459 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
460 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
462 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
463 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
464 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
465 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
467 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
468 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
469 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
470 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
471 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
473 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
474 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
475 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
476 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
478 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
479 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
480 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
482 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
483 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
484 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
485 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
486 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
488 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
489 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
492 /// See [`Channel::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
493 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
495 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
496 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
498 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
499 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
501 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
505 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
506 (0, update, required),
507 (2, blocked, required),
510 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
511 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
512 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
515 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
516 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
517 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
518 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
520 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
521 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
522 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
523 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
525 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
529 channel_id: [u8; 32],
530 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
533 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
534 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
536 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
537 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
538 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
540 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
541 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
542 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
543 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
545 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
546 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
548 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
550 holder_signer: Signer,
551 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
552 destination_script: Script,
554 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
555 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
556 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
558 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
559 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
560 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
561 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
562 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
563 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
565 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
566 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
567 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
568 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
569 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
570 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
572 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
574 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
575 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
576 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
578 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
579 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
580 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
581 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
582 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
583 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
584 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
586 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
588 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
589 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
590 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
591 // HTLCs with similar state.
592 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
593 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
594 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
595 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
596 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
597 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
598 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
599 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
600 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
603 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
604 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
605 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
607 update_time_counter: u32,
609 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
610 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
611 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
612 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
613 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
614 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
616 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
617 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
619 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
620 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
621 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
622 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
624 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
625 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
627 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
629 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
631 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
632 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
633 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
634 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
635 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
636 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
638 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
639 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
640 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
641 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
642 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
644 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
645 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
646 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
647 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
648 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
649 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
650 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
651 channel_creation_height: u32,
653 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
656 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
658 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
661 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
663 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
666 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
668 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
670 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
671 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
674 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
676 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
678 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
679 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
681 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
683 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
684 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
685 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
687 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
689 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
690 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
692 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
693 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
694 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
696 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
698 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
700 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
701 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
702 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
703 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
705 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
706 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
707 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
709 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
710 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
711 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
713 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
714 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
715 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
716 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
717 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
718 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
719 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
720 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
722 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
723 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
724 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
725 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
726 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
728 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
729 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
731 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
732 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
733 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
734 /// unblock the state machine.
736 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
737 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
738 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
740 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
741 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
742 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
744 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
745 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
746 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
747 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
748 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
749 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
750 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
751 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
753 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
754 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
756 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
757 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
758 // the channel's funding UTXO.
760 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
761 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
762 // associated channel mapping.
764 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
765 // to store all of them.
766 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
768 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
769 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
770 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
771 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
772 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
774 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
775 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
777 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
778 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
780 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
781 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
782 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
784 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
785 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
786 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
787 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
788 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
791 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
792 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
794 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
795 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
796 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
800 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
802 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
803 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
804 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
805 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
809 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
811 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
813 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
815 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
816 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
817 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
818 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
819 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
821 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
822 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
824 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
826 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
827 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
829 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
830 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
831 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
832 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
833 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
834 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
836 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
837 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
839 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
840 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
841 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
842 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
843 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
845 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
846 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
848 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
849 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
851 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
852 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
853 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
854 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
860 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
861 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
863 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
864 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
865 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
870 macro_rules! secp_check {
871 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
874 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
879 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
880 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
881 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
882 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
884 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
886 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
887 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
888 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
890 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
893 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
895 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
898 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
899 /// required by us according to the configured or default
900 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
902 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
904 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
905 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
906 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
907 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
908 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
911 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
912 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
913 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
914 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
915 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
916 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
917 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
920 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
921 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
924 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
925 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
926 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
927 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
928 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
929 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
930 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
931 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
932 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
933 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
936 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
937 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
938 // `only_static_remotekey`.
940 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
941 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
942 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
943 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
950 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
951 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
952 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
953 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
954 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
955 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
956 // We've exhausted our options
959 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
960 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
963 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
964 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
965 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
966 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
968 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
969 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
970 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
971 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
972 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
973 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
975 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
977 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
981 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
982 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
983 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
984 outbound_scid_alias: u64
985 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
986 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
987 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
988 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
990 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
991 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
992 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
993 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
995 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
996 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
998 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
999 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1001 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1002 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1003 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1005 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1008 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
1009 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1010 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1011 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1012 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
1015 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1016 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1018 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
1020 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1021 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1022 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
1023 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1026 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1027 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1029 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1030 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1031 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1032 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1036 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1037 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1038 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1042 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1043 Ok(script) => script,
1044 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1047 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1052 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1053 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1054 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1055 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1060 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1062 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1063 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1064 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1065 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1067 channel_value_satoshis,
1069 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1072 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1075 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1076 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1079 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1080 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1081 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1082 pending_update_fee: None,
1083 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1084 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1085 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1086 update_time_counter: 1,
1088 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1090 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1091 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1092 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1093 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1094 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1095 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1097 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1098 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1099 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1100 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1102 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1103 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1104 closing_fee_limits: None,
1105 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1107 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1109 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1110 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1111 short_channel_id: None,
1112 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1114 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1115 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1116 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1117 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1118 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1119 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1120 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1121 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1122 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1123 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1124 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1125 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1127 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1129 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1130 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1131 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1132 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1133 counterparty_parameters: None,
1134 funding_outpoint: None,
1135 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1136 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1138 funding_transaction: None,
1140 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1141 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1142 counterparty_node_id,
1144 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1146 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1148 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1149 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1151 announcement_sigs: None,
1153 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1154 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1155 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1156 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1158 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1159 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1161 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1162 outbound_scid_alias,
1164 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1165 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1167 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1168 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1173 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1177 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1178 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1179 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1181 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1182 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1183 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1184 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1185 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1186 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1187 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1190 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1191 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1192 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1193 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1194 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1195 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1196 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1197 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1199 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1200 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1204 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1209 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1210 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1211 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1212 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1213 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1214 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1215 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1216 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1217 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1218 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1219 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1222 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1224 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1225 // support this channel type.
1226 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1227 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1231 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1232 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1233 // `static_remote_key`.
