1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
163 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
164 /// through the following states in the state machine:
165 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
166 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
167 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
168 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
169 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
170 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
171 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
173 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
175 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
176 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
177 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
178 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
179 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
180 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
181 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
183 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
184 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
185 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
186 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
188 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
189 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
190 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
191 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
192 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
193 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
194 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
195 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
197 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
200 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
201 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
203 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
204 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
206 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
207 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
208 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
209 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
210 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
211 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
212 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
213 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
214 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
215 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
220 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
221 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
222 (2, Committed) => {},
223 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
224 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
227 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 state: InboundHTLCState,
235 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
236 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
237 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
239 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
240 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
241 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
243 /// The amount in msat.
244 pub amount_msat: u64,
245 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
246 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
247 /// The payment hash.
248 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
250 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
251 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
252 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
253 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
254 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
255 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
256 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
257 /// transactions as well.
259 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
260 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
263 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
264 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
268 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
269 (0, htlc_id, required),
270 (2, amount_msat, required),
271 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
272 (6, payment_hash, required),
273 (7, state, upgradable_option),
274 (8, is_dust, required),
277 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
278 enum OutboundHTLCState {
279 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
280 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
281 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
282 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
283 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
284 /// money back (though we won't), and,
285 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
286 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
287 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
288 /// we'll never get out of sync).
289 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
290 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
291 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
293 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
294 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
295 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
296 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
297 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
298 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
299 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
300 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
301 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
302 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
303 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
304 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
305 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
306 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
307 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
310 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
312 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
313 /// through the following states in the state machine:
314 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
315 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
316 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
317 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
318 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
319 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
320 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
322 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
323 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
324 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
325 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
326 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
327 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
328 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
329 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
331 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
332 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
334 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
335 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
336 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
337 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
338 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
339 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
340 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
341 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
342 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
343 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
346 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
347 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
349 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
350 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
351 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
352 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
353 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
355 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
356 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
357 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
358 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
359 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
360 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
361 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
362 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
363 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
364 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
369 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
370 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
371 (2, Committed) => {},
372 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
373 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
377 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
378 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
379 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
380 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
381 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
384 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
385 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
387 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
388 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
393 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
394 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
396 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
397 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
402 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
403 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
407 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
408 state: OutboundHTLCState,
410 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
411 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
414 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
415 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
416 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
418 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
419 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
420 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
422 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
423 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
424 /// The amount in msat.
425 pub amount_msat: u64,
426 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
427 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
428 /// The payment hash.
429 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
430 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
431 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
432 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
433 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
434 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
435 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
436 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
437 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
438 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
439 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
440 /// transactions as well.
442 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
443 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
446 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
447 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
451 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
452 (0, htlc_id, required),
453 (2, amount_msat, required),
454 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
455 (6, payment_hash, required),
456 (7, state, upgradable_option),
457 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
458 (10, is_dust, required),
461 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
462 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
463 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
464 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
468 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
470 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
471 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
472 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
473 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
476 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
481 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
486 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
490 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
491 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
492 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
493 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
494 struct $flag_type(u32);
499 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
502 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
504 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
507 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
510 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
511 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
514 Ok($flag_type(flags))
519 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
521 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
523 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
525 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
529 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
532 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
534 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
536 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
537 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
539 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
541 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
543 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
544 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
547 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
548 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
550 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
553 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
555 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
557 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
560 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
561 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
563 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
564 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
565 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
566 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
567 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
568 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
569 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
570 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
572 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
574 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
576 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
577 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
579 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
581 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
583 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
584 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
586 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
587 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
589 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
590 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
595 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
598 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
599 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
600 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
601 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
602 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
603 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
604 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
605 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
606 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
607 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
608 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
609 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
610 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
611 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
615 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
617 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
618 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
619 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
620 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
621 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
622 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
623 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
624 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
625 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
626 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
627 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
628 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
629 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
630 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
635 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
636 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
637 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
638 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
639 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
640 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
645 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
646 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
647 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
648 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
649 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
650 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
651 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
652 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
653 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
654 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
655 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
656 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
657 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
658 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
663 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
664 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
665 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
666 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
667 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
668 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
669 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
670 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
674 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
675 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
676 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
678 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
679 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
680 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
681 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
682 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
684 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
685 /// funding transaction to confirm.
686 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
687 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
689 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
690 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
691 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
695 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
696 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
698 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
701 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
710 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
712 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
716 fn $clear(&mut self) {
719 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
721 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
725 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
726 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
728 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
729 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
734 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
736 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
737 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
739 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
740 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
741 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
742 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
743 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
744 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
745 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
746 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
754 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
756 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
757 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
758 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
759 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
760 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
764 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
765 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
768 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
769 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
772 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
774 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
775 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
776 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
780 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
782 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
783 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
784 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
785 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
787 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
793 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
794 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
795 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
796 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
797 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
798 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
799 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
800 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
803 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
805 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
807 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
808 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
809 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
810 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
814 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
816 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
818 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
820 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
821 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
822 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
823 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
824 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
826 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
827 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
829 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
831 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
832 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
834 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
835 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
836 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
837 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
838 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
839 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
841 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
842 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
844 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
845 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
846 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
847 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
848 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
850 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
851 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
853 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
854 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
856 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
857 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
858 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
859 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
865 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
866 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
868 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
869 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
870 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
875 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
876 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
878 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
879 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
880 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
885 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
887 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
888 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
891 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
892 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
893 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
894 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
895 self.logger.log(record)
899 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
900 where L::Target: Logger {
901 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
902 where S::Target: SignerProvider
906 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
907 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
912 macro_rules! secp_check {
913 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
916 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
921 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
922 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
923 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
924 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
925 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
926 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
927 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
928 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
930 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
932 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
934 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
938 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
940 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
941 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
942 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
944 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
945 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
947 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
948 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
949 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
950 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
951 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
953 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
954 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
958 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
964 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
967 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
968 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
969 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
970 holding_cell_msat: u64,
971 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
974 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
975 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
976 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
977 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
978 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
979 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
980 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
981 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
982 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
983 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
984 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
987 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
988 struct HTLCCandidate {
990 origin: HTLCInitiator,
994 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1002 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1004 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1006 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1007 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1008 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1013 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1014 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1015 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1016 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1017 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1019 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1020 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1021 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1022 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1024 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1025 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1029 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1030 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1031 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1032 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1033 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1034 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1035 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1036 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1037 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1038 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1039 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1042 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1044 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1045 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1046 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1047 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1050 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1051 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1052 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1053 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1054 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1055 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1056 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1057 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1060 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1062 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1063 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1064 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1065 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1066 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1067 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1068 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1069 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1070 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1071 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1072 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1073 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1074 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1075 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1076 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1079 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1080 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1081 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1082 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1083 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1084 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1085 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1086 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1087 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1088 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1089 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1090 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1091 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1092 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1093 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1095 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1096 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1097 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1098 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1100 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1101 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1102 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1103 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1105 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1106 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1107 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1108 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1109 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1111 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1112 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1113 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1114 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1116 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1117 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1118 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1120 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1121 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1122 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1123 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1124 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1126 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1127 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1130 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1131 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1133 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1134 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1135 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1136 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1138 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1139 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1141 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1142 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1145 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1146 (0, update, required),
1149 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1150 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1151 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1152 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1153 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1154 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1157 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1158 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1159 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1161 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1163 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1164 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1165 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1169 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1171 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1172 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1173 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1178 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1179 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1180 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1181 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1182 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1184 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1185 /// in a timely manner.
1186 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1189 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1190 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1191 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1193 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1194 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1195 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1196 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1200 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1201 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1202 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1204 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1205 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1206 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1207 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1209 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1213 /// The current channel ID.
1214 channel_id: ChannelId,
1215 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1216 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1217 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1218 channel_state: ChannelState,
1220 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1221 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1223 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1224 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1225 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1227 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1228 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1229 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1230 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1232 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1233 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1235 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1237 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1238 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1239 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1241 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1242 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1243 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1245 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1246 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1247 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1248 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1249 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1250 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1252 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1253 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1254 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1255 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1256 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1257 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1259 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1261 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1262 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1263 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1265 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1266 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1267 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1268 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1269 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1270 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1271 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1273 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1274 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1275 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1277 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1278 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1279 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1280 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1281 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1282 /// outbound or inbound.
1283 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1285 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1287 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1288 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1289 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1290 // HTLCs with similar state.
1291 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1292 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1293 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1294 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1295 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1296 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1297 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1298 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1299 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1300 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1302 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1303 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1304 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1306 update_time_counter: u32,
1308 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1309 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1310 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1311 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1312 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1313 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1315 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1316 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1318 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1319 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1320 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1321 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1323 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1324 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1326 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1328 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1330 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1331 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1332 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1333 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1334 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1336 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1337 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1339 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1340 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1341 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1343 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1344 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1345 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1346 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1347 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1348 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1349 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1350 channel_creation_height: u32,
1352 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1355 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1357 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1360 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1362 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1365 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1367 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1369 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1370 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1373 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1375 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1377 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1378 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1380 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1382 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1383 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1384 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1386 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1388 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1389 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1390 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1392 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1393 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1394 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1396 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1398 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1400 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1401 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1402 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1403 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1405 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1406 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1407 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1409 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1410 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1411 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1413 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1414 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1415 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1416 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1417 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1418 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1419 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1420 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1422 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1423 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1424 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1425 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1426 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1428 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1429 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1431 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1432 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1433 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1434 /// unblock the state machine.
