1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
483 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
485 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
486 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
488 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
492 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
493 (0, update, required),
494 (2, blocked, required),
497 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
498 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
499 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
502 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
503 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
504 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
505 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
507 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
508 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
509 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
510 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
512 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
516 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
520 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
521 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
523 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
524 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
525 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
527 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
528 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
530 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
532 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
533 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
535 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
537 holder_signer: Signer,
538 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
539 destination_script: Script,
541 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
542 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
543 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
545 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
546 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
547 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
548 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
549 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
550 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
552 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
553 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
554 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
555 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
556 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
557 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
559 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
561 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
562 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
563 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
565 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
566 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
567 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
568 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
569 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
570 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
571 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
573 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
575 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
576 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
577 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
578 // HTLCs with similar state.
579 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
580 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
581 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
582 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
583 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
584 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
585 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
586 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
587 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
590 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
591 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
592 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
594 update_time_counter: u32,
596 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
597 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
598 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
599 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
600 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
601 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
603 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
604 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
606 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
607 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
608 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
609 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
611 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
612 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
614 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
616 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
618 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
619 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
620 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
621 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
622 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
623 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
625 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
626 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
627 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
628 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
629 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
631 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
632 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
633 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
634 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
635 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
636 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
637 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
638 channel_creation_height: u32,
640 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
645 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
648 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
650 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
653 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
655 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
657 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
658 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
661 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
663 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
665 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
666 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
668 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
670 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
671 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
672 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
674 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
676 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
677 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
679 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
680 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
681 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
683 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
685 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
687 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
688 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
689 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
690 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
692 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
693 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
694 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
696 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
697 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
698 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
700 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
701 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
702 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
703 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
704 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
705 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
707 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
709 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
710 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
711 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
712 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
713 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
715 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
716 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
718 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
719 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
720 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
721 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
722 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
723 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
724 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
725 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
727 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
728 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
730 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
731 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
732 // the channel's funding UTXO.
734 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
735 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
736 // associated channel mapping.
738 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
739 // to store all of them.
740 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
742 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
743 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
744 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
745 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
746 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
748 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
749 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
751 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
752 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
754 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
755 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
756 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
758 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
759 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
760 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
761 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
762 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
766 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
768 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
769 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
770 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
774 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
776 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
777 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
778 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
779 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
783 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
785 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
787 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
789 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
790 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
791 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
792 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
793 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
795 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
796 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
798 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
800 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
801 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
803 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
804 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
805 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
806 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
807 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
808 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
810 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
811 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
813 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
814 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
815 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
816 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
817 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
819 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
820 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
822 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
823 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
825 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
826 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
827 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
828 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
834 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
835 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
837 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
838 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
839 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
844 macro_rules! secp_check {
845 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
848 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
853 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
854 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
855 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
858 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
860 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
861 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
862 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
864 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
867 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
869 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
872 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
873 /// required by us according to the configured or default
874 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
876 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
878 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
879 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
880 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
881 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
882 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
885 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
886 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
887 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
888 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
889 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
890 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
891 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
894 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
895 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
898 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
899 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
900 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
901 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
902 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
903 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
904 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
905 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
906 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
907 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
910 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
911 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
912 // `only_static_remotekey`.
914 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
915 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
916 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
917 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
924 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
925 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
926 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
927 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
928 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
929 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
930 // We've exhausted our options
933 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
934 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
937 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
938 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
939 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
940 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
942 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
943 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
944 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
945 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
946 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
947 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
949 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
951 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
955 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
956 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
957 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
958 outbound_scid_alias: u64
959 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
960 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
961 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
962 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
964 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
965 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
966 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
967 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
969 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
970 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
972 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
973 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
975 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
976 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
979 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
982 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
983 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
984 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
985 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
989 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
990 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
992 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
994 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
995 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
996 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1000 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1001 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1003 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1004 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1005 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1006 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1010 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1011 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1012 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1016 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1017 Ok(script) => script,
1018 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1021 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1026 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1027 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1028 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1029 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1034 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1036 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1037 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1038 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1039 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1041 channel_value_satoshis,
1043 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1046 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1049 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1050 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1053 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1054 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1055 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1056 pending_update_fee: None,
1057 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1058 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1059 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1060 update_time_counter: 1,
1062 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1064 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1065 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1066 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1067 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1068 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1069 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1071 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1072 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1073 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1074 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1076 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1077 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1078 closing_fee_limits: None,
1079 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1081 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1083 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1084 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1085 short_channel_id: None,
1086 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1088 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1089 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1090 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1091 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1092 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1093 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1094 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1095 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1096 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1097 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1098 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1099 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1101 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1103 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1104 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1105 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1106 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1107 counterparty_parameters: None,
1108 funding_outpoint: None,
1109 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1110 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1112 funding_transaction: None,
1114 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1115 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1116 counterparty_node_id,
1118 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1120 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1122 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1123 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1125 announcement_sigs: None,
1127 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1128 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1129 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1130 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1132 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1134 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1135 outbound_scid_alias,
1137 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1138 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1140 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1141 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1146 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1150 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1151 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1152 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1154 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1155 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1156 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1157 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1158 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1159 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1160 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1163 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1164 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1165 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1166 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1167 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1168 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1169 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1170 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1172 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1173 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1182 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1183 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1184 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1185 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1186 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1187 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1188 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1189 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1190 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1191 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1192 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1195 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1197 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1198 // support this channel type.
1199 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1200 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1204 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1205 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1206 // `static_remote_key`.
1207 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1210 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1211 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1214 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1217 channel_type.clone()
1219 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1220 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1225 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1227 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1228 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1229 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1230 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1231 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1232 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1233 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1234 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1235 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1238 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1242 // Check sanity of message fields:
1243 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1246 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1249 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1252 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1253 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1256 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1259 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1262 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1264 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1265 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1268 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1271 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1275 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1276 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1279 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1282 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1285 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1288 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1291 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1294 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1298 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1300 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1301 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1306 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1307 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1308 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1309 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1312 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1315 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1316 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1317 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1319 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1323 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1324 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1325 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1326 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1327 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1331 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1332 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1333 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1334 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1338 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1339 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1340 &Some(ref script) => {
1341 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1342 if script.len() == 0 {
1345 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1348 Some(script.clone())
1351 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1358 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1359 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1360 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1361 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1365 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1366 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1367 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1371 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1372 Ok(script) => script,
1373 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1376 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1377 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1379 let chan = Channel {
1382 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1383 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1385 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1390 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1392 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1393 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1394 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1395 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1398 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1401 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1404 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1405 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1406 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1408 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1409 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1410 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1411 pending_update_fee: None,
1412 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1413 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1414 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1415 update_time_counter: 1,
1417 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1419 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1420 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1421 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1422 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1423 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1424 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1426 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1427 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1428 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1429 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1431 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1432 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1433 closing_fee_limits: None,
1434 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1436 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1438 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1439 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1440 short_channel_id: None,
1441 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1443 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1444 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1445 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1446 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1447 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1448 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1449 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1450 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1451 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1452 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1453 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1454 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1455 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1457 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1459 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1460 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1461 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1462 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1463 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1464 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1465 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1467 funding_outpoint: None,
1468 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1469 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1471 funding_transaction: None,
1473 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1474 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1475 counterparty_node_id,
1477 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1479 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1481 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1482 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1484 announcement_sigs: None,
1486 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1487 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1488 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1489 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1491 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1493 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1494 outbound_scid_alias,
1496 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1497 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1499 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1500 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1505 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1511 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1512 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1513 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1514 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1515 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1517 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1518 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1519 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1520 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1521 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1522 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1523 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1525 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1526 where L::Target: Logger
1528 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1529 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1530 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1532 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1533 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1534 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1535 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1537 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1538 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1539 if match update_state {
1540 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1541 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1542 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1543 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1544 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1546 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1550 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1551 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1552 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1553 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1555 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1556 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1557 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1559 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1560 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1561 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1562 transaction_output_index: None
1567 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1568 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1569 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1570 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1571 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1574 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1576 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1577 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1578 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1580 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1581 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1584 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1585 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1588 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1590 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1591 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1592 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1594 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1595 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1601 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1602 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1603 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1604 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1605 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1606 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1607 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1611 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1612 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1614 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1616 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1617 if generated_by_local {
1618 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1619 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1628 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1630 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1631 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1632 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1633 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1634 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1635 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1636 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1639 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1640 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1641 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1642 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1646 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1647 preimages.push(preimage);
1651 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1652 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1654 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1656 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1657 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1659 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1660 if !generated_by_local {
1661 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1669 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1670 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1671 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1672 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1673 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1674 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1675 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1676 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1678 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1680 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1681 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1682 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1683 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1685 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1687 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1688 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1689 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1690 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1693 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1694 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1695 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1696 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1698 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1701 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1702 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1703 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1704 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1706 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1709 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1710 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1715 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1721 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1723 let channel_parameters =
1724 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1725 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1726 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1729 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1734 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1737 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1738 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1739 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1740 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1742 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1743 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1744 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1752 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1753 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1759 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1760 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1761 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1762 // outside of those situations will fail.
