1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
308 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
309 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
310 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
311 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
312 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
314 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
316 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
318 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
320 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
324 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
326 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
327 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
328 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
330 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
331 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
333 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
334 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
335 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
336 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
337 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
339 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
340 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
344 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
350 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
353 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
354 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
356 holding_cell_msat: u64,
357 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
360 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
361 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
362 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
363 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
364 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
365 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
366 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
367 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
368 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
369 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
372 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
373 struct HTLCCandidate {
375 origin: HTLCInitiator,
379 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
387 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
389 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
391 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
392 htlc_value_msat: u64,
393 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
398 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
399 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
400 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
401 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
402 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
404 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
405 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
406 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
407 htlc_value_msat: u64,
409 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
410 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
414 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
415 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
416 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
417 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
418 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
419 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
420 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
421 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
422 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
423 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
424 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
427 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
428 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
429 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
430 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
431 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
432 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
434 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
437 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
438 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
439 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
440 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
441 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
442 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
443 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
444 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
445 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
446 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
447 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
448 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
449 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
450 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
451 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
453 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
454 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
455 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
456 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
458 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
459 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
460 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
461 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
463 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
464 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
465 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
466 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
467 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
469 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
470 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
471 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
472 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
474 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
475 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
476 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
478 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
479 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
480 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
481 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
482 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
484 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
485 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
486 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
487 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
488 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
490 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
494 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
495 (0, update, required),
496 (2, blocked, required),
499 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
500 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
501 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
504 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
505 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
506 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
507 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
509 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
510 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
511 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
512 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
514 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
518 channel_id: [u8; 32],
519 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
522 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
523 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
525 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
526 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
527 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
529 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
530 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
531 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
532 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
534 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
535 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
537 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
539 holder_signer: Signer,
540 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
541 destination_script: Script,
543 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
544 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
545 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
547 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
548 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
549 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
550 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
551 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
552 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
554 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
555 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
556 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
557 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
558 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
559 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
561 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
563 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
564 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
565 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
567 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
568 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
569 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
570 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
571 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
572 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
573 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
575 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
577 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
578 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
579 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
580 // HTLCs with similar state.
581 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
582 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
583 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
584 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
585 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
586 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
587 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
588 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
589 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
592 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
593 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
594 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
596 update_time_counter: u32,
598 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
599 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
600 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
601 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
602 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
603 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
605 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
606 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
608 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
609 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
610 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
611 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
613 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
614 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
616 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
618 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
620 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
621 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
622 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
623 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
624 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
625 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
627 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
628 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
629 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
630 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
631 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
633 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
634 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
635 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
636 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
637 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
638 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
639 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
640 channel_creation_height: u32,
642 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
647 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
650 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
652 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
655 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
657 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
659 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
660 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
663 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
665 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
667 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
668 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
670 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
672 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
673 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
674 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
676 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
678 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
679 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
681 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
682 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
683 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
685 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
687 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
689 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
690 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
691 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
692 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
694 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
695 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
696 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
698 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
699 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
700 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
702 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
703 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
704 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
705 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
707 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
709 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
711 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
712 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
713 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
714 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
715 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
717 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
718 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
720 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
721 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
722 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
723 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
724 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
725 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
726 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
727 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
729 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
730 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
732 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
733 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
734 // the channel's funding UTXO.
736 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
737 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
738 // associated channel mapping.
740 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
741 // to store all of them.
742 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
744 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
745 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
746 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
747 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
748 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
750 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
751 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
753 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
754 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
756 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
757 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
758 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
760 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
761 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
762 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
763 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
764 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
767 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
768 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
770 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
771 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
772 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
776 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
778 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
779 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
780 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
781 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
785 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
787 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
789 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
791 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
792 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
793 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
794 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
795 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
797 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
798 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
800 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
802 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
803 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
805 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
806 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
807 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
808 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
809 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
810 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
812 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
813 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
815 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
816 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
817 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
818 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
819 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
821 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
822 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
824 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
825 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
827 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
828 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
829 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
830 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
836 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
837 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
839 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
840 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
841 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
846 macro_rules! secp_check {
847 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
850 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
855 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
856 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
857 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
858 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
860 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
862 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
863 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
864 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
866 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
869 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
871 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
874 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
875 /// required by us according to the configured or default
876 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
878 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
880 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
881 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
882 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
883 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
884 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
887 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
888 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
889 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
890 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
891 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
892 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
893 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
896 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
897 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
900 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
901 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
902 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
903 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
904 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
905 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
906 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
907 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
908 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
909 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
912 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
913 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
914 // `only_static_remotekey`.
916 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
917 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
918 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
919 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
926 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
927 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
928 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
929 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
930 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
931 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
932 // We've exhausted our options
935 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
936 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
939 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
940 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
941 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
942 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
944 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
945 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
946 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
947 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
948 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
949 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
951 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
953 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
957 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
958 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
959 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
960 outbound_scid_alias: u64
961 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
962 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
963 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
964 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
966 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
967 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
968 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
969 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
971 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
972 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
974 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
977 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
978 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
981 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
984 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
985 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
986 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
987 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
988 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
991 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
992 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
994 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
996 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
997 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
998 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
999 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1002 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1003 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1005 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1006 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1007 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1008 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1012 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1013 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1014 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1018 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1019 Ok(script) => script,
1020 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1023 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1028 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1029 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1030 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1031 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1036 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1038 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1039 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1040 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1041 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1043 channel_value_satoshis,
1045 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1048 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1051 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1052 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1055 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1056 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1057 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1058 pending_update_fee: None,
1059 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1060 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1061 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1062 update_time_counter: 1,
1064 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1066 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1067 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1068 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1069 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1070 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1071 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1073 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1074 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1075 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1076 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1078 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1079 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1080 closing_fee_limits: None,
1081 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1083 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1085 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1086 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1087 short_channel_id: None,
1088 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1090 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1091 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1092 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1093 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1094 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1095 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1096 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1097 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1098 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1099 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1100 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1101 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1103 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1105 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1106 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1107 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1108 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1109 counterparty_parameters: None,
1110 funding_outpoint: None,
1111 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1112 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1114 funding_transaction: None,
1116 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1117 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1118 counterparty_node_id,
1120 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1122 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1124 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1125 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1127 announcement_sigs: None,
1129 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1130 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1131 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1132 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1134 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1136 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1137 outbound_scid_alias,
1139 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1140 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1142 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1143 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1148 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1152 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1153 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1154 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1156 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1157 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1158 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1159 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1160 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1161 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1162 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1165 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1166 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1167 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1168 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1169 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1170 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1171 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1172 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1174 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1175 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1184 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1185 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1186 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1187 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1188 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1189 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1190 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1191 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1192 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1193 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1194 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1197 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1199 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1200 // support this channel type.
1201 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1202 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1206 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1207 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1208 // `static_remote_key`.