1234 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1237 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1238 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1241 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1244 channel_type.clone()
1246 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1247 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1252 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1254 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1255 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1256 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1257 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1258 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1259 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1260 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1261 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1262 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1265 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1269 // Check sanity of message fields:
1270 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1273 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1276 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1279 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1280 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1283 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1286 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1289 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1291 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1292 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1295 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1298 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1302 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1303 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1306 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1309 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1312 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1315 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1318 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1321 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1325 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1327 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1328 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1333 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1334 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1335 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1336 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1337 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1339 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1340 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1342 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1343 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1344 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1346 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1347 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1350 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1351 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1352 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1353 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1354 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1355 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1358 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1359 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1360 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1361 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1365 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1366 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1367 &Some(ref script) => {
1368 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1369 if script.len() == 0 {
1372 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1373 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1375 Some(script.clone())
1378 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1380 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1385 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1386 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1387 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1388 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1392 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1393 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1394 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1398 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1399 Ok(script) => script,
1400 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1403 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1404 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1406 let chan = Channel {
1409 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1410 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1412 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1417 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1419 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1420 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1421 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1422 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1425 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1428 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1431 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1432 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1433 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1435 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1436 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1437 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1438 pending_update_fee: None,
1439 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1440 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1441 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1442 update_time_counter: 1,
1444 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1446 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1447 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1448 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1449 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1450 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1451 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1453 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1454 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1455 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1456 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1458 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1459 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1460 closing_fee_limits: None,
1461 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1463 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1465 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1466 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1467 short_channel_id: None,
1468 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1470 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1471 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1472 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1473 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1474 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1475 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1476 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1477 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1478 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1479 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1480 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1481 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1482 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1484 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1486 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1487 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1488 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1489 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1490 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1491 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1492 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1494 funding_outpoint: None,
1495 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1496 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1498 funding_transaction: None,
1500 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1501 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1502 counterparty_node_id,
1504 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1506 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1508 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1509 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1511 announcement_sigs: None,
1513 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1514 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1515 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1516 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1518 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1519 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1521 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1522 outbound_scid_alias,
1524 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1525 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1527 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1528 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1533 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1539 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1540 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1541 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1542 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1543 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1545 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1546 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1547 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1548 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1549 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1550 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1551 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1553 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1554 where L::Target: Logger
1556 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1557 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1558 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1560 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1561 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1562 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1563 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1565 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1566 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1567 if match update_state {
1568 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1569 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1570 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1571 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1572 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1574 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1578 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1579 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1580 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1581 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1583 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1584 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1585 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1587 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1588 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1589 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1590 transaction_output_index: None
1595 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1596 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1597 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1598 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1599 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1602 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1604 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1605 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1606 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1608 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1609 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1612 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1613 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1616 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1618 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1619 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1620 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1622 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1623 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1629 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1630 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1631 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1632 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1633 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1634 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1635 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1639 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1640 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1642 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1644 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1645 if generated_by_local {
1646 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1647 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1656 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1658 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1659 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1660 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1661 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1662 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1663 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1664 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1667 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1668 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1669 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1670 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1674 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1675 preimages.push(preimage);
1679 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1680 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1682 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1684 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1685 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1687 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1688 if !generated_by_local {
1689 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1697 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1698 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1699 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1700 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1701 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1702 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1703 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1704 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1706 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1708 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1709 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1710 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1711 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1713 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1715 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1716 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1717 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1718 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1721 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1722 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1723 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1724 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1726 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1729 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1730 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1731 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1732 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1734 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1737 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1738 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1743 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1744 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1749 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1751 let channel_parameters =
1752 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1753 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1754 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1757 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1762 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1765 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1766 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1767 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1768 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1770 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1771 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1772 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1780 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1781 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1787 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1788 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1789 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1790 // outside of those situations will fail.
1791 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1795 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1800 1 + // script length (0)
1804 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1805 2 + // witness marker and flag
1806 1 + // witness element count
1807 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1808 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1809 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1810 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1811 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1812 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1814 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1815 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1816 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1822 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1823 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1824 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1825 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1827 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1828 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1829 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1831 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1832 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1833 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1834 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1835 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1836 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1839 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1840 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1843 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1844 value_to_holder = 0;
1847 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1848 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1849 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1850 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1852 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1853 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1856 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1857 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1861 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1862 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1863 /// our counterparty!)
1864 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1865 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1866 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1867 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1868 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1869 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1870 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1872 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1876 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1877 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1878 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1879 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1880 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1881 //may see payments to it!
1882 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1883 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1884 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1886 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1889 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1890 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1891 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1892 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1893 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1896 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1899 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1900 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1902 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1904 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1905 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1906 where L::Target: Logger {
1907 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1908 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1909 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1910 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1911 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1912 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1913 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1914 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1918 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1919 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1920 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1921 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1923 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1924 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1926 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1928 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1930 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1931 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1932 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1934 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1935 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1936 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1937 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1938 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1940 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1941 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1942 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1944 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1945 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1947 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1950 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1951 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1955 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1959 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1960 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1961 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1962 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1963 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1964 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1967 // Now update local state:
1969 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1970 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1971 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1972 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1973 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1974 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1975 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1979 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1980 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1981 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1982 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1983 // do not not get into this branch.
1984 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1985 match pending_update {
1986 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1987 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1988 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1989 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1990 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1991 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1992 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1995 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1996 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1997 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1998 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1999 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2000 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2001 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2007 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
2008 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2009 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2011 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2012 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2013 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2015 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2016 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2019 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2020 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2022 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2023 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2025 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2026 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2029 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2032 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2033 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2034 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2035 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2040 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2041 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2042 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2043 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2044 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2045 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2046 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2047 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2048 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2049 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2050 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2051 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2052 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2053 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2054 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2055 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2056 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2058 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2060 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2061 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2062 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2063 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2064 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2065 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2066 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2068 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2069 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2072 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2073 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2074 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2075 update, blocked: true,
2080 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2081 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2082 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2083 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2087 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2091 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2092 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2093 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2094 /// before we fail backwards.
2096 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2097 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2098 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2099 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2100 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2101 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2102 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2105 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2106 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2107 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2108 /// before we fail backwards.
2110 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2111 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2112 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2113 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2114 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2115 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2116 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2118 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2120 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2121 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2122 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2124 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2125 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2126 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2128 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2129 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2130 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2132 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2137 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2138 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2144 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2145 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2146 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2147 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2148 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2152 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2153 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2154 force_holding_cell = true;
2157 // Now update local state:
2158 if force_holding_cell {
2159 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2160 match pending_update {
2161 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2162 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2163 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2164 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2168 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2169 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2170 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2171 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2177 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2178 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2179 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2185 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2187 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2188 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2191 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2192 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2193 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2198 // Message handlers:
2200 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2201 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2203 // Check sanity of message fields:
2204 if !self.is_outbound() {
2205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2207 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2210 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2213 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2216 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2219 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2221 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2223 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2224 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2227 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2228 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2231 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2234 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2238 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2239 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2242 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2245 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2248 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2251 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2254 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2257 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2261 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2262 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2263 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2265 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2266 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2268 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2269 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2272 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2275 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2276 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2277 &Some(ref script) => {
2278 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2279 if script.len() == 0 {
2282 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2285 Some(script.clone())
2288 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2295 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2296 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2297 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2298 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2299 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2301 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2302 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2304 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2307 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2308 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2309 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2310 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2311 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2312 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2315 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2316 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2317 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2320 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2321 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2323 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2324 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2329 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2330 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2332 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2333 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2335 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2336 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2337 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2338 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2339 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2340 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2341 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2342 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2343 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2346 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2347 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2349 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2350 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2351 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2352 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2354 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2355 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2357 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2358 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2361 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2362 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2365 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2366 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2367 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2369 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2372 if self.is_outbound() {
2373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2375 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2376 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2377 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2381 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2384 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2385 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2386 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2387 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2390 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2391 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2392 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2393 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2394 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2396 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2398 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2399 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2400 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2403 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2404 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2405 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2409 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2410 initial_commitment_tx,
2413 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2414 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2417 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2418 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2420 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2422 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2423 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2424 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2425 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2426 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2427 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2428 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2429 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2430 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2431 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2432 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2434 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2436 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2438 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2439 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2440 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2441 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2443 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2445 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2446 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2448 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2449 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2452 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2453 }, channel_monitor))
2456 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2457 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2458 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2459 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2460 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2462 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2465 if !self.is_outbound() {
2466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2468 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2469 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2471 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2472 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2473 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2474 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2477 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2479 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2480 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2481 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2482 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2484 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2485 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2487 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2488 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2490 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2491 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2492 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2493 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2494 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2499 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2500 initial_commitment_tx,
2503 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2504 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2507 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2508 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2511 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2512 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2513 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2514 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2515 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2516 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2517 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2518 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2519 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2520 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2521 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2522 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2524 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2526 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2528 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2529 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2530 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2531 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2533 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2535 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2536 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2540 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2541 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2543 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2544 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2545 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2546 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2548 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2551 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2552 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2553 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2556 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2557 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2558 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2559 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2560 // when routing outbound payments.