1763 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1767 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1772 1 + // script length (0)
1776 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1777 2 + // witness marker and flag
1778 1 + // witness element count
1779 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1780 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1781 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1782 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1783 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1784 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1786 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1787 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1788 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1794 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1795 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1796 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1797 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1799 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1800 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1801 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1803 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1804 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1805 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1806 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1807 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1808 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1811 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1812 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1815 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1816 value_to_holder = 0;
1819 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1820 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1821 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1822 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1824 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1825 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1828 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1829 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1833 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1834 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1835 /// our counterparty!)
1836 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1837 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1838 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1839 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1840 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1841 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1842 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1844 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1848 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1849 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1850 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1851 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1852 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1853 //may see payments to it!
1854 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1855 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1856 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1858 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1861 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1862 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1863 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1864 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1865 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1868 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1871 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1872 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1874 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1876 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1877 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1878 where L::Target: Logger {
1879 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1880 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1881 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1882 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1883 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1884 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1885 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1886 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1890 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1891 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1892 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1893 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1895 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1896 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1898 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1900 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1902 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1903 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1904 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1906 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1907 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1908 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1909 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1910 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1912 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1913 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1914 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1916 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1917 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1919 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1922 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1923 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1927 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1931 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1932 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1933 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1934 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1935 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1936 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1939 // Now update local state:
1941 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1942 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1943 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1944 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1945 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1946 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1947 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1951 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1952 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1953 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1954 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1955 // do not not get into this branch.
1956 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1957 match pending_update {
1958 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1959 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1960 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1961 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1962 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1963 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1964 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1967 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1968 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1969 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1970 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1971 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1972 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1973 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1979 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1980 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1981 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1983 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1984 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1985 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1987 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1988 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1991 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1992 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1994 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1995 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1997 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1998 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2001 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2004 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2005 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2006 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2007 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2012 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2013 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2014 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2015 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2016 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2017 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2018 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2019 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2020 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2021 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2022 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2023 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2024 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2025 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2026 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2027 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2028 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2030 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2032 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2033 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2034 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2035 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2036 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2037 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2038 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2040 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2041 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2044 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2045 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2046 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2047 update, blocked: true,
2052 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2053 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2054 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2055 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2059 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2063 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2064 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2065 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2066 /// before we fail backwards.
2068 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2069 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2070 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2071 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2072 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2073 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2074 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2077 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2078 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2079 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2080 /// before we fail backwards.
2082 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2083 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2084 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2085 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2086 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2087 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2088 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2090 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2092 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2093 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2094 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2096 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2097 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2098 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2100 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2101 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2102 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2104 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2109 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2116 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2117 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2118 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2119 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2120 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2124 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2125 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2126 force_holding_cell = true;
2129 // Now update local state:
2130 if force_holding_cell {
2131 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2132 match pending_update {
2133 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2134 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2135 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2136 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2140 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2141 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2142 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2143 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2149 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2150 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2151 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2157 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2159 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2160 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2163 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2164 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2165 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2170 // Message handlers:
2172 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2173 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2175 // Check sanity of message fields:
2176 if !self.is_outbound() {
2177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2179 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2182 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2185 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2188 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2191 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2193 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2195 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2196 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2199 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2200 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2203 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2206 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2210 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2211 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2214 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2217 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2220 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2226 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2229 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2233 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2234 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2237 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2238 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2240 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2241 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2244 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2247 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2248 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2249 &Some(ref script) => {
2250 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2251 if script.len() == 0 {
2254 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2257 Some(script.clone())
2260 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2267 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2268 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2269 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2270 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2271 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2273 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2274 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2276 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2279 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2280 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2281 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2282 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2283 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2284 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2287 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2288 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2289 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2292 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2293 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2295 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2296 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2301 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2302 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2304 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2305 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2307 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2308 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2309 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2310 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2311 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2312 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2313 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2314 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2315 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2318 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2319 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2321 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2322 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2323 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2324 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2326 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2327 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2329 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2330 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2333 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2334 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2337 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2338 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2339 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2341 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2344 if self.is_outbound() {
2345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2347 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2348 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2349 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2353 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2356 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2357 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2358 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2359 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2362 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2363 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2364 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2365 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2366 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2368 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2370 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2371 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2372 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2375 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2376 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2377 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2381 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2382 initial_commitment_tx,
2385 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2386 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2389 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2390 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2392 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2394 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2395 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2396 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2397 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2398 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2399 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2400 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2401 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2402 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2403 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2404 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2406 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2408 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2410 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2411 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2412 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2413 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2415 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2417 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2418 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2420 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2421 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2424 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2425 }, channel_monitor))
2428 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2429 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2430 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2431 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2432 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2434 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2437 if !self.is_outbound() {
2438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2440 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2441 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2443 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2444 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2445 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2446 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2449 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2451 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2452 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2453 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2454 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2456 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2457 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2459 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2460 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2462 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2463 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2464 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2465 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2466 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2471 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2472 initial_commitment_tx,
2475 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2476 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2479 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2480 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2483 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2484 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2485 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2486 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2487 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2488 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2489 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2490 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2491 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2492 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2493 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2494 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2496 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2498 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2500 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2501 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2502 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2503 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2505 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2507 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2508 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2512 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2513 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2515 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2516 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2517 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2518 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2520 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2523 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2524 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2525 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2528 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2529 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2530 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2531 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2532 // when routing outbound payments.
2533 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2537 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2539 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2540 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2541 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2542 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2543 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2544 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2545 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2546 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2547 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2549 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2550 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2551 let expected_point =
2552 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2553 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2555 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2556 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2557 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2558 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2559 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2560 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2562 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2563 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2564 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2565 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2566 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2568 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2569 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2576 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2577 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2579 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2581 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2584 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2585 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2586 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2587 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2593 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2594 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2595 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2596 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2597 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2598 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2599 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2600 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2601 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2604 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2607 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2608 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2609 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2611 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2612 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2613 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2614 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2615 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2616 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2618 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2619 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2625 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2626 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2627 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2628 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2629 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2630 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2631 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2632 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2633 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2636 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2639 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2640 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2641 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2643 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2644 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2645 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2646 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2647 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2648 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2650 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2651 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2655 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2656 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2657 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2658 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2659 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2660 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2661 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2663 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2664 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2666 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2673 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2674 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2675 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2676 /// corner case properly.
