1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
61 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
62 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
63 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
65 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
69 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
72 pub struct AvailableBalances {
73 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
74 pub balance_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
76 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
78 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
81 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
85 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
90 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
91 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
92 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
93 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
94 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
100 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
101 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
102 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
103 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
106 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
108 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
109 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
110 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
112 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
113 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
115 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
117 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
118 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
119 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
121 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
125 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
127 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
130 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
134 enum InboundHTLCState {
135 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
136 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
137 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
139 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
140 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
141 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
142 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
143 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
144 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
145 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
146 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
147 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
148 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
149 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
151 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
152 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
153 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
154 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
155 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
156 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
157 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
158 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
159 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
160 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
161 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
162 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
163 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
164 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
166 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
167 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
168 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
169 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
170 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
171 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
172 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
173 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
175 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
176 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
178 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
179 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
180 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
181 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
182 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
183 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
184 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
185 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
188 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
190 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
191 /// through the following states in the state machine:
192 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
193 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
194 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
195 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
196 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
197 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
198 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
200 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
201 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
202 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
203 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
204 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
205 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
206 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
207 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
208 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
210 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
211 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
212 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
213 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
215 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
216 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
217 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
218 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
219 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
220 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
221 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
222 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
224 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
227 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
228 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
230 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
231 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
232 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
233 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
234 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
235 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
236 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
237 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
238 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
239 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
240 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
241 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
242 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
247 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
248 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
249 (2, Committed) => {},
250 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
251 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
254 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
258 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
259 state: InboundHTLCState,
262 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
263 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
264 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
266 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
267 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
268 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
270 /// The amount in msat.
271 pub amount_msat: u64,
272 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
273 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
274 /// The payment hash.
275 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
276 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
278 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
279 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
281 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
283 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
284 /// states may result in `None` here.
285 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
286 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
287 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
288 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
289 /// transactions as well.
291 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
292 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
295 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
296 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
300 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
301 (0, htlc_id, required),
302 (2, amount_msat, required),
303 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
304 (6, payment_hash, required),
305 (7, state, upgradable_option),
306 (8, is_dust, required),
309 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
310 enum OutboundHTLCState {
311 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
312 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
313 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
314 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
315 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
316 /// money back (though we won't), and,
317 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
318 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
319 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
320 /// we'll never get out of sync).
321 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
322 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
323 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
325 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
326 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
327 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
328 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
329 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
330 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
331 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
332 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
333 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
334 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
335 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
336 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
337 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
338 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
339 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
342 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
344 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
345 /// through the following states in the state machine:
346 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
347 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
348 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
349 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
350 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
351 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
352 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
354 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
355 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
356 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
357 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
358 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
359 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
360 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
361 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
363 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
364 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
366 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
367 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
368 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
369 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
370 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
371 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
372 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
373 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
374 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
375 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
378 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
379 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
381 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
382 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
383 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
384 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
385 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
387 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
388 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
390 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
391 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
392 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
393 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
394 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
395 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
396 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
401 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
402 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
403 (2, Committed) => {},
404 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
405 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
409 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
410 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
411 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
412 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
413 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
416 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
417 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
419 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
420 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
425 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
426 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
428 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
429 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
434 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
435 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
439 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
440 state: OutboundHTLCState,
442 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
443 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
447 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
448 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
450 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
451 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
452 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
454 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
455 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
456 /// The amount in msat.
457 pub amount_msat: u64,
458 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
459 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
460 /// The payment hash.
461 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
462 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
464 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
465 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
467 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
469 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
470 /// states may result in `None` here.
471 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
472 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
473 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
474 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
475 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
476 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
477 /// transactions as well.
479 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
480 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
483 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
484 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
488 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
489 (0, htlc_id, required),
490 (2, amount_msat, required),
491 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
492 (6, payment_hash, required),
493 (7, state, upgradable_option),
494 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
495 (10, is_dust, required),
498 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
499 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
500 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
501 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
505 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
507 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
508 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
509 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
510 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
513 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
518 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
523 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
527 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
528 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
529 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
530 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
531 struct $flag_type(u32);
536 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
539 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
541 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
544 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
547 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
548 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
551 Ok($flag_type(flags))
556 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
558 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
560 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
562 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
566 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
569 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
571 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
573 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
574 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
576 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
578 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
580 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
581 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
584 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
585 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
587 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
590 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
592 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
594 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
597 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
598 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
600 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
601 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
602 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
603 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
604 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
605 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
606 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
607 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
609 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
611 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
613 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
614 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
616 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
618 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
620 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
621 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
623 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
624 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
626 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
627 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
632 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
635 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
636 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
637 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
638 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
639 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
640 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
641 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
642 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
643 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
644 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
645 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
646 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
647 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
648 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
652 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
654 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
655 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
656 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
657 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
658 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
659 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
660 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
661 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
662 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
663 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
664 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
665 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
666 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
667 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
672 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
673 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
674 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
675 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
676 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
677 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
682 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
683 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
684 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
685 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
686 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
687 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
688 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
689 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
690 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
691 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
692 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
693 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
694 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
695 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
700 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
701 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
702 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
703 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
704 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
705 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
706 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
707 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
711 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
712 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
713 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
715 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
716 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
717 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
718 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
719 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
721 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
722 /// funding transaction to confirm.
723 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
724 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
726 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
727 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
728 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
732 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
733 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
735 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
738 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
747 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
749 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
753 fn $clear(&mut self) {
756 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
758 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
762 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
763 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
765 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
766 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
771 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
773 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
774 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
776 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
777 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
778 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
779 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
780 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
781 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
782 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
783 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
791 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
793 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
794 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
795 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
796 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
797 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
801 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
802 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
805 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
806 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
809 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
811 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
812 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
813 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
817 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
819 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
820 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
821 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
822 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
824 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
830 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
831 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
832 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
833 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
834 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
835 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
836 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
837 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
840 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
842 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
844 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
845 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
846 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
847 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
851 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
853 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
855 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
857 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
858 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
859 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
860 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
861 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
863 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
864 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
866 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
868 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
869 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
871 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
872 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
873 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
874 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
875 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
876 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
878 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
879 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
881 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
882 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
883 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
884 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
885 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
887 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
888 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
890 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
891 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
893 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
894 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
895 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
896 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
902 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
903 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
905 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
906 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
907 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
912 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
913 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
915 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
916 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
917 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
922 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
924 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
925 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
926 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
929 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
930 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
931 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
932 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
933 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
934 self.logger.log(record)
938 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
939 where L::Target: Logger {
940 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
941 where S::Target: SignerProvider
945 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
946 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
952 macro_rules! secp_check {
953 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
956 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
961 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
962 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
963 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
964 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
965 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
966 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
967 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
968 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
970 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
972 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
974 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
978 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
980 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
981 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
982 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
984 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
985 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
987 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
988 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
989 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
990 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
991 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
993 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
994 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
998 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
1004 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
1006 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
1007 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
1008 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1009 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1010 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1011 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1012 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
1013 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
1016 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
1017 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
1018 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
1019 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
1020 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
1021 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
1022 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
1023 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1024 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1025 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
1026 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
1029 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
1030 struct HTLCCandidate {
1032 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1035 impl HTLCCandidate {
1036 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1044 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1046 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1048 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1049 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1050 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1055 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1056 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1057 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1058 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1059 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1061 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1062 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1063 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1064 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1066 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1067 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1071 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1072 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1073 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1074 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1075 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1076 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1077 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1078 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1079 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1080 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1081 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1082 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1085 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1087 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1088 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1089 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1090 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1093 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1094 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1095 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1096 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1097 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1098 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1099 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1100 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1103 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1105 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1106 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1107 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1108 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1109 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1110 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1111 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1112 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1113 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1114 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1115 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1116 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1117 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1118 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1119 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1122 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1123 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1124 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1125 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1126 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1127 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1128 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1129 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1130 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1131 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1132 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1133 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1134 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1135 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1136 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1138 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1139 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1140 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1141 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1143 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1144 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1145 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1146 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1148 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1149 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1150 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1151 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1152 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1154 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1155 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1156 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1157 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1159 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1160 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1161 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1163 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1164 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1165 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1166 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1167 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1169 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1170 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1173 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1174 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1176 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1177 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1178 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1179 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1181 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1182 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1184 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1185 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1188 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1189 (0, update, required),
1192 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1193 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1194 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1195 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1196 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1197 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1198 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1199 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1200 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1201 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1204 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1205 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1206 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1208 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1210 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1211 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1212 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1213 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1214 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1215 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1216 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1220 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1222 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1223 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1224 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1225 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1226 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1227 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1228 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1233 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1234 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1235 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1236 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1237 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1239 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1240 /// in a timely manner.
1241 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1244 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1245 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1246 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1248 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1249 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1250 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1251 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1255 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1256 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1257 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1259 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1260 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1261 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1262 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1264 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1268 /// The current channel ID.
1269 channel_id: ChannelId,
1270 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1271 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1272 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1273 channel_state: ChannelState,
1275 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1276 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1278 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1279 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1280 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1282 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1283 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1284 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1285 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1287 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1288 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1290 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1292 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1293 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1294 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1296 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1297 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1298 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1300 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1301 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1302 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1303 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1304 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1305 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1307 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1308 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1309 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1310 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1311 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1312 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1314 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1316 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1317 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1318 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1320 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1321 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1322 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1323 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1324 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1325 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1326 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1327 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1329 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1330 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1331 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1333 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1334 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1335 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1336 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1337 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1338 /// outbound or inbound.
1339 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1341 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1343 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1344 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1345 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1346 // HTLCs with similar state.
1347 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1348 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1349 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1350 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1351 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1352 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1353 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1354 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1355 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1356 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1358 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1359 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1360 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1362 update_time_counter: u32,
1364 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1365 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1366 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1367 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1368 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1369 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1371 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1372 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1374 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1375 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1376 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1377 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1379 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1380 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1382 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1384 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1386 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1387 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1388 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1389 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1390 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1392 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1393 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1395 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1396 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1397 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1399 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1400 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1401 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1402 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1403 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1404 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1405 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1406 channel_creation_height: u32,
1408 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1411 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1413 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1416 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1418 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1421 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1423 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1425 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1426 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1429 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1431 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1433 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1434 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1436 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1438 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1439 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1440 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1442 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1444 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1445 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1446 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1448 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1449 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1450 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1452 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1454 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1456 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1457 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1458 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1459 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1461 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1462 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1463 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1465 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1466 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1467 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1469 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1470 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1471 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1472 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1473 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1474 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1475 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1476 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1478 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1479 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1480 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1481 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1482 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1484 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1485 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1487 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1488 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1489 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1490 /// unblock the state machine.
