1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
309 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
310 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
312 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
316 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
318 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
322 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
323 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
324 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
325 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
326 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
328 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
329 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
331 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
333 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
334 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
336 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
337 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
338 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
339 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
340 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
341 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
343 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
344 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
346 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
347 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
348 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
349 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
350 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
352 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
353 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
355 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
356 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
358 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
359 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
360 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
361 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
367 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
368 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
370 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
371 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
377 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
378 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
380 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
381 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
382 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
387 macro_rules! secp_check {
388 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
391 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
396 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
397 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
398 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
399 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
400 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
401 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
402 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
403 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
405 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
407 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
409 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
413 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
415 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
416 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
417 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
419 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
420 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
422 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
423 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
424 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
425 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
426 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
428 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
429 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
433 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
439 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
442 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
443 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
444 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
445 holding_cell_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
449 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
450 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
451 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
452 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
453 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
454 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
455 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
456 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
457 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
458 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
461 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
462 struct HTLCCandidate {
464 origin: HTLCInitiator,
468 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
476 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
478 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
480 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
481 htlc_value_msat: u64,
482 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
487 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
488 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
489 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
490 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
491 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
493 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
494 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
495 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
496 htlc_value_msat: u64,
498 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
499 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
503 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
504 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
505 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
506 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
507 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
508 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
509 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
510 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
511 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
512 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
513 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
516 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
517 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
518 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
519 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
520 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
521 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
522 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
523 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
526 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
527 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
528 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
529 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
532 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
533 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
534 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
535 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
536 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
537 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
538 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
539 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
540 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
541 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
542 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
543 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
544 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
545 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
546 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
549 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
550 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
551 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
553 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
554 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
555 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
556 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
558 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
559 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
560 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
561 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
562 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
564 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
565 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
566 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
567 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
569 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
570 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
571 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
573 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
574 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
575 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
576 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
577 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
579 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
580 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
583 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
584 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
586 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
587 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
588 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
589 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
590 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
592 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
596 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
597 (0, update, required),
598 (2, blocked, required),
601 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
602 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
603 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
605 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
606 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
607 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
608 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
610 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
614 channel_id: [u8; 32],
615 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
618 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
619 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
621 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
622 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
623 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
625 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
626 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
627 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
628 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
630 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
631 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
633 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
635 holder_signer: Signer,
636 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
637 destination_script: Script,
639 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
640 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
641 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
643 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
644 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
645 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
646 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
647 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
648 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
650 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
651 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
652 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
653 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
654 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
655 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
657 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
659 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
660 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
661 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
663 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
664 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
665 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
666 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
667 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
668 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
669 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
671 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
673 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
674 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
675 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
676 // HTLCs with similar state.
677 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
678 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
679 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
680 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
681 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
682 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
683 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
684 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
685 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
688 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
689 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
690 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
692 update_time_counter: u32,
694 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
695 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
696 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
698 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
699 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
701 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
702 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
704 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
705 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
706 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
707 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
709 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
710 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
712 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
714 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
716 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
717 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
718 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
719 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
720 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
721 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
723 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
724 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
725 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
726 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
727 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
729 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
730 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
731 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
732 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
733 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
734 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
735 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
736 channel_creation_height: u32,
738 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
741 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
743 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
746 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
748 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
753 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
755 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
756 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
759 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
761 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
763 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
764 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
766 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
768 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
769 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
770 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
772 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
774 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
775 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
777 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
778 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
779 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
781 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
783 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
785 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
786 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
787 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
788 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
790 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
791 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
792 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
794 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
795 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
796 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
798 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
799 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
800 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
801 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
803 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
805 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
807 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
808 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
809 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
810 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
811 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
813 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
814 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
816 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
817 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
818 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
819 /// unblock the state machine.
821 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
822 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
823 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
825 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
826 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
827 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
829 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
830 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
831 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
832 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
833 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
834 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
835 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
836 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
838 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
839 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
841 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
842 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
843 // the channel's funding UTXO.
845 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
846 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
847 // associated channel mapping.
849 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
850 // to store all of them.
851 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
853 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
854 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
855 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
856 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
857 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
859 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
860 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
862 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
863 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
865 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
866 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
867 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
869 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
870 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
871 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
872 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
873 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
876 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
877 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
878 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
881 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
882 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
883 self.update_time_counter
886 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
887 self.latest_monitor_update_id
890 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
891 self.config.announced_channel
894 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
895 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
898 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
899 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
900 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
901 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
904 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
905 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
906 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
909 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
910 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
911 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
912 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
913 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
916 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
917 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
918 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
919 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
920 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
925 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
929 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
931 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
932 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
933 self.temporary_channel_id
936 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
940 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
941 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
942 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
946 /// Gets the channel's type
947 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
951 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
952 /// is_usable() returns true).
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
955 self.short_channel_id
958 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
959 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
960 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
963 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
964 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
965 self.outbound_scid_alias
968 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
969 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
970 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
971 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
972 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
975 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
976 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
977 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
978 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
981 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
982 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
983 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
986 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
987 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
988 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
989 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
993 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
996 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
997 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1000 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1001 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1004 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1005 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1006 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1009 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1010 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1013 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1014 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1015 self.counterparty_node_id
1018 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1019 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1020 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1023 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1024 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1025 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1028 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1029 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1031 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1032 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1033 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1034 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1036 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1040 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1041 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1042 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1045 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1046 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1047 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1050 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1051 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1052 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1054 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1055 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1060 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1061 self.channel_value_satoshis
1064 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1065 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1068 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1069 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1072 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1073 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1076 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1077 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1078 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1081 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1082 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1083 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1086 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1087 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1088 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1091 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1092 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1093 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1096 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1097 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1098 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1101 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1102 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1103 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1106 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1107 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1108 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1109 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1110 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1113 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1115 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1116 self.prev_config = None;
1120 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1121 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1125 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1126 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1127 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1128 let did_channel_update =
1129 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1130 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1131 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1132 if did_channel_update {
1133 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1134 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1135 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1136 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1138 self.config.options = *config;
1142 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1143 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1144 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1147 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1148 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1149 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1150 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1151 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1153 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1154 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1155 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1156 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1157 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1158 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1159 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1161 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1162 where L::Target: Logger
1164 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1165 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1166 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1168 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1169 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1170 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1171 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1173 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1174 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1175 if match update_state {
1176 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1177 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1178 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1179 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1180 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1182 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1186 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1187 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1188 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1189 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1191 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1192 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1193 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1195 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1196 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1197 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1198 transaction_output_index: None
1203 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1204 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1205 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1206 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1207 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1210 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1212 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1213 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1214 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1216 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1217 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1220 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1221 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1224 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1226 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1227 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1228 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1230 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1231 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1237 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1238 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1239 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1240 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1241 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1242 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1243 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1247 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1248 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1250 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1252 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1253 if generated_by_local {
1254 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1255 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1264 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1266 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1267 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1268 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1269 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1270 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1271 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1272 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1275 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1276 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1277 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1278 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1282 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1283 preimages.push(preimage);
1287 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1288 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1290 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1292 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1293 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1295 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1296 if !generated_by_local {
1297 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1305 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1306 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1307 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1308 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1309 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1310 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1311 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1312 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1314 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1316 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1317 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1318 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1319 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1321 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1323 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1324 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1325 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1326 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1329 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1330 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1331 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1332 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1334 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1337 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1338 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1339 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1340 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1342 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1345 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1346 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1351 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1352 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1357 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1359 let channel_parameters =
1360 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1361 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1362 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1365 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1370 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1373 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1374 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1375 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1376 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1378 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1379 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1380 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1388 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1389 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1395 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1396 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1397 /// our counterparty!)
1398 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1399 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1400 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1401 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1402 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1403 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1404 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1406 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1410 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1411 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1412 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1413 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1414 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1415 //may see payments to it!