1436 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1437 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1438 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1440 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1441 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1442 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1445 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1446 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1447 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1448 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1449 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1450 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1451 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1453 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1454 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1456 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1457 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1458 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1460 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1461 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1462 // associated channel mapping.
1464 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1465 // to store all of them.
1466 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1468 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1469 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1470 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1471 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1472 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1474 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1475 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1477 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1478 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1480 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1481 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1483 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1484 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1485 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1487 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1488 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1489 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1492 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1493 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1494 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1495 self.update_time_counter
1498 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1499 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1502 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1503 self.config.announced_channel
1506 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1507 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1510 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1511 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1512 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1513 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1516 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1517 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1518 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1521 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1522 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1523 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1524 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1525 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1526 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1527 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1530 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1531 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1532 match self.channel_state {
1533 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1534 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1535 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1536 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1537 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1538 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1539 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1541 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1543 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1544 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1548 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1549 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1550 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1551 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1552 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1553 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1556 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1557 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1558 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1562 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1563 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1564 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1565 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1566 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1569 // Public utilities:
1571 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1575 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1577 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1578 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1579 self.temporary_channel_id
1582 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1586 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1587 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1588 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1592 /// Gets the channel's type
1593 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1597 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1599 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1600 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1601 self.short_channel_id
1604 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1605 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1606 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1609 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1610 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1611 self.outbound_scid_alias
1614 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1616 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1617 return &self.holder_signer
1620 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1621 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1622 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1623 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1624 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1625 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1628 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1629 /// get_funding_created.
1630 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1631 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1634 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1635 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1636 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1637 if conf_height > 0 {
1644 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1645 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1646 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1649 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1650 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1651 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1652 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1656 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1659 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1660 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1663 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1664 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1667 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1668 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1669 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1672 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1673 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1676 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1677 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1678 self.counterparty_node_id
1681 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1682 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1683 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1686 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1687 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1688 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1691 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1692 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1694 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1695 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1696 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1697 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1699 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1703 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1704 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1705 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1708 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1709 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1710 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1713 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1714 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1715 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1717 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1718 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1723 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1724 self.channel_value_satoshis
1727 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1728 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1731 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1732 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1735 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1736 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1737 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1739 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1740 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1741 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1742 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1743 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1745 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1749 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1750 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1751 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1754 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1755 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1756 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1759 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1760 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1761 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1764 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1765 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1766 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1769 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1770 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1771 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1774 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1775 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1776 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1779 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1780 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1781 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1782 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1783 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1786 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1788 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1789 self.prev_config = None;
1793 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1794 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1798 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1799 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1800 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1801 let did_channel_update =
1802 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1803 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1804 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1805 if did_channel_update {
1806 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1807 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1808 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1809 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1811 self.config.options = *config;
1815 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1816 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1817 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1818 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1819 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1822 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1823 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1824 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1825 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1826 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1828 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1829 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1830 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1831 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1832 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1833 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1834 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1836 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1837 where L::Target: Logger
1839 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1840 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1841 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1843 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1844 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1845 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1846 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1848 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1849 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1850 if match update_state {
1851 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1852 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1853 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1854 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1855 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1857 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1861 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1862 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1863 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1865 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1867 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1868 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1869 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1871 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1872 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1873 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1874 transaction_output_index: None
1879 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1880 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1881 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1882 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1883 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1886 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1888 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1889 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1890 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1892 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1893 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1896 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1897 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1900 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1902 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1903 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1904 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1906 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1907 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1913 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1915 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1916 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1917 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1918 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1919 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1920 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1921 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1925 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1926 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1928 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1930 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1931 if generated_by_local {
1932 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1933 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1934 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1944 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1946 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1947 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1948 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1949 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1950 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1951 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1952 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1955 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1956 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1957 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1958 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1962 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1963 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1967 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1968 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1970 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1972 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1973 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1975 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1976 if !generated_by_local {
1977 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1985 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1986 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1987 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1988 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1989 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1990 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1991 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1992 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1994 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1996 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1997 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1998 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1999 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2001 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2003 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2004 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2005 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2006 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2009 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2010 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2011 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2012 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2014 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2017 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2018 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2019 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2020 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2022 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2025 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2026 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2031 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2032 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2037 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2039 let channel_parameters =
2040 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2041 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2042 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2049 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2052 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2053 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2054 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2055 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2063 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2064 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2065 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2066 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2071 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2072 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2073 /// our counterparty!)
2074 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2075 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2076 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2077 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2078 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2079 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2080 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2082 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2086 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2087 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2088 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2089 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2090 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2091 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2092 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2094 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2097 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2098 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2099 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2100 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2101 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2104 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2105 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2108 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2112 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2113 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2114 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2115 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2116 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2117 // which are near the dust limit.
2118 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2119 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2120 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2121 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2122 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2124 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2125 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2127 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2128 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2131 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2132 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2133 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2136 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2137 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2139 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2140 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2141 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2142 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2143 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2144 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2145 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2148 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2151 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2152 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2153 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2155 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2156 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2157 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2158 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2159 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2160 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2162 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2169 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2170 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2172 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2173 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2174 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2175 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2176 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2177 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2178 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2181 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2184 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2185 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2186 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2188 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2189 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2190 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2191 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2192 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2193 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2195 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2196 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2200 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2201 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2202 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2203 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2204 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2205 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2206 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2208 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2209 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2211 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2218 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2219 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2220 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2221 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2222 match holding_cell_update {
2223 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2224 holding_cell_states.insert(
2226 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2229 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2230 holding_cell_states.insert(
2232 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2235 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2236 holding_cell_states.insert(
2238 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2242 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2245 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2246 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2249 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2250 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2252 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2253 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2254 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2255 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2256 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2257 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2258 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2259 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2260 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2261 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2268 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2269 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2270 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2271 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2274 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2275 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2277 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2278 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2279 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2280 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2281 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2282 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2283 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2284 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2285 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2286 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2289 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2290 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2296 } = *holding_cell_update {
2297 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2299 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2300 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2301 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2302 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2303 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2304 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2311 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2312 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2313 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2314 /// corner case properly.
2315 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2316 -> AvailableBalances
2317 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2319 let context = &self;
2320 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2321 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2322 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2324 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2325 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2326 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2327 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2330 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2332 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2333 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2335 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2337 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2339 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2340 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2344 if context.is_outbound() {
2345 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2346 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2348 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2349 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2351 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2352 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2353 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2354 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2357 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2358 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2359 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2360 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2361 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2362 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2363 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2366 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2367 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2368 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2369 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2370 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2371 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2372 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2373 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2374 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2375 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2376 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2378 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2381 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2382 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2383 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2384 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2385 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2388 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2389 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2391 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2392 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2393 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2395 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2396 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2397 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2398 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2402 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2404 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2405 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2406 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2407 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2408 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2409 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2410 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2412 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2413 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2415 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2416 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2417 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2419 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2420 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2421 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2422 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2423 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2426 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2427 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2428 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2429 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2430 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2431 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2434 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2435 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2436 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2438 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2442 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2443 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2445 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2446 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2450 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2451 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2452 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2453 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2455 outbound_capacity_msat,
2456 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2457 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2462 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2463 let context = &self;
2464 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2467 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2468 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2470 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2471 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2473 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2474 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2476 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2477 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2478 let context = &self;
2479 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2481 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2484 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2485 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2487 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2488 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2490 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2491 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2493 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2494 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2498 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2499 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2505 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2506 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2507 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2510 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2511 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2512 included_htlcs += 1;
2515 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2516 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2520 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2521 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2522 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2523 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2524 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2525 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2530 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2532 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2533 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2538 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2539 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2543 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2544 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2545 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2548 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2549 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2551 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2552 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2553 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2555 total_pending_htlcs,
2556 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2557 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2558 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2560 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2561 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2562 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2564 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2566 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2571 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2572 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2574 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2575 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2577 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2578 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2580 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2581 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2582 let context = &self;
2583 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2585 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2588 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2589 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2591 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2592 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2594 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2595 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2597 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2598 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2602 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2603 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2609 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2610 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2611 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2612 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2613 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2614 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2617 included_htlcs += 1;
2620 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2621 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2624 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2625 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2627 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2628 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2629 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2634 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2635 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2636 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2639 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2640 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2642 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2643 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2645 total_pending_htlcs,
2646 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2647 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2648 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2650 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2651 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2652 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2654 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2656 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2661 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2662 match self.channel_state {
2663 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2664 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2665 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2666 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2676 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2678 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2679 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2682 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2684 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2685 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2686 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2690 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2691 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2692 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2695 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2697 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2698 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2701 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2702 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2703 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2704 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2705 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2706 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
2707 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2708 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2709 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2710 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2711 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2713 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2714 // return them to fail the payment.
