1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
483 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
484 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
489 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
490 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
492 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
493 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
494 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
495 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
497 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
501 channel_id: [u8; 32],
504 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
505 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
507 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
508 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
509 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
511 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
512 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
513 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
514 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
516 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
517 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
519 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
521 holder_signer: Signer,
522 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
523 destination_script: Script,
525 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
526 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
527 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
529 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
530 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
531 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
532 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
533 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
534 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
536 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
537 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
538 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
539 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
540 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
541 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
543 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
545 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
546 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
547 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
549 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
550 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
551 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
552 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
553 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
554 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
555 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
557 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
559 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
560 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
561 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
562 // HTLCs with similar state.
563 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
564 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
565 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
566 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
567 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
568 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
569 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
570 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
571 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
574 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
575 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
576 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
578 update_time_counter: u32,
580 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
581 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
582 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
583 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
584 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
585 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
587 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
588 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
590 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
591 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
592 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
593 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
595 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
596 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
598 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
600 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
602 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
603 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
604 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
605 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
606 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
607 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
609 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
610 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
611 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
612 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
613 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
615 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
616 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
617 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
618 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
619 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
620 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
621 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
622 channel_creation_height: u32,
624 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
627 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
629 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
632 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
634 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
637 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
639 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
642 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
645 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
647 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
649 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
650 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
652 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
654 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
656 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
658 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
660 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
661 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
663 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
664 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
665 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
667 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
669 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
671 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
672 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
673 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
674 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
676 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
677 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
678 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
680 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
681 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
682 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
684 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
685 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
686 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
687 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
688 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
689 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
690 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
691 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
693 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
694 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
695 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
696 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
697 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
699 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
700 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
702 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
703 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
704 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
705 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
706 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
707 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
708 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
709 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
711 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
712 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
714 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
715 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
716 // the channel's funding UTXO.
718 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
719 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
720 // associated channel mapping.
722 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
723 // to store all of them.
724 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
726 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
727 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
728 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
729 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
730 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
732 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
733 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
735 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
736 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
737 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
739 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
740 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
741 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
742 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
743 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
747 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
749 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
750 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
751 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
755 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
757 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
758 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
760 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
764 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
766 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
768 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
770 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
771 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
772 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
773 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
774 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
776 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
777 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
779 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
781 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
782 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
784 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
785 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
786 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
787 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
788 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
789 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
791 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
792 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
794 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
795 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
796 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
797 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
798 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
800 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
801 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
803 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
804 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
806 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
807 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
808 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
809 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
815 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
816 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
818 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
819 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
825 macro_rules! secp_check {
826 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
829 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
834 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
835 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
836 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
839 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
842 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
843 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
845 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
848 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
850 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
853 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
854 /// required by us according to the configured or default
855 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
857 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
859 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
860 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
861 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
862 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
863 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
866 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
867 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
868 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
869 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
870 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
871 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
872 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
875 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
876 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
879 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
880 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
881 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
882 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
883 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
884 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
885 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
886 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
887 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
888 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
891 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
892 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
893 // `only_static_remotekey`.
895 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
896 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
897 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
898 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
905 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
906 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
907 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
908 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
909 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
910 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
911 // We've exhausted our options
914 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
915 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
918 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
919 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
920 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
921 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
923 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
924 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
925 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
926 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
927 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
928 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
930 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
932 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
936 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
937 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
938 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
939 outbound_scid_alias: u64
940 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
941 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
942 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
943 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
945 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
946 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
947 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
948 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
950 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
953 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
956 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
957 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
960 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
961 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
963 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
964 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
965 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
966 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
970 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
971 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
973 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
975 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
976 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
977 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
978 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
981 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
982 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
984 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
985 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
988 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
989 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
990 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
997 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
998 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
999 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1000 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1005 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1007 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1008 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1009 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1011 channel_value_satoshis,
1013 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1016 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1017 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1019 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1020 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1023 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1024 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1025 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1026 pending_update_fee: None,
1027 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1028 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1029 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1030 update_time_counter: 1,
1032 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1034 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1035 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1036 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1037 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1038 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1039 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1041 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1042 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1043 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1044 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1046 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1047 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1048 closing_fee_limits: None,
1049 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1051 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1053 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1054 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1055 short_channel_id: None,
1056 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1058 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1059 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1060 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1061 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1062 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1063 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1064 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1065 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1066 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1067 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1068 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1070 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1072 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1073 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1074 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1075 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1076 counterparty_parameters: None,
1077 funding_outpoint: None,
1078 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1079 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1081 funding_transaction: None,
1083 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1084 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1085 counterparty_node_id,
1087 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1089 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1091 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1092 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1094 announcement_sigs: None,
1096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1097 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1099 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1101 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1103 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1104 outbound_scid_alias,
1106 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1108 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1109 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1114 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1118 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1119 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1120 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1122 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1123 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1124 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1125 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1126 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1127 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1128 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1131 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1132 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1133 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1134 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1135 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1136 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1137 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1138 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1140 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1141 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1150 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1151 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1152 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1153 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1154 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1155 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1156 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1157 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1158 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1159 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1163 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1165 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1166 // support this channel type.
1167 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1168 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1172 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1173 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1174 // `static_remote_key`.
1175 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1178 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1179 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1182 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1185 channel_type.clone()
1187 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1188 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1193 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1195 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1196 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1197 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1198 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1199 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1200 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1201 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1202 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1203 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1206 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1210 // Check sanity of message fields:
1211 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1214 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1217 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1220 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1221 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1224 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1227 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1230 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1232 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1233 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1236 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1239 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1243 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1244 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1247 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1250 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1253 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1256 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1259 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1262 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1266 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1268 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1269 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1274 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1275 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1276 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1277 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1280 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1283 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1284 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1285 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1287 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1291 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1292 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1293 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1294 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1295 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1299 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1300 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1301 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1302 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1306 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1307 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1308 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1309 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1310 if script.len() == 0 {
1313 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1316 Some(script.clone())
1319 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1320 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1326 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1327 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1330 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1331 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1336 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1337 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1339 let chan = Channel {
1342 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1343 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1345 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1350 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1352 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1353 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1354 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1357 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1360 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1361 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1363 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1365 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1367 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1369 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1370 pending_update_fee: None,
1371 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1372 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1373 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1374 update_time_counter: 1,
1376 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1378 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1379 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1380 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1381 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1383 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1385 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1386 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1387 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1388 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1390 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1391 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1392 closing_fee_limits: None,
1393 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1395 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1397 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1398 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1399 short_channel_id: None,
1400 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1402 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1403 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1404 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1405 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1406 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1407 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1408 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1409 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1410 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1411 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1412 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1413 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1415 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1417 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1418 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1419 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1420 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1421 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1422 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1423 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1425 funding_outpoint: None,
1426 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1427 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1429 funding_transaction: None,
1431 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1432 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1433 counterparty_node_id,
1435 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1437 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1439 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1440 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1442 announcement_sigs: None,
1444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1445 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1446 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1447 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1449 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1451 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1452 outbound_scid_alias,
1454 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1456 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1457 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1462 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1468 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1469 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1470 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1471 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1472 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1474 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1475 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1476 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1477 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1478 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1479 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1480 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1482 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1483 where L::Target: Logger
1485 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1486 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1487 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1489 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1490 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1491 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1492 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1494 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1495 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1496 if match update_state {
1497 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1498 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1499 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1500 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1501 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1503 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1507 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1508 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1509 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1510 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1512 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1513 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1514 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1516 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1517 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1518 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1519 transaction_output_index: None
1524 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1525 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1526 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1527 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1528 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1531 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1533 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1534 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1535 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1537 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1538 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1541 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1542 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1545 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1547 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1548 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1549 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1551 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1552 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1558 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1559 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1560 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1562 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1563 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1564 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1568 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1569 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1571 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1573 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1574 if generated_by_local {
1575 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1576 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1585 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1587 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1588 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1589 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1591 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1592 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1593 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1596 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1597 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1598 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1599 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1603 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1604 preimages.push(preimage);
1608 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1609 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1611 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1613 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1614 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1616 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1617 if !generated_by_local {
1618 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1626 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1627 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1628 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1629 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1630 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1631 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1632 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1633 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1635 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1637 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1638 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1639 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1640 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1642 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1644 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1645 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1646 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1647 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1650 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1651 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1652 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1653 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1655 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1658 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1659 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1660 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1661 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1663 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1666 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1667 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1672 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1673 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1678 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1680 let channel_parameters =
1681 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1682 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1683 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1686 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1691 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1694 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1695 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1696 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1697 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1699 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1700 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1701 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1709 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1710 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1716 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1717 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1718 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1719 // outside of those situations will fail.