1492 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1493 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1494 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1496 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1497 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1498 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1500 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1501 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1502 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1503 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1504 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1505 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1506 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1507 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1509 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1510 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1512 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1513 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1514 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1516 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1517 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1518 // associated channel mapping.
1520 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1521 // to store all of them.
1522 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1524 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1525 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1526 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1527 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1528 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1530 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1531 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1533 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1534 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1536 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1537 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1539 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1540 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1542 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1544 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1546 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1547 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1548 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1551 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1552 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1553 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1554 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1555 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1556 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1557 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1559 config: &'a UserConfig,
1560 current_chain_height: u32,
1563 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1564 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1565 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1566 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1567 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1569 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1570 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1572 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1573 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1575 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1577 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1578 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1580 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1582 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1583 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1584 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1586 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1587 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1590 // Check sanity of message fields:
1591 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1592 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1593 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1594 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1595 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1597 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1598 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1600 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1601 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1603 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1604 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1607 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1608 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1610 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1611 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1613 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1615 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1616 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1617 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1619 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1620 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1622 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1623 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1626 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1627 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1628 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1630 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1631 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1633 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1634 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1636 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1639 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1640 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1642 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1643 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1645 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1646 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1649 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1651 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1652 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1653 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1657 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1658 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1659 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1660 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1662 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1665 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1666 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1667 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1669 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1670 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1673 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1674 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1675 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1676 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1680 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1681 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1682 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1683 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1686 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1687 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1688 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1689 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1693 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1694 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1695 &Some(ref script) => {
1696 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1697 if script.len() == 0 {
1700 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1701 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1703 Some(script.clone())
1706 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1708 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1713 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1714 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1715 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1716 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1720 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1721 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1722 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1726 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1727 Ok(script) => script,
1728 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1731 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1732 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1734 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1737 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1740 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1742 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1744 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1747 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1748 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1750 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1755 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1757 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1758 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1759 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1760 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1762 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1765 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1767 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1768 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1771 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1772 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1775 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1776 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1777 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1778 pending_update_fee: None,
1779 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1780 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1781 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1782 update_time_counter: 1,
1784 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1786 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1787 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1788 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1789 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1790 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1791 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1792 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1794 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1795 signer_pending_funding: false,
1798 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1799 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1800 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1801 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1803 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1804 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1805 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1806 closing_fee_limits: None,
1807 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1809 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1810 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1811 short_channel_id: None,
1812 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1814 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1815 channel_value_satoshis,
1816 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1817 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1818 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1819 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1820 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1821 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1822 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1823 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1824 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1825 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1828 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1830 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1831 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1832 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1833 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1834 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1835 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1836 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1838 funding_outpoint: None,
1839 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1841 funding_transaction: None,
1842 is_batch_funding: None,
1844 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1845 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1846 counterparty_node_id,
1848 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1850 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1852 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1853 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1855 announcement_sigs: None,
1857 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1858 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1859 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1860 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1862 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1863 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1865 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1866 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1868 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1869 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1871 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1872 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1877 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1879 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1885 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1886 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1887 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1888 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1889 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1890 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1891 funding_satoshis: u64,
1894 config: &'a UserConfig,
1895 current_chain_height: u32,
1896 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1897 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1898 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1899 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1900 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1901 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1902 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1904 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1905 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1906 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1908 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1909 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1911 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1913 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1916 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1919 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1920 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1923 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1924 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1927 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1928 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1930 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1931 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1933 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1935 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1937 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1938 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1939 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1940 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1943 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1944 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1946 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1947 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1948 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1949 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1953 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1954 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1955 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1959 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1960 Ok(script) => script,
1961 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1964 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1969 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1970 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1971 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1972 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1977 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1979 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1980 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1981 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1982 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1984 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1985 channel_value_satoshis,
1987 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1989 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1990 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1993 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1994 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1997 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1998 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1999 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
2000 pending_update_fee: None,
2001 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
2002 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
2003 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
2004 update_time_counter: 1,
2006 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2008 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2009 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2010 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2011 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2012 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2013 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2014 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
2016 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
2017 signer_pending_funding: false,
2019 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
2020 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2021 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2022 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2023 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2024 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2026 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2027 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2028 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
2029 closing_fee_limits: None,
2030 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2032 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2033 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2034 short_channel_id: None,
2035 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2037 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
2038 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
2039 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2040 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
2041 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
2042 // receive `accept_channel2`.
2043 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2044 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2045 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2046 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
2047 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2048 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
2049 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2050 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2052 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2054 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2055 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2056 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2057 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2058 counterparty_parameters: None,
2059 funding_outpoint: None,
2060 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
2062 funding_transaction: None,
2063 is_batch_funding: None,
2065 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
2066 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2067 counterparty_node_id,
2069 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2071 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2073 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2074 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2076 announcement_sigs: None,
2078 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2079 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2080 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2081 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2083 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2084 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2086 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2087 outbound_scid_alias,
2089 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2090 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2092 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2093 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
2098 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2099 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
2103 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2104 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2105 self.update_time_counter
2108 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2109 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2112 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2113 self.config.announced_channel
2116 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2117 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2120 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2121 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2122 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2123 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2126 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2127 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2128 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2131 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2132 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2133 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2134 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2135 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2136 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2137 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2140 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2141 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2142 match self.channel_state {
2143 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2144 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2145 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2146 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2147 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2148 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2149 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2151 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2153 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2154 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2158 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2159 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2160 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2161 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2162 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2163 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2166 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2167 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2168 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2172 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2173 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2174 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2175 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2176 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2179 // Public utilities:
2181 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2185 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2187 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2188 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2189 self.temporary_channel_id
2192 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2196 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2197 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2198 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2202 /// Gets the channel's type
2203 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2207 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2209 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2210 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2211 self.short_channel_id
2214 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2215 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2216 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2219 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2220 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2221 self.outbound_scid_alias
2224 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2226 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2227 return &self.holder_signer
2230 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2231 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2232 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2233 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2234 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2235 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2238 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2239 /// get_funding_created.
2240 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2241 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2244 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2245 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2246 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2247 if conf_height > 0 {
2254 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2255 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2256 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2259 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2260 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2261 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2262 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2266 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2269 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2270 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2273 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2274 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2277 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2278 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2279 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2282 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2283 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2286 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2287 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2288 self.counterparty_node_id
2291 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2292 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2293 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2296 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2297 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2298 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2301 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2302 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2304 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2305 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2306 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2307 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2309 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2313 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2314 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2315 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2318 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2319 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2320 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2323 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2324 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2325 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2327 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2328 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2333 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2334 self.channel_value_satoshis
2337 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2338 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2341 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2342 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2345 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2346 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2347 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2348 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2351 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2352 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2353 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2354 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2356 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2360 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2361 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2362 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2365 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2366 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2367 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2370 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2371 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2372 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2375 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2376 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2377 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2380 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2381 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2382 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2385 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2386 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2387 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2390 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2391 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2392 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2393 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2394 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2397 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2399 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2400 self.prev_config = None;
2404 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2405 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2409 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2410 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2411 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2412 let did_channel_update =
2413 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2414 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2415 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2416 if did_channel_update {
2417 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2418 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2419 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2420 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2422 self.config.options = *config;
2426 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2427 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2428 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2429 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2430 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2433 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2434 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2435 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2436 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2437 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2439 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2440 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2441 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2442 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2443 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2444 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2445 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2447 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2448 where L::Target: Logger
2450 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2451 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2452 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2454 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2455 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2456 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2457 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2459 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2460 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2461 if match update_state {
2462 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2463 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2464 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2465 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2466 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2468 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2472 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2473 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2474 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2476 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2478 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2479 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2480 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2482 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2483 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2484 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2485 transaction_output_index: None
2490 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2491 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2492 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2493 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2494 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2497 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2499 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2500 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2501 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2503 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2504 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2507 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2508 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2511 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2513 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2514 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2515 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2517 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2518 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2524 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2526 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2527 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2528 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2529 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2530 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2531 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2532 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2536 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2537 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2539 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2541 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2542 if generated_by_local {
2543 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2544 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2545 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2555 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2557 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2558 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2559 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2560 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2561 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2562 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2563 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2566 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2567 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2568 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2569 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2573 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2574 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2578 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2579 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2581 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2583 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2584 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2586 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2587 if !generated_by_local {
2588 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2596 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2597 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2598 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2599 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2600 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2601 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2602 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2603 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2605 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2607 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2608 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2609 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2610 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2612 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2614 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2615 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2616 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2617 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2620 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2621 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2622 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2623 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2625 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2628 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2629 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2630 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2631 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2633 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2636 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2637 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2642 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2643 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2648 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2650 let channel_parameters =
2651 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2652 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2653 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2660 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2663 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2664 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2665 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2666 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2674 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2675 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2676 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2677 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2682 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2683 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2684 /// our counterparty!)
2685 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2686 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2687 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2688 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2689 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2690 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2691 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2693 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2697 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2698 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2699 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2700 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2701 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2702 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2703 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2705 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2708 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2709 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2710 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2711 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2712 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2715 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2716 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2719 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2723 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2724 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2725 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2726 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2727 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2728 // which are near the dust limit.
2729 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2730 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2731 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2732 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2733 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2735 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2736 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2738 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2739 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2742 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2743 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2744 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2747 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2748 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2750 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2752 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2753 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2756 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2757 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2760 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2761 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2763 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2764 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2766 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2769 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2770 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2771 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2772 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2773 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2774 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2776 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2778 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2779 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2784 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2785 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2786 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2787 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2789 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2790 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2791 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2792 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2793 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2794 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2796 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2798 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2799 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2803 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2804 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2805 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2806 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2807 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2808 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2809 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2811 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2813 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2814 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2816 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2822 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2823 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2824 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2825 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2826 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2827 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2828 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2829 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2830 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2831 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2832 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2833 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2834 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2835 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2836 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2837 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2838 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2843 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2844 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2845 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2846 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2847 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2848 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2849 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2850 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2854 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2855 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2856 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2857 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2858 match holding_cell_update {
2859 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2860 holding_cell_states.insert(
2862 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2865 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2866 holding_cell_states.insert(
2868 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2871 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2872 holding_cell_states.insert(
2874 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2878 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2881 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2882 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2885 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2886 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2888 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2889 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2890 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2891 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2892 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2893 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2894 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2895 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2896 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2897 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2904 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2905 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2906 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2907 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2910 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2911 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2913 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2914 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2915 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2916 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2917 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2918 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2919 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2920 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2921 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2922 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2925 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2926 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2932 } = *holding_cell_update {
2933 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2935 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2936 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2937 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2938 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2939 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2940 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2947 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2948 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2949 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2950 /// corner case properly.