2561 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2565 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2567 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2568 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2569 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2570 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2571 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2572 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2573 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2574 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2575 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2577 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2578 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2579 let expected_point =
2580 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2581 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2583 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2584 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2585 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2586 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2587 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2588 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2590 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2591 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2592 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2593 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2594 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2596 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2597 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2604 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2605 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2607 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2609 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2612 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2613 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2614 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2615 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2621 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2622 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2623 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2624 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2625 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2626 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2627 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2628 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2629 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2632 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2635 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2636 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2637 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2639 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2640 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2641 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2642 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2643 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2644 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2646 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2647 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2653 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2654 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2655 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2656 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2657 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2658 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2659 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2660 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2661 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2664 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2667 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2668 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2669 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2671 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2672 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2673 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2674 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2675 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2676 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2678 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2679 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2683 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2684 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2685 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2686 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2687 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2688 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2689 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2691 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2692 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2694 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2701 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2702 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2703 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2704 /// corner case properly.
2705 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2706 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2707 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2709 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2710 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2711 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2712 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2715 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2717 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2718 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2719 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2722 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2723 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2724 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2725 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2727 outbound_capacity_msat,
2728 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2729 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2730 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2736 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2737 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2740 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2741 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2742 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2743 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2744 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2745 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2748 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2749 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2751 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2752 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2755 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2756 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2757 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2759 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2760 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2762 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2765 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2766 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2768 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2769 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2771 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2772 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2774 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2775 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2779 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2780 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2786 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2787 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2788 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2791 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2792 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2793 included_htlcs += 1;
2796 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2797 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2801 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2802 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2803 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2804 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2805 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2806 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2811 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2813 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2814 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2819 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2820 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2824 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2825 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2826 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2829 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2830 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2832 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2833 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2834 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2836 total_pending_htlcs,
2837 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2838 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2839 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2841 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2842 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2843 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2845 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2847 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2852 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2853 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2854 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2856 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2857 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2859 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2862 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2863 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2865 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2866 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2868 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2869 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2871 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2872 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2876 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2877 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2883 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2884 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2885 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2886 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2887 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2888 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2891 included_htlcs += 1;
2894 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2895 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2898 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2899 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2901 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2902 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2903 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2908 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2909 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2910 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2913 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2914 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2916 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2917 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2919 total_pending_htlcs,
2920 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2921 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2922 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2924 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2925 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2926 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2928 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2930 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2935 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2936 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2937 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2938 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2939 if local_sent_shutdown {
2940 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2942 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2943 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2944 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2947 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2950 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2951 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2953 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2956 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2957 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2960 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2961 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2962 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2965 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2966 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2968 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2969 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2970 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2971 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2972 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2973 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2974 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2975 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2976 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2977 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2978 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2980 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2981 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2982 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2983 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2984 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2985 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2989 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2992 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2993 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2994 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2996 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2997 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2998 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2999 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3000 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3001 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3002 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3006 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3007 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3008 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3009 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3010 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3011 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3012 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3016 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3017 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3018 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3019 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3020 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3021 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3024 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3025 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3026 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3027 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3028 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3030 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3031 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3034 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3038 if !self.is_outbound() {
3039 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3040 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3041 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3042 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3043 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3044 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3045 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3046 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3047 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3048 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3049 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3050 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3051 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3052 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3053 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3056 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3057 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3058 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3059 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3063 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3064 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3066 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3070 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3071 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3072 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3076 // Now update local state:
3077 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3078 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3079 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3080 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3081 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3082 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3083 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3088 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3090 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3091 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3092 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3093 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3094 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3095 None => fail_reason.into(),
3096 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3097 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3098 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3101 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3105 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3107 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3108 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3110 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3116 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3119 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3120 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3123 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3124 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3127 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3130 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3131 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3134 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3135 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3138 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3142 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3143 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3146 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3150 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3154 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3155 where L::Target: Logger
3157 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3160 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3163 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3167 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3169 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3171 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3172 let commitment_txid = {
3173 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3174 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3175 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3177 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3178 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3179 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3180 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3181 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3186 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3188 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3189 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3190 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3191 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3194 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3195 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3196 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3200 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3202 if self.is_outbound() {
3203 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3204 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3205 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3206 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3207 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3208 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3209 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3210 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3211 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3212 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3218 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3222 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3223 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3224 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3225 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3226 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3227 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3228 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3229 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3230 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3231 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3232 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3233 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3234 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3237 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3238 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3239 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3240 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3241 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3242 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3243 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3245 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3246 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3247 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3248 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3249 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3250 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3251 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3254 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3255 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3258 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3260 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3261 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3262 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3265 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3268 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3269 commitment_stats.tx,
3271 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3272 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3273 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3276 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3277 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3279 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3280 let mut need_commitment = false;
3281 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3282 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3283 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3284 need_commitment = true;
3288 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3289 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3290 Some(forward_info.clone())
3292 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3293 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3294 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3295 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3296 need_commitment = true;
3299 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3300 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3301 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3302 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3303 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3304 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3305 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3306 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3307 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3308 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3309 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3310 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3311 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3312 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3314 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3316 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3317 need_commitment = true;
3321 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3322 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3323 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3324 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3325 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3326 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3328 nondust_htlc_sources,
3332 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3333 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3334 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3335 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3337 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3338 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3339 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3340 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3341 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3342 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3343 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3344 // includes the right HTLCs.
3345 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3346 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3347 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3348 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3349 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3350 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3352 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3353 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3354 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3357 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3358 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3359 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3360 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3361 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3362 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3363 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3364 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3365 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3369 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3370 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3371 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3372 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3375 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3376 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3377 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3378 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3379 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3380 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3381 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3382 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3385 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3386 /// for our counterparty.
3387 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3388 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3389 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3390 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3391 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3393 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3394 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3395 updates: Vec::new(),
3398 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3399 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3400 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3401 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3402 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3403 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3404 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3405 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3406 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3407 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3408 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3409 // to rebalance channels.
3410 match &htlc_update {
3411 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3412 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3413 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3416 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3417 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3418 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3419 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3420 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3421 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3422 // into the holding cell without ever being
3423 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3424 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3425 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3428 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3434 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3435 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3436 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3437 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3438 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3439 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3440 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3441 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3442 (msg, monitor_update)
3443 } else { unreachable!() };
3444 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3445 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3447 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3448 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3449 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3450 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3451 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3452 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3453 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3454 // for a full revocation before failing.
3455 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3458 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3460 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3467 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3468 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3470 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3471 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3476 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3477 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3478 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3479 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3480 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3482 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3483 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3484 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3486 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3487 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3493 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3494 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3495 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3496 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3497 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3498 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3499 where L::Target: Logger,
3501 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3502 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3504 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3505 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3507 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3511 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3513 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3514 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3515 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3519 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3520 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3521 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3522 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3523 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3524 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3525 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3526 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3527 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3530 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3532 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3533 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3536 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3537 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3539 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3541 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3542 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3543 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3544 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3545 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3546 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3547 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3548 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3552 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3553 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3554 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3555 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3556 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3557 self.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3558 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3559 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3560 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3562 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3563 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3566 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3567 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3568 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3569 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3570 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3571 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3572 let mut require_commitment = false;
3573 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3576 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3577 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3578 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3580 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3581 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3582 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3583 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3584 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3585 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3590 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3591 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3592 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3593 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3594 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3596 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3597 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3598 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3603 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3604 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3606 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3610 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3611 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3613 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3614 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3615 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3616 require_commitment = true;
3617 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3618 match forward_info {
3619 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3620 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3621 require_commitment = true;
3623 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3624 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3625 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3627 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3628 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3629 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3633 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3634 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3635 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3636 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3642 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3643 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3644 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3645 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3647 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3648 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3649 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3650 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3651 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3652 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3653 require_commitment = true;
3657 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3659 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3660 match update_state {
3661 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3662 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3663 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3664 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3665 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3667 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3668 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3669 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3670 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3671 require_commitment = true;
3672 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3673 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3678 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3679 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3680 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3681 if require_commitment {
3682 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3683 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3684 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3685 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3686 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3687 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3688 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3689 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3690 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3692 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3693 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3694 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3695 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3696 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3699 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3700 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3701 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3702 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3703 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3704 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3705 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3707 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3708 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3710 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3711 if require_commitment {
3712 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3714 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3715 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3716 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3717 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3719 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3720 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3721 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3722 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3724 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3725 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3726 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3732 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3733 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3734 /// commitment update.