1416 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1417 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1418 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1420 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1423 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1424 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1425 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1426 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1427 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1430 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1431 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1434 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1438 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1439 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1440 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1441 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1442 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1443 // which are near the dust limit.
1444 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1445 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1446 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1447 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1448 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1450 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1451 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1453 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1456 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1457 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1458 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1461 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1462 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1464 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1465 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1466 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1467 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1468 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1469 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1470 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1473 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1476 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1477 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1478 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1480 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1481 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1482 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1483 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1484 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1485 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1487 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1488 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1494 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1495 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1497 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1498 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1499 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1500 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1501 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1502 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1503 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1506 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1509 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1510 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1511 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1513 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1514 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1515 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1516 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1517 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1518 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1520 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1521 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1525 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1526 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1527 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1528 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1529 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1530 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1531 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1533 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1534 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1536 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1543 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1544 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1545 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1546 /// corner case properly.
1547 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1548 let context = &self;
1549 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1550 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1551 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1553 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1554 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1555 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1556 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1559 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1561 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1562 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1564 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1566 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1568 if context.is_outbound() {
1569 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1570 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1572 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1573 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1575 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1576 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1577 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1578 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1581 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1582 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1583 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1584 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1586 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1587 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1588 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1589 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1590 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1591 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1592 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1593 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1594 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1595 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1597 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1600 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1601 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1602 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1603 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1604 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1607 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1608 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1610 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1611 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1612 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1614 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1615 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1616 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1617 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1621 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1623 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1624 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1625 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1626 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1627 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1628 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1630 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1631 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1633 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1634 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1635 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1637 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1638 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1639 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1640 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1641 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1644 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1645 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1646 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1647 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1648 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1649 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1652 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1653 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1654 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1656 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1660 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1661 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1663 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1664 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1668 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1669 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1670 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1671 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1673 outbound_capacity_msat,
1674 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1675 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1680 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1681 let context = &self;
1682 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1685 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1686 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1688 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1689 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1691 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1692 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1694 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1695 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1696 let context = &self;
1697 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1699 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1702 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1703 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1705 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1706 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1708 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1709 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1711 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1712 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1716 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1717 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1723 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1724 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1725 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1728 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1729 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1730 included_htlcs += 1;
1733 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1734 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1738 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1739 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1740 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1741 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1742 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1743 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1748 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1750 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1751 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1756 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1757 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1761 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1762 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1766 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1767 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1769 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1770 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1771 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1773 total_pending_htlcs,
1774 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1775 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1776 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1778 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1779 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1780 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1782 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1784 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1789 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1790 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1792 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1793 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1795 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1796 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1798 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1799 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1800 let context = &self;
1801 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1803 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1806 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1807 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1809 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1810 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1812 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1813 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1815 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1816 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1821 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1827 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1828 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1829 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1830 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1831 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1832 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1835 included_htlcs += 1;
1838 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1839 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1842 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1843 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1845 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1846 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1847 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1852 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1853 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1857 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1858 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1860 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1861 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1863 total_pending_htlcs,
1864 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1865 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1866 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1868 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1869 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1870 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1872 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1874 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1879 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1880 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1881 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1882 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1888 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1889 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1890 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1891 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1892 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1893 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1894 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1895 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1896 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1897 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1898 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1900 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1901 // return them to fail the payment.
1902 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1903 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1904 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1906 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1907 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1912 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1913 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1914 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1915 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1916 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1917 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1918 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1919 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1920 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1921 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1922 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1923 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1924 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1929 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1930 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1931 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1935 // Internal utility functions for channels
1937 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1938 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1939 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1941 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1943 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1944 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1945 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1947 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1950 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1952 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1955 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1956 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1957 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1959 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1961 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1962 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1963 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1964 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1965 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1968 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1969 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1970 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1971 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1972 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1973 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1974 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1977 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1978 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1980 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1981 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1984 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1985 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1986 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1987 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1988 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1989 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1992 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1993 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1994 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1997 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1998 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1999 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2000 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2003 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2004 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2006 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2007 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2008 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2012 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2015 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2016 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2017 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2019 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2020 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2021 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2022 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2023 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2024 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2025 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2028 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2029 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2030 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2031 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2032 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2033 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2034 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2035 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2037 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2038 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2048 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2049 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2050 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2051 // outside of those situations will fail.
2052 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2056 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2061 1 + // script length (0)
2065 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2066 2 + // witness marker and flag
2067 1 + // witness element count
2068 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2069 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2070 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2071 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2072 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2073 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2075 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2076 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2077 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2083 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2084 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2085 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2086 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2088 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2089 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2090 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2092 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2093 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2094 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2095 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2096 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2097 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2100 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2101 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2104 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2105 value_to_holder = 0;
2108 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2109 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2110 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2111 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2113 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2114 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2117 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2118 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2121 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2124 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2125 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2127 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2129 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2130 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2131 where L::Target: Logger {
2132 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2133 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2134 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2135 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2136 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2137 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2138 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2139 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2143 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2144 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2145 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2146 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2148 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2149 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2151 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2153 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2155 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2156 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2157 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2159 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2160 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2161 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2162 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2163 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2165 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2166 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2167 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2169 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2170 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2172 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2175 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2176 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2180 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2184 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2185 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2186 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2187 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2188 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2189 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2192 // Now update local state:
2194 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2195 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2196 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2197 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2198 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2199 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2200 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2204 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2205 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2206 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2207 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2208 // do not not get into this branch.
2209 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2210 match pending_update {
2211 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2212 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2213 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2214 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2215 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2216 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2217 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2220 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2221 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2222 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2223 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2224 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2225 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2226 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2232 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2233 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2234 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2236 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2237 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2238 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2240 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2241 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2244 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2245 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2247 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2248 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2250 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2251 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2254 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2257 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2258 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2259 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2260 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2265 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2266 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2267 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2268 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2269 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2270 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2271 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2272 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2273 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2274 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2275 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2276 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2277 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2278 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2279 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2280 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2281 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2283 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2285 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2286 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2287 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2288 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2289 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2290 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2291 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2293 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2294 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2297 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2298 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2299 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2300 update, blocked: true,
2305 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2306 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2307 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2308 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2312 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2316 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2317 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2318 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2319 /// before we fail backwards.
2321 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2322 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2323 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2324 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2325 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2326 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2327 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2330 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2331 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2332 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2333 /// before we fail backwards.
2335 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2336 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2337 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2338 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2339 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2340 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2341 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2343 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2345 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2346 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2347 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2349 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2350 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2351 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2353 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2354 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2355 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2357 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2362 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2363 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2369 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2370 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2371 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2372 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2373 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2377 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2378 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2379 force_holding_cell = true;
2382 // Now update local state:
2383 if force_holding_cell {
2384 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2385 match pending_update {
2386 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2387 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2388 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2389 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2393 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2394 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2395 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2396 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2402 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2403 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2404 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2410 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2412 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2413 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2416 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2417 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2418 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2423 // Message handlers:
2425 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2426 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2428 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2429 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2431 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2432 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2433 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2434 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2435 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2436 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2437 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2438 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2439 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2442 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2443 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2445 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2446 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2447 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2448 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2450 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
2451 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2453 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2454 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2457 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2458 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2459 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2461 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2464 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2465 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2467 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2468 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2469 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2473 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2476 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2477 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2478 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2479 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2482 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2483 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2484 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2485 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2486 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2488 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2490 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2491 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2492 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2495 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2496 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2497 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2501 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2502 initial_commitment_tx,
2505 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2506 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2509 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2510 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2512 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2514 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2515 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2516 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2517 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2518 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2519 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2520 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2521 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2522 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2523 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2524 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2526 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2528 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2530 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2531 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2532 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2533 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2535 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2537 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2538 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2540 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2541 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
2544 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2545 }, channel_monitor))
2548 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2549 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2550 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2551 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2552 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2554 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2557 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2558 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2560 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2561 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2563 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2564 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2565 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2566 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2569 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2571 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2572 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2573 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2574 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2576 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2577 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2579 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2580 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2582 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2583 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2584 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2585 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2586 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2591 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2592 initial_commitment_tx,
2595 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2596 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2599 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2600 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2603 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2604 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2605 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2606 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2607 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2608 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2609 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2610 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2611 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2612 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2613 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2614 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2616 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2618 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2620 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2621 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2622 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2623 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2625 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2627 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2628 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2632 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2633 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2635 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2636 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2637 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2638 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2640 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2643 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2644 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2645 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2648 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2649 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2650 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2651 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2652 // when routing outbound payments.