2715 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2716 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2717 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2719 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2720 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2725 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2726 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2727 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2728 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2729 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2730 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2731 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2732 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2733 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
2734 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2735 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2736 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2737 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2738 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2739 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
2743 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2744 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
2746 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2747 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2751 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2752 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2753 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2754 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
2755 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2756 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2757 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
2758 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
2762 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2763 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2764 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2765 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2767 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2768 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2769 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2770 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2772 match &self.holder_signer {
2773 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2774 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2775 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2776 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2777 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2780 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2784 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2785 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2786 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2788 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2789 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2790 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2792 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2793 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2794 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2797 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2798 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2800 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2807 // Internal utility functions for channels
2809 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2810 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2811 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2813 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2815 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2816 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2817 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2819 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2822 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2824 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2827 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2828 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2829 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2831 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2833 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2834 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2835 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2836 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2837 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2840 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2841 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2842 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2843 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2844 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2845 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2846 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2849 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2850 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2852 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2853 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2856 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2857 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2858 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2859 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2860 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2861 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2864 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2865 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2866 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2867 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2870 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2871 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2873 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2874 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2875 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2879 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2880 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2881 trait FailHTLCContents {
2882 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2883 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2884 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2885 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2887 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2888 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2889 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2890 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2892 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2893 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2895 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2896 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2899 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
2900 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
2901 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2902 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2905 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2906 failure_code: self.1
2909 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2910 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
2912 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2913 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2915 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2916 failure_code: self.1
2921 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2922 fn name() -> &'static str;
2924 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2925 fn name() -> &'static str {
2929 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2930 fn name() -> &'static str {
2931 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2935 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2936 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2937 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2939 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2940 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2941 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2942 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2944 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2945 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2947 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2949 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2950 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2951 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2952 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2954 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2955 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2965 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2966 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2967 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2968 // outside of those situations will fail.
2969 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2973 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2978 1 + // script length (0)
2982 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2983 2 + // witness marker and flag
2984 1 + // witness element count
2985 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2986 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2987 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2988 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2989 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2990 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2992 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2993 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2994 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3000 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3001 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3002 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3003 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3005 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3006 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3007 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3009 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3010 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3011 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3012 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3013 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3014 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3017 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3018 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3021 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3022 value_to_holder = 0;
3025 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3026 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3027 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3028 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3030 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3031 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3034 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3035 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3038 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3041 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3042 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3044 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3046 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3047 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3048 where L::Target: Logger {
3049 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3050 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3051 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3052 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3053 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3054 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3055 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3056 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3060 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3061 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3062 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3063 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3065 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3066 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3069 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3070 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3071 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3073 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3074 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3075 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3076 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3077 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3078 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3079 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3081 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3082 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3083 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3085 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3086 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3088 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3091 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3092 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3096 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3100 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3101 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3102 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3103 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3104 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3105 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3108 // Now update local state:
3110 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3111 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3112 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3113 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3114 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3115 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3116 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3117 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3119 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3122 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3123 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3124 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3125 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3126 // do not not get into this branch.
3127 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3128 match pending_update {
3129 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3130 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3131 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3132 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3133 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3134 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3135 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3138 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3139 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3141 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3142 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3143 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3144 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3145 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3146 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3152 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3153 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3154 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3156 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3157 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3158 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3160 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3161 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3164 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3165 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3167 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3168 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3170 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3171 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3174 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3177 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3178 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3179 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3180 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3185 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3186 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3187 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3188 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3189 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3190 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3191 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3192 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3193 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3194 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3195 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3196 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3197 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3198 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3199 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3201 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3202 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3203 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3204 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3205 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3208 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3209 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3210 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3216 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3217 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3219 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3223 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3224 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3225 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3226 /// before we fail backwards.
3228 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3229 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3230 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3231 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3232 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3233 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3234 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3237 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3238 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3240 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3241 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3242 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3243 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3244 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3245 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3248 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3249 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3250 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3251 /// before we fail backwards.
3253 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3254 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3255 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3256 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3257 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3259 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3260 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3261 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3264 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3265 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3266 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3268 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3269 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3270 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3272 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3273 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3274 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3276 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3281 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3282 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3288 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3289 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3290 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3291 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3292 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3296 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3297 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3298 force_holding_cell = true;
3301 // Now update local state:
3302 if force_holding_cell {
3303 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3304 match pending_update {
3305 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3306 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3307 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3308 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3312 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3313 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3315 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3316 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3317 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3323 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3324 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3328 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3329 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3331 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3332 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3335 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3338 // Message handlers:
3339 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3340 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3341 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3342 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3343 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3344 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3345 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3348 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3350 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3352 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3353 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3354 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3355 debug_assert!(matches!(
3356 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3358 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3359 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3362 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3363 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3365 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3366 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3367 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3368 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3370 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3373 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3374 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3375 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3378 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3379 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3380 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3381 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3382 // when routing outbound payments.
3383 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3387 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3388 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3389 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3390 match &self.context.channel_state {
3391 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3392 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3393 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3394 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3395 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3396 check_reconnection = true;
3397 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3398 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3399 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3400 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3401 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3403 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3404 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3407 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3408 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3409 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3411 if check_reconnection {
3412 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3413 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3414 let expected_point =
3415 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3416 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3418 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3419 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3420 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3421 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3422 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3423 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3425 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3426 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3427 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3428 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3429 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3431 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3432 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3437 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3438 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3440 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3442 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3445 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3446 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3447 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3448 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3449 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3450 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3452 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3453 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3455 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3456 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3457 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3459 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3460 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3463 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3464 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3466 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3469 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3470 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3472 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3473 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3476 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3477 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3478 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3479 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3481 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3482 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3485 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3486 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3487 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3488 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3489 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3490 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3491 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3492 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3493 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3494 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3495 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3497 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3498 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3499 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3500 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3501 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3502 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3506 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3507 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3510 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3511 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3512 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3514 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3515 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3516 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3517 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3518 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3519 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3520 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3524 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3525 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3526 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3527 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3528 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3529 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3530 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3534 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3535 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3536 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3537 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3538 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3539 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3542 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3543 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3545 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3546 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3547 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3549 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3550 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3554 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3555 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3557 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3558 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3562 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3563 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3567 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3568 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3569 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3570 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3571 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3572 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3573 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3574 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3575 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3577 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3578 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3579 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3580 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3581 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3584 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3585 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3586 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3587 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3588 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3591 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3592 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3594 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3598 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3599 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3600 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3604 // Now update local state:
3605 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3606 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3607 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3608 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3609 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3610 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3611 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3616 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3618 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3619 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3620 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3621 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3622 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3623 None => fail_reason.into(),
3624 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3625 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3626 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3627 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3629 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3633 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3634 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3635 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3636 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3638 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3639 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3644 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3647 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
3648 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3651 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3655 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
3658 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3659 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3660 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3662 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3663 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3666 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3670 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3671 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3672 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3674 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3675 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3678 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3682 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3683 where L::Target: Logger
3685 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3686 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3688 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3691 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3692 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3695 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3697 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3699 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3700 let commitment_txid = {
3701 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3702 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3703 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3705 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3706 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3707 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3708 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3709 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3710 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3714 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3716 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3717 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3718 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3719 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3722 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3723 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3724 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3728 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3730 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3731 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3732 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3733 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3734 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3735 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3736 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3737 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3738 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3739 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3740 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3746 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3747 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3750 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3751 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3752 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3753 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3754 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3755 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3756 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3757 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3758 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3759 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3760 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3761 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3762 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3765 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3766 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3767 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3768 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3769 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3770 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3771 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3773 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3774 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3775 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3776 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3777 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3778 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3779 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3782 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3783 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3786 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3788 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3789 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3790 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3793 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3796 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3797 commitment_stats.tx,
3799 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3800 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3801 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3804 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3805 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3807 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3808 let mut need_commitment = false;
3809 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3810 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3811 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3812 need_commitment = true;
3816 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3817 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3818 Some(forward_info.clone())
3820 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3821 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3822 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3823 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3824 need_commitment = true;
3827 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3828 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3829 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3830 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3831 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3832 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3833 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3834 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3835 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3836 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3837 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3838 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3839 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3840 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3842 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3844 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3845 need_commitment = true;
3849 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3850 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3851 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3852 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3853 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3854 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3855 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3857 nondust_htlc_sources,
3859 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3862 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3863 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3864 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3865 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3866 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3868 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3869 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3870 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3871 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3872 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3873 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3874 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3875 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3876 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3877 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3878 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3879 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3880 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3881 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3883 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3884 &self.context.channel_id);
3885 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3888 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3889 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3890 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3891 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3892 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3893 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3894 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3895 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3896 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3900 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3901 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3902 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3903 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3906 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3907 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3908 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3909 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3910 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3911 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3912 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3914 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3915 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3916 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3919 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3920 /// for our counterparty.
3921 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3922 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3923 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3924 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3926 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3927 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3928 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3929 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3931 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3932 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3933 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3934 updates: Vec::new(),
3935 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3938 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3939 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3940 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3941 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3942 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3943 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3944 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3945 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3946 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3947 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3948 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3949 // to rebalance channels.
3950 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
3951 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3952 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3953 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3955 match self.send_htlc(
3956 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3957 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3959 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3962 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3963 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3964 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3965 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3966 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3967 // into the holding cell without ever being
3968 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3969 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3970 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3973 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3980 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3981 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3982 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3983 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3984 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3985 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3986 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3987 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3988 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3989 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3990 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3991 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3994 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3995 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
3996 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3998 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3999 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4000 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4003 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4005 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4006 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4007 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4008 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4009 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4010 // for a full revocation before failing.