3735 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3736 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3737 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3740 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3741 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3742 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3743 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3745 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3746 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3747 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3748 if !self.is_outbound() {
3749 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3751 if !self.is_usable() {
3752 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3754 if !self.is_live() {
3755 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3758 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3759 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3760 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3761 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3762 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3763 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3764 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3765 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3766 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3767 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3771 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3772 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3773 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3774 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3775 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3778 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3779 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3783 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3784 force_holding_cell = true;
3787 if force_holding_cell {
3788 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3792 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3793 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3795 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3796 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3801 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3802 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3804 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3806 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3807 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3808 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3809 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3813 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3814 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3815 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3819 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3820 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3823 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3824 // will be retransmitted.
3825 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3826 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3827 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3829 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3830 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3832 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3833 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3834 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3835 // this HTLC accordingly
3836 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3839 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3840 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3841 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3842 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3845 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3846 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3847 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3848 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3849 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3850 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3855 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3857 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3858 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3859 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3860 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3864 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3865 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3866 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3867 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3868 // the update upon reconnection.
3869 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3873 self.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3875 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3876 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3879 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3880 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3881 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3882 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3883 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3884 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3885 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3887 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3888 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3889 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3890 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3891 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3892 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3893 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3895 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3896 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3897 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3898 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3899 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3900 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3901 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3904 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3905 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3906 /// to the remote side.
3907 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3908 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3909 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3910 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3913 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3915 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3916 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3917 let mut found_blocked = false;
3918 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3919 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3920 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3924 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3925 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3926 // first received the funding_signed.
3927 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3928 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3929 self.funding_transaction.take()
3931 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3932 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3933 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3934 funding_broadcastable = None;
3937 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3938 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3939 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3940 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3941 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3942 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3943 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3944 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3945 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3946 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3947 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3948 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3949 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3950 next_per_commitment_point,
3951 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3955 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3957 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3958 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3959 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3960 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3961 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3962 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3964 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3965 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3966 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3967 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3968 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3969 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3973 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3974 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3976 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3977 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3978 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3981 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3982 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3983 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3984 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3985 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3986 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3987 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3988 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3989 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3993 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3994 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3996 if self.is_outbound() {
3997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3999 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4000 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4002 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4003 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4005 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4006 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4007 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4008 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4009 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4010 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4011 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4012 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4013 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4014 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4015 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4016 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4017 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4019 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4021 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4027 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4028 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4029 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4030 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4031 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4032 per_commitment_secret,
4033 next_per_commitment_point,
4035 next_local_nonce: None,
4039 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4040 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4041 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4042 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4043 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4045 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4046 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4047 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4048 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4049 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4050 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4051 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4052 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4053 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4058 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4059 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4061 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4062 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4063 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4064 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4065 reason: err_packet.clone()
4068 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4069 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4070 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4071 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4072 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4073 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4076 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4077 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4078 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4079 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4080 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4087 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4088 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4089 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4090 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4094 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4095 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4096 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4097 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4098 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4099 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4103 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4104 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4106 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4107 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4108 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4109 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4110 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4111 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4112 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4113 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4116 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4118 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4119 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4120 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4121 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4125 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4126 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4130 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4131 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4132 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4133 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4134 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4135 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4137 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4138 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4139 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4140 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4141 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4144 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4145 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4146 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4147 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4148 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4149 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4150 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4151 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4155 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4156 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4157 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4158 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4160 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4164 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4165 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4166 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4167 self.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4169 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4170 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4171 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4172 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4173 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4177 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4179 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4180 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4181 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4182 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4183 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4186 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4187 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4188 channel_ready: None,
4189 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4190 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4191 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4195 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4196 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4197 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4198 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4199 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4200 next_per_commitment_point,
4201 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4203 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4204 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4205 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4209 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4210 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4211 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4213 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4214 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4215 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4218 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4224 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4225 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4226 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4227 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4228 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4229 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4230 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4232 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4234 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4235 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4236 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4237 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4238 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4239 next_per_commitment_point,
4240 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4244 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4245 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4246 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4248 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4251 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4252 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4253 raa: required_revoke,
4254 commitment_update: None,
4255 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4257 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4258 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4259 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4261 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4264 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4265 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4266 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4267 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4268 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4269 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4272 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4273 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4274 raa: required_revoke,
4275 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4276 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4280 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4284 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4285 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4286 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4287 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4289 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4291 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4293 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4294 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4295 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4296 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4297 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4298 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4300 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4301 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4302 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4303 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4304 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4306 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4307 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4308 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4309 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4312 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4313 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4314 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4315 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4316 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4317 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4318 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4319 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4320 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4321 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4322 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4323 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4324 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4325 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4326 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4328 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4331 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4332 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4335 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4336 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4337 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4338 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4339 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4340 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4341 self.channel_state &
4342 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4343 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4344 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4345 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4348 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4349 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4350 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4351 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4352 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4353 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4356 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4362 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4363 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4364 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4365 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4367 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4368 return Ok((None, None));
4371 if !self.is_outbound() {
4372 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4373 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4375 return Ok((None, None));
4378 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4380 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4381 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4382 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4383 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4385 let sig = self.holder_signer
4386 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4387 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4389 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4390 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4391 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4392 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4394 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4395 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4396 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4401 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4402 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4404 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4405 self.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4408 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4409 /// within our expected timeframe.
4411 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4412 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4413 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4416 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4419 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4420 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4423 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4424 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4425 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4426 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4428 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4431 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4432 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4433 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4434 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4435 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4437 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4438 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4442 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4444 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4445 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4448 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4449 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4450 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4453 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4456 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4457 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4458 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4459 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4461 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4464 assert!(send_shutdown);
4465 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4466 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4467 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4469 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4472 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4477 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4479 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4480 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4482 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4483 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4484 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4485 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4486 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4487 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4490 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4491 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4492 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4495 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4496 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4497 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4498 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4502 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4503 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4504 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4505 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4506 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4507 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4509 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4510 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4517 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4518 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4520 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4523 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4524 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4526 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4528 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4529 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4530 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4531 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4532 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4533 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4534 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4535 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4536 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4538 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4539 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4542 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4546 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4547 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4548 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4549 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4551 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4554 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4555 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4557 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4558 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4560 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4561 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4564 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4565 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4568 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4569 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4570 return Ok((None, None));
4573 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4574 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4575 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4576 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4578 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4580 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4583 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4584 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4585 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4586 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4587 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4591 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4592 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4597 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4598 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4599 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4600 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4601 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4602 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4603 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4607 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4609 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4610 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4611 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4612 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4614 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4617 let sig = self.holder_signer
4618 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4619 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4621 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4622 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4623 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4624 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4628 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4629 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4630 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4631 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4633 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4634 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4635 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4641 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4642 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4643 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4645 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4646 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4648 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4649 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4652 if !self.is_outbound() {
4653 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4654 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4655 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4656 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4658 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4659 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4660 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4662 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4663 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4666 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4667 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4668 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4669 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4670 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4671 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4672 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4673 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4678 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4679 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4680 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4681 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4683 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4687 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4688 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4689 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4690 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4692 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4698 // Public utilities:
4700 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4704 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4706 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4707 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4708 self.temporary_channel_id
4711 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4715 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4716 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4717 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4721 /// Gets the channel's type
4722 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4726 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4727 /// is_usable() returns true).