2653 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2657 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2659 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2660 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2661 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2662 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2663 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2664 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2665 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2666 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2667 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2669 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2670 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2671 let expected_point =
2672 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2673 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2675 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2676 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2677 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2678 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2679 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2680 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2682 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2683 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2684 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2685 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2686 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2688 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2696 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2697 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2699 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2701 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2704 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2705 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2706 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2707 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2708 if local_sent_shutdown {
2709 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2711 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2712 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2713 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2714 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2716 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2717 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2719 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2720 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2722 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2723 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2725 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2726 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2729 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2730 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2731 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2732 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2734 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2735 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2737 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2738 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2739 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2740 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2741 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2742 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2743 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2744 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2745 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2746 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2747 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2749 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2750 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2751 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2752 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2753 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2754 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2758 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
2761 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2762 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2763 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2765 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2766 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2767 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2768 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2769 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2770 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2771 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2775 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2776 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2777 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2778 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2779 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2780 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2781 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2785 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2786 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2787 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2788 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2789 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2790 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2793 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2794 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2795 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2796 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2797 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2799 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2803 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2804 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2807 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2808 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2809 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2810 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2811 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2812 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2813 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2814 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2815 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2816 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2817 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2818 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2819 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2820 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2821 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2822 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2825 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2826 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2827 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2828 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2832 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2835 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2836 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2839 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2840 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2841 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2845 // Now update local state:
2846 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2847 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2848 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2849 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2850 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2851 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2852 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2857 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2859 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2860 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2861 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2862 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2863 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2864 None => fail_reason.into(),
2865 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2866 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2867 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2868 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2870 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2874 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2875 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2876 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2877 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2879 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2880 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2885 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2888 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2889 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2892 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2893 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2896 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2899 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2900 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2903 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2907 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2911 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2912 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2915 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2919 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2923 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2924 where L::Target: Logger
2926 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2927 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2929 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2932 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2936 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2938 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2940 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2941 let commitment_txid = {
2942 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2943 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2944 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2946 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2947 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2948 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2949 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2950 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2951 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2955 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2957 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2958 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2959 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2960 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2963 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2964 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2965 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2969 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2971 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2972 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2973 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2974 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2975 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2976 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2977 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2978 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2979 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2980 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2981 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2987 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2991 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2992 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2993 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2994 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2995 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2996 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2997 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2998 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2999 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3000 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3001 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3002 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3003 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3006 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3007 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3008 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3009 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3010 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3011 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
3012 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3014 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3015 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3016 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3017 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3018 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3019 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3020 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3021 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3023 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3024 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3027 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3029 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3030 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3031 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3034 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3037 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3038 commitment_stats.tx,
3040 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3041 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3042 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3045 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3046 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3048 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3049 let mut need_commitment = false;
3050 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3051 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3052 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3053 need_commitment = true;
3057 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3058 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3059 Some(forward_info.clone())
3061 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3062 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3063 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3064 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3065 need_commitment = true;
3068 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3069 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3070 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3071 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3072 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3073 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3074 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3075 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3076 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3077 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3078 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3079 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3080 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3081 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3083 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3085 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3086 need_commitment = true;
3090 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3091 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3092 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3093 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3094 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3095 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3097 nondust_htlc_sources,
3101 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3102 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3103 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3104 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3106 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3107 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3108 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3109 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3110 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3111 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3112 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3113 // includes the right HTLCs.
3114 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3115 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3116 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3117 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3118 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3119 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3121 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3122 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3123 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3126 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3127 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3128 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3129 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3130 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3131 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3132 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3133 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3134 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3138 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3139 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3140 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3141 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3144 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3145 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3146 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3147 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3148 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3149 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3150 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3151 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3154 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3155 /// for our counterparty.
3156 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3157 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3158 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3159 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3160 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3162 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3163 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3164 updates: Vec::new(),
3167 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3168 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3169 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3170 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3171 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3172 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3173 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3174 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3175 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3176 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3177 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3178 // to rebalance channels.
3179 match &htlc_update {
3180 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3181 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3182 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3185 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3186 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3187 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3188 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3189 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3190 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3191 // into the holding cell without ever being
3192 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3193 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3194 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3197 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3203 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3204 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3205 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3206 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3207 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3208 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3209 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3210 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3211 (msg, monitor_update)
3212 } else { unreachable!() };
3213 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3214 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3216 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3217 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3218 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3219 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3220 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3221 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3222 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3223 // for a full revocation before failing.
3224 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3227 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3229 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3236 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3237 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3239 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3240 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3245 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3246 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3247 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3248 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3249 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3251 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3252 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3253 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3255 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3256 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3262 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3263 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3264 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3265 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3266 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3267 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3268 where L::Target: Logger,
3270 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3273 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3276 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3280 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3282 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3283 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3288 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3289 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3290 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3291 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3292 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3293 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3294 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3295 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3299 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3301 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3302 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3305 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3306 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3308 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3310 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3311 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3312 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3313 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3314 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3315 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3316 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3317 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3321 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3322 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3323 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3324 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3325 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3326 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3327 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3328 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3329 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3331 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3332 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3335 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3336 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3337 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3338 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3339 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3340 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3341 let mut require_commitment = false;
3342 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3345 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3346 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3347 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3349 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3350 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3351 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3352 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3353 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3354 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3359 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3360 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3361 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3362 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3363 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3365 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3366 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3367 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3372 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3373 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3375 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3379 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3380 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3382 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3383 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3384 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3385 require_commitment = true;
3386 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3387 match forward_info {
3388 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3389 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3390 require_commitment = true;
3392 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3393 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3394 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3396 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3397 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3398 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3402 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3403 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3404 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3405 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3411 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3412 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3413 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3414 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3416 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3417 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3418 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3419 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3420 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3421 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3422 require_commitment = true;
3426 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3428 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3429 match update_state {
3430 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3431 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3432 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3433 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3434 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3436 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3437 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3438 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3439 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3440 require_commitment = true;
3441 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3442 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3447 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3448 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3449 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3450 if require_commitment {
3451 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3452 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3453 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3454 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3455 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3456 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3457 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3458 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3459 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3461 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3462 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3463 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3464 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3465 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3468 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3469 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3470 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3471 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3472 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3473 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3474 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3476 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3477 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3479 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3480 if require_commitment {
3481 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3483 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3484 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3485 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3486 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3488 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3489 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3490 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3491 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3493 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3494 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3495 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3501 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3502 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3503 /// commitment update.
3504 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3505 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3506 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3509 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3510 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3511 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3512 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3514 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3515 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3516 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3517 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3518 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3520 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3521 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3523 if !self.context.is_live() {
3524 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3527 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3528 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3529 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3530 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3531 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3532 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3533 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3534 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3535 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3536 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3540 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3541 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3542 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3543 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3544 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3547 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3548 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3552 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3553 force_holding_cell = true;
3556 if force_holding_cell {
3557 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3561 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3562 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3564 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3565 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3570 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3571 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3573 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3575 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3576 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3577 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3578 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3582 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3583 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3584 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3588 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3589 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3592 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3593 // will be retransmitted.