1209 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1212 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1213 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1216 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1219 channel_type.clone()
1221 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1222 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1223 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1227 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1229 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1230 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1231 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1232 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1233 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1234 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1235 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1236 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1237 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1240 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1241 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1244 // Check sanity of message fields:
1245 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1248 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1251 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1254 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1255 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1258 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1261 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1264 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1266 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1267 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1270 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1273 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1277 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1278 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1281 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1284 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1285 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1287 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1290 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1293 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1296 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1300 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1302 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1303 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1308 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1309 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1310 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1311 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1314 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1317 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1318 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1319 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1321 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1325 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1326 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1327 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1328 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1329 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1333 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1334 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1335 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1336 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1340 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1341 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1342 &Some(ref script) => {
1343 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1344 if script.len() == 0 {
1347 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1348 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1350 Some(script.clone())
1353 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1360 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1361 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1362 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1363 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1367 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1368 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1369 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1373 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1374 Ok(script) => script,
1375 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1378 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1379 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1381 let chan = Channel {
1384 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1385 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1387 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1392 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1394 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1395 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1396 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1397 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1400 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1403 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1406 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1407 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1408 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1410 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1411 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1412 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1413 pending_update_fee: None,
1414 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1415 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1416 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1417 update_time_counter: 1,
1419 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1421 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1422 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1423 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1424 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1425 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1426 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1428 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1429 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1430 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1431 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1433 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1434 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1435 closing_fee_limits: None,
1436 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1438 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1440 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1441 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1442 short_channel_id: None,
1443 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1445 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1446 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1447 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1448 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1449 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1450 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1451 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1452 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1453 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1454 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1455 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1456 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1457 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1459 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1461 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1462 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1463 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1464 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1465 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1466 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1467 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1469 funding_outpoint: None,
1470 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1471 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1473 funding_transaction: None,
1475 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1476 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1477 counterparty_node_id,
1479 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1481 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1483 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1484 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1486 announcement_sigs: None,
1488 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1489 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1490 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1491 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1493 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1495 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1496 outbound_scid_alias,
1498 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1499 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1501 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1502 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1507 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1513 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1514 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1515 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1516 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1517 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1519 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1520 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1521 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1522 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1523 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1524 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1525 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1527 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1528 where L::Target: Logger
1530 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1531 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1532 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1534 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1535 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1536 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1537 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1539 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1540 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1541 if match update_state {
1542 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1543 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1544 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1545 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1546 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1548 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1552 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1553 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1554 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1555 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1557 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1558 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1559 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1561 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1562 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1563 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1564 transaction_output_index: None
1569 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1570 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1571 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1572 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1573 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1576 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1578 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1579 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1580 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1582 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1583 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1586 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1587 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1590 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1592 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1593 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1594 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1596 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1597 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1603 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1604 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1605 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1606 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1607 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1608 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1609 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1613 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1614 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1616 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1618 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1619 if generated_by_local {
1620 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1621 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1630 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1632 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1633 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1634 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1635 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1636 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1637 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1638 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1641 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1642 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1643 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1644 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1648 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1649 preimages.push(preimage);
1653 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1654 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1656 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1658 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1659 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1661 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1662 if !generated_by_local {
1663 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1671 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1672 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1673 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1674 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1675 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1676 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1677 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1678 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1680 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1682 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1683 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1684 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1685 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1687 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1689 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1690 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1691 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1692 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1695 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1696 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1697 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1698 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1700 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1703 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1704 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1705 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1706 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1708 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1711 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1712 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1717 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1718 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1723 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1725 let channel_parameters =
1726 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1727 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1728 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1731 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1736 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1739 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1740 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1741 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1742 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1744 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1745 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1746 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1754 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1755 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1761 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1762 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1763 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1764 // outside of those situations will fail.
1765 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1769 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1774 1 + // script length (0)
1778 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1779 2 + // witness marker and flag
1780 1 + // witness element count
1781 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1782 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1783 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1784 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1785 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1786 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1788 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1789 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1790 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1796 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1797 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1798 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1799 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1801 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1802 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1803 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1805 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1806 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1807 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1808 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1809 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1810 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1813 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1814 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1817 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1818 value_to_holder = 0;
1821 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1822 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1823 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1824 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1826 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1827 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1830 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1831 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1835 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1836 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1837 /// our counterparty!)
1838 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1839 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1840 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1841 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1842 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1843 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1844 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1846 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1850 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1851 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1852 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1853 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1854 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1855 //may see payments to it!
1856 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1857 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1858 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1860 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1863 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1864 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1865 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1866 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1867 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1870 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1873 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1874 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1876 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1878 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1879 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1880 where L::Target: Logger {
1881 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1882 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1883 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1884 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1885 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1886 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1887 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1888 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1892 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1893 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1894 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1895 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1897 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1898 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1900 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1902 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1904 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1905 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1906 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1908 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1909 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1910 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1911 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1912 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1914 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1915 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1916 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1918 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1919 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1921 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1924 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1925 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1929 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1933 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1934 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1935 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1936 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1937 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1938 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1941 // Now update local state:
1943 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1944 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1945 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1946 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1947 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1948 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1949 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1953 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1954 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1955 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1956 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1957 // do not not get into this branch.
1958 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1959 match pending_update {
1960 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1961 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1962 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1963 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1964 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1965 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1966 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1969 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1970 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1971 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1972 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1973 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1974 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1975 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1981 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1982 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1983 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1985 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1986 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1987 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1989 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1990 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1993 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1994 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1996 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1997 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1999 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2000 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2003 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2006 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2007 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2008 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2009 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2014 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2015 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2016 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2017 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2018 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2019 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2020 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2021 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2022 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2023 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2024 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2025 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2026 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2027 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2028 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2029 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2030 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2032 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2034 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2035 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2036 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2037 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2038 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2039 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2040 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2042 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2043 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2046 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2047 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2048 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2049 update, blocked: true,
2054 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2055 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2056 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2057 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2061 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2065 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2066 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2067 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2068 /// before we fail backwards.
2070 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2071 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2072 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2073 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2074 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2075 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2076 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2079 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2080 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2081 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2082 /// before we fail backwards.
2084 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2085 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2086 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2087 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2088 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2089 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2090 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2092 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2094 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2095 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2096 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2098 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2099 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2100 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2102 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2103 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2104 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2106 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2111 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2118 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2119 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2120 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2121 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2122 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2126 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2127 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2128 force_holding_cell = true;
2131 // Now update local state:
2132 if force_holding_cell {
2133 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2134 match pending_update {
2135 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2136 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2137 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2138 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2142 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2143 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2144 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2151 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2152 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2153 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2159 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2161 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2162 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2165 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2166 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2167 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2172 // Message handlers:
2174 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2175 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2177 // Check sanity of message fields:
2178 if !self.is_outbound() {
2179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2181 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2184 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2187 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2190 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2193 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2195 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2197 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2198 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2199 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2201 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2202 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2205 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2208 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2212 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2213 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2216 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2219 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2222 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2225 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2228 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2231 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2232 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2235 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2236 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2239 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2240 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2242 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2243 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2246 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2249 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2250 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2251 &Some(ref script) => {
2252 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2253 if script.len() == 0 {
2256 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2259 Some(script.clone())
2262 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2269 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2270 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2271 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2272 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2273 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2275 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2276 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2278 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2281 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2282 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2283 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2284 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2285 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2286 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2289 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2290 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2291 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2294 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2295 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2297 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2298 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2303 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2304 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2306 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2307 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2309 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2310 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2311 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2312 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2313 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2314 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2315 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2316 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2317 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2320 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2321 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2323 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2324 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2325 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2326 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2328 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2329 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2331 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2332 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2335 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2336 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2339 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2340 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2341 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2343 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2346 if self.is_outbound() {
2347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2349 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2350 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2351 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2355 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2358 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2359 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2360 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2361 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2364 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2365 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2366 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2367 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2368 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2370 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2372 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2373 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2377 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2378 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2379 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2383 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2384 initial_commitment_tx,
2387 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2388 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2391 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2392 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2394 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2396 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2397 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2398 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2399 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2400 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2401 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2402 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2403 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2404 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2405 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2406 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2408 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2410 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2412 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2413 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2414 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2415 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2417 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2419 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2420 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2422 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2423 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2426 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2427 }, channel_monitor))
2430 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2431 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2432 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2433 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2434 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2436 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2439 if !self.is_outbound() {
2440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2442 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2445 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2446 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2447 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2448 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2451 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2453 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2454 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2455 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2456 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2458 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2459 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2461 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2462 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2464 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2465 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2466 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2467 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2468 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2469 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2473 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2474 initial_commitment_tx,
2477 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2478 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2481 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2482 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2485 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2486 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2487 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2488 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2489 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2490 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2491 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2492 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2493 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2494 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2495 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2496 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2498 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2500 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2502 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2503 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2504 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2505 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2507 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2509 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2510 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2514 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2515 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2517 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2518 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2519 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2520 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2522 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2525 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2526 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2527 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2530 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2531 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2532 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2533 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2534 // when routing outbound payments.