4011 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4012 update_fail_count += 1;
4014 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4016 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4021 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4022 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4024 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4025 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4030 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4031 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4032 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4033 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4034 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4036 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4037 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4038 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4040 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4041 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4047 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4048 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4049 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4050 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4051 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4052 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4053 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4054 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4055 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4057 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4060 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4063 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4067 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4069 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4070 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4075 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4076 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4077 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4078 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4079 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4080 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4081 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4082 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4086 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4088 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4089 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4092 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4093 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4094 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4095 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4097 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4099 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4104 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4105 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4106 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4107 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4108 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4109 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4110 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4111 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4112 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4114 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4117 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4118 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4119 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4120 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4121 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4122 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4123 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4124 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4125 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4127 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4128 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4131 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4132 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4133 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4134 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4135 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4136 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4137 let mut require_commitment = false;
4138 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4141 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4142 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4143 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4144 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4146 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4147 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4148 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4149 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4150 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4151 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4153 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4157 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4158 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4159 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4160 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4161 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4163 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4164 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4165 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4170 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4171 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4173 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4177 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4178 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4180 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
4181 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4182 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
4183 require_commitment = true;
4184 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
4185 match forward_info {
4186 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4187 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4188 require_commitment = true;
4190 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4191 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4192 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4194 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4195 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4196 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4200 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4201 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4202 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4203 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4209 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4210 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4211 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4212 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4213 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4215 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4216 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4217 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4218 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4219 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4220 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4221 require_commitment = true;
4225 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4227 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4228 match update_state {
4229 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4230 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4231 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4232 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4233 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4234 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4236 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4237 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4238 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4239 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4240 require_commitment = true;
4241 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4242 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4247 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4248 let release_state_str =
4249 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4250 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4251 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4252 if !release_monitor {
4253 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4254 update: monitor_update,
4256 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4258 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4263 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4264 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4265 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4266 if require_commitment {
4267 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4268 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4269 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4270 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4272 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4273 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4274 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4275 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4276 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4278 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4279 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4280 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4281 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4282 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4285 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4286 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4287 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4288 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4289 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4290 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4292 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4293 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4295 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4296 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4298 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4299 if require_commitment {
4300 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4302 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4303 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4304 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4305 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4307 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4308 &self.context.channel_id(),
4309 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4312 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4313 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4315 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4316 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4318 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4319 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4325 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4326 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4327 /// commitment update.
4328 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4329 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4330 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4332 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4333 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4336 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4337 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4338 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4339 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4341 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4342 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4343 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4344 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4345 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4346 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4347 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4349 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4350 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4352 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4353 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4355 if !self.context.is_live() {
4356 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4359 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4360 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4361 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4362 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4363 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4364 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4365 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4366 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4367 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4368 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4372 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4373 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4374 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4375 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4376 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4377 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4380 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4381 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4385 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4386 force_holding_cell = true;
4389 if force_holding_cell {
4390 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4394 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4395 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4397 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4398 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4403 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4404 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4406 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4408 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4409 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4410 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4411 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4415 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4416 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4417 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4421 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4422 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4425 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4426 // will be retransmitted.
4427 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4428 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4429 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4431 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4432 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4434 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4435 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4436 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4437 // this HTLC accordingly
4438 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4441 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4442 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4443 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4444 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4447 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4448 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4449 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4450 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4451 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4452 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4457 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4459 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4460 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4461 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4462 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4466 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4467 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4468 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4469 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4470 // the update upon reconnection.
4471 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4475 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4477 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4478 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4482 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4483 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4484 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4485 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4486 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4487 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4488 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4490 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4491 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4492 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4493 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4494 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4495 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4496 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4498 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4499 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4500 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4501 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4502 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4503 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4504 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4507 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4508 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4509 /// to the remote side.
4510 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4511 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4512 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4513 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4516 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4518 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4519 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4521 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4522 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4523 // first received the funding_signed.
4524 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4525 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4526 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4527 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
4529 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4531 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4532 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4533 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4534 funding_broadcastable = None;
4537 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4538 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4539 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4540 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4541 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4542 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4543 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4544 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4545 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4546 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4547 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4548 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4549 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4550 next_per_commitment_point,
4551 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4555 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4557 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4558 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4559 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4560 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4561 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4562 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4564 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4565 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4566 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4567 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4568 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4569 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4573 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4574 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4576 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4577 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4579 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4580 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4583 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4584 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4585 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4586 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4587 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4588 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4589 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4590 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4591 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4595 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4596 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4598 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4601 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4604 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4606 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4607 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4608 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4609 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4610 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4611 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4612 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4613 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4614 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4615 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4616 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4617 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4619 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4621 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4627 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4629 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4630 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4631 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4632 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4634 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4635 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4637 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4638 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4641 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4642 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4643 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4644 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4646 SignerResumeUpdates {
4653 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4654 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4655 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4656 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4657 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4658 per_commitment_secret,
4659 next_per_commitment_point,
4661 next_local_nonce: None,
4665 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4666 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4667 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4668 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4669 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4670 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4672 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4673 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4674 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4675 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4676 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4677 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4678 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4679 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4680 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4681 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4682 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4687 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4688 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4690 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4691 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4692 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4693 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4694 reason: err_packet.clone()
4697 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4698 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4699 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4700 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4701 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4702 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4705 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4706 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4707 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4708 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4709 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4716 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4717 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4718 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4719 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4723 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4724 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4725 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4726 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4727 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4728 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4729 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4733 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4734 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4736 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4737 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4738 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4739 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4744 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4745 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4750 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4751 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4752 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4753 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4754 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4755 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4756 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4761 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4762 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4764 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4765 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4766 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4767 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4768 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4769 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4770 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4771 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4774 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4776 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4777 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4778 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4779 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4783 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4784 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4788 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4789 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4790 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4791 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4792 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4793 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4796 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4797 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4798 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4799 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4800 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4803 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4804 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4805 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4806 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4807 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4808 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4809 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4810 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4814 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4815 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4816 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4817 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4818 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4819 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4820 our_commitment_transaction
4824 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4825 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4826 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4827 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4829 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4831 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4833 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4834 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4835 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4836 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4837 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4840 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4841 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4842 channel_ready: None,
4843 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4844 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4845 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4849 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4850 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4851 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4852 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4853 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4854 next_per_commitment_point,
4855 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4857 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4858 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4859 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4863 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4864 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4865 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4867 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4868 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4869 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4872 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4875 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4877 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4878 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4879 our_commitment_transaction
4883 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4884 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4885 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4886 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4887 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4888 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4889 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4891 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4893 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4894 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4895 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4896 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4897 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4898 next_per_commitment_point,
4899 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4903 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4904 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4905 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4907 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4910 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4911 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4912 raa: required_revoke,
4913 commitment_update: None,
4914 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4916 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4917 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4918 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4920 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4923 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4924 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4925 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4926 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4927 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4928 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4931 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4932 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4933 raa: required_revoke,
4934 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4935 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4938 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4939 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4940 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4941 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4942 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4945 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4946 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4947 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4948 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4953 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4954 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4955 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4956 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4958 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4960 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4962 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4963 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4964 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4965 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4966 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4967 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4968 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4969 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4971 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4972 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4973 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4974 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4975 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4977 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4978 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4979 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4980 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4983 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4984 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4985 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4986 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4987 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4988 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4989 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4990 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4991 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4992 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4993 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4994 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4995 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4996 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4997 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4999 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5002 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5003 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5006 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5007 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5008 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5009 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5010 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5011 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5014 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5015 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5016 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5017 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5018 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5019 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5022 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5028 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5029 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5030 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5031 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5033 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5034 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5035 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5036 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5037 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5038 return Ok((None, None, None));
5041 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5042 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5043 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5045 return Ok((None, None, None));
5048 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5049 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5050 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5051 return Ok((None, None, None));
5054 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5056 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5057 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5058 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5059 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5061 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5062 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5064 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5065 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5067 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5068 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5069 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5070 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5072 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5073 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5074 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5078 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5084 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5085 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5087 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5088 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5091 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5092 /// within our expected timeframe.
5094 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5095 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5096 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5099 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5102 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5103 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5107 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5108 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5110 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5111 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5113 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5114 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5115 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5116 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5117 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5119 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5120 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5124 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5126 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5127 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5130 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5131 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5132 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5135 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5138 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5139 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5140 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5141 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5143 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5146 assert!(send_shutdown);
5147 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5148 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5149 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5151 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5154 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5159 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5161 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5162 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5164 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5165 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5166 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5167 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5168 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5169 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5170 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5172 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5174 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5175 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5177 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5178 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5179 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5180 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5184 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5185 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5186 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5187 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5188 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5189 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5191 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5192 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5199 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5200 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5202 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5205 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5206 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5208 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5210 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5211 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5212 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5213 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5214 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5215 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5216 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5217 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5218 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5220 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5221 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5224 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5228 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5229 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5230 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5231 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5233 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5236 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5239 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5242 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5246 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5247 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5250 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5251 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5252 return Ok((None, None, None));
5255 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5256 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5257 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5260 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5262 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5265 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5266 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5267 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5268 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5269 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5273 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5274 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5279 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5280 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5282 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5285 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5286 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5287 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5288 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5290 monitor_update: None,
5291 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5292 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5293 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5294 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5295 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5296 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5297 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5298 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5300 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5301 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5302 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5303 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5307 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5309 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5310 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5311 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5312 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5314 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5317 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5318 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5320 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5321 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5322 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5323 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5325 monitor_update: None,
5326 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5327 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5328 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5329 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5330 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5331 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5332 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5333 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5335 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5336 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5337 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5338 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5343 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5344 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5345 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5346 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5348 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5349 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5350 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5352 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5354 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5361 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5362 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5363 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5365 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5366 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5368 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5369 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5372 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5373 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5374 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5375 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5376 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5378 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5379 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5380 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5382 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5383 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5386 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5387 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5388 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5389 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5390 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5391 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5392 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5393 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5395 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5398 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5399 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5400 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5401 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5403 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5407 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5408 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5409 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5410 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5412 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5418 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5419 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5420 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5421 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5422 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5423 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5424 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5426 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5427 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5430 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5432 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5433 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5439 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5440 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5441 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5442 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5443 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5444 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5445 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5447 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5448 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5455 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5456 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5459 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5460 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5463 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5464 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5468 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5469 &self.context.holder_signer
5473 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5475 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5476 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5477 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5478 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5479 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5480 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5482 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5484 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5492 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5493 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5497 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5498 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5499 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5500 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5503 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5504 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5505 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5506 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5509 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5510 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5511 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5512 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5513 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5514 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5517 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5518 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5519 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5520 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5521 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5522 if !release_monitor {
5523 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5532 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5533 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5536 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5537 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5538 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5540 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5541 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5543 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5544 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
5546 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5547 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5548 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5551 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5552 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5553 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5554 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5555 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5556 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5558 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5559 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5560 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5562 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5563 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5564 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5565 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5566 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5567 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5573 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5574 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5575 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5576 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5579 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5580 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5581 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5584 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5585 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5586 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5589 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
5590 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5591 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
5594 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5595 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5596 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5597 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5598 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5601 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5602 self.context.channel_update_status
5605 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5606 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5607 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5610 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5612 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5613 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5614 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5618 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5619 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5620 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5623 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5627 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5628 // channel_ready yet.