3594 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3595 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3596 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3598 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3599 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3601 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3602 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3603 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3604 // this HTLC accordingly
3605 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3608 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3609 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3610 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3611 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3614 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3615 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3616 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3617 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3618 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3619 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3624 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3626 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3627 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3628 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3629 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3633 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3634 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3635 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3636 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3637 // the update upon reconnection.
3638 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3642 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3644 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3645 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3648 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3649 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3650 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3651 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3652 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3653 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3654 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3656 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3657 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3658 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3659 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3660 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3661 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3662 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3664 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3665 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3666 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3667 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3668 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3669 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3670 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3673 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3674 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3675 /// to the remote side.
3676 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3677 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3678 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3679 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3682 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3684 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3685 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3686 let mut found_blocked = false;
3687 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3688 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3689 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3693 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3694 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3695 // first received the funding_signed.
3696 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3697 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3698 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3700 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3701 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3702 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3703 funding_broadcastable = None;
3706 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3707 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3708 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3709 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3710 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3711 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3712 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3713 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3714 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3715 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3716 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3717 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3718 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3719 next_per_commitment_point,
3720 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3724 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3726 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3727 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3728 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3729 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3730 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3731 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3733 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3734 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3735 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3736 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3737 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3738 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3742 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3743 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3745 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3746 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3747 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3750 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3751 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3752 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3753 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3754 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3755 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3756 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3757 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3758 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3762 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3763 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3765 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3766 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3768 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3771 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3772 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3774 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3775 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3776 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3777 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3778 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3779 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3780 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3781 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3782 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3783 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3784 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3785 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3786 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3788 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3789 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3790 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3796 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3797 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3798 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3799 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3800 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3801 per_commitment_secret,
3802 next_per_commitment_point,
3804 next_local_nonce: None,
3808 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3809 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3810 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3811 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3812 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3814 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3815 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3816 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3817 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3818 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3819 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3820 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3821 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3822 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3827 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3828 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3830 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3831 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3832 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3833 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3834 reason: err_packet.clone()
3837 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3838 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3839 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3840 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3841 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3842 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3845 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3846 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3847 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3848 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3849 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3856 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3857 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3858 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3859 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3863 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3864 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3865 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3866 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3867 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3868 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3872 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3873 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3875 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3876 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3877 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3878 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3879 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3880 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3881 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3882 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3885 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3887 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3888 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3889 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3890 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3891 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3894 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3895 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3899 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3900 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3901 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3902 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3903 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3906 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3907 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3908 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3909 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3910 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3913 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3914 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3915 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3916 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3917 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3918 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3919 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3920 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3924 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3925 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3926 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3927 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3929 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3933 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3934 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3935 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3936 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3938 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3939 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3940 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3941 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3942 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3946 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3948 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3949 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3950 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3951 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3952 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3953 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3955 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3956 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3957 channel_ready: None,
3958 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3959 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3960 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3964 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3965 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3966 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3967 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3968 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3969 next_per_commitment_point,
3970 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3972 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3973 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3974 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3978 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3979 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3980 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3982 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3983 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3984 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3987 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3993 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3994 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3995 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3996 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3997 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3998 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3999 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4001 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4003 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4004 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4005 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4006 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4007 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4008 next_per_commitment_point,
4009 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4013 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4014 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4015 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4017 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4020 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4021 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4022 raa: required_revoke,
4023 commitment_update: None,
4024 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4026 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4027 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4028 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4030 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4033 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4034 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4035 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4036 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4037 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4038 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4041 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4042 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4043 raa: required_revoke,
4044 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4045 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4049 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4053 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4054 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4055 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4056 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4058 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4060 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4062 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4063 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4064 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4065 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4066 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4067 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4069 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4070 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4071 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4072 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4073 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4075 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4076 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4077 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4078 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4081 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4082 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4083 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4084 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4085 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4086 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4087 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4088 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4089 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4090 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4091 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4092 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4093 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4094 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4095 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4097 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4100 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4101 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4104 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4105 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4106 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4107 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4108 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4109 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4110 self.context.channel_state &
4111 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4112 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4113 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4114 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4117 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4118 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4119 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4120 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4121 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4122 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4125 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4131 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4132 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4133 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4134 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4136 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4137 return Ok((None, None));
4140 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4141 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4142 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4144 return Ok((None, None));
4147 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4149 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4150 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4151 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4152 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4154 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4155 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4156 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4158 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4159 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4160 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4161 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4163 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4164 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4165 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4170 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4171 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4173 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4174 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4177 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4178 /// within our expected timeframe.
4180 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4181 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4182 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4185 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4188 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4189 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4192 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4193 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4194 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4195 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4197 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4198 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4200 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4201 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4202 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4203 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4206 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4207 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4211 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4213 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4214 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4217 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4218 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4219 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4222 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4225 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4226 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4227 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4228 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4230 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4233 assert!(send_shutdown);
4234 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4235 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4236 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4238 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4241 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4246 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4248 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4249 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4251 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4252 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4253 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4254 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4255 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4256 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4259 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4260 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4261 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4264 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4265 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4266 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4267 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4271 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4272 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4273 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4274 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4275 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4276 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4278 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4279 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4286 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4287 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4289 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4292 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4293 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4295 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4297 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4298 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4299 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4300 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4301 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4302 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4303 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4304 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4305 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4307 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4308 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4311 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4315 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4316 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4317 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4318 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4320 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4323 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4324 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4326 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4329 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4333 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4337 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4338 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4339 return Ok((None, None));
4342 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4343 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4344 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4345 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4347 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4349 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4352 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4353 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4354 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4355 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4356 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4360 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4361 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4366 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4367 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4368 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4369 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4370 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4371 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4372 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4376 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4378 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4379 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4380 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4381 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4383 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4386 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4387 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4388 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4390 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4391 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4392 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4393 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4397 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4398 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4399 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4400 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4402 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4403 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4404 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4410 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4411 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4414 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4415 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4417 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4421 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4422 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4423 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4424 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4425 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4427 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4428 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4429 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4431 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4432 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4435 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4436 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4437 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4438 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4439 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4440 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4441 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4442 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4444 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4447 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4448 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4449 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4450 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4452 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4456 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4457 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4458 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4459 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4461 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4467 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4468 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4469 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4470 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4471 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4472 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4473 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4475 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4476 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4479 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4481 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4482 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4488 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4489 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4490 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4491 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4492 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4493 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4494 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4496 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4497 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4504 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4505 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4508 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4509 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4512 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4513 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4517 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4518 &self.context.holder_signer
4522 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4524 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4525 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4526 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4527 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4528 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4529 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4531 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4533 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4541 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4542 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4546 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4547 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4548 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4549 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4552 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4553 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4554 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4557 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4558 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4559 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4560 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4561 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4562 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4563 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
4564 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
4570 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
4571 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
4572 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
4573 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
4574 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4575 update, blocked: !release_monitor
4580 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
4581 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
4583 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4584 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4585 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
4586 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
4589 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
4590 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
4593 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4594 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4595 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
4596 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
4602 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
4603 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
4606 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
4607 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4608 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
4609 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
4612 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4613 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4614 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4616 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4617 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4618 if self.context.channel_state &
4619 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4620 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4621 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4622 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4623 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4626 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4627 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4628 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4629 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4630 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4631 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4633 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4634 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4635 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4637 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4638 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4639 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4640 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4641 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4642 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4648 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4649 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4650 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4653 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4654 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4655 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4658 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4659 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4660 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4663 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4664 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4665 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4666 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4667 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4668 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4673 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4674 self.context.channel_update_status
4677 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4678 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4679 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4682 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4684 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4685 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4686 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4690 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4691 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4692 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4695 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4699 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4700 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4701 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4703 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4704 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4705 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4707 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4708 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4711 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4712 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4713 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4714 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4715 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4716 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4717 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4718 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4719 self.context.channel_state);
4721 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4725 if need_commitment_update {
4726 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4727 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4728 let next_per_commitment_point =
4729 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4730 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4731 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4732 next_per_commitment_point,
4733 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4737 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4743 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4744 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4745 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4746 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4747 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4748 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4749 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4751 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4754 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4755 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4756 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4757 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4758 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4759 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4760 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4761 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4762 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4763 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4764 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4765 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4766 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4767 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4768 // channel and move on.