2535 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2539 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2541 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2542 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2543 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2544 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2545 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2546 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2547 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2548 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2549 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2551 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2552 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2553 let expected_point =
2554 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2555 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2557 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2558 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2559 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2560 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2561 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2562 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2564 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2565 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2566 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2567 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2568 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2570 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2578 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2579 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2581 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2583 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2586 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2587 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2588 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2589 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2595 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2596 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2597 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2598 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2599 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2600 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2601 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2602 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2603 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2606 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2609 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2610 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2611 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2613 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2614 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2615 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2616 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2617 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2618 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2620 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2621 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2627 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2628 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2629 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2630 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2631 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2632 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2633 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2634 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2635 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2638 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2641 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2642 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2643 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2645 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2646 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2647 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2648 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2649 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2650 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2652 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2653 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2657 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2658 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2659 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2660 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2661 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2662 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2663 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2665 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2666 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2668 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2675 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2676 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2677 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2678 /// corner case properly.
2679 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2680 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2681 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2682 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2684 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2685 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2686 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2687 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2690 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2692 let outbound_capacity_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
2693 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2695 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2697 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2699 if self.is_outbound() {
2700 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2701 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2703 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2704 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2706 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2707 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2708 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2709 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2712 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2713 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2714 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2715 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2717 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2718 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2719 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2720 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
2721 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2722 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2723 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2724 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2725 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2726 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2728 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2731 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2732 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2733 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2734 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2735 real_dust_limit_success_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2738 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2739 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2741 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2742 let remote_balance_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat)
2743 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2745 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
2746 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2747 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2748 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2752 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2754 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2755 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2756 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2757 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2758 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2759 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2761 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2762 (self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2764 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2765 (self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2766 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2768 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2769 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
2770 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2771 Some(self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2772 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2775 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2776 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
2777 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2778 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2779 self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2780 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2783 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2784 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2785 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2787 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2791 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2792 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2794 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2795 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2799 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2800 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2801 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2802 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2804 outbound_capacity_msat,
2805 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2806 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2811 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2812 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2815 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2816 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2817 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2818 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2819 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2820 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2823 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2824 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2826 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2827 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2830 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2831 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2833 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2834 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2836 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2837 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2839 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2840 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2841 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2843 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2846 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2847 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2849 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2850 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2852 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2853 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2855 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2860 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2861 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2867 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2868 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2869 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2872 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2873 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2874 included_htlcs += 1;
2877 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2878 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2882 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2883 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2884 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2885 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2886 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2887 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2892 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2894 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2895 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2900 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2901 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2905 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2906 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2907 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2910 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2911 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2913 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2914 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2915 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2917 total_pending_htlcs,
2918 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2919 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2920 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2922 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2923 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2924 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2926 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2928 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2933 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2934 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2936 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2937 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2939 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2940 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2942 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2943 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2944 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2946 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2949 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2950 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2952 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2953 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2955 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2956 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2958 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2959 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2963 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2964 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2970 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2971 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2972 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2973 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2974 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2975 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2978 included_htlcs += 1;
2981 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2982 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2985 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2986 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2988 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2989 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2990 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2995 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2996 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2997 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3000 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3001 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
3003 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3004 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3006 total_pending_htlcs,
3007 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3008 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3009 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
3011 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3012 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3013 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3015 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
3017 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3022 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3023 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
3024 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3025 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3026 if local_sent_shutdown {
3027 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3029 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3030 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3031 if remote_sent_shutdown {
3032 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3034 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3037 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3040 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3041 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3043 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3044 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3047 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3048 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3049 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3052 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3055 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3056 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3057 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3058 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3059 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3060 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3061 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3062 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3063 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3064 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3065 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3067 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3068 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3069 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3070 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3071 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3072 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3076 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
3079 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3080 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3081 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3083 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3084 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3085 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3086 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3087 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3088 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3089 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3093 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3094 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3095 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3096 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3097 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3098 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3099 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3103 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3104 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3105 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3106 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3107 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3108 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3111 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3112 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3113 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3114 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3115 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3117 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3121 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3125 if !self.is_outbound() {
3126 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3127 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3128 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3129 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3130 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3131 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3132 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3133 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3134 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3135 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3136 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3137 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3138 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3139 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3140 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3143 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3144 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3145 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3146 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3150 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3153 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3157 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3158 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3159 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3163 // Now update local state:
3164 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3165 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3166 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3167 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3168 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3169 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3170 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3175 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3177 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3178 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3179 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3180 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3181 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3182 None => fail_reason.into(),
3183 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3184 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3185 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3188 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3192 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3194 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3195 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3197 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3203 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3206 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3207 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3210 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3214 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3217 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3218 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3221 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3225 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3229 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3230 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3231 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3233 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3234 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3237 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3241 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3242 where L::Target: Logger
3244 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3247 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3250 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3254 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3256 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3258 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3259 let commitment_txid = {
3260 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3261 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3262 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3264 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3265 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3266 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3267 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3268 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3273 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3275 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3276 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3277 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3278 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3281 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3282 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3283 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3287 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3289 if self.is_outbound() {
3290 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3291 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3292 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3293 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3294 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3295 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3296 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3297 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3298 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3299 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3305 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3309 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3310 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3311 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3312 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3313 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3314 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3315 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3316 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3317 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3318 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3319 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3320 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3321 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3324 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3325 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3326 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3327 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3328 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3329 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3330 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3332 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3333 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3334 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3335 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3336 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3337 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3338 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3341 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3342 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3345 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3347 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3348 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3349 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3352 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3355 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3356 commitment_stats.tx,
3358 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3359 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3360 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3363 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3364 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3366 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3367 let mut need_commitment = false;
3368 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3369 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3370 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3371 need_commitment = true;
3375 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3376 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3377 Some(forward_info.clone())
3379 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3380 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3381 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3382 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3383 need_commitment = true;
3386 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3387 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3388 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3389 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3390 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3391 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3392 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3393 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3394 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3395 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3396 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3397 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3398 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3399 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3401 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3403 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3404 need_commitment = true;
3408 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3409 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3410 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3411 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3412 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3413 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3415 nondust_htlc_sources,
3419 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3420 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3421 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3422 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3424 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3425 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3426 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3427 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3428 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3429 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3430 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3431 // includes the right HTLCs.
3432 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3433 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3434 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3435 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3436 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3437 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3439 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3440 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3441 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3444 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3445 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3446 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3447 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3448 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3449 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3450 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3451 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3452 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3456 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3457 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3458 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3459 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3462 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3463 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3464 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3465 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3466 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3467 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3468 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3469 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3472 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3473 /// for our counterparty.
3474 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3475 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3476 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3477 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3478 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3480 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3481 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3482 updates: Vec::new(),
3485 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3486 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3487 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3488 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3489 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3490 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3491 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3492 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3493 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3494 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3495 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3496 // to rebalance channels.
3497 match &htlc_update {
3498 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3499 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3500 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3503 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3504 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3505 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3506 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3507 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3508 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3509 // into the holding cell without ever being
3510 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3511 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3512 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3515 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3521 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3522 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3523 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3524 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3525 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3526 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3527 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3528 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3529 (msg, monitor_update)
3530 } else { unreachable!() };
3531 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3532 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3534 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3535 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3536 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3537 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3538 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3539 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3540 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3541 // for a full revocation before failing.