4728 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4729 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4730 self.short_channel_id
4733 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4734 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4735 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4738 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4739 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4740 self.outbound_scid_alias
4742 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4743 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4744 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4745 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4746 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4749 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4750 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4751 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4752 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4755 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4756 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4757 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4760 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4761 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4762 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4763 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4767 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4770 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4771 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4774 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4775 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4778 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4779 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4780 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4783 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4784 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4787 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4788 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4789 self.counterparty_node_id
4792 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4793 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4794 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4797 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4798 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4799 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4802 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4803 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4805 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4806 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4807 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4808 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4810 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4814 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4815 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4816 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4819 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4820 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4821 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4824 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4825 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4826 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4828 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4829 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4834 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4835 self.channel_value_satoshis
4838 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4839 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4842 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4843 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4846 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4847 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4850 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4851 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4852 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4855 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4856 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4857 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4860 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4861 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4862 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4865 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4866 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4867 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4870 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4871 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4872 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4875 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4876 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4877 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4880 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4881 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4882 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4883 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4884 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4887 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4889 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4890 self.prev_config = None;
4894 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4895 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4899 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4900 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4901 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4902 let did_channel_update =
4903 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4904 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4905 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4906 if did_channel_update {
4907 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4908 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4909 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4910 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4912 self.config.options = *config;
4916 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4917 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4918 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4919 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4920 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4921 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4922 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4924 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4925 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4928 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4930 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4931 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4937 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4938 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4939 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4940 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4941 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4942 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4943 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4945 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4946 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4953 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4957 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4958 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4959 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4960 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4961 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4962 // which are near the dust limit.
4963 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4964 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4965 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4966 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4967 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4969 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4970 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4972 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4975 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4976 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4979 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4980 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4983 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4984 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4988 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4993 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4995 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4996 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4997 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4998 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4999 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5000 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5002 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5004 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5012 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5013 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5017 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5018 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
5019 self.update_time_counter
5022 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5023 self.latest_monitor_update_id
5026 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
5027 self.config.announced_channel
5030 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
5031 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
5034 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
5035 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5036 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
5037 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
5040 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
5041 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
5042 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
5045 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
5046 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5047 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
5048 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
5049 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
5052 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5053 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5055 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5056 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5059 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5060 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5061 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5062 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5065 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5066 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5067 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5070 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5071 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5072 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5073 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5074 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5075 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5076 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5077 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5083 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5084 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5085 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5086 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5087 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5088 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5093 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5094 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5096 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5097 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5098 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5099 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5102 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5103 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5106 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5107 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
5108 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
5109 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
5115 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5116 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5119 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
5120 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5121 self.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
5122 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
5125 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5126 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5127 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5130 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5131 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5132 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5134 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5135 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5136 if self.channel_state &
5137 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5138 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5139 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5140 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5141 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5144 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5145 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5146 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5147 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5148 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5149 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5151 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5152 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5153 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5155 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5156 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5157 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5158 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5159 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5160 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5166 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5167 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5168 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5171 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5172 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5173 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5176 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5177 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5178 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5181 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5182 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5183 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5184 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5185 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5186 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5191 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5192 self.channel_update_status
5195 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5196 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5197 self.channel_update_status = status;
5200 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5202 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5203 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5204 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5208 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5209 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5210 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5213 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5217 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5218 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5219 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5221 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5222 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5223 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5225 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5226 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5229 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5230 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5231 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5232 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5233 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5234 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5235 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5236 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5237 self.channel_state);
5239 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5243 if need_commitment_update {
5244 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5245 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5246 let next_per_commitment_point =
5247 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5248 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5249 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5250 next_per_commitment_point,
5251 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5255 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5261 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5262 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5263 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5264 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5265 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5266 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5267 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5269 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5272 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5273 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5274 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5275 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5276 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5277 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5278 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5279 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5280 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5281 if self.is_outbound() {
5282 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5283 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5284 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5285 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5286 // channel and move on.
5287 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5288 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5290 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5291 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5292 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5294 if self.is_outbound() {
5295 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5296 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5297 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5298 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5299 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5300 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5304 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5305 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5306 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5307 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5308 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5312 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5313 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5314 // may have already happened for this block).
5315 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5316 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5317 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5318 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5321 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5322 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5323 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5324 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5332 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5333 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5334 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5335 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5337 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5338 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5341 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5343 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5344 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5345 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5346 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5348 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5351 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5354 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5355 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5356 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5357 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5359 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5362 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5363 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5364 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5366 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5367 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5369 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5370 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5371 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5379 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5381 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5382 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5383 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5385 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5386 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5389 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5390 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5391 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5392 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5393 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5394 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5395 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5396 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5397 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5400 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5401 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5402 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5403 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5405 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5406 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5407 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5409 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5410 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5411 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5412 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5414 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5415 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5416 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5417 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5418 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5419 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5420 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5423 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5424 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5426 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5429 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5430 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5431 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5432 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5433 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5434 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5435 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5436 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5437 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5438 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5439 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5440 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5441 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5442 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5443 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5444 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5445 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5451 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5456 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5457 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5459 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5460 if !self.is_outbound() {
5461 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5463 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5464 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5467 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5468 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5471 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5472 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5476 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5477 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5478 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5479 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5480 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5481 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5482 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5483 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5484 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5485 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5486 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5487 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5488 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5489 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5490 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5491 first_per_commitment_point,
5492 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5493 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5494 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5495 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5497 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5501 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5502 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5505 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5506 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5507 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5508 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5511 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5512 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5514 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5515 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5516 if self.is_outbound() {
5517 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5519 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5520 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5522 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5523 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5525 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5526 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5529 self.user_id = user_id;
5530 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5532 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5535 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5536 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5537 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5539 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5540 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5541 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5542 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5544 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5545 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5546 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5547 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5548 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5549 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5550 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5551 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5552 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5553 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5554 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5555 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5556 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5557 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5558 first_per_commitment_point,
5559 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5560 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5561 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5563 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5565 next_local_nonce: None,
5569 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5570 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5572 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5574 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5575 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5578 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5579 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5580 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5581 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5582 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5583 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5586 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5587 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5588 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5589 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5590 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5591 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5592 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5593 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5594 if !self.is_outbound() {
5595 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5597 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5598 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5600 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5601 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5602 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5603 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5606 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5607 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5609 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5612 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5613 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5618 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5620 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5622 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5623 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5624 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5626 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5627 temporary_channel_id,
5628 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5629 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5632 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5634 next_local_nonce: None,
5638 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5639 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5640 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5641 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5643 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5646 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5647 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5648 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5649 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5650 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5651 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5653 if !self.is_usable() {
5654 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5657 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5658 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5659 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5660 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5662 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5663 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5665 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5666 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5667 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5668 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5669 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5670 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5676 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5677 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5678 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5679 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5681 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5684 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5688 if !self.is_usable() {
5692 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5693 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5697 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5701 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5702 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5705 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5709 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5711 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5716 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5718 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5723 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5725 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5726 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5727 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5728 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5729 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5733 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5735 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5736 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5737 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5738 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5739 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5740 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5741 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5743 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5744 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5745 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5746 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5747 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5748 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5749 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5750 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5751 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5752 contents: announcement,
5755 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5759 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5760 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5761 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5762 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5763 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5764 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5765 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5766 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5768 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5770 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5771 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5772 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5773 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5775 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5776 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5777 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5778 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5781 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5782 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5783 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5784 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5787 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5790 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5791 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5792 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5793 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5794 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5795 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5798 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5800 Err(_) => return None,
5802 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5803 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5808 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5809 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5810 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5811 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5812 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5813 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5814 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5815 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5816 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5817 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5818 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5819 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5820 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5821 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5822 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5823 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5826 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5829 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5830 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5831 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5832 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5833 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5834 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5835 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5836 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5837 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5839 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5840 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5841 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5842 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5843 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5844 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5845 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5846 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5847 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5849 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5850 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5851 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5852 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5853 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5854 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5855 next_funding_txid: None,
5860 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5862 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5863 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5864 /// commitment update.