4769 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4770 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4772 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4773 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4774 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4776 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4777 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4778 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4779 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4780 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4781 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4782 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4786 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4787 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4788 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4789 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4790 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4794 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4795 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4796 // may have already happened for this block).
4797 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4798 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4799 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4800 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4803 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4804 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4805 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4806 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4814 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4815 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4816 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4817 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4819 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4820 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4823 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4825 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4826 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4827 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4828 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4830 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4833 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4836 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4837 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4838 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4839 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4841 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4844 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4845 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4846 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4848 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4849 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4851 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4852 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4853 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4861 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4863 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4864 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4865 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4867 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4868 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4871 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4872 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4873 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4874 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4875 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4876 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4877 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4878 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4879 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4882 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4883 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4884 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4885 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4887 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4888 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4889 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4891 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4892 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4893 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4894 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4896 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4897 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4898 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4899 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4900 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4901 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4902 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4905 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4906 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4908 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4911 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4912 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4913 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4914 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4915 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4916 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4917 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4918 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4919 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4920 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4921 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4922 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4923 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4924 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4925 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4926 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4927 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4933 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4938 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4939 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4941 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
4942 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
4945 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
4946 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
4947 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
4948 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
4951 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
4952 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
4954 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
4955 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4956 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4957 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4959 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4960 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4962 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4963 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4965 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
4966 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
4969 self.context.user_id = user_id;
4970 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
4972 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
4975 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
4976 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
4977 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
4979 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
4980 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4981 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4982 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
4984 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4985 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4986 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4987 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4988 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4989 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4990 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4991 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4992 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
4993 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4994 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4995 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4996 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4997 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4998 first_per_commitment_point,
4999 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5000 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5001 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5003 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5005 next_local_nonce: None,
5009 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5010 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5012 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5014 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5015 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5018 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5019 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5020 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5021 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5023 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5026 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5027 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5028 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5029 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5030 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5031 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5033 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5034 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5037 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5038 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5039 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5040 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5042 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5043 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5045 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5046 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5047 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5048 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5049 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5050 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5056 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5057 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5058 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5059 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5061 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5064 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5068 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5072 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5073 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5077 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5081 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5082 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5085 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5089 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5091 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5096 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5098 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5103 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5105 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5106 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5107 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5108 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5109 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5113 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5115 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5116 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5117 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5118 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5119 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5120 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5121 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5123 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5124 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5125 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5126 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5127 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5128 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5129 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5130 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5131 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5132 contents: announcement,
5135 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5139 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5140 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5141 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5142 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5143 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5144 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5145 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5146 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5148 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5150 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5152 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5153 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5155 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5156 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5157 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5158 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5161 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5162 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5163 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5164 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5167 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5170 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5171 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5172 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5173 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5174 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5175 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5178 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5180 Err(_) => return None,
5182 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5183 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5188 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5189 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5190 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5191 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5192 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5193 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5194 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5195 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5196 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5197 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5198 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5199 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5200 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5201 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5202 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5203 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5206 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5209 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5210 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5211 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5212 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5213 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5214 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5215 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5216 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5217 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5219 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5220 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5221 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5222 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5223 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5224 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5225 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5226 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5227 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5229 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5230 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5231 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5232 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5233 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5234 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5235 next_funding_txid: None,
5240 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5242 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5243 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5244 /// commitment update.
5246 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5247 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5248 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5249 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5251 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5252 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5254 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5255 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5260 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5261 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5263 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5265 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5266 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5268 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5269 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5270 /// regenerate them.
5272 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5273 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5275 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5276 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5277 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5278 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5279 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5280 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5282 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5283 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5284 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5287 if amount_msat == 0 {
5288 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5291 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5292 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5293 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5294 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5297 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5298 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5299 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5302 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5303 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5304 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5305 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5306 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5307 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5308 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5309 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5312 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5313 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5314 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5315 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5316 else { "to peer" });
5318 if need_holding_cell {
5319 force_holding_cell = true;
5322 // Now update local state:
5323 if force_holding_cell {
5324 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5329 onion_routing_packet,
5334 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5335 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5337 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5339 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5343 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5344 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5345 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5349 onion_routing_packet,
5351 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5356 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5357 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5358 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5359 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5361 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5362 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5363 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5365 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5366 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5370 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5371 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5372 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5373 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5374 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5375 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5376 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5379 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5380 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5381 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5382 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5383 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5384 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5387 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5389 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5390 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5391 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5393 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5394 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5397 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5398 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5399 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5400 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5401 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5402 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5403 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5404 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5407 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5411 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5412 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5413 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5414 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5416 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5418 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5419 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5420 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5421 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5422 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5423 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5424 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5425 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5426 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5427 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
5428 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5434 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5437 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5438 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5439 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5440 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5441 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5442 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5444 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5445 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5446 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5447 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5450 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5451 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5455 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5456 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5458 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5460 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5461 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5462 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5463 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5465 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5466 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5467 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5468 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5469 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5470 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5474 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5475 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5479 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5480 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5483 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5484 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5486 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5487 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5488 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5489 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5490 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5493 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5494 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5495 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5501 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5502 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5503 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5505 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5506 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5507 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5508 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5514 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5515 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5517 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5518 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5519 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5520 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5521 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5522 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5523 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5524 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5525 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5528 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5529 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5530 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5532 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5533 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5536 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5537 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5539 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5540 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5541 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5544 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5545 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5546 let mut chan_closed = false;
5547 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5551 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5553 None if !chan_closed => {
5554 // use override shutdown script if provided
5555 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5556 Some(script) => script,
5558 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5559 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5560 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5561 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5565 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5566 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5568 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5574 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5575 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5576 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5577 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5579 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5581 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5583 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5584 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5585 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5586 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5587 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5588 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5591 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5592 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
5593 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
5596 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5597 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5598 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5601 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5602 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5603 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5604 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5605 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5607 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5608 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5615 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5616 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5618 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5621 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5622 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5623 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5625 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5626 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5630 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5634 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5635 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5636 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5639 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5640 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5641 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5642 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5643 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5644 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5645 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5646 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5647 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5649 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5650 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5651 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5652 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5654 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5655 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5657 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5658 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5660 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5661 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5662 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5664 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5665 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5667 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5668 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5669 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5670 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5671 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5674 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5675 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5677 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5679 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5680 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
5681 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5682 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5685 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5686 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5688 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5689 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5690 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5691 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5695 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5696 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5697 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5701 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5702 Ok(script) => script,
5703 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5706 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5709 context: ChannelContext {
5712 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5713 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5714 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5715 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5720 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5722 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5723 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5724 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5725 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5727 channel_value_satoshis,
5729 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5732 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5735 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5736 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5739 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5740 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5741 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5742 pending_update_fee: None,
5743 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5744 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5745 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5746 update_time_counter: 1,
5748 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5750 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5751 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5752 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5753 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5754 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5755 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5757 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5758 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5759 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5760 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5762 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5763 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5764 closing_fee_limits: None,
5765 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5767 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5769 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5770 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5771 short_channel_id: None,
5772 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5774 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5775 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5776 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5777 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5778 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5779 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5780 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5781 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5782 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5783 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5784 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5785 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5787 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5789 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5790 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5791 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5792 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5793 counterparty_parameters: None,
5794 funding_outpoint: None,
5795 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
5796 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
5798 funding_transaction: None,
5800 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5801 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5802 counterparty_node_id,
5804 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5806 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5808 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5809 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5811 announcement_sigs: None,
5813 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5814 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5815 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5816 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5818 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5819 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5821 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5822 outbound_scid_alias,
5824 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5825 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5827 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5828 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5833 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5838 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5839 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5840 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5841 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5842 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5843 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5846 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5847 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5848 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5849 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5850 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5851 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5852 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5853 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5854 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5855 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5856 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5858 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5859 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5861 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5862 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5863 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5864 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5867 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5868 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5870 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5873 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5874 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5875 return Err((self, e));