2677 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2678 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2679 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2680 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2682 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2683 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2684 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2685 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2688 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2690 let outbound_capacity_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
2691 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2693 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2695 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2697 if self.is_outbound() {
2698 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2699 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2701 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2702 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2704 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2705 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2706 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2707 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2710 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2711 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2712 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2713 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2715 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2716 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2717 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2718 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
2719 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2720 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2721 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2722 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2723 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2724 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2726 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2729 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2730 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2731 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2732 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2733 real_dust_limit_success_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2736 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2737 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2739 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2740 let remote_balance_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat)
2741 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2743 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
2744 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2745 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2746 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2750 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2751 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2753 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2754 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2758 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2759 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2760 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2761 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2763 outbound_capacity_msat,
2764 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2769 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2770 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2773 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2774 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2775 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2776 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2777 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2778 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2781 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2782 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2784 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2785 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2788 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2789 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2790 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2792 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2793 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2795 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2798 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2799 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2801 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2802 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2804 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2805 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2807 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2808 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2812 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2813 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2819 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2820 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2821 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2824 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2825 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2826 included_htlcs += 1;
2829 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2830 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2834 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2835 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2836 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2837 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2838 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2839 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2844 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2846 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2847 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2852 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2853 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2857 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2858 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2862 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2863 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2865 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2866 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2867 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2869 total_pending_htlcs,
2870 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2871 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2872 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2874 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2875 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2876 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2878 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2880 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2885 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2886 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2887 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2889 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2890 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2892 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2895 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2896 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2898 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2899 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2901 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2902 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2904 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2905 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2909 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2910 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2916 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2917 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2918 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2919 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2920 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2921 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2924 included_htlcs += 1;
2927 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2928 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2931 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2932 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2934 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2935 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2936 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2941 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2942 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2946 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2947 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2949 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2950 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2952 total_pending_htlcs,
2953 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2954 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2955 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2957 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2958 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2959 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2961 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2963 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2968 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2969 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2970 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2971 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2972 if local_sent_shutdown {
2973 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2975 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2976 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2977 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2980 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2981 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2983 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2986 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2989 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2993 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2994 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2995 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2996 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2998 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2999 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3001 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3002 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3003 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3004 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3005 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3006 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3007 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3008 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3009 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3010 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3011 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3013 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3014 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3015 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3016 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3017 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3018 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3022 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
3025 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3026 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3027 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3029 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3030 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3031 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3032 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3033 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3034 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3035 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3039 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3040 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3041 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3042 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3043 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3044 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3045 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3049 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3050 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3051 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3052 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3053 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3057 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3058 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3059 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3060 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3061 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3063 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3067 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3071 if !self.is_outbound() {
3072 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3073 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3074 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3075 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3076 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3077 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3078 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3079 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3080 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3081 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3082 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3083 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3084 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3085 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3086 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3089 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3090 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3091 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3092 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3093 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3096 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3097 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3099 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3103 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3104 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3105 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3109 // Now update local state:
3110 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3111 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3112 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3113 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3114 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3115 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3116 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3121 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3123 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3124 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3125 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3126 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3127 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3128 None => fail_reason.into(),
3129 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3130 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3131 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3134 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3138 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3140 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3141 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3143 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3149 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3152 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3153 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3156 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3160 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3163 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3164 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3165 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3167 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3171 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3175 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3176 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3179 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3183 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3187 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3188 where L::Target: Logger
3190 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3193 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3194 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3196 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3197 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3200 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3202 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3204 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3205 let commitment_txid = {
3206 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3207 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3208 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3210 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3211 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3212 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3213 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3214 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3219 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3221 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3222 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3223 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3224 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3227 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3228 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3229 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3233 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3235 if self.is_outbound() {
3236 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3237 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3238 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3239 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3240 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3241 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3242 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3243 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3244 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3245 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3251 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3255 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3256 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3257 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3258 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3259 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3260 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3261 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3262 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3263 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3264 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3265 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3266 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3267 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3270 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3271 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3272 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3273 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3274 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3275 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3276 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3278 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3279 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3280 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3281 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3282 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3283 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3284 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3287 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3288 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3291 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3293 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3294 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3295 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3298 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3301 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3302 commitment_stats.tx,
3304 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3305 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3306 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3309 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3310 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3312 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3313 let mut need_commitment = false;
3314 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3315 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3316 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3317 need_commitment = true;
3321 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3322 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3323 Some(forward_info.clone())
3325 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3326 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3327 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3328 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3329 need_commitment = true;
3332 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3333 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3334 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3335 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3336 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3337 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3338 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3339 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3340 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3341 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3342 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3343 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3344 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3345 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3347 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3349 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3350 need_commitment = true;
3354 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3355 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3356 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3357 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3358 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3359 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3361 nondust_htlc_sources,
3365 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3366 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3367 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3368 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3370 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3371 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3372 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3373 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3374 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3375 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3376 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3377 // includes the right HTLCs.
3378 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3379 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3380 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3381 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3382 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3383 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3385 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3386 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3387 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3390 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3391 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3392 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3393 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3394 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3395 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3396 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3397 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3398 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3402 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3403 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3404 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3405 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3408 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3409 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3410 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3411 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3412 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3413 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3414 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3415 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3418 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3419 /// for our counterparty.
3420 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3421 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3422 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3423 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3424 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3426 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3427 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3428 updates: Vec::new(),
3431 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3432 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3433 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3434 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3435 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3436 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3437 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3438 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3439 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3440 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3441 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3442 // to rebalance channels.
3443 match &htlc_update {
3444 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3445 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3446 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3449 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3450 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3451 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3452 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3453 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3454 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3455 // into the holding cell without ever being
3456 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3457 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3458 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3461 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3467 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3468 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3469 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3470 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3471 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3472 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3473 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3474 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3475 (msg, monitor_update)
3476 } else { unreachable!() };
3477 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3478 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3480 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3481 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3482 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3483 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3484 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3485 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3486 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3487 // for a full revocation before failing.
3488 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3491 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3493 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3500 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3501 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3503 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3504 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3509 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3510 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3511 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3512 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3513 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3515 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3516 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3517 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3519 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3520 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3526 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3527 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3528 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3529 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3530 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3531 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3532 where L::Target: Logger,
3534 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3535 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3537 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3538 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3540 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3541 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3544 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3546 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3547 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3548 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3552 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3553 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3554 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3555 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3556 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3557 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3558 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3559 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3563 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3565 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3566 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3569 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3570 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3572 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3574 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3575 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3576 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3577 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3578 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3579 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3580 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3581 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3585 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3586 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3587 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3588 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3589 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3590 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3591 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3592 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3594 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3595 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3598 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3599 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3600 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3601 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3602 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3603 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3604 let mut require_commitment = false;
3605 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3608 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3609 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3610 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3612 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3613 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3614 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3615 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3616 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3617 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3622 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3623 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3624 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3625 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3626 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3628 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3629 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3630 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3635 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3636 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3638 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3642 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3643 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3645 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3646 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3647 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3648 require_commitment = true;
3649 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3650 match forward_info {
3651 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3652 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3653 require_commitment = true;
3655 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3656 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3657 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3659 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3660 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3661 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3665 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3666 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3667 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3668 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3674 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3675 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3676 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3677 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3679 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3680 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3681 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3682 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3683 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3684 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3685 require_commitment = true;
3689 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3691 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3692 match update_state {
3693 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3694 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3695 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3696 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3697 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3699 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3700 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3701 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3702 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3703 require_commitment = true;
3704 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3705 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3710 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3711 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3712 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3713 if require_commitment {
3714 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3715 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3716 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3717 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3718 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3719 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3720 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3721 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3722 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3724 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3725 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3726 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3727 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3728 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3731 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3732 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3733 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3734 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3735 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3736 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3737 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3739 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3740 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3742 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3743 if require_commitment {
3744 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3746 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3747 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3748 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3749 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3751 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3752 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3753 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3754 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3756 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3757 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3758 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3764 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3765 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3766 /// commitment update.