1720 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1724 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1729 1 + // script length (0)
1733 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1734 2 + // witness marker and flag
1735 1 + // witness element count
1736 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1737 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1738 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1739 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1740 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1741 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1743 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1744 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1745 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1751 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1752 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1753 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1754 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1756 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1757 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1758 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1760 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1761 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1762 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1763 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1764 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1765 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1768 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1769 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1772 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1773 value_to_holder = 0;
1776 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1777 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1778 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1779 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1781 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1782 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1785 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1786 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1790 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1791 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1792 /// our counterparty!)
1793 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1794 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1795 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1796 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1797 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1798 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1799 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1801 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1805 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1806 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1807 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1808 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1809 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1810 //may see payments to it!
1811 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1812 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1813 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1815 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1818 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1819 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1820 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1821 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1822 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1825 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1828 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1829 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1831 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1833 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1834 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1835 where L::Target: Logger {
1836 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1837 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1838 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1839 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1840 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1841 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1842 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1843 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1847 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1848 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1849 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1850 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1852 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1853 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1855 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1857 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1859 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1860 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1861 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1863 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1864 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1865 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1866 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1867 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1869 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1870 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1871 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1873 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1874 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1876 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1879 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1880 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1884 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1888 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1889 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1890 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1891 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1892 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1893 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1896 // Now update local state:
1898 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1899 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1900 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1901 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1902 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1903 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1904 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1908 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1909 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1910 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1911 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1912 // do not not get into this branch.
1913 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1914 match pending_update {
1915 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1916 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1917 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1918 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1920 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1921 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1924 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1925 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1926 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1927 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1928 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1929 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1930 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1936 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1937 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1938 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1940 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1941 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1942 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1944 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1945 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1948 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1949 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1951 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1952 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1954 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1955 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1958 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1961 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1962 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1963 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1964 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1969 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1970 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1971 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1972 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1973 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1974 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1975 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1976 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1977 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1978 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1979 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1980 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1984 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1985 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1986 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1987 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1988 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1992 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
1996 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1997 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1998 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1999 /// before we fail backwards.
2001 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2002 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2003 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2004 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2005 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2006 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2007 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2010 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2011 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2012 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2013 /// before we fail backwards.
2015 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2016 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2017 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2018 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2019 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2020 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2021 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2023 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2025 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2026 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2027 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2029 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2030 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2031 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2033 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2034 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2035 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2037 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2042 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2049 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2050 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2051 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2052 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2053 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2057 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2058 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2059 force_holding_cell = true;
2062 // Now update local state:
2063 if force_holding_cell {
2064 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2065 match pending_update {
2066 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2067 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2068 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2069 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2073 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2074 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2075 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2082 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2083 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2084 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2090 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2092 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2093 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2096 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2097 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2098 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2103 // Message handlers:
2105 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2106 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2108 // Check sanity of message fields:
2109 if !self.is_outbound() {
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2112 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2115 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2118 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2121 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2124 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2126 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2128 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2129 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2132 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2133 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2136 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2139 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2143 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2144 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2147 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2150 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2153 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2156 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2157 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2159 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2162 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2166 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2167 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2170 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2171 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2173 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2174 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2177 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2180 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2181 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2182 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2183 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2184 if script.len() == 0 {
2187 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2190 Some(script.clone())
2193 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2194 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2200 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2201 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2202 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2203 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2204 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2206 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2207 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2209 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2212 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2213 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2214 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2215 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2216 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2217 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2220 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2221 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2222 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2225 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2226 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2228 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2229 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2234 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2235 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2237 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2238 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2240 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2241 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2242 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2243 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2244 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2245 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2246 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2247 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2248 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2251 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2252 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2254 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2255 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2256 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2257 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2259 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2260 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2262 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2263 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2266 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2267 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2270 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2271 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2272 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2274 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2277 if self.is_outbound() {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2280 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2281 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2282 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2286 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2289 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2290 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2291 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2292 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2295 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2296 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2297 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2298 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2299 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2301 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2303 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2304 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2308 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2309 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2310 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2314 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2315 initial_commitment_tx,
2318 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2319 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2322 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2323 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2325 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2327 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2328 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2329 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2330 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2331 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2332 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2333 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2334 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2335 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2336 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2337 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2339 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2341 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2343 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2344 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2345 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2346 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2348 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2350 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2351 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2353 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2354 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2357 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2358 }, channel_monitor))
2361 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2362 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2363 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2364 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2365 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2367 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2370 if !self.is_outbound() {
2371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2373 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2376 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2377 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2378 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2379 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2382 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2384 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2385 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2386 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2387 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2389 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2390 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2392 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2393 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2395 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2396 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2397 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2398 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2399 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2400 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2404 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2405 initial_commitment_tx,
2408 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2409 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2412 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2413 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2416 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2417 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2418 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2419 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2420 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2421 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2422 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2423 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2424 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2425 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2426 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2427 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2429 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2431 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2433 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2434 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2435 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2436 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2438 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2440 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2441 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2445 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2446 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2448 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2449 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2450 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2451 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2453 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2456 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2457 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2458 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2461 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2462 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2463 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2464 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2465 // when routing outbound payments.
2466 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2470 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2472 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2473 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2474 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2475 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2476 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2477 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2478 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2479 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2480 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2482 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2483 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2484 let expected_point =
2485 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2486 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2488 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2489 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2490 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2491 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2492 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2493 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2495 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2496 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2497 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2498 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2499 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2501 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2502 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2506 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2509 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2510 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2512 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2514 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2517 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2518 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2519 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2520 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2526 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2527 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2528 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2529 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2530 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2531 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2532 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2533 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2534 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2537 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2540 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2541 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2542 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2544 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2545 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2546 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2547 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2548 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2549 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2551 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2552 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2558 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2559 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2560 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2561 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2562 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2563 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2564 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2565 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2566 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2569 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2572 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2573 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2574 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2576 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2577 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2578 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2579 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2580 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2581 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2583 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2584 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2588 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2589 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2590 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2591 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2592 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2593 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2594 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2596 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2597 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2599 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2606 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2607 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2608 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2609 /// corner case properly.