5879 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5881 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5883 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5884 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5885 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5887 let channel = Channel {
5888 context: self.context,
5891 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5892 temporary_channel_id,
5893 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5894 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5897 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5899 next_local_nonce: None,
5903 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5904 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5905 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5906 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5907 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5908 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5909 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5910 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5911 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5912 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5915 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5916 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5917 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5919 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
5920 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5921 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5922 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5929 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5930 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5931 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5932 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5933 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5934 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5935 // We've exhausted our options
5938 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5939 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5942 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5943 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5944 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5945 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5947 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5948 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5949 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
5950 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
5951 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5952 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5954 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5956 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5959 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5960 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5961 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5963 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5964 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5967 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5968 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5971 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5972 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5976 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5977 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5978 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5979 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5980 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5981 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5982 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5983 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5984 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5985 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5986 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5987 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5988 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5989 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5990 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5991 first_per_commitment_point,
5992 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5993 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5994 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5995 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5997 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6002 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6003 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6005 // Check sanity of message fields:
6006 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6009 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6010 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6012 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6015 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6016 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6018 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6021 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6023 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6025 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6026 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6029 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6030 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6033 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6036 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6040 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6041 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6044 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6047 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6050 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6053 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6056 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6059 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6060 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6063 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6064 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6067 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6068 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6070 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6071 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6074 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
6077 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6078 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6079 &Some(ref script) => {
6080 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6081 if script.len() == 0 {
6084 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6085 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6087 Some(script.clone())
6090 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6097 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6098 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6099 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6100 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6101 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6103 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6104 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6106 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6109 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6110 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6111 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6112 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6113 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6114 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6117 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6118 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6119 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6122 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6123 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6125 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6126 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6132 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6133 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
6134 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
6137 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
6138 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6139 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6140 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6141 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6142 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6143 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6144 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
6145 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
6146 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6147 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6148 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6151 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6153 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6154 // support this channel type.
6155 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6156 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6160 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6161 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6162 // `static_remote_key`.
6163 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6166 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6167 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6170 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6173 channel_type.clone()
6175 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6176 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6181 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6183 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6184 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6185 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6186 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6187 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6188 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6189 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6190 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6191 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6194 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6198 // Check sanity of message fields:
6199 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6200 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6202 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6205 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6208 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6209 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6210 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6212 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6215 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6218 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6220 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6221 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6224 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6227 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6231 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6232 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6235 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6238 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6241 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6244 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6247 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6250 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6254 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6256 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6257 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6262 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6263 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6264 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6265 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6268 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6269 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6271 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6272 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6273 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6275 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6276 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6279 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6280 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6281 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6282 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
6283 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6287 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6288 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6289 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6290 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6291 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6294 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6295 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6296 &Some(ref script) => {
6297 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6298 if script.len() == 0 {
6301 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6304 Some(script.clone())
6307 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6314 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6315 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6316 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6317 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6321 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6322 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6327 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6328 Ok(script) => script,
6329 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6332 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6333 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6335 let chan = Channel {
6336 context: ChannelContext {
6339 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6340 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6342 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6347 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6349 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6350 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6351 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6352 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6355 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6358 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6361 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6362 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6363 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6365 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6366 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6367 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6368 pending_update_fee: None,
6369 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6370 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6371 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6372 update_time_counter: 1,
6374 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6376 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6377 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6378 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6379 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6380 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6381 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6383 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6384 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6385 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6386 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6388 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6389 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6390 closing_fee_limits: None,
6391 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6393 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6395 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6396 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6397 short_channel_id: None,
6398 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6400 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6401 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6402 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6403 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6404 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6405 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6406 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6407 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6408 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6409 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6410 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6411 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6412 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6414 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6416 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6417 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6418 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6419 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6420 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6421 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6422 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6424 funding_outpoint: None,
6425 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
6426 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6428 funding_transaction: None,
6430 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6431 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6432 counterparty_node_id,
6434 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6436 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6438 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6439 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6441 announcement_sigs: None,
6443 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6444 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6445 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6446 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6448 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6449 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6451 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6452 outbound_scid_alias,
6454 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6455 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6457 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6458 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6463 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6471 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6472 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6474 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6480 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6481 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6482 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6483 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6484 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6486 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6487 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6488 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6489 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6495 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6496 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6497 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6498 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6499 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6500 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6505 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6506 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6507 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6508 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6510 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6511 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6512 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6513 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6518 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6519 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6520 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6521 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6522 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6523 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6528 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6529 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6530 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6533 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6535 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6536 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6537 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6538 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6539 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6541 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6542 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6543 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6544 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6546 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6547 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6548 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6550 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6552 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6553 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6554 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6555 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6556 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6557 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6559 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6560 // deserialized from that format.
6561 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6562 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6563 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6565 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6567 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6568 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6569 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6571 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6572 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6573 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6574 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6577 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6578 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6579 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6582 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6583 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6584 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6585 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6587 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6588 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6590 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6592 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6594 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6596 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6599 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6601 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6606 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6608 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6609 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6610 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6611 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6612 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6613 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6614 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6616 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6618 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6620 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6623 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6624 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6625 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6628 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6630 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6631 preimages.push(preimage);
6633 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6634 reason.write(writer)?;
6636 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6638 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6639 preimages.push(preimage);
6641 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6642 reason.write(writer)?;
6647 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6648 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6650 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6652 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6653 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6654 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6655 source.write(writer)?;
6656 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6658 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6660 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6661 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6663 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6665 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6666 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6671 match self.context.resend_order {
6672 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6673 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6676 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6677 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6678 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6680 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6681 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6682 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6683 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6686 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6687 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6688 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6689 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6690 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6693 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6694 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6695 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6696 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6698 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6699 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6700 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6702 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6704 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6705 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6706 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6707 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6709 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6710 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6711 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6712 // consider the stale state on reload.
6715 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6716 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6717 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6719 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6720 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6721 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6723 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6724 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6726 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6727 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6728 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6730 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6731 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6733 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6736 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6737 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6738 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6740 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6743 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6744 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6746 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6747 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6748 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6750 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6752 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6754 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6756 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6757 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6758 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6759 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6760 htlc.write(writer)?;
6763 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6764 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6765 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6767 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6768 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6770 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6771 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6772 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6773 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6774 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6775 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6776 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6778 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6779 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6780 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6781 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6782 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6784 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6785 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6787 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6788 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6789 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6790 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6792 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6794 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6795 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6796 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6797 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6798 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6799 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6800 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6802 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6803 (2, chan_type, option),
6804 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6805 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6806 (5, self.context.config, required),
6807 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6808 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6809 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6810 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6811 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6812 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6813 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6814 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6815 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6816 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6817 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6818 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6819 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6820 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6821 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6822 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6829 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6830 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6832 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6833 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6835 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6836 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6837 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6839 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6840 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6841 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6842 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6846 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6847 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6849 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6850 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6852 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6853 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6858 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6860 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6862 let mut keys_data = None;
6864 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6865 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6866 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6868 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6869 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6870 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6871 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6872 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6873 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6877 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6878 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6879 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6882 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6884 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6890 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6891 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6892 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6893 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6894 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6895 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6896 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6897 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6898 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6899 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6900 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6901 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6902 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6907 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6908 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6909 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6910 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6911 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6912 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6913 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6914 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6915 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6916 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6917 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6918 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6920 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6924 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6925 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6928 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6929 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6931 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6936 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6938 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6939 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6940 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6941 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6942 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6943 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6944 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6945 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6947 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6948 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6949 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6951 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6952 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6953 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6955 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6959 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6960 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6961 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6962 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6965 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6967 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6971 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6972 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6975 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6976 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6977 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6978 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6981 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6983 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6985 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6986 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6987 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6988 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6991 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6992 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6993 // consider the stale state on reload.