3767 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3768 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3769 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3772 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3773 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3774 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3775 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3777 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3778 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3779 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3780 if !self.is_outbound() {
3781 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3783 if !self.is_usable() {
3784 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3786 if !self.is_live() {
3787 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3790 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3791 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3792 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3793 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3794 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3795 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3796 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3797 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3798 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3799 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3803 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3804 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3805 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3806 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3807 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3810 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3811 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3815 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3816 force_holding_cell = true;
3819 if force_holding_cell {
3820 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3824 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3825 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3827 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3828 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3833 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3834 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3836 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3838 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3839 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3840 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3841 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3845 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3846 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3847 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3851 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3852 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3855 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3856 // will be retransmitted.
3857 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3858 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3859 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3861 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3862 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3864 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3865 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3866 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3867 // this HTLC accordingly
3868 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3871 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3872 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3873 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3874 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3877 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3878 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3879 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3880 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3881 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3882 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3887 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3889 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3890 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3891 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3892 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3896 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3897 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3898 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3899 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3900 // the update upon reconnection.
3901 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3905 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3906 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3909 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3910 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3911 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3912 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3913 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3914 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3915 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3917 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3918 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3919 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3920 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3921 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3922 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3923 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3925 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3926 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3927 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3928 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3929 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3930 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3931 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3934 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3935 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3936 /// to the remote side.
3937 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3938 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3939 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3940 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3943 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3945 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3946 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3947 let mut found_blocked = false;
3948 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3949 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3950 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3954 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3955 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3956 // first received the funding_signed.
3957 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3958 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3959 self.funding_transaction.take()
3961 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3962 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3963 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3964 funding_broadcastable = None;
3967 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3968 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3969 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3970 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3971 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3972 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3973 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3974 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3975 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3976 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3977 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3978 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3979 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3980 next_per_commitment_point,
3981 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3985 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3987 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3988 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3989 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3990 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3991 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3992 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3994 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3995 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3996 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3997 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3998 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3999 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4003 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4004 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4006 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4007 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
4010 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4011 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4012 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
4013 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4014 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4015 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4016 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4017 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4018 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4022 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4023 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4025 if self.is_outbound() {
4026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4028 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4031 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4032 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4034 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4035 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4036 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4037 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4038 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4039 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4040 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4041 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4042 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4043 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4044 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4046 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4048 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4049 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4050 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4056 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4057 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4058 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4059 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4060 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4061 per_commitment_secret,
4062 next_per_commitment_point,
4064 next_local_nonce: None,
4068 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4069 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4070 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4071 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4072 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4074 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4075 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4076 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4077 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4078 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4079 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4080 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4081 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4082 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4087 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4088 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4090 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4091 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4092 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4093 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4094 reason: err_packet.clone()
4097 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4098 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4099 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4100 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4101 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4102 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4105 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4106 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4107 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4108 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4109 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4116 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4117 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4118 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4119 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4123 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4124 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4125 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4126 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4127 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4128 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4132 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4133 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4135 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4136 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4137 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4138 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4139 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4140 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4141 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4142 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4145 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4147 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4148 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4149 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4150 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4154 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4155 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4159 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4160 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4161 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4162 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4163 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4166 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4167 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4168 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4169 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4170 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4173 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4174 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4175 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4176 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4177 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4178 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4179 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4180 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4184 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4185 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4186 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4187 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4189 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4193 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4194 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4195 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4197 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4198 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4199 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4200 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4201 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4205 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4207 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4208 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4209 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4210 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4211 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4214 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4215 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4216 channel_ready: None,
4217 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4218 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4219 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4223 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4224 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4225 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4226 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4227 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4228 next_per_commitment_point,
4229 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4231 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4232 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4233 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4237 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4238 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4239 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4241 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4242 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4243 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4246 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4252 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4253 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4254 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4255 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4256 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4258 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4259 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4260 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4261 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4262 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4263 next_per_commitment_point,
4264 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4268 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4269 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4270 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4272 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4275 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4276 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4277 raa: required_revoke,
4278 commitment_update: None,
4279 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4281 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4282 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4283 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4285 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4288 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4289 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4290 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4291 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4292 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4293 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4296 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4297 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4298 raa: required_revoke,
4299 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4300 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4304 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4308 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4309 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4310 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4311 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4313 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4315 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4317 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4318 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4319 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4320 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4321 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4322 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4324 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4325 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4326 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4327 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4328 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4330 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4331 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4332 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4333 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4336 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4337 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4338 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4339 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4340 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4341 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4342 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4343 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4344 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4345 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4346 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4347 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4348 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4349 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4350 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4352 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4355 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4356 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4359 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4360 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4361 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4362 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4363 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4364 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4365 self.channel_state &
4366 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4367 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4368 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4369 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4372 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4373 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4374 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4375 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4376 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4377 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4380 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4386 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4387 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4388 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4389 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4391 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4392 return Ok((None, None));
4395 if !self.is_outbound() {
4396 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4397 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4399 return Ok((None, None));
4402 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4404 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4405 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4406 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4407 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4409 let sig = self.holder_signer
4410 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4411 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4413 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4414 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4415 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4416 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4418 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4419 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4420 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4425 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4426 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4427 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4428 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4430 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4431 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4433 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4434 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4435 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4436 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4439 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4440 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4441 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4444 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4446 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4447 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4450 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4451 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4452 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4455 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4458 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4459 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4460 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4461 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4463 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4466 assert!(send_shutdown);
4467 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4468 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4469 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4471 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4472 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4474 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4479 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4481 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4482 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4484 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4485 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4486 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4487 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4488 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4489 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4492 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4493 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4494 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4497 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4498 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4499 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4500 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4504 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4505 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4506 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4507 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4508 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4509 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4511 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4512 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4519 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4520 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4522 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4525 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4526 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4528 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4530 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4531 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4532 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4533 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4534 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4535 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4536 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4537 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4538 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4540 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4541 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4544 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4548 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4549 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4550 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4551 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4553 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4556 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4557 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4559 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4560 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4562 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4566 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4570 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4571 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4572 return Ok((None, None));
4575 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4576 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4577 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4578 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4580 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4582 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4585 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4586 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4587 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4588 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4589 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4593 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4594 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4599 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4600 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4601 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4602 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4603 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4604 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4605 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4609 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4611 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4612 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4613 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4614 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4616 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4619 let sig = self.holder_signer
4620 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4621 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4623 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4624 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4625 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4626 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4630 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4631 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4632 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4633 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4635 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4636 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4637 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4643 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4644 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4645 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4647 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4648 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4650 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4651 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4654 if !self.is_outbound() {
4655 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4656 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4657 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4658 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4660 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4661 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4662 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4664 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4665 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4668 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4669 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4670 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4671 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4672 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4673 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4674 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4675 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4677 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4680 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4681 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4682 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4683 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4685 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4689 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4690 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4691 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4692 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4694 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4700 // Public utilities:
4702 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4706 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4708 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4709 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4710 self.temporary_channel_id
4713 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4717 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4718 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4719 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4723 /// Gets the channel's type
4724 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4728 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4729 /// is_usable() returns true).
