1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
538 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
539 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
540 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
541 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
544 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
545 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
546 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
547 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
548 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
549 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
550 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
551 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
554 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
556 /// Contains a tuple with the following:
557 /// - An optional (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
558 /// - A list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this channel's
559 /// counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
560 /// - An optional transaction id identifying a corresponding batch funding transaction.
561 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
562 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
563 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
567 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
568 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
569 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
570 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
571 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
572 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
573 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
574 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
575 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
576 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
577 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
578 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
579 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
580 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
581 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
583 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
584 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
585 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
586 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
588 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
589 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
590 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
591 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
593 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
594 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
595 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
596 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
597 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
599 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
600 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
601 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
602 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
604 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
605 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
606 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
608 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
609 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
610 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
611 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
612 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
614 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
615 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
618 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
619 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
621 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
622 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
623 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
624 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
626 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
627 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
629 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
630 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
633 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
634 (0, update, required),
637 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
638 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
639 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
640 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
641 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
645 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
646 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
647 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
649 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
651 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
657 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
659 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
660 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
661 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
666 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
667 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
668 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
669 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
670 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
672 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
673 /// in a timely manner.
674 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
677 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
678 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
679 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
681 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
682 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
683 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
684 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
688 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
689 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
690 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
692 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
693 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
694 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
695 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
697 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
701 /// The current channel ID.
702 channel_id: ChannelId,
703 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
704 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
705 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
708 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
709 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
711 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
712 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
713 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
715 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
716 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
717 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
718 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
720 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
721 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
723 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
725 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
726 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
727 destination_script: Script,
729 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
730 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
731 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
733 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
734 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
735 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
736 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
737 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
738 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
740 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
741 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
742 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
743 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
744 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
745 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
747 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
749 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
750 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
751 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
753 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
754 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
755 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
756 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
757 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
758 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
759 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
761 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
762 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
763 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
765 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
766 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
767 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
768 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
769 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
770 /// outbound or inbound.
771 signer_pending_funding: bool,
773 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
775 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
776 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
777 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
778 // HTLCs with similar state.
779 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
780 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
781 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
782 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
783 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
784 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
785 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
786 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
787 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
790 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
791 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
792 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
794 update_time_counter: u32,
796 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
797 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
798 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
800 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
801 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
803 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
804 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
806 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
807 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
808 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
809 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
811 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
812 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
814 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
816 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
818 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
819 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
820 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
821 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
822 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
823 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
824 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
825 channel_creation_height: u32,
827 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
830 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
832 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
835 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
837 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
840 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
842 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
844 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
845 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
848 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
850 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
852 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
853 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
855 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
857 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
858 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
859 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
861 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
863 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
864 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
865 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
867 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
868 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
869 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
871 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
873 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
875 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
876 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
877 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
878 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
880 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
881 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
882 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
884 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
885 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
886 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
888 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
889 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
890 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
891 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
893 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
895 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
897 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
898 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
899 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
900 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
901 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
903 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
904 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
906 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
907 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
908 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
909 /// unblock the state machine.
911 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
912 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
913 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
915 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
916 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
917 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
920 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
921 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
922 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
923 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
924 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
925 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
926 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
928 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
929 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
931 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
932 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
933 // the channel's funding UTXO.
935 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
936 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
937 // associated channel mapping.
939 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
940 // to store all of them.
941 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
943 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
944 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
945 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
946 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
947 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
949 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
950 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
952 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
953 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
955 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
956 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
957 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
959 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
960 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
961 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
964 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
965 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
966 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
967 self.update_time_counter
970 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
971 self.latest_monitor_update_id
974 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
975 self.config.announced_channel
978 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
979 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
982 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
983 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
984 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
985 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
988 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
989 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
990 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
993 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
994 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
995 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
996 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
997 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1000 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1001 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1002 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1003 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1005 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1006 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1008 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1009 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1011 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1012 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1014 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1017 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1018 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1019 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1020 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1021 self.channel_state &
1022 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1023 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1024 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1025 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1028 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1029 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1030 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1031 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1032 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1035 // Public utilities:
1037 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1041 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1043 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1044 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1045 self.temporary_channel_id
1048 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1052 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1053 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1054 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1058 /// Gets the channel's type
1059 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1063 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1065 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1066 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1067 self.short_channel_id
1070 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1071 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1072 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1075 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1076 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1077 self.outbound_scid_alias
1080 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1081 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1082 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1083 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1084 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1085 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1088 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1089 /// get_funding_created.
1090 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1091 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1094 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1095 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1096 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1099 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1100 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1101 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1102 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1106 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1109 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1110 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1113 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1114 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1117 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1118 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1119 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1122 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1123 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1126 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1127 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1128 self.counterparty_node_id
1131 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1132 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1133 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1136 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1137 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1138 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1141 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1142 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1144 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1145 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1146 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1147 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1149 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1153 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1154 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1155 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1158 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1159 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1160 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1163 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1164 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1165 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1167 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1168 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1173 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1174 self.channel_value_satoshis
1177 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1178 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1181 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1182 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1185 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1186 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1187 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1189 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1190 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1191 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1192 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
1193 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1195 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1199 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1200 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1201 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1204 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1205 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1206 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1209 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1210 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1211 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1214 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1215 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1216 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1219 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1220 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1221 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1224 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1225 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1226 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1229 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1230 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1231 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1232 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1233 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1236 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1238 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1239 self.prev_config = None;
1243 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1244 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1248 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1249 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1250 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1251 let did_channel_update =
1252 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1253 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1254 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1255 if did_channel_update {
1256 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1257 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1258 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1259 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1261 self.config.options = *config;
1265 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1266 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1267 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1268 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1269 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1272 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1273 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1274 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1275 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1276 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1278 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1279 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1280 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1281 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1282 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1283 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1284 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1286 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1287 where L::Target: Logger
1289 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1290 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1291 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1293 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1294 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1295 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1296 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1298 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1299 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1300 if match update_state {
1301 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1302 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1303 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1304 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1305 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1307 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1311 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1312 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1313 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1315 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1317 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1318 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1319 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1321 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1322 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1323 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1324 transaction_output_index: None
1329 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1330 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1331 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1332 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1333 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1336 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1338 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1339 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1340 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1342 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1343 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1346 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1347 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1350 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1352 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1353 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1354 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1356 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1357 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1363 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1364 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1365 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1366 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1367 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1368 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1369 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1373 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1374 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1376 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1378 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1379 if generated_by_local {
1380 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1381 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1390 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1392 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1393 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1394 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1395 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1396 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1397 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1398 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1401 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1402 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1403 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1404 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1408 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1409 preimages.push(preimage);
1413 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1414 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1416 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1418 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1419 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1421 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1422 if !generated_by_local {
1423 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1431 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1432 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1433 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1434 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1435 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1436 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1437 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1438 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1440 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1442 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1443 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1444 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1445 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1447 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1449 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1450 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1451 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1452 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1455 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1456 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1457 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1458 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1460 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1463 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1464 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1465 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1466 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1468 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1471 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1472 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1477 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1478 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1483 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1485 let channel_parameters =
1486 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1487 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1488 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1495 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1498 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1499 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1500 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1501 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1503 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1504 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1505 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1513 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1514 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1520 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1521 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1522 /// our counterparty!)
1523 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1524 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1525 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1526 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1527 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1528 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1529 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1531 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1535 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1536 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1537 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1538 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1539 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1540 //may see payments to it!
1541 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1542 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1543 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1545 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1548 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1549 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1550 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1551 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1552 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1555 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1556 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1559 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1563 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1564 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1565 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1566 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1567 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1568 // which are near the dust limit.
1569 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1570 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1571 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1572 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1573 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1575 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1576 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1578 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1581 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1582 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1583 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1586 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1587 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1589 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1590 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1591 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1592 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1593 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1594 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1595 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1598 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1601 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1602 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1603 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1605 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1606 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1607 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1608 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1609 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1610 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1612 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1613 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1619 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1620 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1622 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1623 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1624 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1625 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1626 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1627 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1628 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1631 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1634 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1635 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1636 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1638 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1639 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1640 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1641 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1642 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1643 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1645 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1646 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1650 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1651 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1652 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1653 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1654 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1655 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1656 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1658 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1659 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1661 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1668 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1669 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1670 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1671 /// corner case properly.