3542 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3545 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3547 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3554 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3555 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3557 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3558 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3563 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3564 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3565 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3566 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3567 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3569 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3570 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3571 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3573 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3574 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3580 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3581 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3582 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3583 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3584 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3585 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3586 where L::Target: Logger,
3588 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3591 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3594 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3598 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3600 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3601 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3606 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3607 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3608 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3609 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3610 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3611 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3612 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3613 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3617 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3619 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3620 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3623 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3624 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3626 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3628 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3629 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3630 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3631 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3632 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3633 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3634 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3635 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3639 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3640 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3641 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3642 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3643 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3644 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3645 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3646 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3648 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3649 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3652 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3653 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3654 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3655 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3656 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3657 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3658 let mut require_commitment = false;
3659 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3662 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3663 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3664 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3666 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3667 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3668 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3669 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3670 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3671 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3676 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3677 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3678 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3679 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3680 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3682 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3683 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3684 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3689 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3690 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3692 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3696 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3697 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3699 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3700 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3701 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3702 require_commitment = true;
3703 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3704 match forward_info {
3705 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3706 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3707 require_commitment = true;
3709 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3710 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3711 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3713 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3714 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3715 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3719 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3720 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3721 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3722 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3728 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3729 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3730 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3731 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3733 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3734 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3735 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3736 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3737 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3738 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3739 require_commitment = true;
3743 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3745 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3746 match update_state {
3747 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3748 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3749 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3750 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3751 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3753 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3754 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3755 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3756 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3757 require_commitment = true;
3758 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3759 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3764 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3765 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3766 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3767 if require_commitment {
3768 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3769 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3770 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3771 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3772 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3773 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3774 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3775 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3776 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3778 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3779 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3780 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3781 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3782 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3785 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3786 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3787 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3788 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3789 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3790 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3791 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3793 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3794 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3796 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3797 if require_commitment {
3798 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3800 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3801 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3802 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3803 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3805 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3806 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3807 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3808 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3810 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3811 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3812 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3818 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3819 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3820 /// commitment update.
3821 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3822 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3823 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3826 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3827 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3828 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3829 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3831 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3832 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3833 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3834 if !self.is_outbound() {
3835 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3837 if !self.is_usable() {
3838 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3840 if !self.is_live() {
3841 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3844 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3845 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3846 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3847 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3848 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3849 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3850 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3851 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3852 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3853 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3857 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3858 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3859 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3860 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3861 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3864 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3865 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3869 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3870 force_holding_cell = true;
3873 if force_holding_cell {
3874 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3878 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3879 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3881 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3882 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3887 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3888 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3890 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3892 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3893 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3894 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3895 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3899 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3900 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3901 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3905 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3906 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3909 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3910 // will be retransmitted.
3911 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3912 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3913 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3915 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3916 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3918 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3919 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3920 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3921 // this HTLC accordingly
3922 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3925 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3926 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3927 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3928 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3931 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3932 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3933 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3934 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3935 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3936 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3941 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3943 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3944 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3945 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3946 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3950 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3951 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3952 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3953 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3954 // the update upon reconnection.
3955 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3959 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3960 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3963 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3964 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3965 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3966 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3967 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3968 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3969 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3971 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3972 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3973 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3974 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3975 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3976 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3977 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3979 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3980 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3981 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3982 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3983 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3984 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3985 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3988 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3989 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3990 /// to the remote side.
3991 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3992 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3993 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3994 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3997 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3999 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4000 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4001 let mut found_blocked = false;
4002 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4003 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
4004 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
4008 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
4009 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4010 // first received the funding_signed.
4011 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4012 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4013 self.funding_transaction.take()
4015 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4016 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4017 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4018 funding_broadcastable = None;
4021 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4022 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4023 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4024 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4025 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4026 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4027 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4028 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4029 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4030 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4031 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4032 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4033 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4034 next_per_commitment_point,
4035 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4039 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4041 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4042 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
4043 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4044 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
4045 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4046 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4048 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
4049 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4050 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4051 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4052 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4053 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4057 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4058 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4060 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4061 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
4064 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4065 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4066 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
4067 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4068 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4069 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4070 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4071 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4072 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4076 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4077 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4079 if self.is_outbound() {
4080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4082 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4085 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4086 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4088 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4089 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4090 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4091 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4092 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4093 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4094 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4095 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4096 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4097 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4098 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4100 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4102 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4104 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4110 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4111 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4112 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4113 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4114 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4115 per_commitment_secret,
4116 next_per_commitment_point,
4118 next_local_nonce: None,
4122 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4123 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4124 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4125 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4126 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4128 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4129 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4130 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4131 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4132 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4133 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4134 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4135 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4136 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4141 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4142 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4144 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4145 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4146 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4147 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4148 reason: err_packet.clone()
4151 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4152 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4153 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4154 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4155 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4156 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4159 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4160 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4161 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4162 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4163 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4170 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4171 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4172 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4173 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4177 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4178 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4179 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4180 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4181 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4182 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4186 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4187 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4189 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4190 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4191 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4192 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4193 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4194 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4195 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4196 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4199 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4201 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4202 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4203 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4204 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4208 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4209 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4213 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4214 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4215 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4216 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4217 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4220 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4221 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4222 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4223 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4224 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4227 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4228 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4229 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4230 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4231 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4232 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4233 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4234 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4238 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4239 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4240 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4241 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4243 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4247 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4248 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4249 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4251 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4252 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4253 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4254 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4255 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4259 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4261 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4262 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4263 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4264 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4265 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4266 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4268 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4269 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4270 channel_ready: None,
4271 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4272 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4273 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4277 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4278 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4279 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4280 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4281 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4282 next_per_commitment_point,
4283 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4285 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4286 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4287 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4291 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4292 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4293 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4295 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4296 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4297 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4300 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4306 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4307 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4308 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4309 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4310 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4312 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4313 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4314 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4315 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4316 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4317 next_per_commitment_point,
4318 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4322 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4323 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4324 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4326 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4329 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4330 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4331 raa: required_revoke,
4332 commitment_update: None,
4333 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4335 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4336 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4337 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4339 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4342 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4343 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4344 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4345 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4346 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4347 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4350 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4351 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4352 raa: required_revoke,
4353 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4354 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4358 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4362 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4363 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4364 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4365 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4367 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4369 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4371 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4372 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4373 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4374 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4375 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4376 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4378 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4379 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4380 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4381 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4382 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4384 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4385 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4386 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4387 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4390 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4391 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4392 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4393 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4394 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4395 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4396 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4397 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4398 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4399 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4400 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4401 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4402 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4403 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4404 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4406 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4409 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4410 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4413 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4414 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4415 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4416 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4417 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4418 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4419 self.channel_state &
4420 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4421 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4422 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4423 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4426 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4427 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4428 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4429 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4430 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4431 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4432 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4434 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4440 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4441 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4442 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4443 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4445 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4446 return Ok((None, None));
4449 if !self.is_outbound() {
4450 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4451 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4453 return Ok((None, None));
4456 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4458 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4459 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4460 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4461 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4463 let sig = self.holder_signer
4464 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4465 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4467 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4468 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4469 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4470 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4472 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4473 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4474 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4479 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4480 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4481 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4482 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4484 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4485 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4487 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4488 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4489 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4490 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4491 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4493 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4494 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4498 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4500 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4501 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4504 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4505 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4506 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4509 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4512 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4513 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4514 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4515 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4517 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4520 assert!(send_shutdown);
4521 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4522 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4523 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4525 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4528 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4533 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4535 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4536 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4538 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4539 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4540 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4541 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4542 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4543 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4546 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4547 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4548 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4551 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4552 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4553 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4554 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4558 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4559 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4560 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4561 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4562 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4563 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4565 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4566 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4573 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4574 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4576 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4579 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4580 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4582 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4584 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4585 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4586 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4587 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4588 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4589 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4590 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4591 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4592 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4594 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4595 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4598 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4602 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4603 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4604 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4605 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4607 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4610 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4613 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4614 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4616 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4617 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4620 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4624 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4625 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4626 return Ok((None, None));
4629 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4630 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4631 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4632 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4634 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4636 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4639 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4640 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4641 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4642 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4643 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4647 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4648 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4649 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4653 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4654 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4655 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4656 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4657 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4658 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4659 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4663 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4665 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4666 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4667 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4668 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4670 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4673 let sig = self.holder_signer
4674 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4675 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4677 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4678 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4679 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4680 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4684 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4685 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4686 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4687 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4689 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4690 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4691 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4697 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4698 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4699 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4701 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4702 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4704 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4705 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4708 if !self.is_outbound() {
4709 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4710 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4711 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4712 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4714 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4715 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4716 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4718 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4719 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4722 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4723 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4724 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4725 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4726 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4727 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4728 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4729 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4731 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4734 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4735 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4736 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4737 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4739 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4743 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4744 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4745 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4746 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4748 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4754 // Public utilities:
4756 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4760 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4762 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4763 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4764 self.temporary_channel_id
4767 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4771 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4772 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4773 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4777 /// Gets the channel's type
4778 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4782 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4783 /// is_usable() returns true).