2951 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2952 -> AvailableBalances
2953 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2955 let context = &self;
2956 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
2959 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
2960 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2962 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2963 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2964 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2965 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2968 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
2970 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2971 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
2973 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2975 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2977 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2978 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2982 if context.is_outbound() {
2983 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2984 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2986 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2987 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2989 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2990 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2991 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2992 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2995 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2996 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2997 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2998 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2999 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3000 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3001 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3004 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
3005 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
3006 // match the value to right-below-dust.
3007 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
3008 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
3009 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
3010 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
3011 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
3012 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
3013 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
3014 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
3016 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
3019 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
3020 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
3021 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3022 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3023 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
3026 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3027 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
3029 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3030 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
3031 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3033 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3034 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
3035 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
3036 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
3040 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
3042 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
3043 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
3044 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
3045 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
3046 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
3047 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
3048 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3050 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3051 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
3053 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3054 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3055 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3058 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3059 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
3060 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
3061 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
3062 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
3063 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
3064 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3065 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
3066 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
3067 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3071 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
3072 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
3073 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
3074 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
3075 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
3076 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3079 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3080 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
3081 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
3082 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
3083 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
3086 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
3087 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
3088 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
3090 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3094 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3095 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3097 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
3098 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3102 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3103 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3104 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3105 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3107 outbound_capacity_msat,
3108 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3109 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3114 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3115 let context = &self;
3116 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3119 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3120 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3122 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3123 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3125 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3126 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3128 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3129 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3130 let context = &self;
3131 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3133 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3136 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3137 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3139 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3140 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3142 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3143 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3145 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3146 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3150 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3151 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3157 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3158 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3159 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3162 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3163 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3164 included_htlcs += 1;
3167 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3168 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3172 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3173 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3174 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3175 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3176 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3177 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3182 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3184 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3185 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3190 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3191 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3195 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3196 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3197 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3200 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3201 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3203 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3204 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3205 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3207 total_pending_htlcs,
3208 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3209 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3210 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3212 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3213 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3214 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3216 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3218 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3223 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3224 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3226 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3227 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3229 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3230 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3232 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3233 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3234 let context = &self;
3235 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3237 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3240 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3241 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3243 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3244 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3246 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3247 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3249 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3250 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3254 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3255 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3261 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3262 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3263 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3264 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3265 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3266 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3269 included_htlcs += 1;
3272 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3273 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3276 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3277 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3279 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3280 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3281 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3286 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3287 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3288 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3291 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3292 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3294 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3295 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3297 total_pending_htlcs,
3298 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3299 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3300 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3302 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3303 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3304 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3306 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3308 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3313 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3314 match self.channel_state {
3315 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3316 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3317 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3318 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3328 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3330 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3331 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3334 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3336 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3337 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3338 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3342 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3343 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3344 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3347 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3349 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3350 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3353 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3354 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3355 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3356 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3357 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3358 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3359 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3360 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3361 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3362 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3363 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3365 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3366 // return them to fail the payment.
3367 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3368 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3369 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3371 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3372 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3377 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3378 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3379 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3380 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3381 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3382 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3383 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3384 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3385 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3386 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3387 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3388 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3389 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3390 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3391 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3395 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3396 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3398 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3399 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3403 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3404 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3405 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3406 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3407 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3408 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3409 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3410 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3414 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3415 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3416 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3417 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3419 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3420 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3421 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3422 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3424 match &self.holder_signer {
3425 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3426 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3427 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3428 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3429 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3432 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3436 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3437 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3438 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3440 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3441 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3442 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3444 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3445 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3446 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3449 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3450 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3452 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3458 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3459 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3460 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3461 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3462 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3465 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3467 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3469 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3470 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3475 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3476 // We've exhausted our options
3479 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3480 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3483 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3484 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3485 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3486 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3488 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3489 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3490 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3491 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3492 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3493 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3495 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3497 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3502 // Internal utility functions for channels
3504 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3505 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3506 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3508 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3510 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3511 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3512 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3514 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3517 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3519 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3522 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3523 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3524 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3526 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3528 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3529 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3530 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3531 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3532 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3535 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3536 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3537 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3538 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3539 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3540 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3541 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3544 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3545 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3547 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3549 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3550 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3551 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3552 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3553 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3554 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3555 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3558 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3559 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3561 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3562 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3565 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3566 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3567 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3568 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3569 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3570 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3573 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3574 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3575 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3576 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3577 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3578 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3584 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3585 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3586 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3587 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3588 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3589 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3590 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3591 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3592 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3593 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3594 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3595 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3598 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3599 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3600 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3601 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3602 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3603 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3606 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3607 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3609 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3610 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3611 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3615 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3616 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3617 trait FailHTLCContents {
3618 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3619 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3620 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3621 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3623 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3624 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3625 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3626 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3628 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3629 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3631 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3632 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3635 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3636 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3637 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3638 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3641 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3642 failure_code: self.1
3645 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3646 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3648 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3649 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3651 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3652 failure_code: self.1
3657 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3658 fn name() -> &'static str;
3660 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3661 fn name() -> &'static str {
3665 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3666 fn name() -> &'static str {
3667 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3671 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3672 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3673 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3675 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3676 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3677 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3678 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3680 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3681 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3683 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3685 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3686 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3687 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3688 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3690 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3691 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3695 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3701 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3702 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3703 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3704 // outside of those situations will fail.
3705 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3709 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3714 1 + // script length (0)
3718 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3719 2 + // witness marker and flag
3720 1 + // witness element count
3721 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3722 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3723 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3724 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3725 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3726 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3728 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3729 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3730 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3736 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3737 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3738 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3739 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3741 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3742 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3743 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3745 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3746 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3747 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3748 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3749 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3750 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3753 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3754 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3757 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3758 value_to_holder = 0;
3761 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3762 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3763 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3764 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3766 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3767 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3770 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3771 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3774 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3777 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3778 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3780 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3782 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3783 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3784 where L::Target: Logger {
3785 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3786 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3787 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3788 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3789 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3790 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3791 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3792 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3796 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3797 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3798 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3799 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3801 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3802 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3805 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3806 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3807 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3809 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3810 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3811 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3812 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3813 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3814 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3815 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3817 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3818 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3819 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3821 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3822 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3824 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3827 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3828 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3832 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3836 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3837 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3838 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3839 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3840 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3841 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3844 // Now update local state:
3846 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3847 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3848 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3849 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3850 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3851 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3852 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3853 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3855 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3858 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3859 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3860 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3861 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3862 // do not not get into this branch.
3863 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3864 match pending_update {
3865 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3866 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3867 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3868 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3869 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3870 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3871 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3874 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3875 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3877 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3878 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3879 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3880 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3881 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3882 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3888 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3889 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3890 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3893 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3894 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3896 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3897 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3900 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3901 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3903 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3904 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3906 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3907 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3910 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3913 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3914 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3915 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3916 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3921 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3922 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3923 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3924 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3925 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3926 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3927 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3928 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3929 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3930 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3931 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3932 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3933 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3934 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3935 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3937 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3938 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3939 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3940 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3941 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3944 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3945 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3946 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3952 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3953 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3955 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3959 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3960 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3961 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3962 /// before we fail backwards.
3964 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3965 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3966 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3967 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3968 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3969 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3970 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3973 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3974 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3976 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3977 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3978 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3979 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3980 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3981 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3984 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3985 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3986 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3987 /// before we fail backwards.
3989 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3990 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3991 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3992 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3993 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3995 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3996 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3997 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
4000 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
4001 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
4002 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
4004 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
4005 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
4006 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
4008 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
4009 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
4010 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4012 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4017 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
4018 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
4024 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
4025 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4026 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
4027 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
4028 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4032 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4033 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
4034 force_holding_cell = true;
4037 // Now update local state:
4038 if force_holding_cell {
4039 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4040 match pending_update {
4041 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
4042 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4043 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4044 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4048 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
4049 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
4051 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4052 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4053 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
4059 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
4060 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
4064 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
4065 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
4067 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
4068 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
4071 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
4074 // Message handlers:
4075 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
4076 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
4077 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
4078 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
4079 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
4080 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
4081 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
4084 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
4086 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
4088 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
4089 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
4090 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
4091 debug_assert!(matches!(
4092 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
4094 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4095 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
4098 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
4099 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4101 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4102 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4103 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4104 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4106 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4109 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4110 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4111 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4114 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4115 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4116 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4117 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4118 // when routing outbound payments.