1672 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1673 -> AvailableBalances
1674 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1676 let context = &self;
1677 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1678 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1679 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1681 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1682 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1683 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1684 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1687 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1689 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1690 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1692 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1694 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1696 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1697 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1701 if context.is_outbound() {
1702 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1703 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1705 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1706 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1708 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1709 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1710 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1711 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1714 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1715 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1716 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1717 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1718 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1719 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1720 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1723 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1724 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1725 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1726 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1727 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1728 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1729 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1730 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1731 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1732 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1733 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1735 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1738 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1739 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1740 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1741 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1742 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1745 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1746 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1748 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1749 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1750 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1752 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1753 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1754 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1755 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1759 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1761 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1762 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1763 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1764 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1765 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1766 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1767 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1769 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1770 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1772 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1773 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1774 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1776 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1777 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1778 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1779 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1780 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1783 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1784 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1785 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1786 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1787 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1788 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1791 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1792 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1793 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1795 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1799 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1800 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1802 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1803 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1807 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1808 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1809 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1810 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1812 outbound_capacity_msat,
1813 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1814 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1819 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1820 let context = &self;
1821 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1824 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1825 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1827 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1828 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1830 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1831 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1833 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1834 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1835 let context = &self;
1836 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1838 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1841 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1842 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1844 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1845 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1847 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1848 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1850 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1851 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1855 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1862 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1863 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1864 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1867 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1868 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1869 included_htlcs += 1;
1872 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1873 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1877 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1878 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1879 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1880 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1881 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1882 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1887 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1889 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1890 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1895 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1896 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1900 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1901 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1902 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1905 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1906 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1908 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1909 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1910 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1912 total_pending_htlcs,
1913 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1914 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1915 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1917 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1918 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1919 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1921 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1923 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1928 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1929 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1931 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1932 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1934 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1935 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1937 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1938 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1939 let context = &self;
1940 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1942 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1945 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1946 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1948 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1949 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1951 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1952 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1954 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1955 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1959 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1960 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1966 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1967 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1968 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1969 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1970 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1971 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1974 included_htlcs += 1;
1977 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1978 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1981 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1982 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1984 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1985 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1986 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1991 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1992 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1996 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1997 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1999 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2000 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2002 total_pending_htlcs,
2003 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2004 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2005 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2007 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2008 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2009 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2011 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2013 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2018 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2019 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2020 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2021 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2028 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2030 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2031 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2034 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2036 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2037 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2038 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2042 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2043 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2044 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2047 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2049 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2050 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2053 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2054 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2055 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2056 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2057 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2058 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2059 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2060 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2061 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2062 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2063 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2065 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2066 // return them to fail the payment.
2067 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2068 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2069 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2071 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2072 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2077 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2078 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2079 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2080 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2081 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2082 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2083 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2084 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2085 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2086 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2087 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2088 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2089 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2093 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2095 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2096 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2097 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid)
2101 // Internal utility functions for channels
2103 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2104 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2105 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2107 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2109 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2110 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2111 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2113 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2116 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2118 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2121 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2122 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2123 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2125 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2127 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2128 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2129 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2130 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2131 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2134 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2135 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2136 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2137 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2138 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2139 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2140 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2143 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2144 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2146 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2147 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2150 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2151 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2152 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2153 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2154 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2155 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2158 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2159 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2160 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2161 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2164 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2165 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2167 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2168 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2169 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2173 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2174 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2175 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2177 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2178 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2179 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2180 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2182 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2183 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2184 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2185 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2186 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2187 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2188 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2190 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2191 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2196 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2197 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2199 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2201 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2202 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2203 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2204 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2206 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2207 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2217 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2218 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2219 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2220 // outside of those situations will fail.
2221 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2225 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2230 1 + // script length (0)
2234 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2235 2 + // witness marker and flag
2236 1 + // witness element count
2237 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2238 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2239 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2240 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2241 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2242 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2244 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2245 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2246 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2252 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2253 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2254 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2255 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2257 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2258 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2259 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2261 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2262 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2263 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2264 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2265 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2266 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2269 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2270 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2273 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2274 value_to_holder = 0;
2277 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2278 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2279 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2280 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2282 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2283 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2286 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2287 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2290 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2293 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2294 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2296 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2298 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2299 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2300 where L::Target: Logger {
2301 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2302 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2303 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2304 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2305 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2306 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2307 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2308 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2312 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2313 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2314 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2315 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2317 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2318 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2320 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2322 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2323 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2324 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2326 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2327 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2328 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2329 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2330 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2331 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2332 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2334 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2335 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2336 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2338 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2339 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2341 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2344 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2345 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2349 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2353 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2354 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2355 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2356 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2357 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2358 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2361 // Now update local state:
2363 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2364 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2365 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2366 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2367 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2368 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2369 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2373 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2374 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2375 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2376 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2377 // do not not get into this branch.
2378 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2379 match pending_update {
2380 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2381 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2382 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2383 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2384 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2385 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2386 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2389 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2390 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2391 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2392 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2393 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2394 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2395 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2401 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2402 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2403 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2405 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2406 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2407 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2409 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2410 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2413 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2414 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2416 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2417 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2419 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2420 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2423 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2426 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2427 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2428 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2429 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2434 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2435 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2436 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2437 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2438 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2439 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2440 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2441 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2442 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2443 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2444 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2445 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2446 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2447 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2448 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2450 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2451 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2452 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2453 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2454 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2457 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2458 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2459 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2465 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2466 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2468 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2472 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2473 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2474 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2475 /// before we fail backwards.
2477 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2478 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2479 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2480 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2481 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2482 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2483 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2486 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2487 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2488 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2489 /// before we fail backwards.
2491 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2492 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2493 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2494 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2495 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2496 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2497 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2499 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2501 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2502 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2503 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2505 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2506 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2507 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2509 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2510 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2511 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2513 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2518 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2519 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2525 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2526 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2527 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2528 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2529 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2533 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2534 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2535 force_holding_cell = true;
2538 // Now update local state:
2539 if force_holding_cell {
2540 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2541 match pending_update {
2542 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2543 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2544 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2545 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2549 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2550 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2551 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2552 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2558 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2559 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2560 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2566 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2568 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2569 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2572 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2573 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2574 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2579 // Message handlers:
2581 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2582 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2583 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2584 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2585 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2589 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2592 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2595 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2596 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2597 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2598 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2601 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2603 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2604 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2605 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2606 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2608 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2609 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2611 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2612 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2614 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2615 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2616 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2617 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2618 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2619 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2623 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2624 initial_commitment_tx,
2627 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2628 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2631 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2632 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2635 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2636 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2637 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2638 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2639 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2640 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2641 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2642 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2643 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2644 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2645 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2646 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2648 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2650 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2651 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2652 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2653 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2654 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2655 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2656 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2658 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2659 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2660 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2662 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2664 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2665 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2667 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2669 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2670 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2674 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2675 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2676 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2677 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2678 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2679 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2680 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2683 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2684 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2686 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2687 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2688 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2689 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2691 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2694 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2695 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2696 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2699 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2700 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2701 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2702 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2703 // when routing outbound payments.