4730 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4731 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4732 self.short_channel_id
4735 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4736 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4737 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4740 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4741 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4742 self.outbound_scid_alias
4744 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4745 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4746 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4747 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4748 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4751 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4752 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4753 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4754 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4757 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4758 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4759 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4762 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4763 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4764 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4765 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4769 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4772 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4773 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4776 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4777 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4780 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4781 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4782 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4785 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4786 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4789 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4790 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4791 self.counterparty_node_id
4794 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4795 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4796 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4799 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4800 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4801 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4804 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4805 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4807 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4808 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4809 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4810 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4812 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4816 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4817 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4818 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4821 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4822 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4823 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4826 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4827 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4828 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4830 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4831 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4836 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4837 self.channel_value_satoshis
4840 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4841 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4844 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4845 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4848 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4849 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4852 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4853 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4854 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4857 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4858 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4859 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4862 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4863 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4864 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4867 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4868 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4869 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4872 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4873 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4874 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4877 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4878 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4879 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4882 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4883 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4884 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4885 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4886 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4889 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4891 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4892 self.prev_config = None;
4896 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4897 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4901 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4902 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4903 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4904 let did_channel_update =
4905 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4906 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4907 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4908 if did_channel_update {
4909 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4910 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4911 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4912 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4914 self.config.options = *config;
4918 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4919 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4920 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4921 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4922 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4923 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4924 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4926 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4927 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4930 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4932 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4933 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4939 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4940 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4941 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4942 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4943 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4944 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4945 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4947 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4948 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4955 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4959 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4960 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4961 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4962 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4963 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4964 // which are near the dust limit.
4965 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4966 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4967 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4968 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4969 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4971 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4972 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4974 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4977 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4978 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4981 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4982 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4985 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4986 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4990 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4995 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4997 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4998 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4999 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5000 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5001 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5002 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5004 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5006 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5014 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5015 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5019 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5020 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
5021 self.update_time_counter
5024 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5025 self.latest_monitor_update_id
5028 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
5029 self.config.announced_channel
5032 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
5033 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
5036 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
5037 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5038 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
5039 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
5042 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
5043 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
5044 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
5047 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
5048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5049 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
5050 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
5051 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
5054 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5055 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5056 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5057 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5058 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5061 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5062 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5063 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5064 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5067 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5068 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5069 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5072 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5073 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5074 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5075 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5076 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5077 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5078 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5079 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5085 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5086 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5087 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5088 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5089 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5090 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5095 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5096 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5098 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5099 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5100 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5101 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5104 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5105 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5108 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5109 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5112 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5113 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5114 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5117 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5118 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5119 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5121 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5122 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5123 if self.channel_state &
5124 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5125 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5126 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5127 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5128 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5131 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5132 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5133 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5134 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5135 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5136 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5138 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5139 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5140 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5142 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5143 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5144 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5145 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5146 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5147 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5153 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5154 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5155 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5158 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5159 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5160 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5163 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5164 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5165 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5168 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5169 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5170 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5171 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5172 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5173 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5178 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5179 self.channel_update_status
5182 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5183 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5184 self.channel_update_status = status;
5187 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5189 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5190 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5191 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5195 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5196 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5197 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5200 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5204 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5205 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5206 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5208 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5209 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5210 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5212 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5213 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5216 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5217 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5218 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5219 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5220 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5221 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5222 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5223 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5224 self.channel_state);
5226 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5230 if need_commitment_update {
5231 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5232 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5233 let next_per_commitment_point =
5234 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5235 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5236 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5237 next_per_commitment_point,
5238 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5242 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5248 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5249 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5250 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5251 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5252 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5253 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5254 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5256 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5259 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5260 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5261 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5262 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5263 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5264 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5265 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5266 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5267 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5268 if self.is_outbound() {
5269 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5270 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5271 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5272 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5273 // channel and move on.
5274 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5275 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5277 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5278 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5279 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5281 if self.is_outbound() {
5282 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5283 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5284 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5285 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5286 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5287 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5291 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5292 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5293 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5294 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5295 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5299 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5300 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5301 // may have already happened for this block).
5302 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5303 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5304 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5305 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5308 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5309 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5310 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5311 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5319 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5320 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5321 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5322 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5324 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5325 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5328 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5330 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5331 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5332 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5333 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5335 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5338 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5341 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5342 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5343 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5344 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5346 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5349 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5350 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5351 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5353 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5354 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5356 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5357 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5358 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5366 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5368 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5369 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5370 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5372 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5373 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5376 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5377 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5378 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5379 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5380 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5381 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5382 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5383 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5384 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5387 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5388 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5389 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5390 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5392 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5393 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5394 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5396 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5397 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5398 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5399 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5401 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5402 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5403 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5404 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5405 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5406 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5407 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5410 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5411 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5413 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5416 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5417 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5418 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5419 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5420 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5421 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5422 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5423 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5424 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5425 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5426 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5427 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5428 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5429 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5430 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5431 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5432 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5438 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5443 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5444 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5446 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5447 if !self.is_outbound() {
5448 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5450 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5451 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5454 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5455 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5458 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5459 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5463 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5464 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5465 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5466 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5467 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5468 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5469 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5470 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5471 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5472 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5473 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5474 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5475 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5476 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5477 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5478 first_per_commitment_point,
5479 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5480 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5481 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5482 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5484 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5488 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5489 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5492 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5493 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5494 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5495 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5498 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5499 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5501 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5502 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5503 if self.is_outbound() {
5504 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5506 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5507 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5509 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5510 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5512 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5513 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5516 self.user_id = user_id;
5517 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5519 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5522 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5523 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5524 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5526 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5527 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5528 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5529 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5531 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5532 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5533 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5534 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5535 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5536 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5537 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5538 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5539 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5540 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5541 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5542 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5543 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5544 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5545 first_per_commitment_point,
5546 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5547 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5548 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5550 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5552 next_local_nonce: None,
5556 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5557 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5559 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5561 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5562 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5565 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5566 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5567 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5568 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5569 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5570 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5573 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5574 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5575 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5576 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5577 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5578 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5579 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5580 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5581 if !self.is_outbound() {
5582 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5584 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5585 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5587 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5588 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5589 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5590 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5593 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5594 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5596 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5599 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5600 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5605 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5607 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5609 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5610 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5611 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5613 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5614 temporary_channel_id,
5615 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5616 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5619 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5621 next_local_nonce: None,
5625 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5626 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5627 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5628 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5630 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5633 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5634 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5635 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5636 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5637 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5638 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5640 if !self.is_usable() {
5641 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5644 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5645 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5646 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5647 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5649 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5650 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5652 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5653 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5654 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5655 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5656 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5657 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5663 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5664 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5665 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5666 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5668 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5671 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5675 if !self.is_usable() {
5679 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5680 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5684 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5688 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5689 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5692 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5696 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5698 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5703 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5705 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5710 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5712 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5713 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5714 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5715 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5716 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5720 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5722 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5723 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5724 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5725 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5726 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5727 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5728 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5730 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5731 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5732 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5733 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5734 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5735 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5736 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5737 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5738 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5739 contents: announcement,
5742 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5746 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5747 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5748 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5749 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5750 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5751 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5752 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5753 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5755 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5757 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5759 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5760 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5762 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5763 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5764 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5765 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5768 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5769 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5770 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5771 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5774 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5777 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5778 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5779 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5780 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5781 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5782 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5785 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5787 Err(_) => return None,
5789 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5790 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5795 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5796 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5797 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5798 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5799 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5800 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5801 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5802 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5803 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5804 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5805 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5806 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5807 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5808 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5809 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5810 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5813 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5816 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5817 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5818 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5819 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5820 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5821 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5822 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5823 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5825 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5826 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5827 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5828 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5829 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5830 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5831 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5832 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5833 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5835 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5836 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5837 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5838 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5839 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5840 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5841 next_funding_txid: None,
5846 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5848 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5849 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5850 /// commitment update.