4119 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4123 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4124 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4125 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4126 match &self.context.channel_state {
4127 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4128 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4129 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4130 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4131 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4132 check_reconnection = true;
4133 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4134 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4135 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4136 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4137 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4139 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4140 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4143 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4144 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4145 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4147 if check_reconnection {
4148 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4149 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4150 let expected_point =
4151 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4152 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4154 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4155 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4156 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4157 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4158 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4159 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4161 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4162 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4163 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4164 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4165 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4167 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4173 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4174 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4176 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4178 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4181 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4182 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4183 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4184 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4185 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4188 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4189 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4190 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4192 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4195 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4198 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4201 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4205 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4206 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4207 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4210 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4214 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4215 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4216 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4217 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4218 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4219 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4220 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4221 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4222 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4223 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4224 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4226 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4227 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4228 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4229 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4230 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4231 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4235 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4236 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4237 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4238 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4239 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4243 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4244 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4246 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4247 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4248 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4250 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4251 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4255 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4258 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4263 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4264 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4268 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4269 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4270 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4271 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4272 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4276 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4279 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4280 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4283 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4284 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4285 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4289 // Now update local state:
4290 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4291 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4292 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4293 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4294 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4295 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4296 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4297 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4303 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4305 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4306 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4307 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4308 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4309 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4310 None => fail_reason.into(),
4311 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4312 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4313 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4316 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4320 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4321 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4322 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4323 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4325 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4331 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4334 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4335 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4338 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4342 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4345 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4346 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4349 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4350 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4353 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4357 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4358 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4361 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4365 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4369 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4370 where L::Target: Logger
4372 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4375 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4378 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4382 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4384 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4386 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4387 let commitment_txid = {
4388 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4389 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4390 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4392 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4393 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4394 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4395 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4396 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4401 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4403 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4404 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4405 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4406 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4409 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4410 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4411 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4415 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4417 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4418 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4419 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4420 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4421 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4422 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4423 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4424 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4425 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4426 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4427 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4433 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4434 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4437 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4438 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4439 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4440 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4441 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4442 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4443 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4444 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4445 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4446 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4447 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4448 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4449 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4452 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4453 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4454 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4455 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4456 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4457 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4458 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4460 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4461 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4462 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4463 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4464 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4465 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4466 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4469 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4470 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4473 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4475 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4476 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4477 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4480 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4483 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4484 commitment_stats.tx,
4486 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4487 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4488 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4491 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4492 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4494 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4495 let mut need_commitment = false;
4496 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4497 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4498 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4499 need_commitment = true;
4503 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4504 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4505 Some(resolution.clone())
4507 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4508 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4509 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4510 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4511 need_commitment = true;
4514 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4515 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4516 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4517 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4518 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4519 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4520 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4521 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4522 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4523 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4524 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4525 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4526 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4527 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4529 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4531 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4532 need_commitment = true;
4536 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4537 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4538 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4539 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4540 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4541 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4542 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4544 nondust_htlc_sources,
4546 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4549 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4550 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4551 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4552 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4553 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4555 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4556 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4557 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4558 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4559 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4560 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4561 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4562 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4563 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4564 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4565 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4566 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4567 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4568 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4570 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4571 &self.context.channel_id);
4572 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4575 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4576 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4577 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4578 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4579 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4580 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4581 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4582 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4583 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4587 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4588 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4589 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4590 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4593 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4594 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4595 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4596 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4597 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4598 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4599 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4601 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4602 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4603 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4606 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4607 /// for our counterparty.
4608 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4609 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4610 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4611 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4613 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4614 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4615 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4616 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4618 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4619 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4620 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4621 updates: Vec::new(),
4622 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4625 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4626 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4627 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4628 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4629 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4630 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4631 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4632 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4633 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4634 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4635 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4636 // to rebalance channels.
4637 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4638 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4639 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4640 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4642 match self.send_htlc(
4643 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4644 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4646 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4649 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4650 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4651 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4652 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4653 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4654 // into the holding cell without ever being
4655 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4656 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4657 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4660 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4667 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4668 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4669 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4670 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4671 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4672 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4673 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4674 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4675 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4676 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4677 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4678 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4681 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4682 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4683 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4685 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4686 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4687 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4690 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4692 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4693 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4694 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4695 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4696 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4697 // for a full revocation before failing.
4698 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4699 update_fail_count += 1;
4701 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4703 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4708 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4709 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4711 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4712 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4717 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4718 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4719 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4720 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4721 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4723 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4724 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4725 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4727 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4728 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4734 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4735 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4736 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4737 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4738 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4739 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4740 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4741 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4742 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4744 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4747 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4750 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4754 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4756 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4757 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4758 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4762 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4763 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4764 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4765 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4766 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4767 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4768 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4769 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4770 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4773 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4775 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4776 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4779 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4780 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4781 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4782 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4784 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4786 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4791 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4792 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4793 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4794 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4795 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4796 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4797 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4798 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4799 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4801 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4804 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4805 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4806 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4807 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4808 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4809 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4810 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4811 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4812 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4814 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4815 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4818 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4819 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4820 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4821 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4822 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4823 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4824 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4825 let mut require_commitment = false;
4826 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4829 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4830 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4831 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4832 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4834 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4835 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4836 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4837 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4838 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4839 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4841 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4845 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4846 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4847 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4848 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4849 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4851 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4852 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4853 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4858 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4859 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4861 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4865 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4866 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4868 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4869 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4870 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4871 require_commitment = true;
4872 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4874 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4875 match pending_htlc_status {
4876 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4877 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4878 require_commitment = true;
4880 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4881 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4882 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4884 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4885 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4886 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4890 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4891 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4892 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4893 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4896 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4897 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4898 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4899 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4905 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4906 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4907 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4908 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4909 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4911 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4912 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4913 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4914 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4915 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4916 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4917 require_commitment = true;
4921 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4923 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4924 match update_state {
4925 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4926 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4927 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4928 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4929 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4930 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4932 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4933 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4934 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4935 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4936 require_commitment = true;
4937 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4938 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4943 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4944 let release_state_str =
4945 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4946 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4947 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4948 if !release_monitor {
4949 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4950 update: monitor_update,
4952 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4954 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4959 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4961 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4962 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4963 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4964 if require_commitment {
4965 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4966 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4967 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4968 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4970 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4971 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4972 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4973 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4974 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4976 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4977 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4978 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4979 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4980 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4983 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4984 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4985 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4986 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4987 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4988 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4990 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4991 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4993 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4994 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4996 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4997 if require_commitment {
4998 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5000 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
5001 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5002 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5003 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5005 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
5006 &self.context.channel_id(),
5007 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
5010 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5011 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5013 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
5014 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5016 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5017 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5023 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5024 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5025 /// commitment update.
5026 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
5027 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5028 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5030 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
5031 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
5034 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
5035 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
5036 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
5037 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
5039 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
5040 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5041 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5042 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5043 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5044 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
5045 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5047 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5048 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
5050 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5051 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
5053 if !self.context.is_live() {
5054 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
5057 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
5058 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5059 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5060 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5061 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5062 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
5063 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
5064 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
5065 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
5066 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
5070 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
5071 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5072 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5073 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5076 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5077 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5081 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5082 force_holding_cell = true;
5085 if force_holding_cell {
5086 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
5090 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
5091 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
5093 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5094 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5099 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5100 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5102 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5104 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5105 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5106 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5107 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5111 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5112 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5113 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5117 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5118 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5121 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5122 // will be retransmitted.
5123 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5124 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5125 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5127 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5128 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5130 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5131 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5132 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5133 // this HTLC accordingly
5134 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5137 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5138 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5139 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5140 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5143 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5144 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5145 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5146 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5147 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5148 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5153 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5155 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5156 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5157 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5158 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5162 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5163 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5164 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5165 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5166 // the update upon reconnection.
5167 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5171 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5173 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5174 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5178 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5179 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5180 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5181 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5182 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5183 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5184 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5186 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5187 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5188 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5189 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5190 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5191 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5192 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5194 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5195 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5196 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5197 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5198 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5199 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5200 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5203 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5204 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5205 /// to the remote side.
5206 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5207 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5208 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5209 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5212 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5214 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5215 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5217 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5218 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5219 // first received the funding_signed.
5220 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5221 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5222 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5223 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5225 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5227 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5228 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5229 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5230 funding_broadcastable = None;
5233 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5234 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5235 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5236 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5237 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5238 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5239 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5240 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5241 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5242 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5243 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5244 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5245 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5246 next_per_commitment_point,
5247 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5251 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5253 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5254 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5255 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5256 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5257 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5258 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5259 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5260 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5262 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5263 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5264 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5265 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5266 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5267 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5268 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5272 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5273 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5275 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5276 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5278 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5279 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5282 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5283 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5284 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5285 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5286 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5287 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5288 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5289 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5290 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5291 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5295 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5296 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5298 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5301 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5304 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5306 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5307 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5308 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5309 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5310 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5311 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5312 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5314 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5316 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5317 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5318 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5323 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5325 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5326 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5327 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5328 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5330 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5331 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5333 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5334 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5337 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5338 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5339 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5340 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5342 SignerResumeUpdates {
5349 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5350 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5351 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5352 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5353 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5354 per_commitment_secret,
5355 next_per_commitment_point,
5357 next_local_nonce: None,
5361 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5362 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5363 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5364 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5365 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5366 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5368 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5369 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5370 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5371 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5372 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5373 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5374 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5375 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5376 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5377 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5378 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5383 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5384 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5386 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5387 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5388 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5389 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5390 reason: err_packet.clone()
5393 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5394 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5395 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5396 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5397 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5398 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5401 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5402 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5403 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5404 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5405 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5412 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5413 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5414 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5415 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5419 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5420 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5421 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5422 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5423 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5424 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5425 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5429 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5430 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5432 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5433 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5434 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5435 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5440 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5441 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5446 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5447 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5448 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5449 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5450 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5451 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5452 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5457 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5458 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5460 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5461 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5462 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5463 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5464 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5465 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5466 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5467 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5470 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5472 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5473 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5474 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5475 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5476 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5479 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5480 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5481 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5484 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5485 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5486 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5487 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5488 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5489 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5490 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5492 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5493 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5494 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5495 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5496 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5499 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5500 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5501 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5502 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5503 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5504 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5505 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5506 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5510 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5511 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5512 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5513 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5514 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5515 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5516 our_commitment_transaction
5520 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5521 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5522 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5523 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5525 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5527 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5529 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5530 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5531 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5532 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5533 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5536 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5537 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5538 channel_ready: None,
5539 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5540 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5541 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5545 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5546 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5547 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5548 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5549 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5550 next_per_commitment_point,
5551 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5553 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5554 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5555 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5559 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5560 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5561 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5563 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5564 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5565 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5568 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5571 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5572 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5573 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5574 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5575 our_commitment_transaction
5579 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5580 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5581 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5582 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5583 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5584 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5585 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5587 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5589 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5590 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5591 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5592 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5593 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5594 next_per_commitment_point,
5595 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5599 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5600 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5601 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5603 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5606 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5607 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5608 raa: required_revoke,
5609 commitment_update: None,
5610 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5612 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5613 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5614 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5616 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5619 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5620 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5621 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5622 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5623 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5624 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5627 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5628 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5629 raa: required_revoke,
5630 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5631 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5634 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5635 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5636 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5637 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5638 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5641 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5642 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5643 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5644 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5649 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5650 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5651 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5652 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5654 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5656 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5658 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5659 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5660 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5661 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5662 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5663 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5664 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5665 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5667 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5668 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5669 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5670 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5671 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5673 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5674 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5675 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5676 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5679 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5680 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5681 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5682 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5683 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5684 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5685 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5686 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5687 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5688 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5689 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5690 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5691 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5692 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5693 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5695 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5698 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5699 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5702 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5703 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5704 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5705 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5706 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5707 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5710 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5711 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5712 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5713 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5714 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5715 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5718 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5724 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5725 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5726 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5727 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5729 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5730 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5731 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5732 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5733 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5734 return Ok((None, None, None));
5737 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5738 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5739 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5741 return Ok((None, None, None));
5744 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5745 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5746 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5747 return Ok((None, None, None));
5750 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5752 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5753 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5754 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5755 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5757 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5758 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5760 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5761 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5763 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5764 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5765 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5766 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5768 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5769 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5770 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5774 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5780 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5781 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5783 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5784 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5787 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5788 /// within our expected timeframe.