2704 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2708 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2710 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2711 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2713 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2714 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2716 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2717 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2718 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2719 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2720 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2721 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2722 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2723 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2724 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2726 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2727 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2728 let expected_point =
2729 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2730 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2732 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2733 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2734 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2735 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2736 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2737 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2739 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2740 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2741 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2742 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2743 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2745 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2746 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2753 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2754 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2756 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2758 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2761 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2762 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2763 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2764 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2765 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2766 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2768 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2769 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2770 if local_sent_shutdown {
2771 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2773 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2774 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2775 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2778 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2781 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2784 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2785 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2787 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2788 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2791 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2792 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2793 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2796 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2800 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2801 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2802 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2803 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2804 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2805 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2806 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2807 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2808 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2809 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2810 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2812 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2813 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2814 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2815 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2816 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2817 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2821 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2822 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2825 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2826 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2827 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2829 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2830 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2831 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2832 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2833 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2834 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2835 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2839 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2840 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2841 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2842 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2843 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2844 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2845 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2849 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2850 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2851 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2852 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2853 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2857 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2858 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2860 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2861 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2862 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2864 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2865 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2869 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2872 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2877 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2878 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2882 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2883 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2884 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2885 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2886 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2887 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2888 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2889 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2890 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2892 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2893 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2894 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2895 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2896 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2899 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2900 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2901 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2902 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2903 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2906 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2907 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2909 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2910 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2913 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2914 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2915 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2919 // Now update local state:
2920 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2921 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2922 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2923 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2924 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2925 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2926 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2931 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2933 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2934 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2935 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2936 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2937 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2938 None => fail_reason.into(),
2939 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2940 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2941 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2944 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2948 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2949 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2950 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2951 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2953 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2959 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2962 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2963 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2966 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2970 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2973 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2974 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2975 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2977 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2981 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2985 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2986 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2989 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2993 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2997 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2998 where L::Target: Logger
3000 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3003 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3004 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3006 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3010 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3012 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3014 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3015 let commitment_txid = {
3016 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3017 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3018 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3020 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3021 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3022 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3023 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3024 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3025 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3029 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3031 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3032 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3033 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3034 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3037 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3038 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3039 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3043 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3045 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3046 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3047 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3048 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3049 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3050 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3051 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3052 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3053 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3054 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3055 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3061 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3065 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3066 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3067 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3068 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3069 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3070 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3071 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3072 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3073 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3074 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3075 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3076 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3077 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3080 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3081 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3082 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3083 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3084 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3085 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3086 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3088 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3089 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3090 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3091 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3092 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3093 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3094 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3097 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3098 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3101 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3103 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3104 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3105 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3108 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3111 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3112 commitment_stats.tx,
3114 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3115 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3116 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3119 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3120 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3122 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3123 let mut need_commitment = false;
3124 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3125 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3126 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3127 need_commitment = true;
3131 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3132 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3133 Some(forward_info.clone())
3135 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3136 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3137 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3138 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3139 need_commitment = true;
3142 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3143 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3144 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3145 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3146 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3147 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3148 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3149 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3150 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3151 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3152 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3153 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3154 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3155 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3157 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3159 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3160 need_commitment = true;
3164 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3165 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3166 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3167 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3168 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3169 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3171 nondust_htlc_sources,
3175 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3176 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3177 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3178 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3180 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3181 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3182 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3183 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3184 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3185 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3186 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3187 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3188 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3189 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3190 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3191 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3192 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3193 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3195 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3196 &self.context.channel_id);
3197 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3200 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3201 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3202 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3203 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3204 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3205 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3206 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3207 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3208 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3212 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3213 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3214 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3215 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3218 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3219 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3220 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3221 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3222 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3223 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3224 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3226 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3227 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3228 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3229 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3232 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3233 /// for our counterparty.
3234 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3235 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3236 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3237 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3239 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3240 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3241 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3242 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3244 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3245 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3246 updates: Vec::new(),
3249 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3250 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3251 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3252 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3253 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3254 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3255 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3256 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3257 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3258 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3259 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3260 // to rebalance channels.
3261 match &htlc_update {
3262 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3263 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3264 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3266 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3267 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3269 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3272 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3273 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3274 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3275 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3276 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3277 // into the holding cell without ever being
3278 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3279 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3280 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3283 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3289 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3290 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3291 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3292 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3293 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3294 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3295 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3296 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3297 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3298 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3299 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3300 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3302 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3303 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3304 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3305 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3306 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3307 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3308 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3309 // for a full revocation before failing.
3310 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3311 update_fail_count += 1;
3314 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3316 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3323 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3324 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3326 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3327 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3332 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3333 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3334 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3335 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3336 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3338 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3339 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3340 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3342 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3343 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3349 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3350 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3351 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3352 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3353 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3354 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3355 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3356 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3357 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3359 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3360 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3362 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3363 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3365 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3366 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3369 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3371 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3372 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3377 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3378 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3379 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3380 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3381 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3382 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3383 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3384 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3388 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3390 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3391 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3394 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3395 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3396 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3397 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3399 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3403 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3404 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3405 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3406 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3407 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3408 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3409 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3410 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3414 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3415 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3416 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3417 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3418 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3419 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3420 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3421 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3422 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3424 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3425 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3428 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3429 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3430 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3431 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3432 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3433 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3434 let mut require_commitment = false;
3435 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3438 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3439 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3440 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3442 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3443 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3444 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3445 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3446 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3447 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3452 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3453 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3454 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3455 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3456 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3458 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3459 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3460 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3465 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3466 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3468 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3472 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3473 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3475 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3476 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3477 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3478 require_commitment = true;
3479 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3480 match forward_info {
3481 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3482 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3483 require_commitment = true;
3485 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3486 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3487 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3489 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3490 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3491 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3495 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3496 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3497 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3498 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3504 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3505 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3506 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3507 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3509 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3510 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3511 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3512 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3513 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3514 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3515 require_commitment = true;
3519 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3521 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3522 match update_state {
3523 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3524 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3525 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3526 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3527 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3529 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3530 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3531 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3532 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3533 require_commitment = true;
3534 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3535 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3540 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3541 let release_state_str =
3542 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3543 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3544 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3545 if !release_monitor {
3546 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3547 update: monitor_update,
3549 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3551 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3556 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3557 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3558 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3559 if require_commitment {
3560 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3561 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3562 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3563 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3565 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3566 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3567 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3568 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3569 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3571 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3572 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3573 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3574 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3575 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3578 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3579 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3580 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3581 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3582 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3583 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3585 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3586 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3588 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3589 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3591 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3592 if require_commitment {
3593 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3595 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3596 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3597 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3598 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3600 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3601 &self.context.channel_id(),
3602 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3605 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3606 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3608 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3609 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3611 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3612 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3618 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3619 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3620 /// commitment update.
3621 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3622 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3623 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3625 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3626 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3629 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3630 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3631 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3632 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3634 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3635 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3636 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3637 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3638 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3639 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3640 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3642 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3643 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3645 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3646 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3648 if !self.context.is_live() {
3649 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3652 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3653 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3654 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3655 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3656 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3657 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3658 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3659 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3660 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3661 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3665 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3666 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3667 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3668 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3669 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3670 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3673 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3674 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3678 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3679 force_holding_cell = true;
3682 if force_holding_cell {
3683 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3687 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3688 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3690 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3691 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3696 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3697 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3699 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3701 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3702 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3703 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3704 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3708 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3709 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3710 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3714 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3715 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3718 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3719 // will be retransmitted.
3720 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3721 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3722 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3724 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3725 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3727 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3728 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3729 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3730 // this HTLC accordingly
3731 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3734 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3735 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3736 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3737 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3740 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3741 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3742 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3743 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3744 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3745 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3750 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3752 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3753 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3754 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3755 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3759 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3760 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3761 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3762 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3763 // the update upon reconnection.
3764 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3768 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3770 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3771 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3775 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3776 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3777 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3778 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3779 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3780 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3781 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3783 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3784 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3785 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3786 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3787 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3788 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3789 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3791 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3792 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3793 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3794 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3795 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3796 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3797 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3800 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3801 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3802 /// to the remote side.
3803 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3804 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3805 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3806 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3809 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3811 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3812 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3814 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3815 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3816 // first received the funding_signed.