5866 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5867 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5868 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5869 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5871 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5872 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5874 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5875 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5880 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5881 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5883 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5885 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5886 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5888 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5889 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5890 /// regenerate them.
5892 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5893 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5895 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5896 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5897 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5898 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5899 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5900 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5902 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5903 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5904 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5907 if amount_msat == 0 {
5908 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5911 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5912 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5915 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5916 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5917 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5918 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5919 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5920 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5921 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5922 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5925 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5926 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5927 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5928 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5930 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5931 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5932 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5935 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5936 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5937 if !self.is_outbound() {
5938 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5939 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5940 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5941 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5942 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5943 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5947 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5950 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5951 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5952 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5954 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5955 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5956 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5957 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5958 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5959 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5963 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5964 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5965 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5966 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5967 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5968 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5972 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5973 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5974 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5977 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5978 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5979 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5980 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5982 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5983 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5986 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5987 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5988 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5989 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5990 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5993 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5994 force_holding_cell = true;
5997 // Now update local state:
5998 if force_holding_cell {
5999 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6004 onion_routing_packet,
6009 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6010 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6012 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6014 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6018 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6019 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6020 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6024 onion_routing_packet,
6026 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6031 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6032 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6033 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6034 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6036 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6037 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6038 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6040 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6041 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6045 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6046 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6047 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6048 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6049 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6050 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6051 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6054 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6055 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6056 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6057 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6058 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6059 self.pending_update_fee = None;
6062 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6064 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6065 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6066 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6068 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6069 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6072 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6073 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6074 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6075 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6076 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6077 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6078 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6079 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6082 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6086 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6087 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6088 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6089 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6091 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6093 if !self.is_outbound() {
6094 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6095 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6096 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6097 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6098 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6099 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6100 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6101 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6102 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6103 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6109 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6112 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6113 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6114 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6115 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6116 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6117 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6119 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6120 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6121 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6122 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6125 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6126 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6130 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6131 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6133 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6135 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6136 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6137 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6138 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6140 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6141 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6142 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6143 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6144 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6145 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6149 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6150 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6154 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6155 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6158 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6159 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6161 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6162 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6163 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6164 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6165 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6168 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6169 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6170 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6176 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6177 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6178 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6181 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6182 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6185 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6186 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6187 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6188 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6194 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6195 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6197 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6198 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6199 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6200 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6201 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6202 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6203 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6204 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6205 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6208 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6209 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6210 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6212 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6213 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6216 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6217 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6219 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6220 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6221 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6224 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6225 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6226 let mut chan_closed = false;
6227 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6231 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6233 None if !chan_closed => {
6234 // use override shutdown script if provided
6235 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6236 Some(script) => script,
6238 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6239 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6240 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6241 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6245 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6246 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6248 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6254 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6255 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6256 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6257 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6259 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6261 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6263 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6264 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6265 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6266 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6267 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6268 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6271 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6272 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6273 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6276 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6277 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6278 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6281 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6282 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6283 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6284 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6285 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6287 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6288 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6295 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6296 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6298 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6301 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6302 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6303 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6304 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6305 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6306 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
6307 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6308 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6309 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6310 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6311 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6313 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6314 // return them to fail the payment.
6315 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6316 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6317 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6319 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6320 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6325 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6326 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6327 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6328 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6329 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6330 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6331 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6332 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6333 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6334 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6335 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6336 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6337 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6342 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6343 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6344 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6347 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6348 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6349 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6351 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6352 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6356 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6360 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6361 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6363 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6369 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6370 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6371 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6372 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6373 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6375 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6376 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6377 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6378 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6384 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6385 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6386 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6387 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6388 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6389 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6394 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6395 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6396 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6397 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6399 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6400 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6401 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6402 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6407 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6408 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6409 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6410 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6411 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6412 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6417 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6418 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6419 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6422 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6424 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6425 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6426 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6427 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6428 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6430 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6431 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6432 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6433 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6435 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6436 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6437 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6439 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6441 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6442 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6443 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6444 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6445 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6446 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6448 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6449 // deserialized from that format.
6450 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6451 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6452 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6454 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6456 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6457 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6458 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6460 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6461 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6462 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6463 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6466 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6467 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6468 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6471 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6472 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6473 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6474 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6476 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6477 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6479 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6481 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6483 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6485 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6488 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6490 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6495 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6497 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6498 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6499 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6500 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6501 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6502 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6503 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6505 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6507 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6509 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6512 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6513 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6514 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6517 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6519 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6520 preimages.push(preimage);
6522 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6523 reason.write(writer)?;
6525 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6527 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6528 preimages.push(preimage);
6530 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6531 reason.write(writer)?;
6536 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6537 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6539 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6541 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6542 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6543 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6544 source.write(writer)?;
6545 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6547 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6549 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6550 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6552 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6554 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6555 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6560 match self.resend_order {
6561 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6562 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6565 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6566 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6567 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6569 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6570 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6571 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6572 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6575 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6576 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6577 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6578 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6579 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6582 if self.is_outbound() {
6583 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6584 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6585 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6587 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6588 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6589 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6591 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6593 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6594 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6595 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6596 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6598 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6599 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6600 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6601 // consider the stale state on reload.
6604 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6605 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6606 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6608 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6609 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6610 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6612 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6613 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6615 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6616 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6617 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6619 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6620 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6622 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6625 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6626 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6627 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6629 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6632 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6633 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6635 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6636 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6637 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6639 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6641 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6643 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6645 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6646 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6647 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6648 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6649 htlc.write(writer)?;
6652 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6653 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6654 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6656 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6657 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6659 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6660 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6661 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6662 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6663 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6664 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6665 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6667 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6668 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6669 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6670 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6671 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6673 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6674 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6676 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6677 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6678 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6679 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6681 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6683 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6684 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6685 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6686 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6687 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6688 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6689 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6691 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6692 (2, chan_type, option),
6693 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6694 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6695 (5, self.config, required),
6696 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6697 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6698 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6699 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6700 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6701 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6702 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6703 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6704 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6705 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6706 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6707 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6708 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6709 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6710 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6711 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6718 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6719 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6721 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6722 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6724 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6725 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6726 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6728 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6729 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6730 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6731 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6733 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6735 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6736 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6737 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6738 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6739 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6741 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6742 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6745 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6746 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6747 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6749 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6751 let mut keys_data = None;
6753 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6754 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6755 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6756 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6757 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6758 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6759 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6760 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6761 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6762 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6766 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6767 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6768 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6771 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6773 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6774 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6777 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6779 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6780 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6781 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6782 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6783 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6784 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6785 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6786 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6787 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6788 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6789 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6790 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6791 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6796 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6797 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6798 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6799 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6800 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6801 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6802 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6803 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6804 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6805 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6806 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6807 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6809 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6810 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6813 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6814 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6817 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6820 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6825 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6826 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6827 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6828 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6829 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6830 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6831 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6832 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6833 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6834 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6836 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6837 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6838 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6840 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6841 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6842 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6844 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6848 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6849 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6850 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6851 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6854 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6855 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6858 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6859 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6860 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6861 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6864 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6865 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6866 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6867 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6870 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6872 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6876 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6877 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6880 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6881 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6882 // consider the stale state on reload.