4784 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4785 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4786 self.short_channel_id
4789 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4790 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4791 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4794 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4795 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4796 self.outbound_scid_alias
4798 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4799 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4800 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4801 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4802 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4805 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4806 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4807 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4808 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4811 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4812 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4813 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4816 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4817 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4818 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4819 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4823 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4826 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4827 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4830 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4831 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4834 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4835 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4836 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4839 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4840 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4843 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4844 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4845 self.counterparty_node_id
4848 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4849 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4850 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4853 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4854 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4855 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4858 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4859 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4861 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4862 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4863 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4864 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4866 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4870 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4871 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4872 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4875 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4876 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4877 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4880 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4881 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4882 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4884 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4885 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4890 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4891 self.channel_value_satoshis
4894 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4895 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4898 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4899 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4902 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4903 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4906 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4907 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4908 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4911 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4912 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4913 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4916 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4917 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4918 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4921 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4922 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4923 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4926 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4927 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4928 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4931 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4932 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4933 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4936 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4937 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4938 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4939 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4940 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4943 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4945 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4946 self.prev_config = None;
4950 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4951 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4955 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4956 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4957 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4958 let did_channel_update =
4959 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4960 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4961 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4962 if did_channel_update {
4963 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4964 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4965 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4966 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4968 self.config.options = *config;
4972 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4973 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4974 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4975 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4976 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4977 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4978 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4980 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4981 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4984 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4986 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4987 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4993 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4994 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4995 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4996 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4997 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4998 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4999 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
5001 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
5002 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5009 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
5013 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
5014 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
5015 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
5016 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
5017 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
5018 // which are near the dust limit.
5019 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
5020 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
5021 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
5022 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5023 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
5025 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
5026 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
5028 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
5031 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5032 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5035 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5036 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
5039 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5040 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5044 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
5049 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5051 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
5052 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5053 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5054 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5055 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5056 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5058 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5060 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5068 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5069 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5073 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5074 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
5075 self.update_time_counter
5078 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5079 self.latest_monitor_update_id
5082 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
5083 self.config.announced_channel
5086 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
5087 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
5090 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
5091 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5092 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
5093 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
5096 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
5097 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
5098 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
5101 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
5102 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5103 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
5104 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
5105 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
5108 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5109 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5110 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5111 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5112 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5115 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5117 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5118 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5121 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5122 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5123 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5126 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5127 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5128 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5129 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5130 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5131 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5132 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5133 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5139 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5140 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5141 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5142 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5143 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5144 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5149 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5150 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5152 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5153 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5154 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5155 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5158 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5159 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5162 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5163 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5166 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5167 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5168 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5171 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5172 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5173 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5175 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5176 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5177 if self.channel_state &
5178 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5179 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5180 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5181 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5182 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5185 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5186 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5187 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5188 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5189 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5190 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5192 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5193 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5194 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5196 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5197 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5198 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5199 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5200 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5201 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5207 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5208 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5209 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5212 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5213 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5214 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5217 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5218 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5219 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5222 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5223 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5224 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5225 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5226 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5227 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5232 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5233 self.channel_update_status
5236 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5237 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5238 self.channel_update_status = status;
5241 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5243 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5244 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5245 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5249 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5250 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5251 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5254 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5258 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5259 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5260 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5262 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5263 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5264 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5266 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5267 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5270 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5271 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5272 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5273 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5274 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5275 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5276 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5277 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5278 self.channel_state);
5280 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5284 if need_commitment_update {
5285 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5286 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5287 let next_per_commitment_point =
5288 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5289 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5290 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5291 next_per_commitment_point,
5292 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5296 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5302 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5303 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5304 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5305 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5306 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5307 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5308 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5310 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5313 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5314 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5315 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5316 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5317 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5318 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5319 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5320 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5321 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5322 if self.is_outbound() {
5323 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5324 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5325 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5326 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5327 // channel and move on.
5328 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5329 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5331 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5332 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5333 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5335 if self.is_outbound() {
5336 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5337 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5338 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5339 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5340 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5341 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5345 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5346 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5347 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5348 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5349 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5353 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5354 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5355 // may have already happened for this block).
5356 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5357 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5358 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5359 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5362 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5363 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5364 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5365 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5373 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5374 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5375 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5376 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5378 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5379 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5382 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5384 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5385 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5386 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5387 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5389 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5392 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5395 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5396 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5397 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5398 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5400 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5403 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5404 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5405 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5407 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5408 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5410 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5411 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5412 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5420 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5422 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5423 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5424 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5426 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5427 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5430 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5431 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5432 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5433 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5434 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5435 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5436 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5437 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5438 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5441 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5442 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5443 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5444 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5446 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5447 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5448 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5450 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5451 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5452 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5453 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5455 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5456 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5457 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5458 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5459 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5460 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5461 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5464 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5465 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5467 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5470 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5471 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5472 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5473 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5474 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5475 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5476 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5477 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5478 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5479 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5480 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5481 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5482 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5483 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5484 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5485 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5486 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5492 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5497 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5498 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5500 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5501 if !self.is_outbound() {
5502 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5504 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5505 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5508 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5509 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5512 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5513 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5517 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5518 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5519 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5520 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5521 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5522 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5523 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5524 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5525 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5526 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5527 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5528 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5529 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5530 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5531 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5532 first_per_commitment_point,
5533 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5534 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5535 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5536 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5538 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5542 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5543 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5546 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5547 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5548 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5549 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5552 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5553 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5555 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5556 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5557 if self.is_outbound() {
5558 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5560 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5561 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5563 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5564 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5566 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5567 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5570 self.user_id = user_id;
5571 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5573 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5576 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5577 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5578 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5580 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5581 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5582 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5583 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5585 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5586 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5587 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5588 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5589 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5590 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5591 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5592 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5593 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5594 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5595 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5596 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5597 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5598 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5599 first_per_commitment_point,
5600 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5601 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5602 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5604 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5606 next_local_nonce: None,
5610 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5611 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5613 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5615 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5616 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5619 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5620 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5621 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5622 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5623 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5624 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5627 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5628 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5629 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5630 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5631 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5632 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5633 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5634 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5635 if !self.is_outbound() {
5636 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5638 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5639 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5641 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5642 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5643 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5644 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5647 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5648 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5650 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5653 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5654 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5659 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5661 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5663 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5664 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5665 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5667 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5668 temporary_channel_id,
5669 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5670 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5673 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5675 next_local_nonce: None,
5679 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5680 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5681 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5682 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5684 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5687 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5688 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5689 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5690 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5691 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5692 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5694 if !self.is_usable() {
5695 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5698 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5699 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5700 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5701 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5703 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5704 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5706 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5707 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5708 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5709 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5710 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5711 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5717 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5718 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5719 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5720 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5722 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5725 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5729 if !self.is_usable() {
5733 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5734 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5738 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5742 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5743 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5746 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5750 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5752 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5757 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5759 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5764 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5766 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5767 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5768 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5769 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5770 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5774 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5776 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5777 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5778 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5779 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5780 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5781 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5782 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5784 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5785 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5786 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5787 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5788 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5789 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5790 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5791 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5792 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5793 contents: announcement,
5796 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5800 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5801 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5802 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5803 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5804 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5805 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5806 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5807 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5809 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5811 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5812 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5813 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5814 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5816 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5818 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5819 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5822 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5823 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5824 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5825 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5828 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5831 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5832 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5833 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5834 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5835 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5836 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5839 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5841 Err(_) => return None,
5843 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5844 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5849 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5850 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5851 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5852 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5853 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5854 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5855 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5856 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5857 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5858 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5859 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5860 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5861 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5862 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5863 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5864 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5867 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5870 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5871 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5872 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5873 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5874 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5875 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5876 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5877 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5879 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5880 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5881 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5882 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5883 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5884 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5885 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5886 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5887 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5889 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5890 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5891 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5892 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5893 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5894 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5895 next_funding_txid: None,
5900 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5902 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5903 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5904 /// commitment update.