2610 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2611 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2612 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2614 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2615 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2616 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2617 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2620 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2622 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2623 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2624 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2627 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2628 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2629 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2630 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2632 outbound_capacity_msat,
2633 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2634 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2635 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2641 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2642 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2645 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2646 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2647 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2648 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2649 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2650 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2653 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2654 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2656 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2657 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2660 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2661 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2662 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2664 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2665 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2667 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2670 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2671 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2673 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2674 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2676 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2677 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2679 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2680 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2684 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2685 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2691 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2692 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2693 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2696 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2697 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2698 included_htlcs += 1;
2701 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2702 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2706 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2707 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2708 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2709 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2710 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2711 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2716 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2718 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2719 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2724 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2725 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2729 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2730 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2731 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2734 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2735 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2737 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2738 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2739 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2741 total_pending_htlcs,
2742 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2743 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2744 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2746 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2747 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2748 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2750 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2752 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2757 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2758 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2759 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2761 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2762 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2764 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2767 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2768 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2770 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2771 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2773 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2774 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2776 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2777 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2781 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2782 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2788 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2789 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2790 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2791 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2792 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2793 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2796 included_htlcs += 1;
2799 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2800 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2803 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2804 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2806 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2807 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2808 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2813 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2814 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2815 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2818 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2819 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2821 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2822 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2824 total_pending_htlcs,
2825 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2826 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2827 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2829 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2830 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2831 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2833 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2835 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2840 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2841 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2842 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2843 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2844 if local_sent_shutdown {
2845 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2847 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2848 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2849 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2852 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2855 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2856 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2858 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2859 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2861 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2862 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2865 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2866 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2867 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2868 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2870 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2871 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2873 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2874 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2875 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2876 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2877 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2878 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2879 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2880 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2881 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2882 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2883 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2885 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2886 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2887 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2888 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2889 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2890 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2894 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2897 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2898 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2899 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2901 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2902 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2903 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2904 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2905 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2906 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2907 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2911 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2912 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2913 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2914 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2915 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2916 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2917 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2921 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2922 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2923 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2924 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2925 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2929 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2930 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2931 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2932 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2933 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2935 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2939 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2943 if !self.is_outbound() {
2944 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2945 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2946 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2947 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2948 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2949 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2950 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2951 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2952 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2953 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2954 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2955 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2956 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2957 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2958 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2961 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2962 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2963 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2964 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2968 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2971 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2972 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2975 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2976 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2977 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2981 // Now update local state:
2982 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2983 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2984 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2985 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2986 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2987 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2988 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2993 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2995 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2996 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2997 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2998 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2999 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3000 None => fail_reason.into(),
3001 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3002 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3003 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3006 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3010 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3011 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3012 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3013 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3015 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3016 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3021 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3024 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3025 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3028 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3032 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3035 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3036 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3039 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3043 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3047 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3048 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3049 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3051 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3052 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3055 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3059 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3060 where L::Target: Logger
3062 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3065 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3066 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3068 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3069 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3072 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3074 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3076 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3077 let commitment_txid = {
3078 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3079 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3080 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3082 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3083 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3084 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3085 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3086 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3087 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3091 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3093 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3094 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3095 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3096 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3099 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3100 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3101 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3105 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3107 if self.is_outbound() {
3108 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3109 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3110 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3111 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3112 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3113 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3114 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3115 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3116 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3117 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3123 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3124 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3127 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3128 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3129 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3130 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3131 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3132 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3133 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3135 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3136 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3137 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3138 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3139 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3140 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3141 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3144 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3146 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3150 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3151 commitment_stats.tx,
3153 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3154 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3155 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3158 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3159 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3161 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3162 let mut need_commitment = false;
3163 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3164 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3165 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3166 need_commitment = true;
3170 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3171 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3172 Some(forward_info.clone())
3174 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3175 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3176 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3177 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3178 need_commitment = true;
3181 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3182 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3183 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3184 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3185 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3186 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3187 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3188 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3189 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3190 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3191 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3192 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3193 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3194 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3196 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3198 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3199 need_commitment = true;
3203 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3204 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3205 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3206 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3207 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3208 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3213 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3214 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3215 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3216 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3218 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3219 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3220 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3221 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3222 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3223 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3224 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3225 // includes the right HTLCs.
3226 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3227 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3228 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3229 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3230 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3231 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3233 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3234 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3235 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3236 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3239 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3240 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3241 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3242 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3243 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3244 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3245 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3246 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3247 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3251 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3252 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3253 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3254 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3255 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3258 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3259 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3260 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3261 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3262 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3263 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3264 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3265 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3268 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3269 /// for our counterparty.
3270 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3271 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3272 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3273 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3274 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3276 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3277 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3278 updates: Vec::new(),
3281 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3282 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3283 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3284 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3285 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3286 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3287 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3288 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3289 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3290 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3291 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3292 // to rebalance channels.
3293 match &htlc_update {
3294 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3295 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3296 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3299 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3300 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3301 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3302 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3303 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3304 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3305 // into the holding cell without ever being
3306 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3307 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3308 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3311 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3317 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3318 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3319 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3320 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3321 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3322 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3323 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3324 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3325 (msg, monitor_update)
3326 } else { unreachable!() };
3327 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3328 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3330 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3331 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3332 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3333 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3334 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3335 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3336 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3337 // for a full revocation before failing.
3338 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3341 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3343 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3350 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3351 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3353 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3354 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3359 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3360 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3361 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3362 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3363 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3365 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3366 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3367 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3369 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3370 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3371 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3377 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3378 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3379 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3380 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3381 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3382 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3383 where L::Target: Logger,
3385 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3388 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3391 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3395 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3397 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3398 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3403 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3404 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3405 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3406 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3407 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3408 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3409 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3410 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3416 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3417 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3420 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3421 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3423 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3425 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3426 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3427 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3428 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3429 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3430 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3431 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3432 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3436 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3437 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3438 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3439 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3440 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3441 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3442 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3443 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3445 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3446 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3449 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3450 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3451 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3452 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3453 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3454 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3455 let mut require_commitment = false;
3456 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3459 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3460 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3461 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3463 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3464 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3465 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3466 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3467 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3468 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3473 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3474 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3475 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3476 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3477 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3479 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3480 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3481 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3486 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3487 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3489 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3493 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3494 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3496 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3497 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3498 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3499 require_commitment = true;
3500 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3501 match forward_info {
3502 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3503 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3504 require_commitment = true;
3506 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3507 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3508 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3510 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3511 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3512 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3516 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3517 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3518 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3519 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3525 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3526 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3527 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3528 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3530 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3531 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3532 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3533 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3534 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3535 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3536 require_commitment = true;
3540 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3542 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3543 match update_state {
3544 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3545 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3546 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3547 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3548 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3550 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3551 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3552 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3553 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3554 require_commitment = true;
3555 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3556 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3561 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3562 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3563 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3564 if require_commitment {
3565 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3566 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3567 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3568 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3569 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3570 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3571 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3572 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3573 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3575 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3576 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3577 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3578 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3579 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3580 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3583 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3584 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3585 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3586 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3587 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3588 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3589 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3591 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3592 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3593 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3595 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3596 if require_commitment {
3597 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3599 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3600 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3601 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3602 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3604 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3605 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3606 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3607 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3608 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3610 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3611 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3612 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3613 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3619 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3620 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3621 /// commitment update.