6883 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6886 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6890 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6893 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6894 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6899 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6900 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6902 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6903 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6905 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6906 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6908 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6912 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6914 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6915 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6917 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6918 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6923 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6924 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6925 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6926 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6928 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6931 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6934 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6939 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6940 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6942 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6944 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6945 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6946 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6948 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6949 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6950 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6954 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6955 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6956 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6958 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6964 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6965 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6966 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6967 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6968 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6969 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6970 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6971 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6972 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6973 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6975 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6976 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6977 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6978 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6979 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6980 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6981 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6983 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6984 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6985 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6986 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6988 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6990 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6991 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6992 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6993 (2, channel_type, option),
6994 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6995 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6996 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6997 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6998 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6999 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7000 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7001 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7002 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7003 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7004 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7005 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7006 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7007 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7008 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7009 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7010 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7011 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7012 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7015 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7016 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7017 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7018 // required channel parameters.
7019 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7020 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7021 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7023 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7025 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7026 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7027 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7028 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7031 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7032 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7033 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7035 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7036 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7038 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7039 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7044 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7045 if iter.next().is_some() {
7046 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7050 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7051 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7052 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7053 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7054 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7057 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7058 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7060 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7061 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7062 // separate u64 values.
7063 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7065 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7070 config: config.unwrap(),
7074 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7075 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7076 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7079 temporary_channel_id,
7081 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7083 channel_value_satoshis,
7085 latest_monitor_update_id,
7088 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7091 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7092 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7095 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7096 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7097 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7098 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7102 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7103 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7104 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7105 monitor_pending_forwards,
7106 monitor_pending_failures,
7107 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7110 holding_cell_update_fee,
7111 next_holder_htlc_id,
7112 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7113 update_time_counter,
7116 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7117 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7118 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7119 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7121 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7122 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7123 closing_fee_limits: None,
7124 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7126 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7128 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7129 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7131 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7133 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7134 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7135 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7136 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7137 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7138 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7139 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7140 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7141 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7144 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7146 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7147 funding_transaction,
7149 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7150 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7151 counterparty_node_id,
7153 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7157 channel_update_status,
7158 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7162 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7163 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7164 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7165 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7167 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7168 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7170 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7171 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7172 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7174 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7175 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7177 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7178 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7180 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7183 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7191 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7192 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7193 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7194 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7195 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7197 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7198 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7200 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7201 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7202 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7203 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7204 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7205 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7206 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7207 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7208 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7209 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7210 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7211 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7212 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7213 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7214 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7215 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7216 use crate::util::test_utils;
7217 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7218 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7219 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7220 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7221 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7222 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7223 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7224 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7225 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7226 use crate::prelude::*;
7228 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7231 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7232 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7238 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7239 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7240 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7241 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7245 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7246 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7247 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7248 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7249 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7250 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7251 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7255 signer: InMemorySigner,
7258 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7259 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7262 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7263 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7265 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7266 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7269 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7273 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7275 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7276 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7277 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7278 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7279 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7282 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7283 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7284 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7285 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7289 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7290 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7291 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7295 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7296 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7297 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7298 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7300 let seed = [42; 32];
7301 let network = Network::Testnet;
7302 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7303 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7304 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7307 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7308 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7309 let config = UserConfig::default();
7310 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7311 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7312 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7314 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7315 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7319 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7320 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7322 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7323 let original_fee = 253;
7324 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7325 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7326 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7327 let seed = [42; 32];
7328 let network = Network::Testnet;
7329 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7331 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7332 let config = UserConfig::default();
7333 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7335 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7336 // same as the old fee.
7337 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7338 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7339 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7343 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7344 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7345 // dust limits are used.
7346 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7347 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7348 let seed = [42; 32];
7349 let network = Network::Testnet;
7350 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7351 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7353 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7354 // they have different dust limits.
7356 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7357 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7358 let config = UserConfig::default();
7359 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7361 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7362 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7363 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7364 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7365 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7367 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7368 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7369 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7370 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7371 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7373 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7374 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7375 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7377 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7378 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7379 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7380 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7383 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7385 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7386 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7387 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7388 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7389 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7390 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7391 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7392 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7393 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7397 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7398 // the dust limit check.
7399 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7400 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7401 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7402 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7404 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7405 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7406 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7407 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7408 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7409 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7410 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7414 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7415 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7416 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7417 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7418 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7419 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7420 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7421 let seed = [42; 32];
7422 let network = Network::Testnet;
7423 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7425 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7426 let config = UserConfig::default();
7427 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7429 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7430 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7432 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7433 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7434 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7435 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7436 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7437 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7439 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7440 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7441 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7442 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7443 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7445 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7447 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7448 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7449 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7450 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7451 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7453 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7454 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7455 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7456 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7457 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7461 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7462 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7463 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7464 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7465 let seed = [42; 32];
7466 let network = Network::Testnet;
7467 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7468 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7469 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7471 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7473 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7474 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7475 let config = UserConfig::default();
7476 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7478 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7479 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7480 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7481 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7483 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7484 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7485 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7487 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7488 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7489 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7490 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7492 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7493 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7494 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7496 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7497 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7499 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7500 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7501 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7502 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7503 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7504 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7505 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7507 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7509 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7510 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7511 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7512 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7513 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7517 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7518 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7519 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7520 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7521 let seed = [42; 32];
7522 let network = Network::Testnet;
7523 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7524 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7525 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7527 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7528 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7529 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7530 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7531 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7532 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7533 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7534 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7536 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7537 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7538 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7539 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7540 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7541 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7543 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7544 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7545 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7546 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7548 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7550 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7551 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7552 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7553 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7554 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7555 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7557 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7558 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7559 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7560 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7562 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7563 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7564 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7565 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7566 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7568 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7569 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7571 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7572 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7573 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7575 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7576 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7577 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7578 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7579 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7581 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7582 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7584 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7585 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7586 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7590 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7592 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7593 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7594 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7596 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7597 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7598 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7599 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7601 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7602 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7603 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7605 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7607 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7608 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7611 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7612 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7613 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7614 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7615 let seed = [42; 32];
7616 let network = Network::Testnet;
7617 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7618 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7619 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7622 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7623 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7624 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7626 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7627 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7629 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7630 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7631 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7633 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7634 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7636 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7638 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7639 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7641 // Channel Negotiations failed
7642 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7643 assert!(result.is_err());
7648 fn channel_update() {
7649 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7650 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7651 let seed = [42; 32];
7652 let network = Network::Testnet;
7653 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7654 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7656 // Create a channel.