6994 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6997 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6998 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6999 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7001 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7004 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7010 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7013 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7014 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7016 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7017 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7019 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7020 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7021 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7023 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7025 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7026 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7028 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7029 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7034 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7035 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7036 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7037 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7039 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7042 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7043 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7045 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7048 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7050 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7051 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7053 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7055 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7056 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7057 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7059 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7061 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7065 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7066 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7067 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7069 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7075 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7076 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7077 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7078 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7079 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7080 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7081 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7082 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7083 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7084 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7086 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7087 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7088 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7089 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7090 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7091 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7092 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7094 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7095 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7096 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7097 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7099 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7101 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7102 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7103 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7104 (2, channel_type, option),
7105 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7106 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7107 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7108 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7109 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7110 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7111 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7112 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7113 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7114 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7115 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7116 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7117 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7118 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7119 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7120 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7121 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7122 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7123 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7126 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7127 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7128 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7129 // required channel parameters.
7130 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7131 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7132 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7134 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7136 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7137 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7138 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7139 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7142 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7143 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7144 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7146 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7147 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7149 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7150 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7155 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7156 if iter.next().is_some() {
7157 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7161 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7162 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7163 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7164 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7165 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7168 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7169 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7171 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7172 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7173 // separate u64 values.
7174 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7176 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7179 context: ChannelContext {
7182 config: config.unwrap(),
7186 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7187 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7188 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7191 temporary_channel_id,
7193 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7195 channel_value_satoshis,
7197 latest_monitor_update_id,
7200 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7203 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7204 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7207 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7208 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7209 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7210 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7214 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7215 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7216 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7217 monitor_pending_forwards,
7218 monitor_pending_failures,
7219 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7222 holding_cell_update_fee,
7223 next_holder_htlc_id,
7224 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7225 update_time_counter,
7228 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7229 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7230 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7231 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7233 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7234 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7235 closing_fee_limits: None,
7236 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7238 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7240 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7241 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7243 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7245 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7246 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7247 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7248 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7249 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7250 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7251 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7252 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7253 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7256 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7258 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7259 funding_transaction,
7261 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7262 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7263 counterparty_node_id,
7265 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7269 channel_update_status,
7270 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7274 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7275 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7276 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7277 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7279 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7280 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7282 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7283 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7284 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7286 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7287 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7289 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7290 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7292 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7295 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7304 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7305 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7306 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7307 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7308 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7310 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7311 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7313 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7314 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7315 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7316 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7317 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7318 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7319 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7320 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7321 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7322 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7323 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7324 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7325 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7326 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7327 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7328 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7329 use crate::util::test_utils;
7330 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7331 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7332 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7333 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7334 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7335 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7336 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7337 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7338 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7339 use crate::prelude::*;
7341 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7344 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7345 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7351 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7352 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7353 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7354 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7358 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7359 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7360 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7361 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7362 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7363 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7364 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7368 signer: InMemorySigner,
7371 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7372 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7375 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7376 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7378 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7379 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7382 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7386 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7388 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7389 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7390 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7391 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7392 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7395 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7396 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7397 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7398 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7402 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7403 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7404 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7408 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7409 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7410 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7411 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7413 let seed = [42; 32];
7414 let network = Network::Testnet;
7415 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7416 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7417 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7420 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7421 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7422 let config = UserConfig::default();
7423 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7424 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7425 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7427 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7428 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7432 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7433 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7435 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7436 let original_fee = 253;
7437 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7438 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7439 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7440 let seed = [42; 32];
7441 let network = Network::Testnet;
7442 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7444 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7445 let config = UserConfig::default();
7446 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7448 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7449 // same as the old fee.
7450 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7451 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7452 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7456 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7457 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7458 // dust limits are used.
7459 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7460 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7461 let seed = [42; 32];
7462 let network = Network::Testnet;
7463 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7464 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7465 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7467 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7468 // they have different dust limits.
7470 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7471 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7472 let config = UserConfig::default();
7473 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7475 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7476 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7477 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7478 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7479 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7481 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7482 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7483 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7484 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7485 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7487 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7488 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7489 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7490 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7492 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7493 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7494 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7496 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7497 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7499 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7500 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7501 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7503 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7504 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7505 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7506 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7509 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7511 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7512 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7513 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7514 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7515 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7516 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7517 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7518 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7519 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7523 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7524 // the dust limit check.
7525 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7526 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7527 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7528 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7530 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7531 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7532 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7533 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7534 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7535 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7536 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7540 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7541 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7542 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7543 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7544 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7545 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7546 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7547 let seed = [42; 32];
7548 let network = Network::Testnet;
7549 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7551 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7552 let config = UserConfig::default();
7553 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7555 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7556 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7558 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7559 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7560 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7561 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7562 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7563 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7565 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7566 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7567 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7568 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7569 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7571 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7573 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7574 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7575 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7576 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7577 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7579 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7580 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7581 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7582 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7583 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7587 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7588 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7589 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7590 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7591 let seed = [42; 32];
7592 let network = Network::Testnet;
7593 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7594 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7595 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7597 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7599 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7600 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7601 let config = UserConfig::default();
7602 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7604 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7605 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7606 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7607 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7609 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7610 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7611 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7613 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7614 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7615 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7616 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7618 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7619 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7620 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7622 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7623 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7625 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7626 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7627 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7628 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7629 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7630 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7631 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7633 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7635 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7636 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7637 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7638 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7639 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7643 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7644 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7645 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7646 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7647 let seed = [42; 32];
7648 let network = Network::Testnet;
7649 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7650 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7651 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7653 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7654 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7655 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7656 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7657 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7658 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7659 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7660 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7662 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7663 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7664 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7665 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7666 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7667 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7669 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7670 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7671 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7672 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7674 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7676 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7677 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7678 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7679 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7680 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7681 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7683 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7684 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7685 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7686 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7688 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7689 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7690 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7691 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7692 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7694 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7695 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7697 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7698 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7699 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7701 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7702 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7703 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7704 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7705 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7707 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7708 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7710 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7711 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7712 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7716 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7718 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7719 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7720 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7722 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7723 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7724 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7725 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7727 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7728 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7729 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7731 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7733 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7734 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7737 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7738 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7739 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7740 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7741 let seed = [42; 32];
7742 let network = Network::Testnet;
7743 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7744 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7745 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7748 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7749 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7750 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7752 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7753 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7755 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7756 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7757 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7759 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7760 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7762 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7764 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7765 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7767 // Channel Negotiations failed
7768 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7769 assert!(result.is_err());
7774 fn channel_update() {
7775 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7776 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7777 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7778 let seed = [42; 32];
7779 let network = Network::Testnet;
7780 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7781 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7782 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7784 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7785 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7786 let config = UserConfig::default();
7787 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7789 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7790 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7791 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7792 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7793 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7795 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7796 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7797 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7798 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7799 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7801 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7802 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7803 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7804 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7806 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7807 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7808 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7810 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7811 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7813 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7814 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7815 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7817 short_channel_id: 0,
7820 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7821 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7822 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7824 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7825 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7827 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7829 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7831 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7832 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7833 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7834 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7836 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7837 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7838 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7840 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7844 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7846 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7847 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7848 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7849 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7850 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7851 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7852 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7853 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7854 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7855 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7856 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7857 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7858 use crate::sync::Arc;
7860 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7861 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7862 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7863 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7865 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7867 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7868 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7869 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7870 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7871 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7873 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7874 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7880 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7881 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7882 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7884 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7885 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7886 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7887 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7888 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7889 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7891 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7893 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7894 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7895 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7896 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7897 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7898 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7900 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7901 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7902 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7903 selected_contest_delay: 144
7905 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7906 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7908 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7909 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7911 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7912 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7914 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7915 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7917 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7918 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7919 // build_commitment_transaction.