3622 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3623 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3624 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3627 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3628 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3629 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3630 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3632 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3633 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3634 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3635 if !self.is_outbound() {
3636 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3638 if !self.is_usable() {
3639 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3641 if !self.is_live() {
3642 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3645 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3646 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3647 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3648 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3649 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3650 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3651 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3652 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3653 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3654 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3658 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3659 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3660 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3661 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3662 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3665 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3666 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3670 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3671 force_holding_cell = true;
3674 if force_holding_cell {
3675 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3679 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3680 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3682 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3683 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3688 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3689 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3691 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3693 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3694 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3695 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3696 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3700 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3701 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3702 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3706 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3707 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3710 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3711 // will be retransmitted.
3712 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3713 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3714 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3716 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3717 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3719 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3720 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3721 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3722 // this HTLC accordingly
3723 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3726 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3727 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3728 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3729 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3732 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3733 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3734 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3735 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3736 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3737 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3742 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3744 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3745 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3746 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3747 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3751 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3752 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3753 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3754 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3755 // the update upon reconnection.
3756 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3760 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3761 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3764 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3765 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3766 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3767 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3768 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3769 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3770 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3772 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3773 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3774 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3775 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3776 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3777 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3778 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3780 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3781 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3782 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3783 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3784 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3785 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3786 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3789 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3790 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3791 /// to the remote side.
3792 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3793 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3794 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3795 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3798 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3800 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3801 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3802 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3804 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3805 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3806 // first received the funding_signed.
3807 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3808 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3809 self.funding_transaction.take()
3811 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3812 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3813 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3814 funding_broadcastable = None;
3817 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3818 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3819 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3820 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3821 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3822 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3823 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3824 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3825 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3826 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3827 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3828 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3829 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3830 next_per_commitment_point,
3831 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3835 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3837 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3838 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3839 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3840 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3841 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3842 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3844 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3845 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3846 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3847 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3848 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3849 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3853 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3854 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3856 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3857 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3860 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3861 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3862 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3863 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3864 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3865 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3866 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3867 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3868 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3872 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3873 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3875 if self.is_outbound() {
3876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3878 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3879 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3881 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3882 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3884 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3885 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3886 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3887 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3888 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3889 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3890 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3891 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3892 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3893 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3894 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3896 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3898 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3899 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3900 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3906 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3907 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3908 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3909 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3910 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3911 per_commitment_secret,
3912 next_per_commitment_point,
3916 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3917 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3918 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3919 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3920 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3922 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3923 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3924 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3925 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3926 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3927 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3928 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3929 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3930 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3935 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3936 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3938 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3939 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3940 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3941 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3942 reason: err_packet.clone()
3945 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3946 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3947 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3948 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3949 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3950 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3953 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3954 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3955 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3956 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3957 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3964 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3965 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3966 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3967 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3971 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3972 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3973 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3974 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3975 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3976 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3980 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3981 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3983 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3984 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3985 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3986 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3987 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3988 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3989 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3990 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3993 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3995 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3996 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3997 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3998 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4002 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4003 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4004 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4007 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4008 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4009 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4010 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4011 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4012 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4013 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4014 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4016 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4017 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4018 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4019 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4020 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4023 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4024 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4025 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4026 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4027 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4028 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4029 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4030 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4033 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4037 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4038 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4039 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4040 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4042 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4046 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4047 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4048 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4050 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4051 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4052 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4053 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4054 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4058 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4060 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4061 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4062 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4063 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4064 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4067 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4068 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4069 channel_ready: None,
4070 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4071 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4072 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4076 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4077 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4078 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4079 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4080 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4081 next_per_commitment_point,
4082 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4084 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4085 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4086 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4090 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4091 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4092 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4094 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4095 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4096 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4099 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4105 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4106 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4107 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4108 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4109 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4111 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4112 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4113 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4114 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4115 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4116 next_per_commitment_point,
4117 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4121 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4122 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4123 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4125 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4128 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4129 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4130 raa: required_revoke,
4131 commitment_update: None,
4132 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4134 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4135 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4136 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4138 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4141 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4142 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4143 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4144 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4145 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4146 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4149 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4150 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4151 raa: required_revoke,
4152 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4153 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4157 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4161 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4162 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4163 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4164 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4166 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4168 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4170 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4171 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4172 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4173 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4174 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4175 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4177 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4178 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4179 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4180 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4181 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4183 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4184 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4185 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4186 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4189 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4190 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4191 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4192 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4193 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4194 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4195 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4196 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4197 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4198 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4199 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4200 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4201 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4202 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4203 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4205 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4208 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4209 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4212 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4213 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4214 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4215 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4216 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4217 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4218 self.channel_state &
4219 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4220 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4221 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4222 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4225 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4226 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4227 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4228 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4229 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4230 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4231 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4233 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4239 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4240 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4241 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4242 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4244 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4245 return Ok((None, None));
4248 if !self.is_outbound() {
4249 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4250 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4252 return Ok((None, None));
4255 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4257 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4258 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4259 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4260 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4262 let sig = self.holder_signer
4263 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4264 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4266 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4267 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4268 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4269 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4271 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4272 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4273 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4278 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4279 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4280 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4281 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4283 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4286 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4287 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4288 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4289 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4292 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4293 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4297 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4299 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4300 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4303 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4304 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4305 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4308 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4311 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4312 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4313 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4314 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4316 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4319 assert!(send_shutdown);
4320 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4321 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4324 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4329 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4331 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4332 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4334 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4335 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4336 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4337 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4338 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4339 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4342 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4343 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4344 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4346 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4347 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4348 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4349 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4353 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4354 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4355 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4356 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4357 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4358 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4360 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4361 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4368 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4369 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4371 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4374 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4375 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4377 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4379 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4380 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4381 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4382 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4383 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4384 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4385 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4386 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4387 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4389 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4390 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4393 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4397 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4398 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4399 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4400 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4402 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4403 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4405 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4406 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4408 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4409 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4411 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4415 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4419 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4420 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4421 return Ok((None, None));
4424 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4425 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4426 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4427 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4429 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4431 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4434 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4435 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4436 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4437 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4438 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4442 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4443 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4444 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4448 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4449 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4450 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4451 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4452 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4453 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4454 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4458 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4460 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4461 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4462 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4463 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4465 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4468 let sig = self.holder_signer
4469 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4470 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4472 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4473 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4474 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4475 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4479 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4480 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4481 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4482 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4484 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4485 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4486 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4492 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4493 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4494 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4496 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4497 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4499 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4500 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4503 if !self.is_outbound() {
4504 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4505 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4506 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4507 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4509 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4510 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4511 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4513 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4514 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4517 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4518 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4519 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4520 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4521 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4522 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4523 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4524 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4529 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4530 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4531 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4532 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4534 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4538 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4539 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4540 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4541 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4543 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4549 // Public utilities:
4551 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4555 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4559 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4560 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4561 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4565 /// Gets the channel's type
4566 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4570 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4571 /// is_usable() returns true).