5790 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5791 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5792 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5795 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5798 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5799 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5803 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5804 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5806 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5807 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5809 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5810 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5811 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5812 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5813 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5815 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5816 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5817 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5820 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5822 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5823 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5826 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5827 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5828 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5831 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5834 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5835 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5836 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5837 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5839 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5842 assert!(send_shutdown);
5843 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5844 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5845 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5847 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5850 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5855 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5857 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5858 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5860 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5861 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5862 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5863 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5864 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5865 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5866 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5868 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5870 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5871 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5873 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5874 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5875 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5876 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5880 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5881 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5882 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5883 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5884 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5885 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5887 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5888 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5895 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5896 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5898 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5901 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5902 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5904 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5906 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5907 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5908 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5909 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5910 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5911 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5912 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5913 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5914 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5916 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5917 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5920 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5924 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5925 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5926 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5927 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5929 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5932 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5935 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5938 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5942 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5946 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5947 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5948 return Ok((None, None, None));
5951 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5952 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5953 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5956 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5958 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5961 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5962 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5963 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5964 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5965 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5969 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5970 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5975 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5976 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5978 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5981 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5982 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5983 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5984 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5986 monitor_update: None,
5987 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5988 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5989 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5990 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5991 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5992 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5993 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5994 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5996 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5997 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5998 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5999 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
6003 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
6005 macro_rules! propose_fee {
6006 ($new_fee: expr) => {
6007 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6008 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
6010 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
6013 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
6014 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6016 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6017 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
6018 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6019 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6021 monitor_update: None,
6022 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6023 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6024 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6025 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6026 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6027 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6028 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6029 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6031 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6032 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6033 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6034 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
6039 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
6040 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
6041 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6042 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
6044 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
6045 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
6046 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
6048 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
6050 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6057 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
6058 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
6059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
6061 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6062 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6064 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6065 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6068 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6069 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
6070 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
6071 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
6072 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
6074 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
6076 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
6078 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
6079 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6082 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
6083 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
6084 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6085 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6086 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6087 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6088 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6089 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6094 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6095 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6096 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6097 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6103 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6104 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6105 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6106 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6108 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6114 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6115 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6116 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6117 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6118 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6119 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6120 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6122 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6123 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6126 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6128 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6129 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6135 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6136 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6137 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6138 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6139 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6140 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6141 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6143 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6144 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6151 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6152 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6153 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6155 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6158 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6159 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6162 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
6163 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6164 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6165 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6168 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6169 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6170 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6172 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6173 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6174 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6175 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6176 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6177 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6178 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6181 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6182 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6183 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6184 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6185 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6186 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6187 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6188 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6192 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6193 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6194 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6195 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6196 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6197 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6198 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6202 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6203 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6208 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6209 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6210 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6211 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6212 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6213 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6217 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6218 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6219 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6220 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6222 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6223 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6224 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6225 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6226 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6227 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6228 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6229 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6230 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6232 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6233 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6234 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6241 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6242 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6245 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6246 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6249 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6250 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6254 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6255 &self.context.holder_signer
6259 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6261 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6262 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6263 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6264 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6265 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6266 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6268 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6270 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6278 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6279 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6283 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6284 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6285 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6286 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6289 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6290 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6291 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6292 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6295 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6296 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6297 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6298 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6299 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6300 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6303 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6304 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6305 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6306 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6307 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6308 if !release_monitor {
6309 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6318 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6319 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6320 /// here after logging them.
6321 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6322 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6323 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6324 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6327 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6328 update.update.update_id,
6338 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6339 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6342 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6343 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6344 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6346 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6347 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6349 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6350 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6352 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6353 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6354 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6357 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6358 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6359 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6360 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6361 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6362 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6364 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6365 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6366 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6368 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6369 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6370 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6371 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6372 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6373 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6379 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6380 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6381 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6382 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6385 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6386 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6387 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6390 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6391 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6392 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6395 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6396 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6397 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6400 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6401 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6402 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6403 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6404 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6407 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6408 self.context.channel_update_status
6411 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6412 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6413 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6416 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6418 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6419 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6420 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6424 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6425 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6426 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6429 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6433 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6434 // channel_ready yet.
6435 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6439 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6440 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6441 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6442 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6444 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6445 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6446 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6448 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6449 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6452 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6453 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6455 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6456 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6457 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6458 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6459 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6460 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6461 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6462 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6464 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6468 if need_commitment_update {
6469 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6470 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6471 let next_per_commitment_point =
6472 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6473 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6474 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6475 next_per_commitment_point,
6476 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6480 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6486 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6487 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6488 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6489 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6490 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6491 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6492 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6494 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6497 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6498 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6499 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6500 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6501 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6502 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6503 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6504 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6505 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6506 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6507 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6508 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6509 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6510 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6511 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6512 // channel and move on.
6513 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6514 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6516 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6517 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6518 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6520 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6521 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6522 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6523 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6524 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6525 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6526 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6527 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6532 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6533 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6534 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6535 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6536 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6539 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6540 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6541 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6542 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6543 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6544 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6547 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6548 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6549 // may have already happened for this block).
6550 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6551 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6552 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6553 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6556 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6557 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6558 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6559 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6567 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6568 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6569 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6570 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6572 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6573 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6576 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6578 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6579 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6580 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6581 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6583 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6586 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6589 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6590 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6591 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6592 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6594 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6597 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6598 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6599 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6601 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6602 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6604 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6605 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6606 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6614 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6616 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6617 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6618 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6620 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6621 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6624 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6625 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6626 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6627 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6628 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6629 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6630 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6631 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6634 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6635 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6636 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6637 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6639 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6640 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6641 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6643 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6644 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6645 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6646 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6648 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6649 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6650 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6651 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6652 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6653 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6654 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6657 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6658 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6660 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6663 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6664 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6665 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6666 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6667 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6668 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6669 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6670 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6671 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6672 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6673 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6674 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6675 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6676 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6677 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6678 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6679 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6685 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6690 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6691 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6693 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6694 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6695 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6696 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6698 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6701 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6703 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6704 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6705 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6706 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6707 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6708 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6710 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6711 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6714 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6715 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6716 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6717 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6718 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6719 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6721 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6722 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6725 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6726 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6727 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6728 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6729 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6735 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6736 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6737 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6738 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6740 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6743 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6747 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6751 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6752 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6756 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6760 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6761 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6764 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6768 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6770 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6775 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6776 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6777 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6779 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6784 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6786 None => return None,
6789 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6791 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6792 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6794 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6795 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6798 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6804 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6806 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6807 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6808 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6809 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6810 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6811 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6812 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6814 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6815 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6816 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6817 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6818 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6819 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6820 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6821 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6822 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6823 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6824 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6825 contents: announcement,
6828 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6833 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6837 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6838 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6839 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6840 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6841 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6842 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6843 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6844 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6846 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6848 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6849 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6850 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6851 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6853 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6855 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6856 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6859 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6860 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6861 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6862 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6865 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6868 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6869 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6870 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6871 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6872 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6873 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6876 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6878 Err(_) => return None,
6880 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6881 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6886 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6887 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6888 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6889 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6890 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6891 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6892 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6893 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6894 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6895 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6896 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6897 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6898 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6899 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6900 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6901 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6904 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6907 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6908 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6909 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6910 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6911 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6912 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6913 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6914 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6915 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6917 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6918 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6919 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6920 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6921 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6922 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6923 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6924 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6925 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6927 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6928 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6929 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6930 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6931 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6932 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6933 next_funding_txid: None,
6938 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6940 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6941 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6942 /// commitment update.
6944 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6945 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6946 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6947 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6948 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6949 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6950 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6953 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6954 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6955 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6957 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6958 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6963 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6964 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6966 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6968 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6969 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6971 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6972 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6973 /// regenerate them.