3817 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3818 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3819 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3821 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3822 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3823 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3824 funding_broadcastable = None;
3827 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3828 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3829 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3830 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3831 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3832 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3833 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3834 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3835 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3836 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3837 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3838 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3839 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3840 next_per_commitment_point,
3841 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3845 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3847 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3848 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3849 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3850 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3851 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3852 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3854 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3855 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3856 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3857 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3858 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3859 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3863 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3864 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3866 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3867 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3869 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3870 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3873 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3874 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3875 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3876 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3877 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3878 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3879 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3880 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3881 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3885 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3886 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3888 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3889 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3891 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3894 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3895 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3897 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3898 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3899 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3900 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3901 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3902 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3903 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3904 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3905 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3906 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3907 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3908 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3909 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3910 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3912 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3914 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3920 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
3923 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3924 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
3925 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3927 let funding_signed = None;
3928 let funding_created = None;
3929 SignerResumeUpdates {
3936 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3937 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3938 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3939 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3940 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3941 per_commitment_secret,
3942 next_per_commitment_point,
3944 next_local_nonce: None,
3948 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
3949 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3950 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3951 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3952 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3953 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3955 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3956 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3957 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3958 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3959 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3960 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3961 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3962 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3963 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3964 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3969 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3970 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3972 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3973 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3974 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3975 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3976 reason: err_packet.clone()
3979 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3980 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3981 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3982 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3983 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3984 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3987 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3988 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3989 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3990 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3991 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3998 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3999 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4000 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4001 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4005 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4006 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4007 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4008 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4009 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4012 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4015 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4016 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4021 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4022 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4023 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4024 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4025 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4026 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4027 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4032 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4033 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4035 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4036 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4037 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4038 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4039 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4040 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4041 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4042 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4045 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4047 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4048 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4049 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4050 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4054 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4055 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4056 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4059 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4060 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4061 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4062 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4063 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4066 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4067 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4068 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4069 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4070 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4073 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4074 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4075 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4076 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4077 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4078 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4079 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4080 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4084 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4085 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4086 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4087 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4089 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4093 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4094 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4095 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4096 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4098 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4100 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4102 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4103 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4104 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4105 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4106 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4107 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4109 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4110 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4111 channel_ready: None,
4112 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4113 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4114 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4118 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4119 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4120 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4121 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4122 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4123 next_per_commitment_point,
4124 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4126 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4127 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4128 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4132 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4133 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4134 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4136 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4137 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4138 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4141 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4147 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4148 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4149 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4150 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4151 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4152 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4153 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4155 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4157 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4158 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4159 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4160 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4161 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4162 next_per_commitment_point,
4163 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4167 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4168 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4169 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4171 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4174 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4175 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4176 raa: required_revoke,
4177 commitment_update: None,
4178 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4180 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4181 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4182 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4184 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4187 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4188 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4189 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4190 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4191 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4192 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4195 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4196 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4197 raa: required_revoke,
4198 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4199 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4203 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4207 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4208 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4209 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4210 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4212 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4214 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4216 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4217 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4218 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4219 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4220 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4221 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4222 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4223 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4225 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4226 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4227 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4228 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4229 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4231 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4232 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4233 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4234 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4237 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4238 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4239 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4240 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4241 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4242 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4243 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4244 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4245 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4246 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4247 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4248 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4249 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4250 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4251 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4253 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4256 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4257 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4260 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4261 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4262 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4263 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4264 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4265 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4268 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4269 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4270 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4271 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4272 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4273 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4276 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4282 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4283 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4284 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4285 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4287 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4288 return Ok((None, None));
4291 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4292 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4293 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4295 return Ok((None, None));
4298 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4300 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4301 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4302 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4303 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4305 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4306 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4308 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4309 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4311 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4312 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4313 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4314 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4316 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4317 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4318 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4325 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4326 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4328 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4329 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4332 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4333 /// within our expected timeframe.
4335 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4336 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4337 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4340 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4343 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4344 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4348 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4349 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4351 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4354 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4355 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4356 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4357 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4360 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4361 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4365 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4367 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4368 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4371 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4372 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4373 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4376 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4379 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4380 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4381 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4382 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4384 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4387 assert!(send_shutdown);
4388 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4389 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4390 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4392 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4393 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4395 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4400 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4402 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4403 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4405 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4406 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4407 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4408 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4409 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4410 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4413 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4414 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4416 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4417 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4418 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4419 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4423 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4424 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4425 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4426 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4427 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4428 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4430 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4431 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4438 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4439 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4441 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4444 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4445 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4447 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4449 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4450 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4451 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4452 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4453 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4454 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4455 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4456 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4457 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4459 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4460 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4463 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4467 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4468 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4469 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4470 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4472 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4475 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4476 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4478 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4481 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4485 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4486 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4489 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4490 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4491 return Ok((None, None));
4494 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4495 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4496 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4497 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4499 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4501 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4504 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4505 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4506 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4507 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4508 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4512 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4513 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4514 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4518 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4519 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4520 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4521 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4522 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4523 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4524 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4528 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4530 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4531 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4532 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4533 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4535 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4538 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4539 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4541 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4542 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4544 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4545 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4546 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4547 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4551 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4552 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4553 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4554 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4556 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4557 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4558 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4566 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4567 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4568 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4570 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4571 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4573 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4574 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4577 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4578 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4579 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4580 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4581 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4583 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4585 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4587 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4588 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4591 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4592 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4593 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4594 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4595 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4596 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4597 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4598 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4600 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4603 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4604 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4605 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4606 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4608 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4612 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4613 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4614 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4615 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4617 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4623 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4624 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4625 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4626 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4627 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4628 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4629 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4631 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4632 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4635 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4637 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4638 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4644 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4645 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4646 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4647 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4648 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4649 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4650 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4652 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4653 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4660 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4661 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4664 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4665 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4668 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4669 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4673 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4674 &self.context.holder_signer
4678 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4680 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4681 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4682 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4683 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4684 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4685 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4687 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4689 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4697 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4698 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4702 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4703 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4704 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4705 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4708 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4709 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4710 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4711 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4714 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4715 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4716 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4717 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4718 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4719 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4722 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4723 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4724 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4725 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4726 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4727 if !release_monitor {
4728 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4737 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4738 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4741 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4742 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4743 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4745 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4746 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4747 if self.context.channel_state &
4748 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4749 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4750 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4751 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4752 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4755 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4756 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4757 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4758 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4759 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4760 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4762 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4763 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4764 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4766 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4767 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4768 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4769 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4770 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4771 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4777 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4778 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4779 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4782 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4783 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4784 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4787 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4788 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4789 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4792 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4793 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4794 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4795 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4796 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4797 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4802 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4803 self.context.channel_update_status
4806 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4807 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4808 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4811 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4813 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4814 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4815 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4819 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4820 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4821 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4824 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4828 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4829 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4830 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4831 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4832 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4834 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4835 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4836 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4838 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4839 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4842 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4843 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4844 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4845 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4846 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4847 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4848 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4849 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4850 self.context.channel_state);
4852 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4856 if need_commitment_update {
4857 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4858 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4859 let next_per_commitment_point =
4860 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4861 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4862 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4863 next_per_commitment_point,
4864 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4868 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4874 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4875 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4876 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4877 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4878 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4879 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4880 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4882 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4885 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4886 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4887 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4888 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4889 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4890 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4891 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4892 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4893 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4894 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4895 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4896 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4897 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4898 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4899 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4900 // channel and move on.
4901 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4902 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4904 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4905 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4906 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4908 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4909 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4910 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4911 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4912 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4913 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4914 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4915 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4920 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4921 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4922 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4923 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4924 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4927 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4928 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4929 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4930 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4931 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4932 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4935 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4936 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4937 // may have already happened for this block).