5629 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5633 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5634 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5635 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
5636 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5638 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5639 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5640 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5642 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5643 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5646 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5647 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5649 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5650 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5651 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5652 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5653 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5654 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5655 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5656 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5658 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5662 if need_commitment_update {
5663 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5664 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5665 let next_per_commitment_point =
5666 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5667 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5668 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5669 next_per_commitment_point,
5670 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5674 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5680 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5681 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5682 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5683 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5684 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5685 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5686 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5688 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5691 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5692 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5693 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5694 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5695 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5696 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5697 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5698 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5699 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5700 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5701 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5702 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5703 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5704 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5705 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5706 // channel and move on.
5707 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5708 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5710 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5711 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5712 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5714 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5715 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5716 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5717 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5718 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5719 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5720 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5721 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5726 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5727 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5728 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5729 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5730 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5733 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5734 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5735 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5736 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5737 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5738 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5741 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5742 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5743 // may have already happened for this block).
5744 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5745 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5746 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5747 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5750 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5751 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5752 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5753 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5761 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5762 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5763 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5764 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5766 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5767 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5770 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5772 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5773 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5774 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5775 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5777 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5780 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5783 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5784 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5785 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5786 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5788 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5791 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5792 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5793 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5795 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5796 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5798 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5799 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5800 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5808 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5810 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5811 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5812 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5814 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5815 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5818 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5819 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5820 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5821 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5822 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5823 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5824 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5825 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5828 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5829 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5830 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5831 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5833 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5834 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5835 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5837 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5838 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5839 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5840 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5842 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5843 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5844 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5845 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5846 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5847 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5848 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5851 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5852 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5854 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5857 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5858 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5859 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5860 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5861 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5862 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5863 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5864 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5865 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5866 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5867 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5868 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5869 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5870 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5871 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5872 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5873 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5879 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5884 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5885 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5887 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5888 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5889 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5890 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5892 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5895 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5897 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5898 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5899 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5900 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5901 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5902 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5904 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5905 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5908 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5909 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5910 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5911 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5912 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5913 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5915 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5916 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5919 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5920 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5921 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5922 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5923 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5929 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5930 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5931 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5932 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5934 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5937 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5941 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5945 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5946 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5950 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5954 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5955 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5958 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5962 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5964 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5969 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5970 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5971 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5973 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5978 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5980 None => return None,
5983 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5985 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5986 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5988 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5989 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5992 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5998 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6000 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6001 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6002 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6003 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6004 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6005 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6006 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6008 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6009 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6010 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6011 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6012 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6013 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6014 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6015 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6016 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6017 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6018 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6019 contents: announcement,
6022 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6027 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6031 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6032 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6033 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6034 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6035 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6036 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6037 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6038 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6040 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6042 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6044 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6045 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6047 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6049 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6050 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6053 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6054 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6055 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6056 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6059 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6062 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6063 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6064 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6065 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6066 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6067 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6070 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6072 Err(_) => return None,
6074 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6075 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6080 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6081 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6082 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6083 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6084 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6085 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6086 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6087 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6088 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6089 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6090 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6091 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6092 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6093 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6094 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6095 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6098 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6101 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6102 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6103 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6104 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6105 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6106 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6107 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6108 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6109 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6111 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6112 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6113 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6114 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6115 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6116 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6117 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6118 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6119 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6121 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6122 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6123 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6124 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6125 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6126 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6127 next_funding_txid: None,
6132 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6134 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6135 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6136 /// commitment update.
6138 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6139 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6140 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6141 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6142 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6143 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6144 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6147 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6148 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6149 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6151 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6152 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6157 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6158 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6160 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6162 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6163 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6165 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6166 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6167 /// regenerate them.
6169 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6170 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6172 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6173 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6174 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6175 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6176 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6177 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6178 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6179 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6181 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6182 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6183 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6185 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6187 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6188 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6189 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6192 if amount_msat == 0 {
6193 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6196 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6197 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6198 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6199 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6202 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6203 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6204 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6207 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6208 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6209 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6210 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6211 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6212 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6213 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6214 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6217 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6218 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6219 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6220 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6221 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6222 else { "to peer" });
6224 if need_holding_cell {
6225 force_holding_cell = true;
6228 // Now update local state:
6229 if force_holding_cell {
6230 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6235 onion_routing_packet,
6242 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6243 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6245 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6247 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6253 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6254 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6255 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6259 onion_routing_packet,
6263 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6268 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6269 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6270 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6271 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6273 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6274 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6275 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6277 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6278 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6282 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6283 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6284 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6285 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6286 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6287 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6288 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6291 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6292 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6293 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6294 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6295 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6296 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6299 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6301 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6302 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6303 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6304 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6305 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6307 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6308 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6311 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6312 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6313 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6314 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6315 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6316 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6317 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6318 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6319 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6320 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6321 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6322 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6324 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6326 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6330 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6331 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6332 where L::Target: Logger
6334 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6335 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6336 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6338 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6340 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6341 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6342 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6343 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6344 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6345 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6346 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6347 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6348 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6349 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6350 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6356 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6359 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6360 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6361 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6362 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6363 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6364 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6366 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6367 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6368 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6370 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6371 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6372 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6375 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6376 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6380 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6381 &commitment_stats.tx,
6382 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6383 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6384 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6385 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6387 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6389 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6390 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6391 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6392 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6394 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6395 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6396 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6397 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6398 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6399 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6403 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6404 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6408 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6409 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6411 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6417 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6418 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6420 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6421 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6422 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6423 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6424 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6425 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6426 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6427 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6429 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6430 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6431 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6434 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6435 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6436 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6442 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6444 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6445 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6446 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6447 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6448 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6450 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6452 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6458 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6459 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6460 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6461 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6462 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6464 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6465 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6466 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6469 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6470 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6472 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6473 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6475 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6476 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6478 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6479 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6480 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6483 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6486 // use override shutdown script if provided
6487 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6488 Some(script) => script,
6490 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6491 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6492 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6493 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6497 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6498 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6500 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6505 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6506 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6507 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6508 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
6509 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6511 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6512 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6513 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6514 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6515 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6516 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6517 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6519 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6521 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6522 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6524 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6525 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6526 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6529 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6530 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6531 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6532 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6533 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6535 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6536 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6543 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6544 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6546 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6549 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6550 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6551 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6553 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6554 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6558 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6562 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6563 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6564 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6565 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6568 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6569 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6570 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6571 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6572 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6573 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6574 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6575 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6577 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6578 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6579 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6580 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6582 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6583 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6585 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6586 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6588 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6589 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6590 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6592 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6593 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6595 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6596 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6597 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6598 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6599 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6602 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6603 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6605 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6606 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6608 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6610 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6612 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6613 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6614 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6615 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6618 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6619 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6621 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6622 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6623 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6624 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6628 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6629 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6630 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6634 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6635 Ok(script) => script,
6636 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6639 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6642 context: ChannelContext {
6645 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6646 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6647 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6648 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6653 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6655 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6656 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6657 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6658 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6660 channel_value_satoshis,
6662 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6664 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6665 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6668 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6669 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6672 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6673 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6674 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6675 pending_update_fee: None,
6676 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6677 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6678 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6679 update_time_counter: 1,
6681 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6683 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6684 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6685 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6686 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6687 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6688 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6690 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6691 signer_pending_funding: false,
6693 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6694 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6695 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6696 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6698 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6699 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6700 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6701 closing_fee_limits: None,
6702 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6704 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6705 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6706 short_channel_id: None,
6707 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6709 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6710 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6711 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6712 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6713 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6714 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6715 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6716 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6717 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6718 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6719 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6720 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6722 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6724 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6725 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6726 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6727 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6728 counterparty_parameters: None,
6729 funding_outpoint: None,
6730 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6732 funding_transaction: None,
6733 is_batch_funding: None,
6735 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6736 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6737 counterparty_node_id,
6739 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6741 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6743 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6744 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6746 announcement_sigs: None,
6748 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6749 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6751 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6753 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6754 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6756 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6757 outbound_scid_alias,
6759 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6760 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6762 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6763 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
6768 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6769 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
6771 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6775 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6776 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6777 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6778 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6779 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6780 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6781 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6782 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6783 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6785 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6790 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6791 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6792 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6795 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6796 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6797 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6798 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6801 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6803 next_local_nonce: None,
6807 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6808 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6809 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6810 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6811 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6812 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6813 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6814 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6815 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6816 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6817 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6820 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6821 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6823 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6825 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6826 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6827 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6828 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6831 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6832 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6834 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6836 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6837 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
6839 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6840 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6841 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6842 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6843 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6844 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6847 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6848 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6850 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6851 if funding_created.is_none() {
6852 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6853 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6855 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6856 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6857 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6858 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6866 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6867 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6868 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6869 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6870 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6871 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6872 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6873 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6874 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6875 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6878 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6879 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6880 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6881 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6882 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6883 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6889 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6890 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6891 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6892 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6893 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6894 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6896 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6898 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6900 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6901 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6906 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6907 // We've exhausted our options
6910 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6911 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6914 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6915 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6916 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6917 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6919 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6920 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6921 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6922 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6923 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6924 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6926 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6928 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6929 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6932 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6933 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6934 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6936 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6937 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6940 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6941 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6944 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6945 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6949 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6950 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6951 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6952 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6953 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6954 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6955 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6956 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6957 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6958 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6959 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6960 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6961 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6962 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6963 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6964 first_per_commitment_point,
6965 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6966 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6967 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6968 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6970 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6975 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6976 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6978 // Check sanity of message fields:
6979 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6982 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6983 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6985 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6986 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6988 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6989 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6991 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6994 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6995 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6996 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6998 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6999 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7002 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7003 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
7006 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7009 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7010 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7013 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7014 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7017 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7018 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7020 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7021 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7023 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7026 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7027 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7029 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7032 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
7036 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
7037 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7040 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7041 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7043 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7044 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7047 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7048 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7051 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7052 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7053 &Some(ref script) => {
7054 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7055 if script.len() == 0 {
7058 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7061 Some(script.clone())
7064 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7066 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7071 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
7072 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7073 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7074 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
7075 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
7077 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7078 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
7080 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
7083 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7084 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
7085 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
7086 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
7087 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7088 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
7091 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7092 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7093 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7096 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
7097 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7099 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7100 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7102 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7107 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7108 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7109 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7110 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7111 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7115 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7116 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7118 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7119 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7121 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7122 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7123 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7124 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7127 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7129 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7130 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7131 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7132 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7134 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7135 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7137 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7138 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7140 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7141 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7142 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7143 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7144 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7145 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7149 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7150 initial_commitment_tx,
7153 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7154 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7158 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7159 if validated.is_err() {
7160 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7163 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7164 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7165 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7166 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7167 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7168 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7169 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7170 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7171 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7172 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7173 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7174 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7176 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7177 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7178 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7179 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7180 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7181 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7182 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7183 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7185 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7186 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7187 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7189 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7191 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7192 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7194 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7196 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
7198 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7199 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7200 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7203 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7205 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7206 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7207 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7208 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7209 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7214 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7215 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7216 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7217 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7220 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7221 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
7222 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7223 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7224 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7225 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7226 if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
7227 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7228 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7231 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7232 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7233 // `static_remote_key`.