5906 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5907 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5908 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5909 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5911 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5912 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5914 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5915 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5920 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5921 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5923 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5925 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5926 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5928 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5929 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5930 /// regenerate them.
5932 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5933 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5935 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5936 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5937 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5938 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5939 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5940 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5942 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5943 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5944 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5947 if amount_msat == 0 {
5948 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5951 let available_balances = self.get_available_balances();
5952 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5953 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5954 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5957 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5958 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5959 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5962 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5963 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5964 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5965 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5966 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5967 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5968 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5972 let need_holding_cell = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5973 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5974 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5975 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5976 else { "to peer" });
5978 if need_holding_cell {
5979 force_holding_cell = true;
5982 // Now update local state:
5983 if force_holding_cell {
5984 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5989 onion_routing_packet,
5994 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5995 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5997 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5999 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6003 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6004 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6005 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6009 onion_routing_packet,
6011 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6016 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6017 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6018 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6019 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6021 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6022 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6023 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6025 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6026 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6030 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6031 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6032 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6033 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6034 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6035 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6036 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6039 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6040 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6041 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6042 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6043 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6044 self.pending_update_fee = None;
6047 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6049 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6050 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6051 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6053 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6054 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6057 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6058 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6059 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6060 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6061 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6062 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6063 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6064 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6067 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6071 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6072 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6073 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6074 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6076 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6078 if !self.is_outbound() {
6079 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6080 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6081 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6082 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6083 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6084 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6085 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6086 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6087 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6088 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6094 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6097 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6098 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6099 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6100 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6101 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6102 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6104 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6105 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6106 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6107 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6110 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6111 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6115 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6116 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6118 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6120 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6121 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6122 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6123 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6125 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6126 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6127 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6128 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6129 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6130 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6134 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6135 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6139 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6140 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6143 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6144 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6146 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6147 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6148 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6149 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6150 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6153 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6154 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6155 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6161 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6162 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6163 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6166 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6167 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6170 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6171 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6172 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6173 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6179 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6180 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6182 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6183 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6184 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6185 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6186 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6187 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6188 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6189 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6190 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6193 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6194 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6195 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6197 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6198 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6201 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6202 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6204 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6205 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6206 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6209 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6210 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6211 let mut chan_closed = false;
6212 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6216 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6218 None if !chan_closed => {
6219 // use override shutdown script if provided
6220 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6221 Some(script) => script,
6223 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6224 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6225 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6226 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6230 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6231 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6233 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6239 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6240 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6241 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6242 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6244 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6246 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6248 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6249 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6250 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6251 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6252 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6253 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6256 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6257 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6258 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6261 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6262 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6263 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6266 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6267 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6268 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6269 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6270 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6272 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6273 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6280 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6281 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6283 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6286 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6287 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6288 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6289 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6290 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6291 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6292 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6293 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6294 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6295 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6296 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6298 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6299 // return them to fail the payment.
6300 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6301 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6302 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6304 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6305 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6310 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6311 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6312 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6313 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6314 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6315 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6316 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6317 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6318 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6319 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6320 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6321 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6322 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6327 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6328 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6329 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6332 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6333 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6334 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6336 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6337 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6341 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6345 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6346 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6348 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6354 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6355 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6356 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6357 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6358 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6360 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6361 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6362 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6363 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6369 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6370 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6371 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6372 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6373 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6374 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6379 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6380 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6381 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6382 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6384 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6385 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6386 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6387 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6392 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6393 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6394 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6395 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6396 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6397 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6402 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6403 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6404 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6407 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6409 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6410 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6411 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6412 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6413 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6415 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6416 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6417 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6418 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6420 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6421 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6422 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6424 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6426 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6427 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6428 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6429 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6430 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6431 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6433 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6434 // deserialized from that format.
6435 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6436 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6437 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6439 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6441 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6442 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6443 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6445 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6446 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6447 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6448 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6451 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6452 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6453 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6456 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6457 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6458 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6459 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6461 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6462 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6464 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6466 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6468 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6470 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6473 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6475 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6480 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6482 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6483 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6484 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6485 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6486 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6487 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6488 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6490 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6492 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6494 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6497 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6498 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6499 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6502 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6504 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6505 preimages.push(preimage);
6507 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6508 reason.write(writer)?;
6510 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6512 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6513 preimages.push(preimage);
6515 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6516 reason.write(writer)?;
6521 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6522 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6524 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6526 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6527 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6528 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6529 source.write(writer)?;
6530 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6532 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6534 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6535 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6537 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6539 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6540 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6545 match self.resend_order {
6546 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6547 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6550 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6551 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6552 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6554 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6555 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6556 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6557 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6560 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6561 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6562 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6563 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6564 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6567 if self.is_outbound() {
6568 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6569 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6570 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6572 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6573 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6574 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6576 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6578 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6579 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6580 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6581 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6583 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6584 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6585 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6586 // consider the stale state on reload.