5852 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5853 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5854 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5855 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5857 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5858 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5860 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5861 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5866 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5867 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5869 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5871 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5872 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5874 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5875 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5876 /// regenerate them.
5878 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5879 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5881 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5882 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5883 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5884 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5885 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5886 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5888 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5889 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5890 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5893 if amount_msat == 0 {
5894 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5897 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5898 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5901 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5902 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5903 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5904 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5905 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5906 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5907 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5908 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5911 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5912 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5913 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5914 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5915 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5917 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5918 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5919 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5920 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5923 if !self.is_outbound() {
5924 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5925 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5926 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5927 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5928 let remote_balance_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat).saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
5929 if remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5930 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5931 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5935 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5938 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5939 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5940 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5942 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5943 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5944 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5945 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5946 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5947 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5951 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5952 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5953 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5954 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5955 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5956 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5960 let holder_balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
5961 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
5962 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5963 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5964 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5967 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5968 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5969 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5970 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5972 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5973 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5974 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5977 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5978 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5979 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5980 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5981 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5982 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5985 let need_holding_cell = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5986 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5987 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5988 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5989 else { "to peer" });
5991 if need_holding_cell {
5992 force_holding_cell = true;
5995 // Now update local state:
5996 if force_holding_cell {
5997 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6002 onion_routing_packet,
6007 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6008 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6010 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6012 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6016 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6017 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6018 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6022 onion_routing_packet,
6024 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6029 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6030 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6031 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6032 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6034 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6035 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6036 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6038 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6039 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6043 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6044 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6045 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6046 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6047 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6048 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6049 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6052 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6053 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6054 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6055 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6056 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6057 self.pending_update_fee = None;
6060 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6062 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6063 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6064 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6066 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6067 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6070 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6071 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6072 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6073 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6074 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6075 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6076 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6077 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6080 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6084 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6085 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6086 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6087 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6089 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6091 if !self.is_outbound() {
6092 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6093 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6094 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6095 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6096 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6097 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6098 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6099 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6100 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6101 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6107 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6110 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6111 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6112 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6113 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6114 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6115 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6117 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6118 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6119 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6120 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6123 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6124 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6128 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6129 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6131 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6133 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6134 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6135 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6136 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6138 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6139 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6140 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6141 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6142 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6143 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6147 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6148 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6152 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6153 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6156 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6157 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6159 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6160 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6161 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6162 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6163 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6166 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6167 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6168 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6174 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6175 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6176 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6179 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6180 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6181 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6183 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6184 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6185 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6186 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6192 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6193 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6195 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6196 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6197 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6198 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6199 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6200 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6201 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6202 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6203 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6206 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6207 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6208 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6210 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6211 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6214 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6215 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6217 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6218 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6219 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6222 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6223 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6224 let mut chan_closed = false;
6225 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6229 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6231 None if !chan_closed => {
6232 // use override shutdown script if provided
6233 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6234 Some(script) => script,
6236 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6237 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6238 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6239 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6243 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6244 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6246 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6252 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6253 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6254 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6255 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6257 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6259 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6261 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6262 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6263 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6264 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6265 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6266 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6269 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6270 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6271 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6274 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6275 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6276 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6279 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6280 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6281 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6282 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6283 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6285 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6286 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6293 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6294 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6296 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6299 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6300 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6301 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6302 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6303 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6304 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6305 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6306 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6307 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6308 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6309 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6311 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6312 // return them to fail the payment.
6313 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6314 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6315 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6317 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6318 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6323 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6324 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6325 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6326 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6327 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6328 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6329 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6330 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6331 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6332 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6333 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6334 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6335 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6340 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6341 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6342 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6345 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6346 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6347 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6349 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6350 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6354 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6358 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6359 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6361 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6367 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6368 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6369 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6370 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6371 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6373 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6374 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6375 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6376 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6382 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6383 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6384 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6385 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6386 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6387 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6392 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6393 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6394 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6395 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6397 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6398 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6399 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6400 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6405 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6406 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6407 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6408 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6409 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6410 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6415 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6416 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6417 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6420 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6422 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6423 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6424 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6425 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6426 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6428 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6429 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6430 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6431 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6433 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6434 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6435 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6437 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6439 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6440 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6441 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6442 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6443 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6444 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6446 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6447 // deserialized from that format.
6448 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6449 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6450 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6452 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6454 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6455 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6456 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6458 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6459 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6460 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6461 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6464 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6465 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6466 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6469 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6470 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6471 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6472 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6474 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6475 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6477 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6479 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6481 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6483 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6486 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6488 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6493 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6495 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6496 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6497 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6498 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6499 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6500 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6501 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6503 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6505 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6507 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6510 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6511 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6512 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6515 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6517 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6518 preimages.push(preimage);
6520 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6521 reason.write(writer)?;
6523 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6525 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6526 preimages.push(preimage);
6528 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6529 reason.write(writer)?;
6534 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6535 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6537 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6539 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6540 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6541 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6542 source.write(writer)?;
6543 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6545 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6547 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6548 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6550 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6552 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6553 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6558 match self.resend_order {
6559 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6560 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6563 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6564 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6565 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6567 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6568 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6569 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6570 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6573 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6574 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6575 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6576 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6577 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6580 if self.is_outbound() {
6581 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6582 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6583 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6585 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6586 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6587 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6589 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6591 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6592 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6593 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6594 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6596 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6597 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6598 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6599 // consider the stale state on reload.
6602 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6603 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6604 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6606 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6607 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6608 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6610 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6611 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6613 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6614 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6615 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6617 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6618 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6620 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6623 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6624 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6625 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6627 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6630 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6631 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6633 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6634 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6635 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6637 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6639 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6641 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6643 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6644 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6645 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6646 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6647 htlc.write(writer)?;
6650 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6651 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6652 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6654 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6655 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6657 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6658 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6659 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6660 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6661 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6662 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6663 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6665 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6666 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6667 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6668 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6669 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6671 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6672 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6674 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6675 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6676 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6677 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6679 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6681 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6682 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6683 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6684 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6685 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6686 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6687 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6689 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6690 (2, chan_type, option),
6691 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6692 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6693 (5, self.config, required),
6694 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6695 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6696 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6697 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6698 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6699 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6700 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6701 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6702 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6703 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6704 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6705 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6706 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6707 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6708 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6709 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6716 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6717 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6719 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6720 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6722 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6723 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6724 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6726 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6727 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6728 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6729 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6731 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6733 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6734 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6735 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6736 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6737 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6739 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6740 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6743 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6744 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6745 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6747 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6749 let mut keys_data = None;
6751 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6752 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6753 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6754 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6755 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6756 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6757 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6758 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6759 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6760 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6764 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6765 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6766 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6769 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6771 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6772 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6773 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6777 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6778 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6779 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6780 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6781 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6782 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6783 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6784 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6785 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6786 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6787 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6788 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6789 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6794 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6795 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6796 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6797 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6798 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6799 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6800 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6801 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6802 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6803 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6804 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6805 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6807 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6808 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6811 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6812 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6815 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6816 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6818 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6823 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6824 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6825 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6826 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6827 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6828 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6829 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6830 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6831 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6832 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6834 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6835 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6836 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6838 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6839 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6840 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6842 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6846 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6847 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6848 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6849 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6852 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6853 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6854 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6858 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6859 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6862 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6863 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6864 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6865 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6868 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6870 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6872 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6877 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6878 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6879 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6880 // consider the stale state on reload.