7234 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7237 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7238 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7239 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7241 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7242 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7245 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7247 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7248 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7255 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7256 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7257 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7258 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7259 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7260 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7261 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7262 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7263 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7264 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7265 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7268 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
7269 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7271 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7272 // support this channel type.
7273 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7275 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
7276 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7277 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7278 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7279 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
7280 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
7281 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
7282 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7283 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
7286 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
7287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
7290 // Check sanity of message fields:
7291 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
7292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
7294 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
7295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
7297 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
7298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
7300 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7301 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
7302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7304 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
7305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
7307 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7310 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
7312 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7313 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
7314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
7316 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7317 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7319 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7323 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7324 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
7325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
7327 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7330 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7333 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7336 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7337 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7339 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7340 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7342 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7343 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7346 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
7348 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
7349 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
7350 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
7354 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
7355 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7356 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7357 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7358 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7360 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
7361 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
7363 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7364 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
7365 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7367 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
7368 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7371 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
7372 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
7373 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7374 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7378 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7379 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7380 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7381 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7384 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7385 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7386 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7387 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7391 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7392 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7393 &Some(ref script) => {
7394 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7395 if script.len() == 0 {
7398 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7399 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7401 Some(script.clone())
7404 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7406 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7411 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7412 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7413 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7414 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7418 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7419 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7420 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7424 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7425 Ok(script) => script,
7426 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7429 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7430 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7432 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7435 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7439 context: ChannelContext {
7442 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7443 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7445 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7450 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7452 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7453 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7454 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7455 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7457 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7460 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7462 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7463 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7466 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7467 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7468 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7470 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7471 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7472 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7473 pending_update_fee: None,
7474 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7475 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7476 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7477 update_time_counter: 1,
7479 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7481 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7482 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7483 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7484 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7485 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7486 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7488 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7489 signer_pending_funding: false,
7491 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7492 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7493 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7494 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7496 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7497 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7498 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7499 closing_fee_limits: None,
7500 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7502 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7503 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7504 short_channel_id: None,
7505 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7507 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7508 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7509 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7510 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7511 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7512 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7513 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7514 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7515 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7516 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7517 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7518 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7521 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7523 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7524 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7525 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7526 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7527 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7528 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7529 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7531 funding_outpoint: None,
7532 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7534 funding_transaction: None,
7535 is_batch_funding: None,
7537 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7538 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7539 counterparty_node_id,
7541 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7543 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7545 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7546 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7548 announcement_sigs: None,
7550 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7551 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7552 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7553 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7555 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7556 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7558 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7559 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7561 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7562 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7564 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7565 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
7570 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
7572 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7574 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7580 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7581 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7583 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7584 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7585 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7586 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7589 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7590 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7592 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7594 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7595 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7598 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7601 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7602 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7603 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7605 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7606 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7607 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7608 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7610 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7611 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7612 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7613 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7614 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7615 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7616 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7617 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7618 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7619 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7620 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7621 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7622 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7623 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7624 first_per_commitment_point,
7625 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7626 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7627 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7629 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7631 next_local_nonce: None,
7635 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7636 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7638 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7640 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7641 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7644 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7645 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7647 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7648 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7649 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7650 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7651 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7652 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7653 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7654 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7655 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7656 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7657 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7659 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7662 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7663 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7664 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7668 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7669 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7672 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7673 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7675 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7676 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7678 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7680 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7681 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7682 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7683 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7686 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7687 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7688 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7689 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7690 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7692 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7694 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7695 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7696 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7699 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7700 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7701 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7705 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7706 initial_commitment_tx,
7709 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7710 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7713 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7714 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7717 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7719 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7720 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7721 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7722 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7724 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7726 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7727 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7728 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7729 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7730 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7731 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7732 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7733 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7734 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7735 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7736 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7738 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7739 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7740 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7741 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7742 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7743 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7744 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7746 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7747 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7749 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7750 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7751 let mut channel = Channel {
7752 context: self.context,
7754 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7755 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7757 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7761 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7762 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7764 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7770 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7771 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7772 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7773 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7774 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7776 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7777 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7778 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7779 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7785 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7786 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7787 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7788 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7789 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7790 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7795 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7796 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7797 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7798 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7800 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7801 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7802 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7803 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7808 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7809 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7810 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7811 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7812 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7813 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7818 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7819 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7820 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7823 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7825 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7826 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7827 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7828 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7829 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7831 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7832 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7833 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7834 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7836 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7838 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7839 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7840 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7842 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
7844 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7846 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7848 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7850 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7851 // deserialized from that format.
7852 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7853 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7854 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7856 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7858 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7859 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7860 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7862 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7863 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7864 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7865 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7868 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7869 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7870 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7873 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7874 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7875 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7876 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7878 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7879 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7881 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7883 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7885 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7887 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7890 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7892 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7897 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7898 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7899 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7901 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7902 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7903 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7904 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7905 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7906 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7907 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7909 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7911 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7913 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7916 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7917 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7918 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7921 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7923 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7924 preimages.push(preimage);
7926 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7927 reason.write(writer)?;
7929 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7931 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7932 preimages.push(preimage);
7934 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7935 reason.write(writer)?;
7938 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7939 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7942 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7943 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7944 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7945 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7946 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7947 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7949 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7950 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7951 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7954 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7955 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7956 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7957 source.write(writer)?;
7958 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7960 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7961 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7963 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7965 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7966 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7968 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7970 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7971 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7973 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7974 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7976 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7977 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7978 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7980 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7982 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7983 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7988 match self.context.resend_order {
7989 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7990 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7993 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7994 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7995 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7997 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7998 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7999 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8000 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8003 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8004 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8005 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8006 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8007 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8010 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8011 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8012 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8013 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8015 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8016 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8017 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8019 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8021 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8022 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8023 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8024 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8026 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8027 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8028 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8029 // consider the stale state on reload.