6975 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6976 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6978 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6979 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6980 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6981 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6982 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6983 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6984 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6985 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6987 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6988 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6989 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6991 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6993 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6994 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6995 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6998 if amount_msat == 0 {
6999 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
7002 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
7003 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
7004 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
7005 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7008 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
7009 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
7010 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
7013 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
7014 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
7015 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
7016 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
7017 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
7018 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
7019 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
7020 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
7023 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
7024 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
7025 payment_hash, amount_msat,
7026 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
7027 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
7028 else { "to peer" });
7030 if need_holding_cell {
7031 force_holding_cell = true;
7034 // Now update local state:
7035 if force_holding_cell {
7036 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7041 onion_routing_packet,
7048 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7049 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7051 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
7053 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
7059 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
7060 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7061 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7065 onion_routing_packet,
7069 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
7074 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
7075 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
7076 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
7077 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
7079 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7080 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
7081 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
7083 if let Some(state) = new_state {
7084 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7088 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7089 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
7090 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7091 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
7092 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
7093 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
7094 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
7097 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7098 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
7099 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
7100 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
7101 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
7102 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
7105 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7107 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7108 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7109 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7110 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7111 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7113 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7114 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7117 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7118 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7119 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7120 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7121 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7122 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7123 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7124 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7125 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7126 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7127 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7128 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7130 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7132 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7136 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7137 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7138 where L::Target: Logger
7140 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7141 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7142 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7144 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7146 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7147 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7148 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7149 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7150 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7151 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7152 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7153 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7154 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7155 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7156 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7162 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7165 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7166 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7167 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7168 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7169 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7170 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7172 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7173 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7174 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7176 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7177 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7178 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7181 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7182 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7186 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7187 &commitment_stats.tx,
7188 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7189 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7190 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7191 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7193 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7195 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7196 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7197 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7198 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7200 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7201 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7202 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7203 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7204 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7205 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7209 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7210 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7214 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7215 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7217 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7223 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7224 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7226 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7227 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7228 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7229 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7230 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7231 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7232 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7233 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7235 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7236 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7237 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7240 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7241 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7242 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7248 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7250 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7251 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7252 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7253 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7254 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7256 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7258 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7264 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7265 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7266 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7267 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7268 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7270 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7271 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7272 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7275 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7276 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7278 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7279 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7281 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7282 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7284 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7285 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7286 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7289 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7292 // use override shutdown script if provided
7293 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7294 Some(script) => script,
7296 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7297 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7298 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7299 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7303 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7304 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7306 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7311 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7312 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7313 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7314 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7315 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7317 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7318 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7319 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7320 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7321 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7322 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7323 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7325 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7327 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7328 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7330 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7331 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7332 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7335 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7336 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7337 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7338 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7339 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7341 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7342 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7349 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7350 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7352 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7355 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7356 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7357 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7359 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7360 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7364 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7368 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7369 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7370 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7371 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7374 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7375 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7376 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7377 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7378 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7379 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7380 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7381 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7383 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7384 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7385 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7386 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7387 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7388 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7391 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7392 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7393 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7396 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7400 counterparty_node_id,
7402 channel_value_satoshis,
7406 current_chain_height,
7407 outbound_scid_alias,
7408 temporary_channel_id,
7409 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7414 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7419 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7420 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7421 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7422 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7423 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7424 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7425 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7426 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7427 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7429 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7434 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7435 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7436 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7439 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7440 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7441 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7442 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7445 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7447 next_local_nonce: None,
7451 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7452 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7453 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7454 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7455 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7456 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7457 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7458 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7459 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7460 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7461 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7464 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7465 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7467 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7469 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7470 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7471 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7472 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7475 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7476 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7478 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7480 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7481 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7483 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7484 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7485 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7486 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7487 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7488 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7491 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7492 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7494 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7495 if funding_created.is_none() {
7496 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7497 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7499 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7500 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7501 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7502 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7510 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7511 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7512 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7513 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7514 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7515 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7517 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7519 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7520 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7523 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7524 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7525 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7526 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7529 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7530 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7531 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7533 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7534 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7537 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7538 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7541 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7542 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7545 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7547 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7548 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7549 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7550 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7551 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7552 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7553 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7554 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7555 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7556 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7557 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7558 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7559 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7560 first_per_commitment_point,
7561 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7562 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7563 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7564 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7566 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7568 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7569 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7574 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7575 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7577 // Check sanity of message fields:
7578 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7581 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7582 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7584 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7585 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7587 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7588 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7590 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7591 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7593 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7594 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7595 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7597 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7598 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7599 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7601 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7602 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7603 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7605 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7606 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7608 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7609 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7612 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7613 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7614 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7616 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7617 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7619 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7622 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7623 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7625 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7626 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7628 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7629 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7631 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7632 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7635 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7636 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7639 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7640 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7642 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7643 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7646 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7647 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7650 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7651 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7652 &Some(ref script) => {
7653 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7654 if script.len() == 0 {
7657 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7658 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7660 Some(script.clone())
7663 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7670 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7671 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7672 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7673 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7674 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7676 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7677 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7679 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7682 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7683 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7684 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7685 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7686 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7687 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7690 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7691 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7692 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7695 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7696 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7698 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7699 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7701 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7706 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7707 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7708 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7709 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7710 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7714 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7715 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7717 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7718 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7720 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7721 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7722 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7723 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7726 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7728 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7729 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7730 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7731 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7733 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7734 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7736 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7737 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7739 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7740 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7741 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7742 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7743 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7744 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7748 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7749 initial_commitment_tx,
7752 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7753 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7757 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7758 if validated.is_err() {
7759 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7762 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7763 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7764 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7765 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7766 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7767 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7768 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7769 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7770 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7771 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7772 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7773 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7775 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7776 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7777 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7778 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7779 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7780 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7781 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7782 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7784 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7785 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7786 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7788 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7790 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7791 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7793 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7795 let mut channel = Channel {
7796 context: self.context,
7797 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7798 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7801 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7802 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7803 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7806 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7808 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7809 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7810 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7811 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7812 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7817 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7818 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7819 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7820 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7823 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7824 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7825 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7826 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7827 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7828 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7829 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7830 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7834 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7835 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7836 // `static_remote_key`.
7837 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7840 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7841 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7844 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7845 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7848 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7850 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7851 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7858 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7859 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7860 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7861 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7862 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7863 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7864 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7865 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7866 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7867 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7868 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7871 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7873 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7874 // support this channel type.
7875 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7877 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7878 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7879 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7880 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7881 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7882 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7883 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7887 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7891 counterparty_node_id,
7895 current_chain_height,
7900 counterparty_pubkeys,
7902 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7903 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7905 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7907 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7912 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7913 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7915 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7916 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7917 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7918 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7921 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7922 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7924 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7926 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7927 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7930 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7933 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7934 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7935 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7937 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7938 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7939 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7940 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7942 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7943 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7944 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7945 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7946 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7947 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7948 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7949 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7950 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7951 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7952 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7953 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7954 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7955 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7956 first_per_commitment_point,
7957 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7958 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7959 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7961 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7963 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7965 next_local_nonce: None,
7969 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7970 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7972 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7974 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7975 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7978 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7979 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7981 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7982 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7983 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7984 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7985 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7986 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7987 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7988 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7989 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7990 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7991 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7993 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7996 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7997 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7998 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
8002 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8003 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
8006 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8007 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8009 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
8010 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
8012 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
8014 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
8015 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
8016 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8017 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
8020 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
8021 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
8022 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
8023 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
8024 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8026 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
8028 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
8029 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
8030 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
8033 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
8034 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
8035 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
8039 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8040 initial_commitment_tx,
8043 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8044 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8047 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
8048 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
8051 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
8053 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
8054 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
8055 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
8056 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
8058 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
8060 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8061 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
8062 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
8063 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
8064 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
8065 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8066 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
8067 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8068 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
8069 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
8070 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8072 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
8073 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
8074 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
8075 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
8076 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8077 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
8078 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
8080 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
8081 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
8083 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
8084 // `ChannelMonitor`.
8085 let mut channel = Channel {
8086 context: self.context,
8087 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8088 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8090 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
8091 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
8093 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
8097 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8098 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8099 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8100 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8101 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8102 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8103 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8106 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8107 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8108 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8109 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8110 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8111 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8112 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8113 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8114 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8115 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8117 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8118 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8119 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8121 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8123 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8124 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8126 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8127 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8130 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8134 counterparty_node_id,
8140 current_chain_height,
8141 outbound_scid_alias,
8142 temporary_channel_id,
8143 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8148 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8149 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8150 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8151 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8152 funding_tx_locktime,
8153 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8159 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8160 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8161 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8162 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8163 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8164 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8166 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8168 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8169 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8172 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8173 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8174 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8177 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8178 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8181 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8182 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8183 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8184 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8185 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8186 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8187 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8189 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8190 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8192 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8193 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8194 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8195 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8196 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8197 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8198 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8199 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8200 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8201 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8202 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8203 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8204 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8205 first_per_commitment_point,
8206 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8207 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8208 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8209 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8211 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8213 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8214 second_per_commitment_point,
8215 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8216 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8221 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8222 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8223 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8224 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8225 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8226 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8229 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8230 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8231 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8232 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8233 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8234 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8235 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8236 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8237 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8238 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8239 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8240 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8243 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8244 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8245 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8246 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8247 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8249 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8250 // support this channel type.
8251 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8253 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8255 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8257 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8258 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8259 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8260 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8261 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8262 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8265 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8269 counterparty_node_id,
8273 current_chain_height,
8279 counterparty_pubkeys,
8281 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8282 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8283 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8284 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8286 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8287 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8288 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8289 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8293 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8294 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8295 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8296 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8297 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8298 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8305 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8306 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8308 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8309 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8310 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8311 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8314 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8315 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8317 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8319 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8320 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8323 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8326 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8327 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8328 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8330 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8331 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8332 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8333 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8334 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8335 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8336 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8338 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8339 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8340 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8341 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8342 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8343 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8344 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8345 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8346 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8347 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8348 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8349 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8350 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8351 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8352 first_per_commitment_point,
8353 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8354 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8355 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8357 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8359 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8360 second_per_commitment_point,
8361 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8365 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8366 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8368 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8370 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8371 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8375 // Unfunded channel utilities
8377 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8378 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8379 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8380 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8381 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8382 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8383 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8384 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8385 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8386 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8389 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8390 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8391 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8392 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8393 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8394 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8400 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8401 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8403 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8409 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8410 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8411 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8412 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8413 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8415 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8416 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8417 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8418 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8424 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8425 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8426 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8427 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8428 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8429 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8434 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8435 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8436 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8437 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8439 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8440 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8441 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8442 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8447 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8448 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8449 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8450 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8451 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8452 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8457 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8458 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8459 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8462 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8463 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8464 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8465 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8469 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8471 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8473 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8475 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8476 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8477 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8478 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8479 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8481 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8482 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8483 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8484 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8486 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8488 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8489 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8490 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8492 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8494 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8496 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8498 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8500 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8501 // deserialized from that format.
8502 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8503 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8504 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8506 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8508 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8509 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8510 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8512 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8513 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8514 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8515 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8518 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8519 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8520 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8523 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8524 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8525 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8526 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8528 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8529 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8531 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8532 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8533 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8538 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8541 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8543 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8544 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8545 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8550 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8553 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8556 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8558 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8563 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8564 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8565 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8567 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8568 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8569 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8570 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8571 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8572 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8573 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8575 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8577 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8579 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8582 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8583 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8584 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8587 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8589 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8590 preimages.push(preimage);
8592 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8593 reason.write(writer)?;
8595 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8597 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8598 preimages.push(preimage);
8600 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8601 reason.write(writer)?;
8604 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8605 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8608 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8609 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8610 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8611 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8612 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8613 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8615 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8616 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8617 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8620 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8621 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8622 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8623 source.write(writer)?;
8624 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8626 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8627 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8629 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8631 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8632 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8634 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8636 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8637 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8639 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8640 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8642 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8643 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8644 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8646 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8648 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8649 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8654 match self.context.resend_order {
8655 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8656 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8659 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8660 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8661 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8663 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8664 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8665 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8666 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8669 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8670 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8671 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8672 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8673 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8676 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8677 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8678 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8679 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8681 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8682 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8683 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8685 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8687 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8688 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8689 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8690 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8692 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8693 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8694 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8695 // consider the stale state on reload.