4572 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4573 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4574 self.short_channel_id
4577 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4578 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4579 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4582 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4583 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4584 self.outbound_scid_alias
4586 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4587 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4588 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4589 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4590 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4593 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4594 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4595 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4596 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4599 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4600 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4601 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4604 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4605 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4606 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4607 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4611 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4614 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4615 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4618 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4619 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4622 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4623 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4624 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4627 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4628 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4631 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4632 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4633 self.counterparty_node_id
4636 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4637 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4638 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4641 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4642 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4643 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4646 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4647 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4649 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4650 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4651 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4652 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4654 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4658 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4659 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4660 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4663 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4664 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4665 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4668 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4669 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4670 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4672 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4673 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4678 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4679 self.channel_value_satoshis
4682 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4683 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4686 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4687 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4690 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4691 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4694 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4695 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4696 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4699 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4700 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4701 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4704 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4705 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4706 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4709 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4710 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4711 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4712 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4713 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4716 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4718 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4719 self.prev_config = None;
4723 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4724 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4728 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4729 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4730 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4731 let did_channel_update =
4732 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4733 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4734 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4735 if did_channel_update {
4736 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4737 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4738 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4739 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4741 self.config.options = *config;
4745 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4746 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4747 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4748 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4749 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4750 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4751 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4753 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4754 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4757 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4759 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4760 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4766 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4767 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4768 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4769 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4770 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4771 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4772 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4774 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4775 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4782 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4786 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4787 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4788 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4789 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4790 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4791 // which are near the dust limit.
4792 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4793 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4794 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4795 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4796 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4798 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4799 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4801 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4804 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4805 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4808 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4809 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4812 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4813 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4817 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4822 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4824 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4825 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4826 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4827 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4828 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4829 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4831 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4833 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4841 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4842 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4846 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4847 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4848 self.update_time_counter
4851 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4852 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4855 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4856 self.config.announced_channel
4859 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4860 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4863 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4864 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4865 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4866 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4869 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4870 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4871 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4874 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4875 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4876 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4877 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4878 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4881 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4882 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4883 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4884 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4885 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4888 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4889 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4890 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4891 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4894 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4895 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4898 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4899 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4900 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4903 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4904 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4905 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4907 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4908 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4909 if self.channel_state &
4910 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4911 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4912 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4913 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4914 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4917 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4918 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4919 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4920 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4921 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4922 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4924 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4925 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4926 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4928 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4929 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4930 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4931 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4932 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4933 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4939 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4940 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4941 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4944 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4945 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4946 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4949 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4950 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4951 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4954 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4955 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4956 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4957 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4958 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4959 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4964 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4965 self.channel_update_status
4968 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4969 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4970 self.channel_update_status = status;
4973 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4975 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4976 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4977 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4981 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4982 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4983 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4986 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4990 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4991 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4992 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4994 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4995 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4996 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4998 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4999 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5002 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5003 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5004 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5005 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5006 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5007 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5008 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5009 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5010 self.channel_state);
5012 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5016 if need_commitment_update {
5017 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5018 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5019 let next_per_commitment_point =
5020 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5021 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5022 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5023 next_per_commitment_point,
5024 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5028 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5034 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5035 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5036 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5037 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5038 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5039 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5040 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5042 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5045 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5046 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5047 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5048 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5049 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5050 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5051 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5052 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5053 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5054 if self.is_outbound() {
5055 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5056 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5057 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5058 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5059 // channel and move on.
5060 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5061 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5063 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5064 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5065 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5067 if self.is_outbound() {
5068 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5069 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5070 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5071 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5072 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5073 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5077 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5078 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5079 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5080 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5081 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5085 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5086 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5087 // may have already happened for this block).
5088 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5089 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5090 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5091 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5094 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5095 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5096 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5097 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5105 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5106 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5107 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5108 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5110 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5111 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5114 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5116 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5117 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5118 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5119 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5121 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5124 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5127 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5128 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5129 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5130 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5132 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5135 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5136 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5137 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5139 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5140 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5142 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5143 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5144 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5152 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5154 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5155 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5156 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5158 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5159 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5162 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5163 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5164 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5165 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5166 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5167 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5168 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5169 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5170 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5173 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5174 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5175 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5176 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5178 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5179 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5180 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5182 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5183 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5184 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5185 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5187 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5188 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5189 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5190 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5191 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5192 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5193 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5196 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5197 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5199 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5202 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5203 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5204 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5205 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5206 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5207 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5208 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5209 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5210 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5211 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5212 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5213 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5214 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5215 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5216 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5217 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5218 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5224 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5229 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5230 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5232 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5233 if !self.is_outbound() {
5234 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5236 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5237 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5240 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5241 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5244 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5245 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5249 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5250 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5251 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5252 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5253 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5254 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5255 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5256 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5257 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5258 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5259 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5260 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5261 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5262 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5263 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5264 first_per_commitment_point,
5265 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5266 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5267 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5268 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5270 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5274 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5275 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5278 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5279 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5280 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5281 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5284 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5285 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5287 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5288 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5289 if self.is_outbound() {
5290 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5292 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5293 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5295 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5296 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5298 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5299 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5302 self.user_id = user_id;
5303 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5305 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5308 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5309 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5310 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5312 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5313 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5314 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5315 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5317 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5318 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5319 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5320 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5321 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5322 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5323 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5324 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5325 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5326 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5327 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5328 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5329 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5330 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5331 first_per_commitment_point,
5332 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5333 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5334 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5336 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5338 next_local_nonce: None,
5342 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5343 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5345 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5347 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5348 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5351 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5352 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5353 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5354 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5355 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5356 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5359 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5360 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5361 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5362 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5363 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5364 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5365 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5366 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5367 if !self.is_outbound() {
5368 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5370 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5371 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5373 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5374 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5375 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5376 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5379 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5380 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5382 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5385 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5386 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5391 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5393 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5395 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5396 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5397 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5399 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5400 temporary_channel_id,
5401 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5402 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5405 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5407 next_local_nonce: None,
5411 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5412 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5413 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5414 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5416 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5419 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5420 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5421 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5422 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5423 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5424 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5426 if !self.is_usable() {
5427 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5430 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5431 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5432 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5433 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5435 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5436 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5438 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5439 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5440 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5441 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5442 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5443 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5449 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5450 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5451 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5452 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5454 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5457 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5461 if !self.is_usable() {
5465 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5466 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5470 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5474 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5475 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5478 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5482 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5484 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5489 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5491 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5496 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5498 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5499 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5500 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5501 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5502 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5506 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5508 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5509 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5510 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5511 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5512 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5513 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5514 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5516 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5517 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5518 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5519 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5520 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5521 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5522 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5523 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5524 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5525 contents: announcement,
5528 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5532 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5533 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5534 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5535 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5536 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5537 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5538 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5539 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5541 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5543 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5544 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5545 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5546 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5548 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5549 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5550 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5551 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5554 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5555 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5556 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5557 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5560 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5563 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5564 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5565 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5566 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5567 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5568 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5571 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5573 Err(_) => return None,
5575 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5576 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5581 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5582 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5583 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5584 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5585 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5586 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5587 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5588 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5589 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5590 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5591 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5592 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5593 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5594 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5595 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5596 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5597 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5598 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5599 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5602 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5603 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5604 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5605 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5608 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5609 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5610 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5611 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5612 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5613 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5614 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5615 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5617 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5618 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5619 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5620 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5621 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5622 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5623 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5624 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5625 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5627 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5633 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5635 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5636 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5637 /// commitment update.