6589 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6590 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6591 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6593 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6594 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6595 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6597 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6598 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6600 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6601 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6602 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6604 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6605 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6607 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6610 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6611 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6612 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6614 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6617 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6618 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6620 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6621 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6622 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6624 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6626 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6628 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6630 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6631 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6632 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6633 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6634 htlc.write(writer)?;
6637 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6638 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6639 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6641 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6642 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6644 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6645 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6646 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6647 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6648 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6649 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6650 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6652 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6653 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6654 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6655 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6656 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6658 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6659 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6661 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6662 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6663 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6664 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6666 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6668 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6669 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6670 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6671 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6672 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6673 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6674 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6676 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6677 (2, chan_type, option),
6678 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6679 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6680 (5, self.config, required),
6681 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6682 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6683 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6684 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6685 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6686 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6687 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6688 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6689 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6690 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6691 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6692 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6693 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6694 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6695 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6696 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6703 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6704 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6706 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6707 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6709 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6710 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6711 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6713 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6714 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6715 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6716 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6718 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6720 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6721 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6722 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6723 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6724 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6726 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6727 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6730 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6731 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6732 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6734 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6736 let mut keys_data = None;
6738 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6739 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6740 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6741 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6742 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6743 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6744 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6745 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6746 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6747 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6751 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6752 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6753 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6756 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6758 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6759 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6760 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6762 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6764 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6765 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6766 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6767 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6768 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6769 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6770 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6771 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6772 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6773 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6774 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6775 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6776 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6781 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6782 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6783 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6784 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6785 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6786 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6787 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6788 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6789 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6790 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6791 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6792 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6794 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6795 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6798 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6799 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6802 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6803 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6805 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6810 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6811 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6812 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6813 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6814 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6815 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6816 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6817 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6818 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6819 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6821 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6822 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6823 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6825 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6826 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6827 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6829 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6833 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6834 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6835 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6836 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6839 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6841 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6843 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6845 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6846 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6849 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6850 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6851 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6852 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6855 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6859 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6860 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6861 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6862 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6864 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6865 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6866 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6867 // consider the stale state on reload.
6868 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6871 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6872 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6878 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6880 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6882 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6884 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6887 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6888 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6890 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6891 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6893 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6894 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6899 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6900 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6902 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6903 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6908 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6909 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6910 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6911 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6913 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6916 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6917 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6919 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6922 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6924 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6925 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6927 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6929 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6930 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6931 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6933 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6934 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6935 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6939 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6940 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6941 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6943 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6949 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6950 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6951 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6952 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6953 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6954 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6955 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6956 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6957 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6958 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6960 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6961 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6962 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6963 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6964 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6965 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6966 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6968 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6969 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6970 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6971 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6973 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6975 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6976 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6977 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6978 (2, channel_type, option),
6979 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6980 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6981 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6982 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6983 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6984 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6985 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6986 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6987 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6988 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6989 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6990 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6991 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6992 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6993 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6994 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6995 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6996 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6997 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7000 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7001 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7002 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7003 // required channel parameters.
7004 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7005 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7006 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7008 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7010 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7011 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7012 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7013 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7016 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7017 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7018 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7020 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7021 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7023 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7024 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7029 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7030 if iter.next().is_some() {
7031 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7035 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7036 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7037 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7038 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7039 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7042 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7043 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7045 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7046 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7047 // separate u64 values.
7048 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7050 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7055 config: config.unwrap(),
7059 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7060 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7061 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7064 temporary_channel_id,
7066 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7068 channel_value_satoshis,
7070 latest_monitor_update_id,
7073 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7076 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7077 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7080 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7081 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7082 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7083 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7087 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7088 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7089 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7090 monitor_pending_forwards,
7091 monitor_pending_failures,
7092 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7095 holding_cell_update_fee,
7096 next_holder_htlc_id,
7097 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7098 update_time_counter,
7101 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7102 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7103 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7104 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7106 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7107 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7108 closing_fee_limits: None,
7109 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7111 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7113 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7114 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7116 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7118 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7119 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7120 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7121 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7122 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7123 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7124 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7125 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7126 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7129 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7131 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7132 funding_transaction,
7134 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7135 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7136 counterparty_node_id,
7138 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7142 channel_update_status,
7143 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7147 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7148 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7149 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7150 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7152 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7154 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7155 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7156 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7158 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7159 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7161 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7162 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7164 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7167 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7175 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7176 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7177 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7178 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7179 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7181 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7182 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7184 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7185 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7186 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7187 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7188 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7189 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7190 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7191 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7192 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7193 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7194 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7195 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7196 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7197 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7198 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7199 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7200 use crate::util::test_utils;
7201 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7202 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7203 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7204 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7205 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7206 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7207 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7208 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7209 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7210 use crate::prelude::*;
7212 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7215 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7216 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7222 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7223 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7224 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7225 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7229 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7230 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7231 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7232 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7233 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7234 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7235 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7239 signer: InMemorySigner,
7242 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7243 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7246 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7247 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7249 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7250 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7253 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7257 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7259 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7260 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7261 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7262 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7263 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7266 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7267 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7268 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7269 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7273 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7274 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7275 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7279 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7280 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7281 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7282 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7284 let seed = [42; 32];
7285 let network = Network::Testnet;
7286 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7287 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7288 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7291 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7292 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7293 let config = UserConfig::default();
7294 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7295 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7296 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7298 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7299 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7303 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7304 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7306 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7307 let original_fee = 253;
7308 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7309 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7310 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7311 let seed = [42; 32];
7312 let network = Network::Testnet;
7313 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7315 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7316 let config = UserConfig::default();
7317 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7319 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7320 // same as the old fee.
7321 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7322 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7323 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7327 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7328 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7329 // dust limits are used.
7330 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7331 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7332 let seed = [42; 32];
7333 let network = Network::Testnet;
7334 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7335 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7337 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7338 // they have different dust limits.
7340 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7341 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7342 let config = UserConfig::default();
7343 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7345 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7346 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7347 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7348 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7349 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7351 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7352 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7353 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7354 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7355 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7357 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7358 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7359 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7361 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7362 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7363 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7364 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7367 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7369 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7370 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7371 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7372 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7373 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7374 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7375 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7376 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7377 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7381 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7382 // the dust limit check.
7383 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7384 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7385 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7386 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7388 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7389 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7390 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7391 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7392 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7393 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7394 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7398 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7399 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7400 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7401 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7402 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7403 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7404 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7405 let seed = [42; 32];
7406 let network = Network::Testnet;
7407 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7409 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7410 let config = UserConfig::default();
7411 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7413 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7414 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7416 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7417 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7418 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7419 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7420 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7421 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7423 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7424 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7425 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7426 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7427 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7429 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7431 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7432 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7433 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7434 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7435 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7437 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7438 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7439 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7440 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7441 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7445 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7446 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7447 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7448 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7449 let seed = [42; 32];
7450 let network = Network::Testnet;
7451 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7452 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7453 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7455 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7457 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7458 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7459 let config = UserConfig::default();
7460 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7462 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7463 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7464 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7465 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7467 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7468 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7469 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7471 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7472 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7473 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7474 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7476 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7477 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7478 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7480 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7481 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7483 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7484 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7485 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7486 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7487 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7488 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7489 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7491 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7493 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7494 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7495 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7496 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7497 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7501 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7502 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7503 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7504 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7505 let seed = [42; 32];
7506 let network = Network::Testnet;
7507 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7508 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7509 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7511 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7512 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7513 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7514 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7515 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7516 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7517 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7518 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7520 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7521 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7522 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7523 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7524 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7525 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7527 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7528 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7529 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7530 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7532 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7534 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7535 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7536 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7537 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7538 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7539 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7541 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7542 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7543 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7544 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7546 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7547 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7548 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7549 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7550 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7552 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7553 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7555 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7556 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7557 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7559 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7560 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7561 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7562 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7563 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7565 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7566 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7568 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7569 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7570 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7574 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7576 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7577 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7578 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7580 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7581 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7582 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7583 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7585 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7586 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7587 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7589 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7591 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7592 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7595 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7596 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7597 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7598 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7599 let seed = [42; 32];
7600 let network = Network::Testnet;
7601 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7602 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7603 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7606 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7607 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7608 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7610 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7611 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7613 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7614 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7615 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7617 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7618 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7620 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7622 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7623 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7625 // Channel Negotiations failed
7626 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7627 assert!(result.is_err());
7632 fn channel_update() {
7633 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7634 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7635 let seed = [42; 32];
7636 let network = Network::Testnet;
7637 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7638 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7640 // Create a channel.