7920 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7921 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7922 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7923 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7924 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7926 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7927 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7928 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7929 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7933 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7934 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7935 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7936 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7940 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7941 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7942 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7944 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7945 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7947 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7948 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7950 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7952 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7953 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7954 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7955 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7956 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7957 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7958 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7960 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7961 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7962 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7963 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7965 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7966 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7967 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7969 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7971 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7972 commitment_tx.clone(),
7973 counterparty_signature,
7974 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7975 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7976 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7978 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7979 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7981 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7982 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7983 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7985 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7986 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7989 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7990 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7992 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7993 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
7994 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7995 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7996 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7997 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7998 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7999 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8001 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8004 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8005 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8006 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8010 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8013 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8014 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
8015 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8017 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8018 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8019 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8020 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8021 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8022 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8023 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8024 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8026 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8030 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8031 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8032 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8033 "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", {});
8035 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8036 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8038 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8039 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8040 "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", {});
8042 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8043 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8044 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8045 "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", {});
8047 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8048 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8050 amount_msat: 1000000,
8052 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8053 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8055 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8058 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8059 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8061 amount_msat: 2000000,
8063 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8064 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8066 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8069 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8070 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8072 amount_msat: 2000000,
8074 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8075 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8076 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8078 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8081 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8082 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8084 amount_msat: 3000000,
8086 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8087 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8088 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8090 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8093 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8094 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8096 amount_msat: 4000000,
8098 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8099 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8101 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8105 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8106 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8107 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8109 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8110 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8111 "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", {
8114 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8115 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8116 "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" },
8119 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8120 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8121 "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" },
8124 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8125 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8126 "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" },
8129 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8130 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8131 "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" },
8134 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8135 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8136 "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" }
8139 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8140 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8141 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8143 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8144 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8145 "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", {
8148 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8149 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8150 "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" },
8153 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8154 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8155 "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" },
8158 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8159 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8160 "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" },
8163 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8164 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8165 "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" },
8168 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8169 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8170 "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" }
8173 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8174 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8175 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8177 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8178 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8179 "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", {
8182 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8183 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8184 "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" },
8187 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8188 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8189 "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" },
8192 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8193 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8194 "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" },
8197 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8198 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8199 "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" }
8202 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8203 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8204 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8205 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8207 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8208 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8209 "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", {
8212 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8213 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8214 "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" },
8217 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8218 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8219 "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" },
8222 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8223 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8224 "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" },
8227 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8228 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8229 "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" }
8232 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8233 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8234 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8235 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8237 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8238 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8239 "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", {
8242 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8243 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8244 "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" },
8247 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8248 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8249 "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" },
8252 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8253 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8254 "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" },
8257 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8258 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8259 "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" }
8262 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8263 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8264 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8266 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8267 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8268 "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", {
8271 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8272 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8273 "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" },
8276 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8277 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8278 "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" },
8281 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8282 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8283 "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" }
8286 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8287 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8288 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8290 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8291 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8292 "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", {
8295 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8296 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8297 "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" },
8300 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8301 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8302 "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" },
8305 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8306 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8307 "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" }
8310 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8311 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8312 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8314 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8315 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8316 "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", {
8319 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8320 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8321 "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" },
8324 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8325 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8326 "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" }
8329 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8330 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8331 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8332 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8334 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8335 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8336 "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", {
8339 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8340 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8341 "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" },
8344 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8345 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8346 "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" }
8349 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8350 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8351 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8352 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8354 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8355 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8356 "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", {
8359 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8360 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8361 "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" },
8364 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8365 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8366 "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" }
8369 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8370 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8371 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8373 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8374 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8375 "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", {
8378 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8379 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8380 "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" }
8383 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8384 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8385 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8386 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8388 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8389 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8390 "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", {
8393 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8394 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8395 "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" }
8398 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8399 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8400 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8401 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8403 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8404 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8405 "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", {
8408 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8409 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8410 "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" }
8413 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8414 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8415 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8416 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8418 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8419 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8420 "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", {});
8422 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8423 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8424 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8425 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8427 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8428 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8429 "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", {});
8431 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8432 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8433 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8434 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8436 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8437 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8438 "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", {});
8440 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8441 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8442 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8444 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8445 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8446 "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", {});
8448 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8449 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8450 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8451 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8453 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8454 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8455 "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", {});
8457 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8458 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8459 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8460 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8462 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8463 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8464 "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", {});
8466 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8467 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8468 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8469 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8470 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8471 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8473 amount_msat: 2000000,
8475 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8476 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8478 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8481 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8482 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8483 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8485 amount_msat: 5000001,
8487 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8488 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8489 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8491 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8494 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8495 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8497 amount_msat: 5000000,
8499 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8500 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8501 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8503 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8507 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8508 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8509 "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", {
8512 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8513 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8514 "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" },
8516 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8517 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8518 "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" },
8520 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8521 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8522 "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" }
8525 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8526 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8527 "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", {
8530 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8531 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8532 "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" },
8534 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8535 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8536 "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" },
8538 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8539 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8540 "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" }
8545 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8546 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8548 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8549 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8550 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8551 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8553 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8554 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8555 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8557 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8558 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8560 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8561 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8563 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8564 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8565 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8569 fn test_key_derivation() {
8570 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8571 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8573 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8574 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8576 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8577 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8579 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8580 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8582 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8583 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8585 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8586 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8588 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8589 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8591 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8592 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8596 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8597 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8598 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8599 let seed = [42; 32];
8600 let network = Network::Testnet;
8601 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8602 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8604 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8605 let config = UserConfig::default();
8606 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8607 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8609 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8610 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8612 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8613 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8614 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8615 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8616 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8617 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8618 assert!(res.is_ok());
8623 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8624 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8625 // resulting `channel_type`.
8626 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8627 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8628 let network = Network::Testnet;
8629 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8630 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8632 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8633 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8635 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8636 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8638 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8639 // need to signal it.
8640 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8641 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8642 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8645 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8647 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8648 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8649 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8651 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8652 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8653 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8656 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8657 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8658 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8659 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8660 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8663 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8664 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8669 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8670 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8671 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8672 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8673 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8674 let network = Network::Testnet;
8675 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8676 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8678 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8679 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8681 let config = UserConfig::default();
8683 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8684 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8685 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8686 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8687 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8689 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8690 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8691 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8694 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8695 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8696 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8698 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8699 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8700 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8701 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8702 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8703 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8705 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8710 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8711 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8713 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8714 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8715 let network = Network::Testnet;
8716 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8717 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8719 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8720 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8722 let config = UserConfig::default();
8724 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8725 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8726 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8727 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8728 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8729 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8730 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8731 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8733 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8734 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8735 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8736 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8737 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8738 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8741 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8742 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8744 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8745 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8746 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8747 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8749 assert!(res.is_err());
8751 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8752 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8753 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8755 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8756 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8757 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8760 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8762 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8763 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8764 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8765 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8768 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8769 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8771 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8772 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8774 assert!(res.is_err());