5639 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5640 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5641 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5642 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5644 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5645 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5647 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5648 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5653 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5654 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5656 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5658 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5659 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5661 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5662 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5663 /// regenerate them.
5665 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5666 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5668 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5669 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5670 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5671 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5672 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5673 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5675 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5676 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5677 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5680 if amount_msat == 0 {
5681 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5684 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5685 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5688 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5689 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5690 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5691 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5692 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5693 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5694 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5695 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5698 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5699 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5700 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5701 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5703 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5704 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5705 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5708 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5709 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5710 if !self.is_outbound() {
5711 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5712 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5713 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5714 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5715 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5716 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5720 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5723 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5724 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5725 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5727 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5728 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5729 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5730 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5731 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5732 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5736 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5737 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5738 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5739 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5740 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5741 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5745 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5746 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5747 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5750 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5751 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5752 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5753 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5755 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5756 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5759 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5760 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5761 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5762 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5763 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5766 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5767 force_holding_cell = true;
5770 // Now update local state:
5771 if force_holding_cell {
5772 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5777 onion_routing_packet,
5782 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5783 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5785 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5787 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5791 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5792 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5793 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5797 onion_routing_packet,
5799 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5804 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5805 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5806 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5807 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5809 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5810 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5811 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5813 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5814 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5818 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5819 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5820 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5821 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5822 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5823 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5824 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5827 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5828 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5829 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5830 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5831 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5832 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5835 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5837 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5838 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5839 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5841 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5842 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5845 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5846 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5847 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5848 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5849 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5850 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5851 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5852 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5855 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5859 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5860 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5861 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5862 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5864 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5866 if !self.is_outbound() {
5867 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5868 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5869 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5870 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5871 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5872 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5873 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5874 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5875 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5876 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5882 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5885 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5886 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5887 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5888 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5889 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5890 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5892 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5893 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5894 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5895 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5898 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5899 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5903 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5904 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5906 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5908 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5909 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5910 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5911 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5913 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5914 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5915 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5916 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5917 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5918 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5922 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5923 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5926 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5929 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5930 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5932 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5933 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5934 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5935 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5936 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5939 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5940 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5941 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5942 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
5948 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5949 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5950 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5953 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5954 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5955 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5957 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5958 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5959 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5960 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5966 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5967 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5969 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5970 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5971 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5972 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5973 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5974 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5975 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5976 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5980 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5981 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5984 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5985 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5988 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5989 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5990 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5993 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5994 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5995 let mut chan_closed = false;
5996 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6000 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6002 None if !chan_closed => {
6003 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6004 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6005 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6007 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6013 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6014 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6015 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6016 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6018 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6020 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6022 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6023 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6024 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6025 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6026 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6027 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6030 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6031 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6032 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6034 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6035 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6036 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6039 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6040 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6041 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6042 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6043 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6045 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6046 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6053 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6054 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6056 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6059 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6060 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6061 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6062 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6063 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6064 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6065 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6066 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6067 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6068 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6069 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6071 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6072 // return them to fail the payment.
6073 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6074 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6075 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6077 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6078 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6083 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6084 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6085 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6086 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6087 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6088 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6089 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6090 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6091 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6092 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6093 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6094 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6095 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6100 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6101 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6102 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6105 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6106 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6107 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6109 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6110 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6114 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6118 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6119 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6121 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6127 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6128 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6129 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6130 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6131 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6133 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6134 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6135 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6136 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6142 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6143 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6144 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6145 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6146 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6147 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6152 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6153 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6154 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6155 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6157 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6158 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6159 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6160 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6165 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6166 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6167 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6168 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6169 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6170 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6175 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6176 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6177 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6180 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6182 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6183 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6184 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6185 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6186 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6188 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6189 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6190 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6191 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6193 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6194 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6195 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6197 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6199 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6200 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6201 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6202 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6203 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6204 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6206 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6207 // deserialized from that format.
6208 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6209 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6210 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6212 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6214 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6215 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6216 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6218 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6219 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6220 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6221 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6224 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6225 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6226 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6229 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6230 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6231 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6232 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6234 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6235 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6237 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6239 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6241 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6243 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6246 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6248 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6253 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6255 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6256 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6257 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6258 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6259 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6260 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6261 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6263 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6265 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6267 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6270 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6271 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6272 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6275 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6277 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6278 preimages.push(preimage);
6280 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6281 reason.write(writer)?;
6283 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6285 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6286 preimages.push(preimage);
6288 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6289 reason.write(writer)?;
6294 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6295 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6297 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6299 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6300 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6301 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6302 source.write(writer)?;
6303 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6305 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6307 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6308 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6310 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6312 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6313 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6318 match self.resend_order {
6319 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6320 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6323 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6324 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6325 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6327 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6328 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6329 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6330 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6333 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6334 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6335 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6336 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6337 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6340 if self.is_outbound() {
6341 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6342 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6343 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6345 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6346 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6347 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6349 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6351 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6352 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6353 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6354 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6356 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6357 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6358 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6359 // consider the stale state on reload.
6362 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6363 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6364 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6366 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6367 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6368 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6370 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6371 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6373 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6374 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6375 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6377 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6378 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6380 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6383 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6384 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6385 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6387 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6390 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6391 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6393 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6394 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6395 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6397 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6399 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6401 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6403 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6404 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6405 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6406 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6407 htlc.write(writer)?;
6410 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6411 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6412 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6414 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6415 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6417 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6418 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6419 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6420 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6421 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6422 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6423 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6425 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6426 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6427 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6428 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6429 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6431 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6433 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6434 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6435 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6436 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6438 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6439 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6440 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6441 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6442 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6443 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6444 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6446 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6447 (2, chan_type, option),
6448 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6449 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6450 (5, self.config, required),
6451 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6452 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6453 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6454 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6455 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6456 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6457 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6458 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6459 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6460 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6461 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6462 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6469 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6470 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6472 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6473 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6475 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6476 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6477 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6479 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6480 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6481 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6482 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6484 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6486 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6487 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6492 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6493 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6496 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6497 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6498 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let mut keys_data = None;
6504 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6505 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6506 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6507 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6508 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6509 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6510 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6511 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6512 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6513 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6517 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6518 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6519 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6522 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6525 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6526 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6528 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6530 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6531 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6532 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6533 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6534 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6535 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6536 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6537 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6538 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6539 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6540 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6541 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6546 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6547 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6548 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6549 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6550 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6551 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6552 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6553 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6554 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6555 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6556 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6557 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6559 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6560 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6563 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6564 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6567 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6568 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6570 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6575 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6576 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6577 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6578 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6579 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6580 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6581 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6582 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6583 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6584 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6586 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6587 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6588 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6590 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6591 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6592 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6594 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6598 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6599 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6600 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6601 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6604 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6605 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6606 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6608 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6609 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6610 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6611 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6614 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6615 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6616 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6617 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6620 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6624 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6625 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6626 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6627 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6629 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6630 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6631 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6632 // consider the stale state on reload.