8032 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8033 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8034 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8036 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8037 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8038 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8040 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8041 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8043 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8044 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8045 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8047 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8048 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8050 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8053 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8054 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8055 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8057 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8060 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8061 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8063 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8064 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8065 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8067 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8069 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8071 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8073 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8074 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8076 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8077 htlc.write(writer)?;
8080 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8081 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8082 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8084 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8085 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8087 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8088 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8089 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8090 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8091 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8092 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8093 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8095 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8096 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8097 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8098 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8099 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8101 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8102 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8104 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8105 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8106 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8107 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8109 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8111 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8112 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8113 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8114 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8115 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8116 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8117 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8119 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8120 (2, chan_type, option),
8121 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8122 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8123 (5, self.context.config, required),
8124 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8125 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8126 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8127 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8128 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8129 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8130 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8131 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8132 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8133 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8134 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8135 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8136 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8137 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8138 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8139 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8140 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8141 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8142 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8143 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8144 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8145 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8146 (45, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8153 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8154 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8156 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8157 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8159 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8160 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8161 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8163 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8164 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8165 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8166 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8168 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8170 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8171 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8172 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8173 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8174 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8176 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8177 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8180 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8181 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8182 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8184 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8186 let mut keys_data = None;
8188 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8189 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8190 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8191 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8192 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8193 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8194 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8195 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8196 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8197 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8201 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8202 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8203 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8206 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8208 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8209 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8210 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8212 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8214 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8215 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8216 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8217 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8218 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8219 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8220 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8221 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8222 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
8223 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
8224 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8225 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8226 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8231 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8232 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8233 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8234 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8235 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8236 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8237 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8238 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8239 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8240 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8241 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8242 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8244 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8245 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8248 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8249 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8252 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8253 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8255 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8257 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8258 blinding_point: None,
8262 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8263 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8264 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8265 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8266 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8267 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8268 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8269 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8270 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8271 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8272 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8273 blinding_point: None,
8275 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8276 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8277 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8279 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8280 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8281 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8283 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8287 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8288 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8289 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8290 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8293 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8294 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8295 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8297 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8298 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8299 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8300 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8303 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8304 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8305 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8306 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8309 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8311 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8313 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8314 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8315 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8316 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8318 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8319 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8320 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8321 // consider the stale state on reload.
8322 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8325 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8326 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8327 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8329 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8332 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8333 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8334 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8336 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8337 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8338 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8339 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8341 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8342 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8344 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8345 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8347 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8348 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8349 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8351 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8353 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8354 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8356 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8357 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8360 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8362 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8363 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8364 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8365 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8367 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8370 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8371 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8373 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8375 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8376 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8378 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8379 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8381 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8383 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8384 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8385 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8387 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8388 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8389 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8393 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8394 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8395 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8397 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8403 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8404 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8405 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8406 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8407 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8408 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8409 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8410 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8411 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8412 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8414 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8415 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8416 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8417 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8418 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8419 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8420 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8422 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8423 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8424 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8425 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8427 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8429 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8430 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8432 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8434 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8436 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8437 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8439 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8441 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8442 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8443 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8444 (2, channel_type, option),
8445 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8446 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8447 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8448 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8449 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8450 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8451 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8452 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8453 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8454 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8455 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8456 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8457 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8458 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8459 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8460 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8461 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8462 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8463 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8464 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8465 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8466 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8467 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8468 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8469 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8470 (45, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
8473 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8474 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8475 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8476 // required channel parameters.
8477 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8478 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8480 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8482 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8483 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8484 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8485 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8488 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8489 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8490 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8492 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8493 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8495 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8496 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8501 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8502 if iter.next().is_some() {
8503 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8507 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8508 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8509 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8510 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8511 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8514 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8515 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8516 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8518 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8519 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8521 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8522 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8523 // separate u64 values.
8524 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8526 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8528 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8529 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8530 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8531 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8533 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8534 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8536 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8537 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8538 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8539 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8540 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8543 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8544 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8546 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8547 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8548 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8549 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8551 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8552 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8554 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8555 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8556 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8557 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8558 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8561 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8562 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8565 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8566 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8567 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8568 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8569 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8570 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8573 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8574 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8575 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8577 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8582 context: ChannelContext {
8585 config: config.unwrap(),
8589 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8590 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8591 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8594 temporary_channel_id,
8596 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8598 channel_value_satoshis,
8600 latest_monitor_update_id,
8602 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8603 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8606 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8607 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8610 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8611 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8612 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8613 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8617 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8618 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8619 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8620 monitor_pending_forwards,
8621 monitor_pending_failures,
8622 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8624 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8625 signer_pending_funding: false,
8628 holding_cell_update_fee,
8629 next_holder_htlc_id,
8630 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8631 update_time_counter,
8634 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8635 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8636 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8637 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8639 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8640 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8641 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8642 closing_fee_limits: None,
8643 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8645 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8646 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8648 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8650 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8651 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8652 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8653 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8654 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8658 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8661 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8663 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8664 funding_transaction,
8667 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8668 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8669 counterparty_node_id,
8671 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8675 channel_update_status,
8676 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8680 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8681 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8682 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8683 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8685 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8686 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8688 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8689 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8690 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8692 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8693 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8696 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8698 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8701 local_initiated_shutdown,
8703 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8712 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8713 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8714 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8715 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8716 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8717 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8718 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8719 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8720 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8721 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8722 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8723 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8724 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8725 use crate::ln::msgs;
8726 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8727 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8728 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8729 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8730 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8731 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8732 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8733 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8734 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8735 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8736 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8737 use crate::util::test_utils;
8738 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8739 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8740 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8741 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8742 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8743 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8744 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8745 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8746 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8747 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8748 use crate::prelude::*;
8751 fn test_channel_state_order() {
8752 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
8753 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
8754 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
8756 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
8757 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8758 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
8759 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
8762 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8765 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8766 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8772 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8773 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8774 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8775 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8779 signer: InMemorySigner,
8782 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8783 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8786 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8787 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8789 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8791 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8792 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8795 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8799 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8801 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8803 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8804 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8805 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8808 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8809 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8810 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8811 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8815 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8816 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8817 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8821 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8822 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8823 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8824 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8827 let seed = [42; 32];
8828 let network = Network::Testnet;
8829 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8830 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8831 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8834 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8835 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8836 let config = UserConfig::default();
8837 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8838 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8839 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8841 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8842 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8846 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8847 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8849 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8850 let original_fee = 253;
8851 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8852 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8853 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8854 let seed = [42; 32];
8855 let network = Network::Testnet;
8856 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8858 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8859 let config = UserConfig::default();
8860 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8862 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8863 // same as the old fee.
8864 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8865 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8866 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8870 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8871 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8872 // dust limits are used.
8873 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8874 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8875 let seed = [42; 32];
8876 let network = Network::Testnet;
8877 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8878 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8879 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8881 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8882 // they have different dust limits.
8884 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8885 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8886 let config = UserConfig::default();
8887 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8889 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8890 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8891 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8892 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8893 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8895 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8896 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8897 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8898 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8899 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8901 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8902 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8903 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8904 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8906 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8907 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8908 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8910 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8911 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8912 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8914 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8915 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8916 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8918 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8919 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8920 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8921 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8924 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8926 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8927 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8928 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8929 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8930 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8931 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8932 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8933 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8934 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8936 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8937 blinding_point: None,
8940 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8941 // the dust limit check.
8942 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8943 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8944 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8945 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8947 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8948 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8949 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8950 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8951 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8952 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8953 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8957 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8958 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8959 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8960 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8961 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8962 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8963 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8964 let seed = [42; 32];
8965 let network = Network::Testnet;
8966 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8968 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8969 let config = UserConfig::default();
8970 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8972 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8973 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8975 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8976 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8977 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8978 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8979 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8980 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8982 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8983 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8984 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8985 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8986 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8988 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8990 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8991 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8992 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8993 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8994 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8996 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8997 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8998 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8999 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9000 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9004 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9005 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9006 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9007 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9008 let seed = [42; 32];
9009 let network = Network::Testnet;
9010 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9011 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9012 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9014 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9016 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9017 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9018 let config = UserConfig::default();
9019 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9021 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9022 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9023 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9024 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9026 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9027 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9028 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9030 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9031 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9032 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9033 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9035 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9036 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9037 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9039 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9040 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9041 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9043 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9044 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9045 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9046 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9047 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9048 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9049 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9051 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9053 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9054 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9055 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9056 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9057 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9061 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9062 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9063 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9064 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9065 let seed = [42; 32];
9066 let network = Network::Testnet;
9067 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9068 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9069 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9071 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9072 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9073 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9074 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9075 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9076 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9077 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9078 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9080 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9081 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9082 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9083 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9084 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9085 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9087 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9088 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9089 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9090 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9092 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9094 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9095 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9096 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9097 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9098 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9099 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9101 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9102 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9103 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9104 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9106 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9107 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9108 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9109 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9110 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9112 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9113 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9115 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9116 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9117 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9119 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9120 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9121 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9122 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9123 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9125 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9126 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9128 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9129 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9130 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9134 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9136 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9137 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9138 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9140 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9141 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9142 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9143 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9145 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9146 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9147 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9149 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9151 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9152 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9155 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9156 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9157 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9158 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9159 let seed = [42; 32];
9160 let network = Network::Testnet;
9161 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9162 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9163 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9166 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9167 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9168 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9170 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9171 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9173 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9174 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9175 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9177 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9178 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9180 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9182 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9183 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9185 // Channel Negotiations failed
9186 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9187 assert!(result.is_err());
9192 fn channel_update() {
9193 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9194 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9195 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9196 let seed = [42; 32];
9197 let network = Network::Testnet;
9198 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9199 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9200 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9202 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9203 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9204 let config = UserConfig::default();
9205 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9207 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9208 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9209 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9210 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9211 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9213 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9214 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9215 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9216 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9217 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9219 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9220 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9221 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9222 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9224 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9225 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9226 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9228 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9229 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9230 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9232 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9233 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9234 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9236 short_channel_id: 0,
9239 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9240 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9241 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9243 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9244 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9246 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9248 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9250 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9251 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9252 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9253 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9255 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9256 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9257 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9259 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9262 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9266 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9267 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9269 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9270 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9271 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9272 let seed = [42; 32];
9273 let network = Network::Testnet;
9274 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9275 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9277 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9278 let config = UserConfig::default();
9279 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9280 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9281 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9283 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9284 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9285 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9287 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9288 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9289 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9291 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9292 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9293 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9294 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9295 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9298 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9300 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9301 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9302 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9303 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9307 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9308 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9309 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9311 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9314 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9316 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9317 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9318 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9319 blinding_point: None,
9321 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9322 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9324 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9327 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9330 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9332 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9335 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9336 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9337 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9339 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9340 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9343 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9344 blinding_point: None,
9346 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9347 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9350 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9351 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9353 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9354 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9356 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9359 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9360 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9361 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9362 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9363 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9364 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9365 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9366 } = &mut dummy_add {
9367 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9368 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9370 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9371 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9372 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9374 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9377 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9379 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9380 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9381 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9382 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9383 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9384 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9385 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9386 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9389 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9391 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9392 use bitcoin::sighash;
9393 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9394 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9395 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9396 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9397 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9398 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9399 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9400 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9401 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9402 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9403 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9404 use crate::sync::Arc;
9405 use core::str::FromStr;
9406 use hex::DisplayHex;
9408 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9409 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9410 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9411 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9413 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9415 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9416 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9417 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9418 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9419 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9421 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9422 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9428 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9429 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9430 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9432 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9433 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9434 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9435 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9436 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9437 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9439 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9441 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9442 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9443 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9444 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9445 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9446 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9448 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9449 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9450 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9451 selected_contest_delay: 144
9453 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9454 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9456 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9457 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9459 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9460 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9462 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9463 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9465 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9466 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9467 // build_commitment_transaction.