4938 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4939 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4940 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4941 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
4944 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4945 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4946 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4947 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4955 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4956 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4957 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4958 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4960 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4961 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4964 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4966 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4967 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4968 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4969 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4971 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4974 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4977 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4978 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4979 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4980 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4982 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4985 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4986 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4987 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4989 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4990 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4992 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4993 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4994 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5002 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5004 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5005 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5006 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5008 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5009 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5012 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5013 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5014 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5015 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5016 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5017 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5018 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5019 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5020 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5023 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5024 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5025 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5026 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5028 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5029 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5030 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5032 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5033 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5034 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5035 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5037 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5038 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5039 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5040 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5041 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5042 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5043 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5046 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5047 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5049 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5052 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5053 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5054 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5055 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5056 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5057 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5058 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5059 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5060 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5061 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5062 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5063 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5064 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5065 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5066 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5067 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5068 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5074 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5079 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5080 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5082 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5083 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5084 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5085 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5087 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5090 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5092 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5093 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5094 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5095 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5096 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5097 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5099 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5100 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5103 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5104 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5105 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5106 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5107 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5108 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5110 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5111 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5114 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5115 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5116 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5117 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5118 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5124 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5125 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5126 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5127 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5129 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5132 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5136 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5140 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5141 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5145 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5149 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5150 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5153 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5157 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5159 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5164 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5165 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5166 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5168 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5173 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5175 None => return None,
5178 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5180 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5181 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5183 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5184 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5190 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5192 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5193 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5194 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5195 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5196 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5197 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5198 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5200 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5201 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5202 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5203 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5204 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5205 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5206 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5207 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5208 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5209 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5210 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5211 contents: announcement,
5216 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5220 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5221 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5222 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5223 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5224 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5225 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5226 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5227 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5229 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5231 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5232 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5233 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5234 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5236 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5237 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5238 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5239 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5242 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5243 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5244 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5245 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5248 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5251 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5252 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5253 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5254 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5255 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5256 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5259 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5261 Err(_) => return None,
5263 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5264 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5269 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5270 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5271 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5272 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5273 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5274 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5275 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5276 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5277 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5278 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5279 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5280 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5281 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5282 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5283 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5284 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5287 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5290 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5291 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5292 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5293 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5294 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5295 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5296 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5297 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5298 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5300 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5301 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5302 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5303 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5304 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5305 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5306 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5307 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5308 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5310 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5311 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5312 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5313 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5314 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5315 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5316 next_funding_txid: None,
5321 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5323 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5324 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5325 /// commitment update.
5327 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5328 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5329 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5330 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5331 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5332 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5333 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5336 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5337 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5338 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5340 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5341 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5346 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5347 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5349 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5351 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5352 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5354 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5355 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5356 /// regenerate them.
5358 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5359 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5361 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5362 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5363 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5364 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5365 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5366 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5367 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5369 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5370 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5372 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5373 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5374 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5377 if amount_msat == 0 {
5378 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5381 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5382 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5383 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5384 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5387 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5388 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5389 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5392 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5393 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5394 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5395 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5396 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5397 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5398 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5399 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5402 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5403 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5404 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5405 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5406 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5407 else { "to peer" });
5409 if need_holding_cell {
5410 force_holding_cell = true;
5413 // Now update local state:
5414 if force_holding_cell {
5415 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5420 onion_routing_packet,
5426 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5427 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5429 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5431 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5436 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5437 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5438 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5442 onion_routing_packet,
5445 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5450 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5451 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5452 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5453 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5455 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5456 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5457 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5459 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5460 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5464 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5465 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5466 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5467 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5468 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5469 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5470 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5473 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5474 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5475 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5476 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5477 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5478 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5481 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5483 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5484 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5485 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5486 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5487 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5489 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5490 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5493 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5494 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5495 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5496 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5497 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5498 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5499 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5500 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5501 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5502 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5503 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5506 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5510 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5511 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5512 where L::Target: Logger
5514 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5515 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5516 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5518 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5520 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5521 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5522 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5523 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5524 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5525 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5526 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5527 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5528 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5529 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5530 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5536 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5539 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5540 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5541 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5542 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5543 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5544 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5546 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5547 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5548 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5550 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5551 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5552 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5555 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5556 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5560 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5561 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5563 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5565 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5566 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5567 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5568 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5570 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5571 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5572 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5573 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5574 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5575 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5579 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5580 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5584 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5585 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5590 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5591 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5593 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5594 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5595 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5596 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5597 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5598 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5599 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5600 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5602 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5603 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5604 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5607 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5608 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5609 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5615 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5617 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5618 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5619 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5620 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5621 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5623 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5625 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5631 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5632 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5634 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5635 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5636 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5637 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5638 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5640 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5641 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5642 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5645 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5646 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5647 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5649 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5650 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5653 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5654 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5656 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5657 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5658 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5661 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5662 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5663 let mut chan_closed = false;
5664 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5668 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5670 None if !chan_closed => {
5671 // use override shutdown script if provided
5672 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5673 Some(script) => script,
5675 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5676 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5677 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5678 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5682 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5683 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5685 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5691 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5692 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5693 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5694 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5696 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5698 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5700 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5701 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5702 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5703 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5704 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5705 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5708 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5709 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5711 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5712 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5713 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5716 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5717 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5718 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5719 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5720 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5722 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5723 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5730 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5731 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5733 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5736 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5737 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5738 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5740 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5741 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5745 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5749 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5750 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5751 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5752 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5755 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5756 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5757 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5758 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5759 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5760 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5761 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5762 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5764 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5765 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5766 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5767 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5769 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5770 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5772 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5773 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5775 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5776 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5777 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5779 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5780 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5782 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5783 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5784 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5785 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5786 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5789 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5790 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5792 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5793 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5795 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5797 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5799 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5800 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5801 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5802 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5805 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5806 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5808 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5809 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5810 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5811 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5815 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5816 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5817 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5821 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5822 Ok(script) => script,
5823 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5826 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5829 context: ChannelContext {
5832 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5833 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5834 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5835 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5840 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5842 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5843 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5844 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5845 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5847 channel_value_satoshis,
5849 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5851 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5852 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5855 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5856 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5859 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5860 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5861 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5862 pending_update_fee: None,
5863 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5864 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5865 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5866 update_time_counter: 1,
5868 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5870 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5871 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5872 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5873 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5874 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5875 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5877 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
5878 signer_pending_funding: false,
5880 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5881 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5882 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5883 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5885 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5886 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5887 closing_fee_limits: None,
5888 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5890 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5891 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5892 short_channel_id: None,
5893 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5895 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5896 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5897 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5898 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5899 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5900 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5901 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5902 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5903 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5904 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5905 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5906 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5908 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5910 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5911 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5912 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5913 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5914 counterparty_parameters: None,
5915 funding_outpoint: None,
5916 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5918 funding_transaction: None,
5919 is_batch_funding: None,
5921 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5922 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5923 counterparty_node_id,
5925 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5927 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5929 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5930 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5932 announcement_sigs: None,
5934 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5935 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5936 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5937 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5939 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5940 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5942 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5943 outbound_scid_alias,
5945 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5946 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5948 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5949 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5954 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5956 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5960 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5961 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5962 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5963 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5964 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5965 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5966 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5967 .map(|(sig, _)| sig)
5972 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5973 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5974 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5975 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5976 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5977 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5978 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5979 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
5980 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5981 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5982 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5984 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5985 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5987 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5988 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5989 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5990 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5993 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5994 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5996 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5998 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6000 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6001 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6003 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6004 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6005 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6006 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6007 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6008 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6011 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6012 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6014 let funding_created = if let Ok(signature) = self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
6015 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6016 temporary_channel_id,
6017 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
6018 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
6021 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6023 next_local_nonce: None,
6026 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6030 let channel = Channel {
6031 context: self.context,
6034 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6037 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6038 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6039 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6040 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6041 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6042 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6043 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6044 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6045 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6046 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6049 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6050 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6051 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6052 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6053 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6054 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6060 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6061 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6062 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6063 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6064 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6065 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6067 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6069 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6070 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6071 // We've exhausted our options
6074 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6075 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6078 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6079 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6080 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6081 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6083 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6084 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6085 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6086 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6087 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6088 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6090 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6092 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6093 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6096 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6097 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6098 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6100 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6101 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6104 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6105 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6108 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6109 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6113 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6114 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6115 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6116 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6117 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6118 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6119 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6120 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6121 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6122 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6123 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6124 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6125 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6126 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6127 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6128 first_per_commitment_point,
6129 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6130 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6131 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6132 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6134 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6139 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6140 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6142 // Check sanity of message fields:
6143 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6146 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6149 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6150 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6152 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6155 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6156 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6158 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6160 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6162 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6163 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6164 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6166 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6167 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6170 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6173 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6177 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6178 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6181 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6184 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6187 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6190 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6193 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6196 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6200 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6201 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6202 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6204 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6205 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6207 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6208 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6211 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6212 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6215 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6216 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6217 &Some(ref script) => {
6218 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6219 if script.len() == 0 {
6222 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6225 Some(script.clone())
6228 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6235 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6236 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6237 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6238 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6239 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6241 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6242 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6244 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6247 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6248 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6249 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6250 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6251 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6252 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6255 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6256 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6257 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6260 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6261 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6263 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6264 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6270 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6271 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6272 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6273 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6276 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6277 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6278 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6279 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6280 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6281 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6282 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6283 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6284 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6285 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6286 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6289 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6291 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6292 // support this channel type.