7657 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7658 let config = UserConfig::default();
7659 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7660 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7661 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7662 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7664 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7665 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7666 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7668 short_channel_id: 0,
7671 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7672 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7673 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7675 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7676 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7678 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7680 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7682 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7683 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7684 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7685 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7687 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7688 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7689 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7691 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7695 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7697 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7698 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7699 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7700 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7701 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7702 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7703 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7704 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7705 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7706 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7707 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7708 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7709 use crate::sync::Arc;
7711 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7712 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7713 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7714 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7716 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7718 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7719 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7720 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7721 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7722 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7724 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7725 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7731 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7732 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7733 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7735 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7736 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7737 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7738 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7739 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7740 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7742 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7744 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7745 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7746 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7747 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7748 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7749 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7751 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7752 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7753 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7754 selected_contest_delay: 144
7756 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7757 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7759 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7760 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7762 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7763 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7765 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7766 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7768 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7769 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7770 // build_commitment_transaction.
7771 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7772 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7773 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7774 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7775 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7777 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7778 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7779 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7780 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7784 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7785 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7786 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7787 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7791 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7792 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7793 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7795 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7796 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7798 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7799 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7801 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7803 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7804 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7805 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7806 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7807 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7808 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7809 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7811 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7812 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7813 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7814 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7816 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7817 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7818 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7820 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7822 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7823 commitment_tx.clone(),
7824 counterparty_signature,
7825 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7826 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7827 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7829 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7830 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7832 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7833 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7834 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7836 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7837 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7840 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7841 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7843 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7844 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7845 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7846 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7847 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7848 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7849 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7850 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7852 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7855 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7856 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7857 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7861 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7864 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7865 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7866 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7868 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7869 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7870 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7871 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7872 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7873 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7874 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7875 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7877 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7881 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7882 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7883 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7884 "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", {});
7886 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7887 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7889 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7890 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7891 "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", {});
7893 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7894 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7895 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7896 "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", {});
7898 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7899 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7901 amount_msat: 1000000,
7903 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7904 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7906 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7909 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7910 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7912 amount_msat: 2000000,
7914 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7915 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7917 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7920 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7921 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7923 amount_msat: 2000000,
7925 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7926 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7927 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7929 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7932 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7933 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7935 amount_msat: 3000000,
7937 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7938 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7939 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7941 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7944 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7945 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7947 amount_msat: 4000000,
7949 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7950 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7952 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7956 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7957 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7958 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7960 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7961 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7962 "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", {
7965 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7966 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7967 "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" },
7970 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7971 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7972 "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" },
7975 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7976 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7977 "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" },
7980 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7981 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7982 "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" },
7985 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7986 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7987 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7990 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7991 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7992 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7994 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7995 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7996 "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", {
7999 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8000 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8001 "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" },
8004 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8005 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8006 "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" },
8009 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8010 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8011 "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" },
8014 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8015 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8016 "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" },
8019 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8020 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8021 "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" }
8024 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8025 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8026 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8028 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8029 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8030 "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", {
8033 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8034 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8035 "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" },
8038 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8039 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8040 "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" },
8043 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8044 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8045 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8048 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8049 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8050 "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" }
8053 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8054 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8055 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8056 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8058 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8059 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8060 "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", {
8063 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8064 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8065 "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" },
8068 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8069 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8070 "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" },
8073 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8074 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8075 "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" },
8078 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8079 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8080 "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" }
8083 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8084 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8085 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8086 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8088 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8089 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8090 "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", {
8093 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8094 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8095 "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" },
8098 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8099 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8100 "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" },
8103 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8104 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8105 "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" },
8108 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8109 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8110 "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" }
8113 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8114 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8115 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8117 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8118 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8119 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8122 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8123 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8124 "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" },
8127 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8128 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8129 "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" },
8132 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8133 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8134 "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" }
8137 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8138 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8139 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8141 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8142 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8143 "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", {
8146 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8147 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8148 "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" },
8151 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8152 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8153 "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" },
8156 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8157 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8158 "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" }
8161 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8162 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8163 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8165 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8166 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8167 "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", {
8170 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8171 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8172 "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" },
8175 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8176 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8177 "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" }
8180 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8181 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8182 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8183 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8185 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8186 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8187 "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", {
8190 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8191 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8192 "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" },
8195 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8196 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8197 "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" }
8200 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8201 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8202 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8203 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8205 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8206 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8207 "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", {
8210 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8211 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8212 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8215 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8216 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8217 "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" }
8220 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8221 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8222 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8224 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8225 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8226 "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", {
8229 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8230 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8231 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8234 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8235 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8236 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8237 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8239 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8240 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8241 "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", {
8244 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8245 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8246 "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" }
8249 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8250 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8251 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8252 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8254 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8255 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8256 "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", {
8259 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8260 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8261 "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" }
8264 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8265 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8266 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8267 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8269 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8270 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8271 "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", {});
8273 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8274 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8275 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8276 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8278 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8279 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8280 "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", {});
8282 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8283 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8284 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8285 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8287 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8288 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8289 "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", {});
8291 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8292 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8293 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8295 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8296 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8297 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8299 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8300 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8301 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8302 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8304 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8305 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8306 "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", {});
8308 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8309 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8310 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8311 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8313 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8314 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8315 "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", {});
8317 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8318 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8319 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8320 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8321 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8322 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8324 amount_msat: 2000000,
8326 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8327 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8329 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8332 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8333 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8334 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8336 amount_msat: 5000001,
8338 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8339 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8340 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8342 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8345 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8346 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8348 amount_msat: 5000000,
8350 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8351 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8352 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8354 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8358 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8359 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8360 "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", {
8363 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8364 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8365 "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" },
8367 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8368 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8369 "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" },
8371 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8372 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8373 "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" }
8376 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8377 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8378 "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", {
8381 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8382 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8383 "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" },
8385 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8386 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8387 "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" },
8389 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8390 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8391 "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" }
8396 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8397 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8399 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8400 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8401 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8402 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8404 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8405 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8406 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8408 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8409 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8411 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8412 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8414 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8415 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8416 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8420 fn test_key_derivation() {
8421 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8422 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8424 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8425 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8427 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8428 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8430 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8431 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8433 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8434 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8436 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8437 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8439 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8440 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8442 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8443 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8447 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8448 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8449 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8450 let seed = [42; 32];
8451 let network = Network::Testnet;
8452 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8453 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8455 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8456 let config = UserConfig::default();
8457 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8458 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8460 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8461 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8463 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8464 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8465 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8466 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8467 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8468 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8469 assert!(res.is_ok());
8474 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8475 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8476 // resulting `channel_type`.
8477 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8478 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8479 let network = Network::Testnet;
8480 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8481 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8483 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8484 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8486 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8487 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8489 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8490 // need to signal it.
8491 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8492 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8493 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8496 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8498 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8499 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8500 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8502 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8503 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8504 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8507 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8508 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8509 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8510 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8511 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8514 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8515 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8520 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8521 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8522 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8523 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8524 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8525 let network = Network::Testnet;
8526 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8527 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8529 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8530 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8532 let config = UserConfig::default();
8534 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8535 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8536 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8537 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8538 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8540 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8541 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8542 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8545 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8546 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8547 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8549 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8550 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8551 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8552 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8553 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8554 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8556 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8561 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8562 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8564 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8565 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8566 let network = Network::Testnet;
8567 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8568 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8570 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8571 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8573 let config = UserConfig::default();
8575 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8576 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8577 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8578 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8579 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8580 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8581 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8582 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8584 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8585 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8586 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8587 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8588 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8589 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8592 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8593 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8595 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8596 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8597 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8598 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8600 assert!(res.is_err());
8602 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8603 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8604 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8606 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8607 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8608 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8611 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8613 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8614 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8615 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8616 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8619 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8620 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8622 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8623 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8625 assert!(res.is_err());