8698 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8699 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8700 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8702 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8703 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8704 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8706 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8707 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8709 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8710 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8711 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8713 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8714 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8716 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8719 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8720 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8721 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8723 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8726 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8727 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8729 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8730 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8731 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8733 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8735 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8737 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8739 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8740 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8742 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8743 htlc.write(writer)?;
8746 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8747 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8748 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8750 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8751 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8753 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8754 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8755 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8756 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8757 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8758 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8759 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8761 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8762 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8763 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8764 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8765 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8767 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8768 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8770 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8771 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8772 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8773 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8775 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8777 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8778 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8779 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8782 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8783 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8784 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8785 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8786 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8787 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8788 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8790 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8791 (2, chan_type, option),
8792 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8793 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8794 (5, self.context.config, required),
8795 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8796 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8797 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8798 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8799 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8800 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8801 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8802 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8803 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8804 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8805 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8806 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8807 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8808 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8809 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8810 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8811 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8812 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8813 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8814 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8815 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8816 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8817 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8818 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8819 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8826 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8827 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8829 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8830 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8832 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8833 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8834 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8836 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8837 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8838 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8839 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8841 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8843 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8844 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8845 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8846 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8847 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8849 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8850 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8853 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8854 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8855 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8857 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8859 let mut keys_data = None;
8861 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8862 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8863 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8864 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8865 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8866 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8867 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8868 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8869 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8870 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8874 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8875 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8876 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8879 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8881 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8882 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8883 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8885 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8887 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8888 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8889 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8890 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8891 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8892 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8893 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8894 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8896 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8897 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8899 Readable::read(reader)?
8901 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8904 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8905 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8907 Readable::read(reader)?
8909 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8911 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8912 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8913 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8918 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8919 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8920 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8921 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8922 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8923 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8924 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8925 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8926 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8927 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8928 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8929 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8931 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8932 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8935 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8936 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8939 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8940 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8942 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8944 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8945 blinding_point: None,
8949 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8950 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8951 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8952 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8953 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8954 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8955 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8956 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8957 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8958 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8959 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8960 blinding_point: None,
8962 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8963 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8964 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8966 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8967 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8968 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8970 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8974 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8975 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8976 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8977 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8980 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8981 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8982 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8984 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8985 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8986 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8987 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8990 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8991 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8992 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8993 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8996 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8998 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
9000 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9001 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9002 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
9003 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
9005 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
9006 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
9007 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
9008 // consider the stale state on reload.
9009 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9012 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9013 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9014 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
9016 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9019 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
9020 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
9021 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9023 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
9024 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
9025 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9026 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
9028 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
9029 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
9031 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
9032 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9034 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9035 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9036 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
9038 let mut minimum_depth = None;
9040 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
9041 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
9043 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
9044 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9047 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9049 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
9050 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9051 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
9052 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
9054 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9057 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
9058 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9060 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9062 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9063 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9065 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9066 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
9068 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
9070 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9071 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
9072 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9074 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9075 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
9076 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
9080 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
9081 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
9082 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
9084 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
9090 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
9091 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
9092 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
9093 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
9094 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
9095 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
9096 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
9097 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
9098 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9099 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9101 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9102 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9103 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9104 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9105 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9106 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9107 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9109 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9110 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9111 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9112 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9114 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9116 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9117 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9119 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9121 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9123 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9124 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9126 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9127 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9129 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9130 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9131 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9132 (2, channel_type, option),
9133 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9134 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9135 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9136 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9137 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9138 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9139 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9140 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9141 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9142 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9143 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9144 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9145 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9146 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9147 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9148 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9149 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9150 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9151 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9152 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9153 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9154 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9155 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9156 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9157 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9158 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9159 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
9160 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9163 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9164 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9165 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9166 // required channel parameters.
9167 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9168 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9170 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9172 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9173 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9174 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9175 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9178 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9179 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9180 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9182 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9183 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9185 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9186 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9191 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9192 if iter.next().is_some() {
9193 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9197 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9198 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9199 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9200 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9201 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9204 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9205 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9206 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9208 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9209 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9211 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9212 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9213 // separate u64 values.
9214 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9216 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9218 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9219 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9220 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9221 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9223 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9224 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9226 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9227 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9228 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9229 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9230 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9233 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9234 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9236 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9237 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9238 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9239 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9241 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9242 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9244 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9245 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9246 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9247 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9248 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9251 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9252 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9255 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9256 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9257 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9258 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9259 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9260 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9263 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9264 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9265 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9267 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9272 context: ChannelContext {
9275 config: config.unwrap(),
9279 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9280 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9281 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9284 temporary_channel_id,
9286 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9288 channel_value_satoshis,
9290 latest_monitor_update_id,
9292 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9293 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9296 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9297 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9300 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9301 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9302 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9303 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9307 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9308 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9309 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9310 monitor_pending_forwards,
9311 monitor_pending_failures,
9312 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9313 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9315 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9316 signer_pending_funding: false,
9319 holding_cell_update_fee,
9320 next_holder_htlc_id,
9321 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9322 update_time_counter,
9325 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9326 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9327 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9328 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9330 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9331 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9332 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9333 closing_fee_limits: None,
9334 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9336 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9337 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9339 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9341 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9342 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9343 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9344 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9345 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9346 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9347 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9348 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9349 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9352 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9354 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9355 funding_transaction,
9358 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9359 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9360 counterparty_node_id,
9362 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9366 channel_update_status,
9367 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9371 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9372 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9373 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9374 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9376 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9377 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9379 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9380 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9381 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9383 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9384 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9386 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9387 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9389 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9392 local_initiated_shutdown,
9394 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9396 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9397 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9405 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9406 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9407 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
9408 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9409 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
9410 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9411 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9412 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9413 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9414 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9415 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9416 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9417 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9418 use crate::ln::msgs;
9419 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9420 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9421 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9422 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9423 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9424 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9425 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9426 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9427 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9428 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9429 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9430 use crate::util::test_utils;
9431 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9432 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9433 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9434 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9435 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9436 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9437 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9438 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
9439 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9440 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
9441 use crate::prelude::*;
9444 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9445 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9446 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9447 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9449 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9450 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9451 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9452 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9455 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9458 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9459 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9465 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9466 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9467 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9468 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9472 signer: InMemorySigner,
9475 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9476 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9479 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9480 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9482 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9484 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9485 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9488 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9492 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9494 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9496 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9497 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9498 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9501 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9502 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9503 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9504 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9508 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9509 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9510 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9514 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9515 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9516 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9517 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9520 let seed = [42; 32];
9521 let network = Network::Testnet;
9522 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9523 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9524 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9527 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9528 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9529 let config = UserConfig::default();
9530 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9531 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9532 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9534 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9535 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9539 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9540 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9542 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9543 let original_fee = 253;
9544 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9545 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9546 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9547 let seed = [42; 32];
9548 let network = Network::Testnet;
9549 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9551 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9552 let config = UserConfig::default();
9553 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9555 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9556 // same as the old fee.
9557 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9558 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9559 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9563 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9564 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9565 // dust limits are used.
9566 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9567 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9568 let seed = [42; 32];
9569 let network = Network::Testnet;
9570 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9571 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9572 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9574 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9575 // they have different dust limits.
9577 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9578 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9579 let config = UserConfig::default();
9580 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9582 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9583 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9584 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9585 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9586 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9588 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9589 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9590 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9591 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9592 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9594 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9595 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9596 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9597 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9599 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9600 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9601 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9603 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9604 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9605 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9607 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9608 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9609 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9611 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9612 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9613 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9614 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9617 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9619 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9620 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9621 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9622 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9623 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9624 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9625 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9626 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9627 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9629 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9630 blinding_point: None,
9633 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9634 // the dust limit check.
9635 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9636 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9637 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9638 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9640 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9641 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9642 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9643 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9644 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9645 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9646 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9650 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9651 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9652 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9653 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9654 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9655 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9656 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9657 let seed = [42; 32];
9658 let network = Network::Testnet;
9659 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9661 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9662 let config = UserConfig::default();
9663 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9665 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9666 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9668 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9669 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9670 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9671 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9672 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9673 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9675 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9676 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9677 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9678 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9679 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9681 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9683 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9684 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9685 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9686 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9687 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9689 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9690 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9691 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9692 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9693 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9697 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9698 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9699 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9700 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9701 let seed = [42; 32];
9702 let network = Network::Testnet;
9703 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9704 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9705 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9707 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9709 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9710 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9711 let config = UserConfig::default();
9712 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9714 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9715 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9716 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9717 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9719 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9720 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9721 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9723 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9724 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9725 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9726 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9728 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9729 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9730 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9732 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9733 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9734 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9736 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9737 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9738 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9739 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9740 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9741 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9742 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9744 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9746 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9747 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9748 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9749 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9750 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9754 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9755 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9756 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9757 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9758 let seed = [42; 32];
9759 let network = Network::Testnet;
9760 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9761 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9762 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9764 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9765 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9766 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9767 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9768 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9769 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9770 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9771 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9773 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9774 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9775 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9776 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9777 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9778 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9780 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9781 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9782 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9783 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9785 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9787 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9788 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9789 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9790 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9791 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9792 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9794 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9795 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9796 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9797 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9799 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9800 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9801 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9802 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9803 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9805 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9806 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9808 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9809 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9810 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9812 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9813 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9814 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9815 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9816 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9818 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9819 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9821 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9822 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9823 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9827 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9829 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9830 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9831 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9833 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9834 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9835 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9836 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9838 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9839 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9840 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9842 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9844 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9845 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9848 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9849 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9850 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9851 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9852 let seed = [42; 32];
9853 let network = Network::Testnet;
9854 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9855 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9856 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9859 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9860 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9861 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9863 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9864 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9866 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9867 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9868 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9870 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9871 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9873 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9875 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9876 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9878 // Channel Negotiations failed
9879 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9880 assert!(result.is_err());
9885 fn channel_update() {
9886 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9887 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9888 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9889 let seed = [42; 32];
9890 let network = Network::Testnet;
9891 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9892 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9893 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9895 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9896 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9897 let config = UserConfig::default();
9898 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9900 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9901 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9902 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9903 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9904 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9906 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9907 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9908 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9909 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9910 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9912 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9913 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9914 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9915 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9917 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9918 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9919 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9921 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9922 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9923 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9925 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9926 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9927 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9929 short_channel_id: 0,
9932 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9933 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9934 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9936 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9937 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9939 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9941 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9943 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9944 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9945 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9946 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9948 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9949 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9950 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9952 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9955 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9959 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9960 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9962 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9963 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9964 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9965 let seed = [42; 32];
9966 let network = Network::Testnet;
9967 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9968 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9970 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9971 let config = UserConfig::default();
9972 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9973 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9974 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9976 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9977 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9978 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9980 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9981 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9982 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9984 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9985 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9986 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9987 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9988 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9991 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9993 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9994 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9995 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9996 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
10000 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
10001 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
10002 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
10004 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
10007 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
10009 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10010 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
10011 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10012 blinding_point: None,
10014 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
10015 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
10017 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
10020 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
10023 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
10025 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10028 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
10029 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
10030 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
10032 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
10033 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
10036 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10037 blinding_point: None,
10039 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
10040 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
10043 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
10044 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
10046 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
10047 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
10049 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
10052 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
10053 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
10054 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
10055 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
10056 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
10057 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10058 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
10059 } = &mut dummy_add {
10060 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
10061 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
10062 } else { panic!() }
10063 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
10064 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
10065 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
10067 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
10070 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
10072 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
10073 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
10074 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
10075 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
10076 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
10077 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
10078 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
10079 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
10082 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10084 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10085 use bitcoin::sighash;
10086 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10087 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10088 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10089 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10090 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10091 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10092 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10093 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10094 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10095 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10096 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10097 use crate::sync::Arc;
10098 use core::str::FromStr;
10099 use hex::DisplayHex;
10101 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10102 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10103 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10104 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10106 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10108 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10109 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10110 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10111 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10112 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10114 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10115 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10121 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10122 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10123 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10125 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10126 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10127 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10128 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10129 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10130 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10132 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10134 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10135 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10136 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10137 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10138 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10139 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10141 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10142 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10143 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10144 selected_contest_delay: 144
10146 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10147 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10149 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10150 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10152 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10153 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10155 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10156 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10158 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10159 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10160 // build_commitment_transaction.