6293 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6294 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6298 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6299 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6300 // `static_remote_key`.
6301 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6304 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6305 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6308 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6311 channel_type.clone()
6313 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6314 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6315 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6320 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6321 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6322 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6323 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6324 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6325 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6326 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6327 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6328 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6331 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6335 // Check sanity of message fields:
6336 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6337 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6339 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6340 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6342 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6343 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6345 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6346 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6347 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6349 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6350 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6352 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6353 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6355 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6357 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6358 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6359 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6361 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6364 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6365 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6368 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6369 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6370 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6372 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6373 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6375 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6376 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6378 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6379 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6381 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6382 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6384 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6385 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6387 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6388 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6391 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6393 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6394 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6395 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6399 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6400 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6401 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6402 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6403 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6405 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6406 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6408 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6409 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6410 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6412 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6413 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6416 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6417 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6418 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6419 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6423 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6424 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6425 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6426 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6429 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6430 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6431 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6432 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6433 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6436 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6437 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6438 &Some(ref script) => {
6439 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6440 if script.len() == 0 {
6443 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6444 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6446 Some(script.clone())
6449 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6456 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6457 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6458 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6459 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6463 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6464 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6465 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6469 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6470 Ok(script) => script,
6471 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6474 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6475 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6477 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6480 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6484 context: ChannelContext {
6487 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6488 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6490 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6495 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6497 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6498 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6499 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6500 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6503 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6505 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6506 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6509 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6510 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6511 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6513 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6514 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6515 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6516 pending_update_fee: None,
6517 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6518 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6519 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6520 update_time_counter: 1,
6522 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6524 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6525 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6526 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6527 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6528 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6529 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6531 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6532 signer_pending_funding: false,
6534 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6535 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6536 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6537 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6539 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6540 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6541 closing_fee_limits: None,
6542 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6544 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6545 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6546 short_channel_id: None,
6547 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6549 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6550 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6551 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6552 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6553 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6554 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6555 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6556 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6557 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6558 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6559 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6560 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6563 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6565 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6566 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6567 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6568 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6569 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6570 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6571 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6573 funding_outpoint: None,
6574 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6576 funding_transaction: None,
6577 is_batch_funding: None,
6579 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6580 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6581 counterparty_node_id,
6583 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6585 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6587 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6588 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6590 announcement_sigs: None,
6592 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6593 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6594 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6595 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6597 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6598 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6600 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6601 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6603 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6604 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6606 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6607 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6612 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6614 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6620 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6621 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6623 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6624 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6625 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6626 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6628 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6629 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6631 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6632 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6635 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6638 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6639 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6640 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6642 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6643 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6644 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6645 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6647 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6648 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6649 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6650 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6651 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6652 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6653 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6654 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6655 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6656 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6657 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6658 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6659 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6660 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6661 first_per_commitment_point,
6662 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6663 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6664 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6666 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6668 next_local_nonce: None,
6672 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6673 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6675 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6677 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6678 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6681 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Option<Signature>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6682 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6684 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6685 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6687 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6688 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6689 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6690 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6691 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6692 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6693 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6694 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6695 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6698 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6699 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6701 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6702 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6703 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6704 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6706 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6707 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6708 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6709 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6710 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok();
6712 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6713 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6718 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6719 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6720 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6724 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6725 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6727 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6728 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6729 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6731 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6733 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6734 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6735 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6736 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6739 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6740 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6741 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6742 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6743 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6745 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, sig_opt) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6747 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6748 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6749 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6752 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6753 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6754 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6758 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6759 initial_commitment_tx,
6762 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6763 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6766 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6767 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6770 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6772 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6773 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6774 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6775 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6776 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6777 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6778 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6779 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6780 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6781 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6782 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6784 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6786 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6787 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6788 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6789 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6790 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6791 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6793 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6794 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6795 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6796 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6798 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6800 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6801 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6802 let mut channel = Channel {
6803 context: self.context,
6805 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6806 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6807 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6809 let funding_signed = if let Some(signature) = sig_opt {
6810 Some(msgs::FundingSigned {
6814 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6817 channel.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6821 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6825 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6826 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6828 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6834 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6835 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6836 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6837 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6838 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6840 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6841 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6842 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6843 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6849 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6850 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6851 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6852 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6853 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6854 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6859 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6860 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6861 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6862 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6864 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6865 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6866 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6867 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6872 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6873 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6874 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6875 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6876 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6877 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6882 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6883 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6884 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6887 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6889 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6890 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6891 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6892 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6893 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6895 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6896 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6897 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6898 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6900 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6901 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6902 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6904 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6906 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6907 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6908 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6909 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6910 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6911 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6912 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6914 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6915 // deserialized from that format.
6916 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6917 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6918 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6920 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6922 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6923 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6924 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6926 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6927 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6928 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6929 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6932 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6933 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6934 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6937 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6938 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6939 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6940 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6942 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6943 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6945 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6947 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6949 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6951 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6954 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6956 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6961 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6962 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6964 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6965 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6966 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6967 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6968 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6969 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6970 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6972 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6974 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6976 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6979 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6980 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6981 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6984 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6986 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6987 preimages.push(preimage);
6989 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6990 reason.write(writer)?;
6992 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6994 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6995 preimages.push(preimage);
6997 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6998 reason.write(writer)?;
7001 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7002 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7003 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7005 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7006 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7007 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7011 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7012 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7013 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7015 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7016 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7020 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7021 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7022 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7023 source.write(writer)?;
7024 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7026 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7027 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7028 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7030 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7031 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7033 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7035 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7036 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7038 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7040 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7041 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7046 match self.context.resend_order {
7047 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7048 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7051 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7052 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7053 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7055 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7056 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7057 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7058 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7061 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7062 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7063 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7064 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7065 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7068 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7069 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7070 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7071 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7073 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7074 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7075 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7077 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7079 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7080 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7081 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7082 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7084 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7085 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7086 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7087 // consider the stale state on reload.
7090 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7091 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7092 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7094 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7095 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7096 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7098 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7099 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7101 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7102 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7103 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7105 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7106 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7108 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7111 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7112 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7113 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7115 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7118 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7119 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7121 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7122 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7123 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7125 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7127 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7129 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7131 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7132 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7133 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7134 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7135 htlc.write(writer)?;
7138 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7139 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7140 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7142 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7143 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7145 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7146 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7147 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7148 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7149 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7150 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7151 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7153 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7154 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7155 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7156 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7157 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7159 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7160 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7162 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7163 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7164 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7165 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7167 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7169 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7170 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7171 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7172 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7173 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7174 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7175 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7177 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7178 (2, chan_type, option),
7179 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7180 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7181 (5, self.context.config, required),
7182 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7183 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7184 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7185 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7186 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7187 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7188 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7189 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7190 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7191 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7192 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7193 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7194 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7195 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7196 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7197 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7198 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7199 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7200 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7207 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7208 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7210 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7211 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7213 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7214 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7215 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7217 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7218 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7219 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7220 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7222 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7224 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7225 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7226 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7227 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7228 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7230 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7231 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7234 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7235 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7236 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7238 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7240 let mut keys_data = None;
7242 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7243 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7244 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7245 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7246 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7247 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7248 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7249 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7250 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7251 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7255 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7256 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7257 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7260 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7262 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7263 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7264 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7266 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7268 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7269 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7270 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7271 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7272 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7273 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7274 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7275 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7276 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7277 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7278 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7279 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7280 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7285 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7287 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7288 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7289 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7290 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7291 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7292 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7293 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7294 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7295 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7296 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7298 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7299 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7302 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7303 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7306 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7307 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7309 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7311 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7315 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7316 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7317 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7318 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7319 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7320 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7321 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7322 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7323 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7324 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7325 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7327 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7328 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7329 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7331 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7332 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7333 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7335 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7339 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7340 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7341 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7342 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7345 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7346 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7347 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7349 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7350 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7351 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7352 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7355 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7356 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7357 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7358 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7361 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7363 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7365 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7366 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7367 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7368 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7370 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7371 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7372 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7373 // consider the stale state on reload.