6881 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6884 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6891 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6892 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6893 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6896 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6900 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6901 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6903 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6904 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6907 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6908 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6912 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6913 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6915 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6916 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6919 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6921 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6922 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6923 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6924 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6926 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6929 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6930 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6934 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6935 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6940 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6942 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6943 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6944 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6946 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6947 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6948 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6952 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6953 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6954 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6956 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6962 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6963 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6964 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6965 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6966 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6967 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6968 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6969 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6970 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6971 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6973 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6974 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6975 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6976 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6977 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6978 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6979 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6981 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6982 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6983 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6984 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6986 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6988 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6989 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6990 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6991 (2, channel_type, option),
6992 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6993 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6994 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6995 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6996 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6997 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6998 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6999 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7000 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7001 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7002 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7003 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7004 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7005 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7006 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7007 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7008 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7009 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7010 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7013 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7014 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7015 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7016 // required channel parameters.
7017 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7018 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7019 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7021 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7023 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7024 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7025 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7026 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7029 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7030 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7031 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7033 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7034 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7036 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7037 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7042 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7043 if iter.next().is_some() {
7044 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7048 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7049 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7050 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7051 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7052 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7055 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7056 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7058 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7059 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7060 // separate u64 values.
7061 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7063 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7068 config: config.unwrap(),
7072 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7073 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7074 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7077 temporary_channel_id,
7079 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7081 channel_value_satoshis,
7083 latest_monitor_update_id,
7086 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7089 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7090 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7093 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7094 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7095 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7096 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7100 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7101 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7102 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7103 monitor_pending_forwards,
7104 monitor_pending_failures,
7105 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7108 holding_cell_update_fee,
7109 next_holder_htlc_id,
7110 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7111 update_time_counter,
7114 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7115 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7116 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7117 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7119 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7120 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7121 closing_fee_limits: None,
7122 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7124 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7126 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7127 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7129 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7131 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7132 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7133 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7134 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7135 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7136 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7137 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7138 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7139 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7142 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7144 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7145 funding_transaction,
7147 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7148 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7149 counterparty_node_id,
7151 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7155 channel_update_status,
7156 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7160 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7161 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7162 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7163 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7165 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7167 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7168 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7169 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7171 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7172 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7174 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7175 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7177 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7180 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7188 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7189 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7190 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7191 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7192 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7194 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7195 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7197 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7198 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7199 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7200 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7201 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7202 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7203 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7204 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7205 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7206 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7207 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7208 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7209 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7210 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7211 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7212 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7213 use crate::util::test_utils;
7214 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7215 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7216 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7217 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7218 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7219 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7220 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7221 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7222 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7223 use crate::prelude::*;
7225 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7228 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7229 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7235 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7236 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7237 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7238 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7242 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7243 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7244 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7245 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7246 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7247 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7248 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7252 signer: InMemorySigner,
7255 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7256 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7259 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7260 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7262 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7263 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7266 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7270 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7272 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7273 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7274 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7275 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7276 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7279 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7280 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7281 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7282 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7286 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7287 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7288 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7292 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7293 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7294 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7295 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7297 let seed = [42; 32];
7298 let network = Network::Testnet;
7299 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7300 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7301 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7304 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7305 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7306 let config = UserConfig::default();
7307 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7308 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7309 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7311 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7312 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7316 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7317 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7319 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7320 let original_fee = 253;
7321 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7322 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7323 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7324 let seed = [42; 32];
7325 let network = Network::Testnet;
7326 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7328 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7329 let config = UserConfig::default();
7330 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7332 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7333 // same as the old fee.
7334 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7335 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7336 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7340 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7341 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7342 // dust limits are used.
7343 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7344 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7345 let seed = [42; 32];
7346 let network = Network::Testnet;
7347 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7348 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7350 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7351 // they have different dust limits.
7353 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7354 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7355 let config = UserConfig::default();
7356 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7358 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7359 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7360 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7361 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7362 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7364 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7365 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7366 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7367 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7368 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7370 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7371 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7372 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7374 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7375 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7376 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7377 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7380 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7382 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7383 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7384 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7385 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7386 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7387 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7388 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7389 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7390 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7394 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7395 // the dust limit check.
7396 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7397 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7398 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7399 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7401 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7402 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7403 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7404 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7405 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7406 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7407 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7411 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7412 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7413 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7414 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7415 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7416 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7417 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7418 let seed = [42; 32];
7419 let network = Network::Testnet;
7420 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7422 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7423 let config = UserConfig::default();
7424 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7426 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7427 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7429 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7430 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7431 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7432 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7433 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7434 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7436 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7437 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7438 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7439 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7440 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7442 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7444 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7445 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7446 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7447 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7448 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7450 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7451 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7452 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7453 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7454 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7458 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7459 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7460 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7461 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7462 let seed = [42; 32];
7463 let network = Network::Testnet;
7464 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7465 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7466 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7468 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7470 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7471 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7472 let config = UserConfig::default();
7473 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7475 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7476 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7477 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7478 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7480 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7481 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7482 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7484 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7485 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7486 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7487 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7489 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7490 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7491 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7493 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7494 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7496 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7497 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7498 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7499 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7500 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7501 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7502 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7504 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7506 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7507 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7508 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7509 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7510 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7514 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7515 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7516 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7517 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7518 let seed = [42; 32];
7519 let network = Network::Testnet;
7520 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7521 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7522 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7524 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7525 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7526 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7527 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7528 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7529 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7530 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7531 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7533 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7534 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7535 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7536 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7537 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7538 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7540 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7541 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7542 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7543 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7545 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7547 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7548 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7549 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7550 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7551 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7552 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7554 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7555 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7556 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7557 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7559 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7560 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7561 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7562 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7563 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7565 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7566 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7568 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7569 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7570 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7572 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7573 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7574 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7575 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7576 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7578 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7579 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7581 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7582 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7583 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7587 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7589 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7590 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7591 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7593 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7594 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7595 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7596 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7598 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7599 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7600 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7602 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7604 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7605 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7608 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7609 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7610 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7611 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7612 let seed = [42; 32];
7613 let network = Network::Testnet;
7614 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7615 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7616 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7619 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7620 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7621 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7623 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7624 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7626 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7627 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7628 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7630 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7631 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7633 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7635 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7636 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7638 // Channel Negotiations failed
7639 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7640 assert!(result.is_err());
7645 fn channel_update() {
7646 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7647 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7648 let seed = [42; 32];
7649 let network = Network::Testnet;
7650 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7651 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7653 // Create a channel.