7641 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7642 let config = UserConfig::default();
7643 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7644 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7645 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7646 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7648 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7649 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7650 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7652 short_channel_id: 0,
7655 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7656 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7657 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7659 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7660 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7662 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7664 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7666 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7667 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7668 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7669 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7671 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7672 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7673 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7675 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7679 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7681 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7682 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7683 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7684 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7685 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7686 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7687 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7688 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7689 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7690 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7691 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7692 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7693 use crate::sync::Arc;
7695 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7696 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7697 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7698 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7700 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7702 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7703 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7704 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7705 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7706 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7708 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7709 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7715 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7716 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7717 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7719 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7720 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7721 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7722 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7723 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7724 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7726 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7728 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7729 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7730 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7731 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7732 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7733 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7735 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7736 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7737 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7738 selected_contest_delay: 144
7740 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7741 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7743 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7744 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7746 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7747 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7749 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7750 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7752 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7753 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7754 // build_commitment_transaction.
7755 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7756 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7757 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7758 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7759 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7761 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7762 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7763 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7764 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7768 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7769 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7770 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7771 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7775 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7776 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7777 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7779 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7780 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7782 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7783 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7785 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7787 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7788 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7789 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7790 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7791 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7792 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7793 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7795 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7796 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7797 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7798 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7800 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7801 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7802 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7804 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7806 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7807 commitment_tx.clone(),
7808 counterparty_signature,
7809 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7810 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7811 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7813 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7814 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7816 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7817 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7818 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7820 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7821 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7824 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7825 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7827 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7828 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7829 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7830 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7831 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7832 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7833 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7834 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7836 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7839 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7840 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7841 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7845 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7848 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7849 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7850 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7852 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7853 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7854 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7855 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7856 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7857 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7858 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7859 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7861 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7865 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7866 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7867 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7868 "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", {});
7870 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7871 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7873 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7874 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7875 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7877 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7878 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7879 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7880 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7882 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7883 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7885 amount_msat: 1000000,
7887 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7888 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7890 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7893 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7894 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7896 amount_msat: 2000000,
7898 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7899 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7901 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7904 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7905 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7907 amount_msat: 2000000,
7909 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7910 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7911 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7913 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7916 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7917 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7919 amount_msat: 3000000,
7921 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7922 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7923 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7925 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7928 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7929 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7931 amount_msat: 4000000,
7933 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7934 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7936 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7940 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7941 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7942 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7944 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7945 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7946 "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", {
7949 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7950 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7951 "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" },
7954 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7955 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7956 "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" },
7959 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7960 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7961 "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" },
7964 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7965 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7966 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7969 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7970 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7971 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7974 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7975 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7976 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7978 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7979 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7980 "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", {
7983 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7984 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7985 "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" },
7988 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7989 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7990 "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" },
7993 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7994 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7995 "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" },
7998 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7999 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8000 "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" },
8003 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8004 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8005 "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" }
8008 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8009 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8010 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8012 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8013 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8014 "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", {
8017 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8018 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8019 "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" },
8022 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8023 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8024 "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" },
8027 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8028 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8029 "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" },
8032 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8033 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8034 "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" }
8037 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8038 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8039 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8040 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8042 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8043 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8044 "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", {
8047 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8048 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8049 "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" },
8052 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8053 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8054 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8057 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8058 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8059 "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" },
8062 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8063 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8064 "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" }
8067 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8068 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8069 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8070 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8072 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8073 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8074 "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", {
8077 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8078 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8079 "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" },
8082 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8083 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8084 "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" },
8087 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8088 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8089 "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" },
8092 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8093 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8094 "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" }
8097 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8098 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8099 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8101 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8102 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8103 "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", {
8106 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8107 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8108 "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" },
8111 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8112 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8113 "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" },
8116 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8117 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8118 "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" }
8121 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8122 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8123 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8125 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8126 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8127 "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", {
8130 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8131 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8132 "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" },
8135 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8136 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8137 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8140 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8141 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8142 "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" }
8145 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8146 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8147 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8149 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8150 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8151 "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", {
8154 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8155 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8156 "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" },
8159 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8160 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8161 "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" }
8164 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8165 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8166 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8167 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8169 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8170 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8171 "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", {
8174 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8175 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8176 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8179 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8180 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8181 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8184 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8185 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8186 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8187 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8189 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8190 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8191 "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", {
8194 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8195 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8196 "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" },
8199 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8200 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8201 "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" }
8204 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8205 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8206 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8208 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8209 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8210 "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", {
8213 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8214 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8215 "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" }
8218 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8219 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8220 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8221 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8223 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8224 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8225 "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", {
8228 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8229 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8230 "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" }
8233 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8234 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8235 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8236 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8238 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8239 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8240 "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", {
8243 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8244 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8245 "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" }
8248 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8249 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8250 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8251 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8253 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8254 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8255 "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", {});
8257 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8258 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8259 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8260 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8262 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8263 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8264 "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", {});
8266 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8267 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8268 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8269 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8271 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8272 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8273 "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", {});
8275 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8276 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8277 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8279 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8280 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8281 "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", {});
8283 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8284 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8285 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8286 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8288 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8289 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8290 "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", {});
8292 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8293 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8294 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8295 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8297 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8298 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8299 "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", {});
8301 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8302 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8303 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8304 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8305 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8306 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8308 amount_msat: 2000000,
8310 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8311 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8313 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8316 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8317 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8318 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8320 amount_msat: 5000001,
8322 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8323 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8324 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8326 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8329 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8330 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8332 amount_msat: 5000000,
8334 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8335 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8336 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8338 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8342 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8343 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8344 "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", {
8347 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8348 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8349 "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" },
8351 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8352 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8353 "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" },
8355 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8356 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8357 "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" }
8360 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8361 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8362 "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", {
8365 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8366 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8367 "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" },
8369 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8370 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8371 "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" },
8373 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8374 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8375 "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" }
8380 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8381 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8383 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8384 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8385 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8386 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8388 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8389 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8390 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8392 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8393 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8395 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8396 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8398 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8399 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8400 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8404 fn test_key_derivation() {
8405 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8406 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8408 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8409 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8411 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8412 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8414 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8415 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8417 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8418 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8420 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8421 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8423 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8424 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8426 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8427 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8431 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8432 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8433 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8434 let seed = [42; 32];
8435 let network = Network::Testnet;
8436 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8437 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8439 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8440 let config = UserConfig::default();
8441 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8442 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8444 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8445 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8447 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8448 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8449 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8450 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8451 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8452 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8453 assert!(res.is_ok());
8458 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8459 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8460 // resulting `channel_type`.
8461 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8462 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8463 let network = Network::Testnet;
8464 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8465 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8467 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8468 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8470 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8471 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8473 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8474 // need to signal it.
8475 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8476 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8477 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8480 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8482 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8483 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8484 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8486 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8487 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8488 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8491 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8492 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8493 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8494 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8495 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8498 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8499 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8504 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8505 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8506 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8507 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8508 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8509 let network = Network::Testnet;
8510 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8511 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8513 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8514 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8516 let config = UserConfig::default();
8518 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8519 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8520 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8521 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8522 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8524 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8525 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8526 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8529 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8530 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8531 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8533 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8534 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8535 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8536 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8537 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8538 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8540 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8545 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8546 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8548 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8549 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8550 let network = Network::Testnet;
8551 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8552 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8554 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8555 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8557 let config = UserConfig::default();
8559 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8560 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8561 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8562 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8563 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8564 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8565 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8566 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8568 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8569 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8570 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8571 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8572 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8573 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8576 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8577 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8579 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8580 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8581 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8582 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8584 assert!(res.is_err());
8586 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8587 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8588 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8590 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8591 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8592 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8595 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8597 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8598 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8599 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8600 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8603 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8604 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8606 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8607 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8609 assert!(res.is_err());