7374 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7377 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7379 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7381 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7384 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7385 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7386 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7388 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7389 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7390 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7391 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7393 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7394 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7396 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7397 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7399 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7400 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7401 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7403 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7405 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7406 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7408 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7409 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7412 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7414 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7415 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7416 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7417 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7419 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7422 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7423 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7425 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7427 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7428 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7430 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7431 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7433 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7435 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7436 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7437 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7439 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7441 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7445 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7446 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7447 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7449 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7455 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7456 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7457 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7458 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7459 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7460 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7461 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7462 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7463 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7464 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7466 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7467 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7468 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7469 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7470 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7471 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7472 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7474 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7475 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7476 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7477 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7479 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7481 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7482 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7484 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7486 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7487 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7488 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7489 (2, channel_type, option),
7490 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7491 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7492 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7493 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7494 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7495 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7496 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7497 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7498 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7499 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7500 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7501 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7502 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7503 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7504 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7505 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7506 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7507 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7508 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7509 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7510 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7511 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7514 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7515 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7516 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7517 // required channel parameters.
7518 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7519 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7520 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7522 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7524 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7525 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7526 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7527 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7530 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7531 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7532 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7534 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7535 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7537 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7538 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7543 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7544 if iter.next().is_some() {
7545 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7549 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7550 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7551 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7552 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7553 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7556 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7557 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7558 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7560 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7561 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7563 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7564 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7565 // separate u64 values.
7566 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7568 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7570 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7571 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7572 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7573 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7575 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7576 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7578 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7579 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7580 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7581 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7582 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7585 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7586 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7590 context: ChannelContext {
7593 config: config.unwrap(),
7597 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7598 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7599 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7602 temporary_channel_id,
7604 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7606 channel_value_satoshis,
7608 latest_monitor_update_id,
7610 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7611 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7614 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7615 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7618 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7619 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7620 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7621 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7625 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7626 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7627 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7628 monitor_pending_forwards,
7629 monitor_pending_failures,
7630 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7632 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7633 signer_pending_funding: false,
7636 holding_cell_update_fee,
7637 next_holder_htlc_id,
7638 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7639 update_time_counter,
7642 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7643 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7644 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7645 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7647 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7648 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7649 closing_fee_limits: None,
7650 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7652 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7653 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7655 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7657 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7658 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7659 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7660 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7661 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7662 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7663 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7664 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7665 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7668 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7670 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7671 funding_transaction,
7674 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7675 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7676 counterparty_node_id,
7678 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7682 channel_update_status,
7683 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7688 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7690 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7692 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7693 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7695 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7696 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7697 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7699 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7700 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7702 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7703 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7705 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7708 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7717 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7718 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7719 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7720 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7721 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7723 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7724 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7725 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7726 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7727 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7728 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7729 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7730 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7731 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7732 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7733 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7734 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7735 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7736 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7737 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7738 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7739 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7740 use crate::util::test_utils;
7741 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7742 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7743 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7744 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7745 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7746 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7747 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7748 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7749 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7750 use crate::prelude::*;
7752 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7755 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7756 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7762 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7763 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7764 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7765 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7769 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7770 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7771 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7772 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7773 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7774 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7775 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7776 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7780 signer: InMemorySigner,
7783 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7784 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7787 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7788 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7790 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7791 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7794 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7798 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7800 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7801 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7802 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7803 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7804 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7807 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7808 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7809 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7810 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7814 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7815 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7816 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7820 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7821 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7822 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7823 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7825 let seed = [42; 32];
7826 let network = Network::Testnet;
7827 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7828 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7829 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7832 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7833 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7834 let config = UserConfig::default();
7835 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7836 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7837 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7839 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7840 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7844 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7845 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7847 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7848 let original_fee = 253;
7849 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7850 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7851 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7852 let seed = [42; 32];
7853 let network = Network::Testnet;
7854 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7856 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7857 let config = UserConfig::default();
7858 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7860 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7861 // same as the old fee.
7862 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7863 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7864 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7868 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7869 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7870 // dust limits are used.
7871 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7872 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7873 let seed = [42; 32];
7874 let network = Network::Testnet;
7875 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7876 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7877 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7879 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7880 // they have different dust limits.
7882 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7883 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7884 let config = UserConfig::default();
7885 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7887 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7888 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7889 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7890 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7891 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7893 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7894 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7895 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7896 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7897 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7899 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7900 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7901 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7902 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7904 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7905 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7906 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7908 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7909 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7911 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7912 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7913 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7915 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7916 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7917 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7918 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7921 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7923 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7924 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7925 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7926 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7927 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7928 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7929 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7930 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7931 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7933 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7936 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7937 // the dust limit check.
7938 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7939 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7940 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7941 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7943 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7944 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7945 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7946 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7947 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7948 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7949 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7953 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7954 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7955 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7956 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7957 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7958 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7959 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7960 let seed = [42; 32];
7961 let network = Network::Testnet;
7962 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7964 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7965 let config = UserConfig::default();
7966 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7968 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7969 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7971 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7972 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7973 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7974 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7975 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7976 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7978 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7979 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7980 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7981 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7982 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7984 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7986 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7987 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7988 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7989 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7990 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7992 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7993 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7994 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7995 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7996 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8000 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8001 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8002 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8003 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8004 let seed = [42; 32];
8005 let network = Network::Testnet;
8006 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8007 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8008 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8010 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8012 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8013 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8014 let config = UserConfig::default();
8015 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8017 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8018 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8019 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8020 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8022 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8023 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8024 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8026 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8027 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8028 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8029 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8031 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8032 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8033 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8035 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8036 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8038 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8039 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8040 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8041 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8042 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8043 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8044 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8046 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8048 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8049 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8050 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8051 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8052 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8056 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8057 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8058 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8059 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8060 let seed = [42; 32];
8061 let network = Network::Testnet;
8062 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8063 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8064 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8066 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8067 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8068 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8069 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8070 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8071 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8072 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8073 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8075 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8076 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8077 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8078 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8079 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8080 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8082 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8083 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8084 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8085 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8087 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8089 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8090 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8091 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8092 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8093 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8094 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8096 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8097 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8098 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8099 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8101 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8102 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8103 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8104 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8105 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8107 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8108 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8110 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8111 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8112 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8114 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8115 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8116 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8117 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8118 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8120 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8121 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8123 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8124 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8125 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8129 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8131 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8132 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8133 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8135 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8136 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8137 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8138 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8140 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8141 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8142 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8144 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8146 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8147 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8150 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8151 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8152 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8153 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8154 let seed = [42; 32];
8155 let network = Network::Testnet;
8156 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8157 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8158 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8161 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8162 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8163 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8165 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8166 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8168 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8169 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8170 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8172 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8173 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8175 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8177 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8178 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8180 // Channel Negotiations failed
8181 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8182 assert!(result.is_err());
8187 fn channel_update() {
8188 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8189 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8190 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8191 let seed = [42; 32];
8192 let network = Network::Testnet;
8193 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8194 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8195 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8197 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8198 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8199 let config = UserConfig::default();
8200 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8202 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8203 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8204 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8205 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8206 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8208 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8209 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8210 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8211 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8212 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8214 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8215 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8216 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8217 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8219 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8220 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8221 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8223 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8224 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8226 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8227 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8228 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8230 short_channel_id: 0,
8233 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8234 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8235 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8237 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8238 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8240 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8242 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8244 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8245 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8246 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8247 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8249 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8250 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8251 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8253 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8256 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8259 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8261 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8262 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8263 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8264 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8265 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8266 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8267 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8268 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8269 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8270 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8271 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8272 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8273 use crate::sync::Arc;
8275 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8276 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8277 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8278 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8280 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8282 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8283 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8284 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8285 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8286 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8288 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8289 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8295 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8296 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8297 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8299 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8300 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8301 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8302 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8303 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8304 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8306 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8308 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8309 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8310 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8311 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8312 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8313 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8315 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8316 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8317 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8318 selected_contest_delay: 144
8320 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8321 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8323 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8324 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8326 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8327 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8329 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8330 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8332 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8333 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8334 // build_commitment_transaction.