7654 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7655 let config = UserConfig::default();
7656 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7657 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7658 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7659 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7661 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7662 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7663 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7665 short_channel_id: 0,
7668 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7669 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7670 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7672 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7673 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7675 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7677 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7679 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7680 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7681 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7682 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7684 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7685 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7686 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7688 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7692 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7694 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7695 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7696 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7697 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7698 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7699 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7700 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7701 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7702 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7703 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7704 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7705 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7706 use crate::sync::Arc;
7708 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7709 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7710 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7713 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7715 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7716 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7717 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7718 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7719 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7721 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7722 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7728 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7729 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7730 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7732 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7733 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7734 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7735 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7736 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7737 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7739 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7741 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7742 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7743 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7744 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7745 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7746 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7748 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7749 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7750 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7751 selected_contest_delay: 144
7753 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7754 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7756 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7757 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7759 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7760 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7762 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7763 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7765 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7766 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7767 // build_commitment_transaction.
7768 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7769 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7770 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7771 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7772 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7774 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7775 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7776 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7777 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7781 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7782 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7783 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7784 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7788 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7789 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7790 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7792 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7793 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7795 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7796 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7798 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7800 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7801 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7802 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7803 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7804 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7805 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7806 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7808 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7809 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7810 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7811 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7813 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7814 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7815 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7817 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7819 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7820 commitment_tx.clone(),
7821 counterparty_signature,
7822 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7823 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7824 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7826 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7827 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7829 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7830 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7831 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7833 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7834 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7837 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7838 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7840 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7841 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7842 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7843 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7844 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7845 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7846 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7847 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7849 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7852 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7853 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7854 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7858 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7861 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7862 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7863 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7865 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7866 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7867 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7868 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7869 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7870 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7871 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7872 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7874 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7878 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7879 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7880 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7881 "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", {});
7883 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7884 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7886 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7887 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7888 "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", {});
7890 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7891 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7892 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7893 "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", {});
7895 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7896 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7898 amount_msat: 1000000,
7900 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7901 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7903 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7906 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7907 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7909 amount_msat: 2000000,
7911 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7912 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7914 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7917 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7918 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7920 amount_msat: 2000000,
7922 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7923 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7924 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7926 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7929 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7930 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7932 amount_msat: 3000000,
7934 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7935 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7936 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7938 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7941 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7942 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7944 amount_msat: 4000000,
7946 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7947 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7949 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7953 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7954 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7955 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7957 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7958 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7959 "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", {
7962 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7963 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7964 "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" },
7967 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7968 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7969 "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" },
7972 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7973 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7974 "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" },
7977 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7978 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7979 "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" },
7982 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7983 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7984 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7987 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7988 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7989 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7991 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7992 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7993 "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", {
7996 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7997 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7998 "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" },
8001 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8002 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8003 "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" },
8006 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8007 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8008 "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" },
8011 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8012 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8013 "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" },
8016 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8017 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8018 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8021 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8022 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8023 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8025 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8026 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8027 "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", {
8030 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8031 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8032 "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" },
8035 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8036 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8037 "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" },
8040 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8041 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8042 "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" },
8045 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8046 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8047 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8050 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8051 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8052 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8053 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8055 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8056 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8057 "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", {
8060 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8061 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8062 "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" },
8065 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8066 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8067 "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" },
8070 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8071 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8072 "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" },
8075 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8076 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8077 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8080 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8081 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8082 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8083 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8085 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8086 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8087 "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", {
8090 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8091 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8092 "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" },
8095 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8096 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8097 "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" },
8100 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8101 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8102 "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" },
8105 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8106 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8107 "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" }
8110 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8111 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8112 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8114 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8115 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8116 "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", {
8119 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8120 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8121 "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" },
8124 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8125 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8126 "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" },
8129 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8130 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8131 "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" }
8134 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8135 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8136 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8138 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8139 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8140 "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", {
8143 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8144 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8145 "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" },
8148 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8149 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8150 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8153 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8154 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8155 "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" }
8158 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8159 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8160 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8162 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8163 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8164 "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", {
8167 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8168 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8169 "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" },
8172 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8173 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8174 "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" }
8177 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8178 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8179 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8180 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8182 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8183 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8184 "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", {
8187 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8188 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8189 "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" },
8192 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8193 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8194 "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" }
8197 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8198 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8199 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8200 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8202 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8203 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8204 "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", {
8207 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8208 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8209 "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" },
8212 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8213 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8214 "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" }
8217 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8218 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8219 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8221 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8222 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8223 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8226 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8227 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8228 "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" }
8231 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8232 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8233 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8234 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8236 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8237 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8238 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8241 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8242 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8243 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8246 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8247 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8248 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8249 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8251 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8252 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8253 "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", {
8256 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8257 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8258 "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" }
8261 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8262 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8263 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8264 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8266 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8267 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8268 "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", {});
8270 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8271 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8272 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8273 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8275 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8276 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8277 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8279 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8280 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8281 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8282 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8284 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8285 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8286 "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", {});
8288 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8289 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8290 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8292 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8293 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8294 "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", {});
8296 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8297 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8298 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8299 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8301 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8302 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8303 "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", {});
8305 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8306 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8307 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8308 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8310 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8311 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8312 "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", {});
8314 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8315 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8316 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8317 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8318 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8319 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8321 amount_msat: 2000000,
8323 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8324 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8326 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8329 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8330 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8331 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8333 amount_msat: 5000001,
8335 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8336 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8337 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8339 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8342 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8343 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8345 amount_msat: 5000000,
8347 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8348 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8349 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8351 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8355 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8356 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8357 "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", {
8360 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8361 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8362 "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" },
8364 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8365 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8366 "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" },
8368 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8369 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8370 "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" }
8373 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8374 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8375 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8378 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8379 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8380 "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" },
8382 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8383 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8384 "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" },
8386 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8387 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8388 "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" }
8393 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8394 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8396 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8397 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8398 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8399 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8401 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8402 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8403 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8405 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8406 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8408 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8409 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8411 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8412 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8413 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8417 fn test_key_derivation() {
8418 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8419 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8421 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8422 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8424 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8425 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8427 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8428 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8430 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8431 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8433 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8434 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8436 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8437 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8439 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8440 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8444 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8445 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8446 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8447 let seed = [42; 32];
8448 let network = Network::Testnet;
8449 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8450 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8452 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8453 let config = UserConfig::default();
8454 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8455 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8457 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8458 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8460 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8461 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8462 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8463 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8464 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8465 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8466 assert!(res.is_ok());
8471 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8472 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8473 // resulting `channel_type`.
8474 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8475 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8476 let network = Network::Testnet;
8477 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8478 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8480 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8481 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8483 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8484 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8486 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8487 // need to signal it.
8488 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8489 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8490 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8493 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8495 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8496 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8497 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8499 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8500 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8501 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8504 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8505 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8506 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8507 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8508 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8511 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8512 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8517 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8518 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8519 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8520 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8521 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8522 let network = Network::Testnet;
8523 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8524 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8526 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8527 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8529 let config = UserConfig::default();
8531 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8532 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8533 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8534 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8535 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8537 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8538 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8539 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8542 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8543 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8544 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8546 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8547 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8548 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8549 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8550 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8551 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8553 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8558 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8559 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8561 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8562 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8563 let network = Network::Testnet;
8564 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8565 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8567 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8568 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8570 let config = UserConfig::default();
8572 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8573 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8574 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8575 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8576 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8577 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8578 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8579 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8581 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8582 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8583 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8584 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8585 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8586 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8589 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8590 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8592 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8593 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8594 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8595 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8597 assert!(res.is_err());
8599 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8600 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8601 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8603 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8604 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8605 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8608 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8610 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8611 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8612 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8613 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8616 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8617 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8619 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8620 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8622 assert!(res.is_err());