9468 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9469 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9470 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9471 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9472 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9474 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9475 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9476 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9477 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9481 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9482 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9483 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9484 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9488 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9489 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9490 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9492 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9493 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9495 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9496 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9498 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9500 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9501 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9502 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9503 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9504 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9505 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9506 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9508 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9509 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9510 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9511 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9513 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9514 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9515 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9517 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9519 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9520 commitment_tx.clone(),
9521 counterparty_signature,
9522 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9523 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9524 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9526 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9527 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9529 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9530 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9531 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9533 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9534 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9537 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9538 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9540 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9541 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9542 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9543 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9544 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9545 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9546 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9547 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9549 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9552 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9553 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9554 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9558 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9561 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9562 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9563 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9564 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9565 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9566 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9568 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9569 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9570 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9571 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9573 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9574 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9575 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9576 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9577 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9579 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9580 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9581 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9582 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9583 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9584 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9586 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9590 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9591 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9592 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9593 "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", {});
9595 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9596 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9598 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9599 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9600 "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", {});
9602 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9603 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9604 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9605 "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", {});
9607 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9608 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9610 amount_msat: 1000000,
9612 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9613 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9615 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9618 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9619 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9621 amount_msat: 2000000,
9623 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9624 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9626 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9629 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9630 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9632 amount_msat: 2000000,
9634 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9635 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9636 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9637 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9638 blinding_point: None,
9640 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9643 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9644 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9646 amount_msat: 3000000,
9648 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9649 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9650 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9651 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9652 blinding_point: None,
9654 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9657 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9658 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9660 amount_msat: 4000000,
9662 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9663 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9665 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9669 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9670 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9671 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9673 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9674 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9675 "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", {
9678 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9679 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9680 "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" },
9683 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9684 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9685 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9688 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9689 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9690 "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" },
9693 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9694 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9695 "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" },
9698 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9699 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9700 "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" }
9703 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9704 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9705 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9707 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9708 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9709 "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", {
9712 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9713 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9714 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
9717 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9718 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9719 "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" },
9722 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9723 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9724 "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" },
9727 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9728 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9729 "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" },
9732 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9733 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9734 "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" }
9737 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9738 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9739 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9741 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9742 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9743 "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", {
9746 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9747 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9748 "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" },
9751 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9752 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9753 "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" },
9756 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9757 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9758 "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" },
9761 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9762 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9763 "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" }
9766 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9767 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9768 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9769 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9771 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9772 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9773 "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", {
9776 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9777 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9778 "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" },
9781 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9782 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9783 "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" },
9786 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9787 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9788 "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" },
9791 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9792 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9793 "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" }
9796 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9797 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9798 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9799 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9801 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9802 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9803 "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", {
9806 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9807 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9808 "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" },
9811 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9812 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9813 "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" },
9816 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9817 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9818 "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" },
9821 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9822 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9823 "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" }
9826 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9827 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9828 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9830 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9831 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9832 "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", {
9835 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9836 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9837 "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" },
9840 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9841 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9842 "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" },
9845 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9846 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9847 "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" }
9850 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9851 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9852 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9854 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9855 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9856 "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", {
9859 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9860 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9861 "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" },
9864 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9865 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9866 "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" },
9869 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9870 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9871 "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" }
9874 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9875 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9876 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9878 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9879 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9880 "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", {
9883 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9884 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9885 "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" },
9888 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9889 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9890 "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" }
9893 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9894 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9895 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9896 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9897 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9898 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9900 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9901 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9902 "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", {
9905 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9906 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9907 "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" },
9910 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9911 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9912 "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" }
9915 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9916 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9917 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9918 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9919 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9921 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9922 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9923 "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", {
9926 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9927 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9928 "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" },
9931 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9932 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9933 "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" }
9936 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9937 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9938 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9940 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9941 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9942 "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", {
9945 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9946 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9947 "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" }
9950 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9951 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9952 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9953 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9954 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9956 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9957 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9958 "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", {
9961 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9962 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9963 "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" }
9966 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9967 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9968 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9969 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9970 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9972 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9973 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9974 "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", {
9977 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9978 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9979 "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9982 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9983 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9984 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9985 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9987 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9988 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9989 "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", {});
9991 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9992 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9993 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9994 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9995 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9997 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9998 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9999 "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", {});
10001 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10002 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10003 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10004 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10005 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10007 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10008 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10009 "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", {});
10011 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10012 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10013 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10015 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10016 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10017 "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", {});
10019 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10020 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10021 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10022 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10023 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10025 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10026 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10027 "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", {});
10029 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10030 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10031 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10032 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10033 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10035 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10036 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10037 "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", {});
10039 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10040 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10041 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10042 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10043 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10044 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10046 amount_msat: 2000000,
10048 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10049 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10051 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10054 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10055 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10056 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10058 amount_msat: 5000001,
10060 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10061 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10062 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10063 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10064 blinding_point: None,
10066 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10069 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10070 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10072 amount_msat: 5000000,
10074 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10075 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10076 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10077 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10078 blinding_point: None,
10080 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10084 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10085 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10086 "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", {
10089 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10090 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10091 "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" },
10093 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10094 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10095 "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" },
10097 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10098 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10099 "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" }
10102 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10103 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10104 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10105 "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", {
10108 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10109 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10110 "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" },
10112 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10113 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10114 "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" },
10116 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10117 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10118 "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" }
10123 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10124 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10126 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10127 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10128 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10129 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10131 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10132 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10133 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10135 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10136 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10138 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10139 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10141 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10142 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10143 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10147 fn test_key_derivation() {
10148 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10149 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10151 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10152 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10154 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10155 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10157 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10158 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10160 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10161 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10163 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10164 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10166 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10167 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10171 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10172 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10173 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10174 let seed = [42; 32];
10175 let network = Network::Testnet;
10176 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10177 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10179 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10180 let config = UserConfig::default();
10181 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10182 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10184 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10185 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10187 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10188 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10189 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10190 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10191 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10192 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10193 assert!(res.is_ok());
10197 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10198 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10199 // resulting `channel_type`.
10200 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10201 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10202 let network = Network::Testnet;
10203 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10204 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10206 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10207 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10209 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10210 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10212 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10213 // need to signal it.
10214 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10215 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10216 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10217 &config, 0, 42, None
10219 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10221 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10222 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10223 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10225 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10226 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10227 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10231 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10232 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10233 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10234 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10235 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10238 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10239 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10243 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10244 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10245 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10246 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10247 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10248 let network = Network::Testnet;
10249 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10250 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10252 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10253 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10255 let config = UserConfig::default();
10257 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10258 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10259 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10260 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10261 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10263 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10264 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10265 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10269 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10270 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10271 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
10273 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10274 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10275 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10276 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10277 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10278 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10280 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10284 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10285 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10287 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10288 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10289 let network = Network::Testnet;
10290 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10291 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10293 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10294 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10296 let config = UserConfig::default();
10298 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10299 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10300 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10301 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10302 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10303 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10304 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10305 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10307 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10308 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10309 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10310 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10311 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10312 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10316 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10317 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10319 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10320 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10321 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10322 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10324 assert!(res.is_err());
10326 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10327 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10328 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10330 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10331 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10332 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10335 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10337 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10338 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10339 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10340 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10343 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10344 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10346 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10347 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10349 assert!(res.is_err());
10353 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10354 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10355 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10356 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10357 let seed = [42; 32];
10358 let network = Network::Testnet;
10359 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10360 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10361 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10363 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10364 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10365 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10366 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10368 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10369 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10370 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10375 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10385 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10386 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10387 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10392 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10393 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10399 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10402 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10403 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10404 &accept_channel_msg,
10405 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10406 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10409 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10410 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10411 let tx = Transaction {
10413 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10417 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10420 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10423 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10424 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10425 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10426 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10427 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10428 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10432 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10433 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10441 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10442 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10443 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10444 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10446 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10447 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10454 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10455 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10456 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10457 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10458 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10460 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10461 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10462 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10470 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10471 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10474 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10475 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10476 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10477 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());