8335 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8336 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8337 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8338 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8339 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8341 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8342 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8343 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8344 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8348 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8349 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8350 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8351 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8355 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8356 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8357 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8359 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8360 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8362 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8363 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8365 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8367 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8368 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8369 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8370 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8371 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8372 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8373 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8375 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8376 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8377 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8378 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8380 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8381 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8382 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8384 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8386 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8387 commitment_tx.clone(),
8388 counterparty_signature,
8389 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8390 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8391 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8393 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8394 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8396 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8397 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8398 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8400 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8401 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8404 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8405 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8407 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8408 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8409 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8410 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8411 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8412 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8413 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8414 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8416 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8419 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8420 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8421 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8425 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8428 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8429 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8430 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8431 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8432 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8433 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8435 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8436 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8437 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8438 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8440 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8441 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8442 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8443 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8444 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8446 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8447 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8448 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8449 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8450 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
8451 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8453 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8457 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8458 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8459 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8460 "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", {});
8462 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8463 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8465 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8466 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8467 "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", {});
8469 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8470 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8471 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8472 "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", {});
8474 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8475 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8477 amount_msat: 1000000,
8479 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8480 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8482 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8485 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8486 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8488 amount_msat: 2000000,
8490 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8491 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8493 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8496 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8497 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8499 amount_msat: 2000000,
8501 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8502 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8503 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8504 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8506 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8509 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8510 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8512 amount_msat: 3000000,
8514 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8515 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8516 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8517 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8519 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8522 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8523 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8525 amount_msat: 4000000,
8527 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8528 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8530 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8534 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8535 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8536 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8538 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8539 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8540 "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", {
8543 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8544 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8545 "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" },
8548 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8549 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8550 "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" },
8553 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8554 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8555 "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" },
8558 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8559 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8560 "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" },
8563 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8564 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8565 "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" }
8568 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8569 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8570 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8572 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8573 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8574 "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", {
8577 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8578 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8579 "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" },
8582 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8583 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8584 "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" },
8587 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8588 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8589 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8592 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8593 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8594 "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" },
8597 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8598 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8599 "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" }
8602 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8603 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8604 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8606 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8607 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8608 "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", {
8611 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8612 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8613 "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" },
8616 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8617 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8618 "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" },
8621 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8622 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8623 "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" },
8626 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8627 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8628 "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" }
8631 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8632 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8633 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8634 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8636 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8637 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8638 "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", {
8641 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8642 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8643 "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" },
8646 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8647 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8648 "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" },
8651 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8652 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8653 "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" },
8656 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8657 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8658 "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" }
8661 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8662 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8663 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8664 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8666 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8667 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8668 "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", {
8671 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8672 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8673 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8676 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8677 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8678 "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" },
8681 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8682 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8683 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e001473044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c1801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8686 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8687 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8688 "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" }
8691 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8692 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8693 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8695 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8696 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8697 "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", {
8700 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8701 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8702 "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" },
8705 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8706 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8707 "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" },
8710 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8711 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8712 "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" }
8715 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8716 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8717 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8719 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8720 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8721 "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", {
8724 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8725 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8726 "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" },
8729 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8730 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8731 "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" },
8734 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8735 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8736 "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" }
8739 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8740 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8741 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8743 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8744 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8745 "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", {
8748 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8749 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8750 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8753 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8754 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8755 "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" }
8758 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8759 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8760 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8761 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8762 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8763 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8765 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8766 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8767 "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", {
8770 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8771 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8772 "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" },
8775 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8776 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8777 "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" }
8780 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8781 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8782 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8783 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8784 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8786 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8787 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8788 "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", {
8791 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8792 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8793 "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" },
8796 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8797 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8798 "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" }
8801 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8802 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8803 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8805 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8806 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8807 "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", {
8810 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8811 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8812 "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" }
8815 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8816 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8817 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8818 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8819 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8821 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8822 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8823 "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", {
8826 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8827 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8828 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8831 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8832 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8833 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8834 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8835 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8837 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8838 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8839 "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", {
8842 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8843 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8844 "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" }
8847 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8848 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8849 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8850 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8852 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8853 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8854 "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", {});
8856 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8857 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8858 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8859 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8860 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8862 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8863 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8864 "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", {});
8866 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8867 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8868 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8869 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8870 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8872 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8873 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8874 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8876 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8877 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8878 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8880 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8881 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8882 "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", {});
8884 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8885 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8886 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8887 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8888 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8890 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8891 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8892 "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", {});
8894 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8895 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8896 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8897 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8898 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8900 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8901 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8902 "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", {});
8904 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8905 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8906 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8907 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8908 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8909 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8911 amount_msat: 2000000,
8913 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8914 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8916 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8919 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8920 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8921 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8923 amount_msat: 5000001,
8925 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8926 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8927 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8928 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8930 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8933 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8934 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8936 amount_msat: 5000000,
8938 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8939 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8940 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8941 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8943 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8947 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8948 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8949 "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", {
8952 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8953 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8954 "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" },
8956 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8957 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8958 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8960 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8961 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8962 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
8965 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8966 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8967 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8968 "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", {
8971 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8972 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8973 "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" },
8975 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8976 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8977 "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" },
8979 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8980 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8981 "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" }
8986 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8987 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8989 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8990 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8991 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8992 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8994 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8995 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8996 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8998 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8999 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9001 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9002 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9004 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9005 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9006 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9010 fn test_key_derivation() {
9011 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9012 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9014 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9015 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9017 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9018 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9020 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9021 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9023 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9024 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
9026 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9027 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9029 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9030 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9032 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9033 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9037 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9038 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9039 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9040 let seed = [42; 32];
9041 let network = Network::Testnet;
9042 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9043 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9045 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9046 let config = UserConfig::default();
9047 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9048 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
9050 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9051 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9053 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9054 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9055 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9056 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9057 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9058 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9059 assert!(res.is_ok());
9063 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9064 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9065 // resulting `channel_type`.
9066 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9067 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9068 let network = Network::Testnet;
9069 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9070 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9072 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9073 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9075 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9076 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9078 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9079 // need to signal it.
9080 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9081 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9082 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9085 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9087 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9088 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9089 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9091 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9092 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9093 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9096 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9097 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9098 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9099 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9100 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9103 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9104 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9108 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9109 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9110 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9111 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9112 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9113 let network = Network::Testnet;
9114 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9115 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9117 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9118 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9120 let config = UserConfig::default();
9122 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9123 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9124 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9125 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9126 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9128 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9129 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9130 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9133 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9134 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9135 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9137 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9138 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9139 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9140 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9141 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9142 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9144 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9148 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9149 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9151 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9152 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9153 let network = Network::Testnet;
9154 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9155 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9157 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9158 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9160 let config = UserConfig::default();
9162 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9163 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9164 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9165 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9166 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9167 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9168 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9169 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9171 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9172 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9173 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9174 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9175 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9176 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9179 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9180 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9182 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9183 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9184 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9185 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9187 assert!(res.is_err());
9189 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9190 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9191 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9193 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9194 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9195 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9198 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9200 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9201 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9202 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9203 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9206 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9207 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9209 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9210 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9212 assert!(res.is_err());
9216 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9217 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9218 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9219 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9220 let seed = [42; 32];
9221 let network = Network::Testnet;
9222 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9223 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9224 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9226 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9227 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9228 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9229 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9231 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9232 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9233 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9238 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9247 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9248 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9249 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9254 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9255 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9261 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9264 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9265 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9266 &accept_channel_msg,
9267 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9268 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9271 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9272 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9273 let tx = Transaction {
9275 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9279 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9282 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9285 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9286 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9291 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9292 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9293 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9297 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9298 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9306 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9307 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9308 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9309 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9314 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9321 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9322 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9323 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9324 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9326 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9327 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9328 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9331 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9332 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9333 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9341 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9342 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9343 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9344 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9347 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9348 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9350 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9351 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9352 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9354 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());