6633 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6636 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6637 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6638 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6640 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6643 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6647 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6648 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6649 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6650 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6652 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6653 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6655 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6656 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6658 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6659 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6660 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6662 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6664 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6665 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6667 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6668 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6671 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6673 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6674 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6675 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6676 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6678 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6681 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6682 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6684 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6686 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6687 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6689 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6690 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6692 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6695 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6698 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6699 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6700 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6704 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6705 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6706 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6708 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6714 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6715 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6716 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6717 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6718 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6719 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6720 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6721 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6722 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6723 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6725 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6726 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6727 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6728 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6729 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6730 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6732 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6733 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6735 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6736 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6737 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6738 (2, channel_type, option),
6739 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6740 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6741 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6742 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6743 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6744 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6745 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6746 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6747 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6748 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6749 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6750 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6751 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6752 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6753 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6756 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6757 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6758 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6759 // required channel parameters.
6760 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6761 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6762 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6764 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6766 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6767 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6768 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6769 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6772 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6773 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6774 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6776 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6777 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6779 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6780 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6785 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6786 if iter.next().is_some() {
6787 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6791 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6792 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6793 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6794 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6795 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6798 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6799 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6801 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6802 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6803 // separate u64 values.
6804 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6809 config: config.unwrap(),
6813 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6814 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6815 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6819 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6821 channel_value_satoshis,
6823 latest_monitor_update_id,
6826 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6829 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6830 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6833 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6834 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6835 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6839 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6840 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6841 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6842 monitor_pending_forwards,
6843 monitor_pending_failures,
6844 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6847 holding_cell_update_fee,
6848 next_holder_htlc_id,
6849 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6850 update_time_counter,
6853 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6854 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6855 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6856 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6858 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6859 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6860 closing_fee_limits: None,
6861 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6863 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6865 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6866 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6868 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6870 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6871 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6872 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6873 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6874 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6875 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6876 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6877 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6878 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6881 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6883 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6884 funding_transaction,
6886 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6887 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6888 counterparty_node_id,
6890 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6894 channel_update_status,
6895 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6900 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6901 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6902 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6904 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6906 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6907 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6908 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6910 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6912 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6913 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6915 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6918 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6926 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6927 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6928 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6929 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6930 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6932 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6933 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6935 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6936 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6937 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6938 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6939 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6940 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6941 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6942 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6943 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6944 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6945 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6946 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6947 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6948 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6949 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6950 use crate::util::test_utils;
6951 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6952 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6953 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6954 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6955 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6956 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6957 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6958 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6959 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6960 use crate::prelude::*;
6962 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6965 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6966 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6972 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6973 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6974 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6975 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6979 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6980 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6981 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6982 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6983 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6984 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6985 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6989 signer: InMemorySigner,
6992 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6993 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6996 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6997 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6999 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7000 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7003 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7007 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7009 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7010 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7011 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7012 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7013 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7016 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7017 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7018 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7019 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7023 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7024 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7025 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7029 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7030 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7031 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7032 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7034 let seed = [42; 32];
7035 let network = Network::Testnet;
7036 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7037 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7038 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7041 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7042 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7043 let config = UserConfig::default();
7044 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7045 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7046 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7048 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7049 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7053 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7054 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7056 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7057 let original_fee = 253;
7058 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7059 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7060 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7061 let seed = [42; 32];
7062 let network = Network::Testnet;
7063 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7065 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7066 let config = UserConfig::default();
7067 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7069 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7070 // same as the old fee.
7071 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7072 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7073 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7077 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7078 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7079 // dust limits are used.
7080 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7081 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7082 let seed = [42; 32];
7083 let network = Network::Testnet;
7084 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7085 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7087 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7088 // they have different dust limits.
7090 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7091 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7092 let config = UserConfig::default();
7093 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7095 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7096 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7097 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7098 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7099 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7101 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7102 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7103 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7104 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7105 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7107 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7108 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7109 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7111 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7112 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7113 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7114 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7117 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7119 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7120 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7121 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7122 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7123 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7125 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7126 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7127 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7128 payment_secret: None,
7132 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7133 // the dust limit check.
7134 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7135 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7136 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7137 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7139 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7140 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7141 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7142 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7143 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7144 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7145 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7149 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7150 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7151 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7152 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7153 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7154 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7155 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7156 let seed = [42; 32];
7157 let network = Network::Testnet;
7158 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7160 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7161 let config = UserConfig::default();
7162 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7164 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7165 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7167 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7168 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7169 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7170 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7171 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7172 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7174 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7175 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7176 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7177 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7178 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7180 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7182 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7183 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7184 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7185 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7186 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7188 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7189 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7190 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7191 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7192 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7196 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7197 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7198 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7199 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7200 let seed = [42; 32];
7201 let network = Network::Testnet;
7202 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7203 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7204 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7206 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7208 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7209 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7210 let config = UserConfig::default();
7211 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7213 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7214 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7215 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7216 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7218 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7219 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7220 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7222 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7223 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7224 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7225 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7227 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7228 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7229 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7231 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7232 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7234 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7235 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7236 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7237 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7238 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7239 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7240 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7241 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7242 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7247 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7249 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7250 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7251 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7252 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7253 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7254 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7255 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7262 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7263 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7264 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7265 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7266 let seed = [42; 32];
7267 let network = Network::Testnet;
7268 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7269 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7270 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7272 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7273 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7274 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7275 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7276 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7277 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7278 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7279 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7281 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7282 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7283 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7284 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7285 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7286 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7288 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7289 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7290 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7291 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7293 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7295 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7296 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7297 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7298 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7299 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7300 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7302 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7303 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7304 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7305 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7307 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7308 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7309 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7310 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7311 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7313 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7314 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7316 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7317 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7318 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7320 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7321 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7322 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7323 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7324 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7326 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7327 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7329 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7330 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7331 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7335 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7337 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7338 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7339 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7341 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7342 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7343 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7344 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7346 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7347 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7348 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7350 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7352 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7353 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7356 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7357 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7358 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7359 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7360 let seed = [42; 32];
7361 let network = Network::Testnet;
7362 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7363 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7364 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7367 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7368 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7369 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7371 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7372 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7374 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7375 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7376 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7378 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7379 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7381 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7383 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7384 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7386 // Channel Negotiations failed
7387 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7388 assert!(result.is_err());
7393 fn channel_update() {
7394 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7395 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7396 let seed = [42; 32];
7397 let network = Network::Testnet;
7398 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7399 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7401 // Create a channel.
7402 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7403 let config = UserConfig::default();
7404 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7405 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7406 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7407 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7409 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7410 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7411 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7413 short_channel_id: 0,
7416 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7417 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7418 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7420 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7421 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7423 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7425 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7427 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7428 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7429 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7430 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7432 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7433 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7434 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7436 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7440 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7442 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7443 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7444 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7445 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7446 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7447 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7448 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7449 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7450 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7451 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7452 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7453 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7454 use crate::sync::Arc;
7456 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7457 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7458 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7459 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7461 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7463 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7464 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7465 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7466 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7467 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7469 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7470 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7475 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7476 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7477 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7479 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7480 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7481 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7482 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7483 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7484 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7486 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7488 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7489 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7490 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7491 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7492 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7493 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7495 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7496 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7497 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7498 selected_contest_delay: 144
7500 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7501 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7503 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7504 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7506 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7507 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7509 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7510 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7512 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7513 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7514 // build_commitment_transaction.