10161 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10162 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10163 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10164 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10165 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10167 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10168 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10169 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10170 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10174 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10175 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10176 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10177 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10181 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10182 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10183 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10185 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10186 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10188 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10189 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10191 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10193 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10194 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10195 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10196 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10197 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10198 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10199 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10201 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10202 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10203 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10204 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10206 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10207 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10208 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10210 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10212 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10213 commitment_tx.clone(),
10214 counterparty_signature,
10215 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10216 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10217 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10219 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10220 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10222 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10223 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10224 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10226 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10227 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10230 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10231 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10233 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10234 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10235 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10236 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10237 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10238 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10239 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10240 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10242 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10245 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10246 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10247 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10251 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10254 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10255 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10256 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10257 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10258 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10259 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10261 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10262 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10263 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10264 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10265 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10266 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10267 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10268 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10269 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10270 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10272 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10273 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10274 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10275 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10276 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10277 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10279 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10283 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10284 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10285 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10286 "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", {});
10288 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10289 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10291 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10292 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10293 "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", {});
10295 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10296 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10297 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10298 "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", {});
10300 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10301 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10303 amount_msat: 1000000,
10305 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10306 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10308 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10311 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10312 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10314 amount_msat: 2000000,
10316 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10317 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10319 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10322 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10323 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10325 amount_msat: 2000000,
10327 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10328 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10329 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10330 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10331 blinding_point: None,
10333 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10336 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10337 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10339 amount_msat: 3000000,
10341 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10342 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10343 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10344 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10345 blinding_point: None,
10347 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10350 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10351 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10353 amount_msat: 4000000,
10355 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10356 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10358 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10362 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10363 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10364 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10366 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10367 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10368 "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", {
10371 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10372 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10373 "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" },
10376 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10377 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10378 "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" },
10381 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10382 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10383 "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" },
10386 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10387 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10388 "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" },
10391 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10392 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10393 "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" }
10396 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10397 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10398 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10400 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10401 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10402 "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", {
10405 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10406 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10407 "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" },
10410 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10411 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10412 "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" },
10415 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10416 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10417 "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" },
10420 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10421 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10422 "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" },
10425 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10426 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10427 "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" }
10430 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10431 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10432 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10434 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10435 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10436 "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", {
10439 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10440 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10441 "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" },
10444 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10445 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10446 "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" },
10449 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10450 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10451 "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" },
10454 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10455 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10456 "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" }
10459 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10460 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10461 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10462 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10464 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10465 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10466 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10469 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10470 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10471 "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" },
10474 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10475 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10476 "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" },
10479 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10480 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10481 "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" },
10484 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10485 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10486 "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" }
10489 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10490 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10491 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10492 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10494 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10495 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10496 "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", {
10499 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10500 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10501 "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" },
10504 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10505 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10506 "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" },
10509 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10510 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10511 "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" },
10514 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10515 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10516 "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" }
10519 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10520 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10521 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10523 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10524 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10525 "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", {
10528 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10529 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10530 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10533 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10534 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10535 "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" },
10538 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10539 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10540 "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" }
10543 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10544 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10545 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10547 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10548 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10549 "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", {
10552 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10553 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10554 "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" },
10557 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10558 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10559 "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" },
10562 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10563 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10564 "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" }
10567 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10568 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10569 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10571 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10572 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10573 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10576 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10577 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10578 "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" },
10581 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10582 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10583 "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" }
10586 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10587 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10588 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10589 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10590 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10591 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10593 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10594 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10595 "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", {
10598 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10599 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10600 "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" },
10603 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10604 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10605 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
10608 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10609 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10610 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10611 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10612 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10614 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10615 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10616 "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", {
10619 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10620 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10621 "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" },
10624 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10625 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10626 "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" }
10629 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10630 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10631 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10633 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10634 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10635 "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", {
10638 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10639 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10640 "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" }
10643 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10644 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10645 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10646 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10647 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10649 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10650 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10651 "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", {
10654 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10655 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10656 "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" }
10659 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10660 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10661 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10662 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10663 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10665 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10666 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10667 "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", {
10670 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10671 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10672 "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" }
10675 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10676 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10677 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10678 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10680 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10681 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10682 "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", {});
10684 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10685 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10686 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10687 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10688 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10690 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10691 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10692 "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", {});
10694 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10695 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10696 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10697 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10698 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10700 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10701 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10702 "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", {});
10704 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10705 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10706 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10708 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10709 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10710 "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", {});
10712 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10713 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10714 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10715 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10716 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10718 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10719 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10720 "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", {});
10722 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10723 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10724 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10725 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10726 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10728 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10729 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10730 "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", {});
10732 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10733 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10734 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10735 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10736 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10737 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10739 amount_msat: 2000000,
10741 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10742 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10744 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10747 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10748 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10749 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10751 amount_msat: 5000001,
10753 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10754 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10755 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10756 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10757 blinding_point: None,
10759 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10762 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10763 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10765 amount_msat: 5000000,
10767 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10768 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10769 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10770 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10771 blinding_point: None,
10773 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10777 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10778 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10779 "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", {
10782 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10783 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10784 "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" },
10786 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10787 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10788 "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" },
10790 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10791 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10792 "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" }
10795 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10796 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10797 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10798 "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", {
10801 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10802 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10803 "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" },
10805 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10806 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10807 "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" },
10809 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10810 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10811 "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" }
10816 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10817 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10819 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10820 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10821 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10822 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10824 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10825 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10826 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10828 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10829 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10831 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10832 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10834 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10835 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10836 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10840 fn test_key_derivation() {
10841 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10842 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10844 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10845 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10847 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10848 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10850 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10851 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10853 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10854 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10856 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10857 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10859 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10860 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10864 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10865 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10866 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10867 let seed = [42; 32];
10868 let network = Network::Testnet;
10869 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10870 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10872 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10873 let config = UserConfig::default();
10874 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10875 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10877 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10878 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10880 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10881 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10882 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10883 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10884 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10885 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10886 assert!(res.is_ok());
10890 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10891 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10892 // resulting `channel_type`.
10893 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10894 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10895 let network = Network::Testnet;
10896 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10897 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10899 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10900 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10902 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10903 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10905 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10906 // need to signal it.
10907 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10908 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10909 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10910 &config, 0, 42, None
10912 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10914 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10915 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10916 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10918 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10919 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10920 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10924 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10925 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10926 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10927 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10928 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10931 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10932 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10936 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10937 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10938 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10939 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10940 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10941 let network = Network::Testnet;
10942 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10943 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10945 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10946 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10948 let config = UserConfig::default();
10950 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10951 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10952 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10953 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10954 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10956 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10957 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10958 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10962 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10963 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10964 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10966 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10967 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10968 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10969 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10970 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10971 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10973 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10977 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10978 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10980 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10981 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10982 let network = Network::Testnet;
10983 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10984 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10986 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10987 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10989 let config = UserConfig::default();
10991 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10992 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10993 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10994 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10995 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10996 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10997 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10998 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
11000 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
11001 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
11002 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
11003 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11004 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11005 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11009 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11010 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11012 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11013 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11014 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
11015 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11017 assert!(res.is_err());
11019 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
11020 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
11021 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
11023 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11024 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
11025 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
11028 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11030 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11031 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11032 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11033 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11036 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
11037 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11039 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
11040 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
11042 assert!(res.is_err());
11046 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
11047 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11048 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11049 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11050 let seed = [42; 32];
11051 let network = Network::Testnet;
11052 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
11053 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
11054 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
11056 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11057 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
11058 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
11059 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
11061 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
11062 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11063 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11068 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11078 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11079 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
11080 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11085 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11086 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11092 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11095 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11096 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11097 &accept_channel_msg,
11098 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11099 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11102 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11103 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11104 let tx = Transaction {
11106 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11110 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11113 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11116 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11117 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11118 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11119 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11120 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11121 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11125 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11126 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11134 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11135 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11136 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11137 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11139 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11140 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11147 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11148 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11149 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11150 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11151 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11153 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11154 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11155 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11163 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11164 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11167 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11168 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11169 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11170 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());