7515 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7516 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7517 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7518 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7519 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7521 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7522 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7523 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7524 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7528 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7529 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7530 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7531 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7535 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7536 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7537 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7539 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7540 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7542 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7543 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7545 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7547 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7548 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7549 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7550 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7551 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7552 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7553 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7555 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7556 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7557 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7558 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7560 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7561 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7562 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7564 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7566 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7567 commitment_tx.clone(),
7568 counterparty_signature,
7569 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7570 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7571 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7573 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7574 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7576 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7577 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7578 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7580 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7581 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7584 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7585 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7587 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7588 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7589 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7590 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7591 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7592 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7593 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7594 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7596 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7599 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7600 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7601 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7605 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7608 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7609 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7610 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7612 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7613 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7614 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7615 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7616 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7617 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7618 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7619 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7621 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7625 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7626 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7627 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7628 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7630 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7631 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7633 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7634 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7635 "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", {});
7637 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7638 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7639 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7640 "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", {});
7642 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7643 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7645 amount_msat: 1000000,
7647 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7648 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7650 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7653 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7654 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7656 amount_msat: 2000000,
7658 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7659 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7661 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7664 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7665 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7667 amount_msat: 2000000,
7669 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7670 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7671 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7673 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7676 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7677 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7679 amount_msat: 3000000,
7681 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7682 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7683 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7685 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7688 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7689 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7691 amount_msat: 4000000,
7693 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7694 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7696 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7700 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7701 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7702 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7704 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7705 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7706 "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", {
7709 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7710 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7711 "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" },
7714 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7715 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7716 "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" },
7719 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7720 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7721 "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" },
7724 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7725 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7726 "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" },
7729 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7730 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7731 "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" }
7734 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7735 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7736 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7738 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7739 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7740 "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", {
7743 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7744 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7745 "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" },
7748 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7749 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7750 "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" },
7753 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7754 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7755 "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" },
7758 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7759 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7760 "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" },
7763 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7764 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7765 "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" }
7768 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7769 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7770 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7772 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7773 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7774 "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", {
7777 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7778 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7779 "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" },
7782 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7783 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7784 "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" },
7787 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7788 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7789 "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" },
7792 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7793 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7794 "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" }
7797 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7798 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7799 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7800 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7802 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7803 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7804 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7807 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7808 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7809 "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" },
7812 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7813 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7814 "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" },
7817 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7818 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7819 "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" },
7822 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7823 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7824 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7827 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7828 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7829 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7830 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7832 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7833 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7834 "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", {
7837 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7838 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7839 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7842 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7843 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7844 "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" },
7847 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7848 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7849 "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" },
7852 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7853 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7854 "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" }
7857 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7858 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7859 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7861 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7862 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7863 "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", {
7866 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7867 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7868 "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" },
7871 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7872 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7873 "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" },
7876 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7877 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7878 "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" }
7881 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7882 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7883 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7885 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7886 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7887 "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", {
7890 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7891 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7892 "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" },
7895 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7896 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7897 "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" },
7900 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7901 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7902 "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" }
7905 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7906 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7907 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7909 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7910 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7911 "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", {
7914 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7915 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7916 "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" },
7919 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7920 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7921 "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" }
7924 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7925 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7926 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7927 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7929 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7930 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7931 "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", {
7934 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7935 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7936 "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" },
7939 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7940 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7941 "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" }
7944 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7945 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7946 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7947 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7949 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7950 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7951 "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", {
7954 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7955 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7956 "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" },
7959 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7960 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7961 "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" }
7964 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7965 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7966 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7968 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7969 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7970 "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", {
7973 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7974 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7975 "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" }
7978 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7979 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7980 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7981 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7983 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7984 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7985 "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", {
7988 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7989 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7990 "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" }
7993 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7994 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7995 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7996 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7998 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7999 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8000 "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", {
8003 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8004 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8005 "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" }
8008 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8009 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8010 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8011 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8013 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8014 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8015 "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", {});
8017 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8018 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8019 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8020 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8022 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8023 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8024 "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", {});
8026 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8027 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8028 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8029 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8031 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8032 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8033 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8035 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8036 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8037 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8039 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8040 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8041 "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", {});
8043 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8044 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8045 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8046 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8048 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8049 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8050 "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", {});
8052 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8053 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8054 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8055 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8057 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8058 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8059 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8061 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8062 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8063 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8064 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8065 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8066 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8068 amount_msat: 2000000,
8070 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8071 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8073 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8076 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8077 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8078 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8080 amount_msat: 5000001,
8082 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8083 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8084 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8086 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8089 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8090 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8092 amount_msat: 5000000,
8094 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8095 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8096 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8098 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8102 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8103 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8104 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8107 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8108 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8109 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce501473044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8111 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8112 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8113 "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" },
8115 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8116 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8117 "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" }
8120 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8121 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8122 "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", {
8125 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8126 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8127 "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" },
8129 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8130 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8131 "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" },
8133 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8134 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8135 "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" }
8140 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8141 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8143 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8144 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8145 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8146 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8148 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8149 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8150 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8152 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8153 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8155 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8156 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8158 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8159 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8160 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8164 fn test_key_derivation() {
8165 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8166 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8168 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8169 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8171 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8172 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8174 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8175 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8177 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8178 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8180 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8181 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8183 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8184 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8186 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8187 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8191 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8192 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8193 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8194 let seed = [42; 32];
8195 let network = Network::Testnet;
8196 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8197 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8199 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8200 let config = UserConfig::default();
8201 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8202 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8204 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8205 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8207 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8208 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8209 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8210 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8211 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8212 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8213 assert!(res.is_ok());
8218 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8219 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8220 // resulting `channel_type`.
8221 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8222 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8223 let network = Network::Testnet;
8224 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8225 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8227 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8228 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8230 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8231 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8233 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8234 // need to signal it.
8235 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8236 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8237 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8240 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8242 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8243 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8244 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8246 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8247 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8248 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8251 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8252 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8253 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8254 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8255 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8258 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8259 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8264 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8265 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8266 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8267 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8268 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8269 let network = Network::Testnet;
8270 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8271 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8273 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8274 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8276 let config = UserConfig::default();
8278 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8279 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8280 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8281 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8282 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8284 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8285 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8286 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8289 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8290 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8291 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8293 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8294 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8295 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8296 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8297 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8298 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8300 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8305 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8306 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8308 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8309 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8310 let network = Network::Testnet;
8311 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8312 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8314 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8315 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8317 let config = UserConfig::default();
8319 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8320 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8321 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8322 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8323 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8324 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8325 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8326 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8328 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8329 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8330 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8331 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8332 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8333 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8336 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8337 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8339 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8340 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8341 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8342 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8344 assert!(res.is_err());
8346 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8347 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8348 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8350 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8351 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8352 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8355 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8357 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8358 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8359 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8360 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8363 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8364 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8366 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8367 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8369 assert!(res.is_err());