1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, EntropySource, KeysInterface, BaseSign, SignerProvider};
39 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
41 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
42 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
43 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
44 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use crate::prelude::*;
48 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
50 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use crate::sync::Mutex;
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 pub struct AvailableBalances {
67 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
68 pub balance_msat: u64,
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
79 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
81 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
82 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
83 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
84 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
85 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
86 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
88 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
92 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
93 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
94 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
95 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
98 enum InboundHTLCState {
99 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
100 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
101 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
103 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
104 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
105 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
106 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
107 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
108 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
109 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
110 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
111 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
112 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
113 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
115 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
116 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
119 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
120 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
123 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
124 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
125 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
126 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
127 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
128 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
130 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
131 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
132 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
133 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
134 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
135 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
137 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
139 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
140 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
142 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
143 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
144 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
145 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
146 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
147 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
148 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
149 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
152 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
156 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 state: InboundHTLCState,
160 enum OutboundHTLCState {
161 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
162 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
163 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
164 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
165 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
166 /// money back (though we won't), and,
167 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
168 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
169 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
170 /// we'll never get out of sync).
171 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
172 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
173 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
175 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
176 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
177 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
178 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
179 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
180 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
181 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
182 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
183 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
188 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
189 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
194 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
195 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
198 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
201 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
202 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
207 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
216 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
226 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
227 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
236 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
241 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
245 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
246 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
247 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
248 /// move on to ChannelReady.
249 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
250 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
251 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
253 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
254 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
255 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
256 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
257 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
258 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
259 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
261 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
262 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
263 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
265 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
266 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
267 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
268 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
269 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
270 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
272 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
273 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
275 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
277 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
278 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
279 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
280 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
281 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
282 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
283 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
285 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
286 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
287 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
288 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
289 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
290 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
292 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
293 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
294 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
295 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
296 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
298 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
299 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
301 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
303 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
304 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
305 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
306 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
307 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
310 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
312 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
314 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
316 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
320 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
322 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
323 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
324 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
326 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
327 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
329 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
330 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
331 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
332 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
333 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
335 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
336 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
340 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
346 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
349 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
350 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 holding_cell_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
356 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
357 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
358 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
359 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
360 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
361 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
362 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
363 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
368 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
369 struct HTLCCandidate {
371 origin: HTLCInitiator,
375 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
383 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
385 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
387 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
388 htlc_value_msat: u64,
389 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
394 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
395 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
396 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
397 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
398 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
400 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
401 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
402 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
403 htlc_value_msat: u64,
404 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
405 /// in the holding cell).
406 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
408 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
409 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
413 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
415 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
416 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
421 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
424 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
425 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
426 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
427 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
428 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
429 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
430 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
431 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
432 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
433 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
434 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
437 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
438 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
439 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
440 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
441 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
442 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
443 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
444 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
447 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
448 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
449 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
450 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
451 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
452 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
453 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
454 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
455 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
456 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
457 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
458 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
459 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
460 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
461 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
463 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
464 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
465 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
466 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
468 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
469 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
470 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
471 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
473 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
474 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
475 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
476 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
477 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
479 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
480 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
481 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
482 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
484 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
485 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
486 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
488 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
489 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
490 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
491 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
492 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
494 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
495 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
496 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
499 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
500 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
501 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
502 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
504 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
505 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
506 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
507 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
509 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
513 channel_id: [u8; 32],
516 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
517 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
519 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
520 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
521 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
524 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
525 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
526 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
528 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
529 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
531 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
533 holder_signer: Signer,
534 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
535 destination_script: Script,
537 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
538 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
539 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
541 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
548 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
549 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
550 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
551 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
552 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
553 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
555 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
557 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
558 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
559 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
560 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
561 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
562 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
564 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
566 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
567 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
568 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
569 // HTLCs with similar state.
570 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
571 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
572 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
573 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
574 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
575 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
576 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
577 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
578 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
581 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
582 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
583 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
585 update_time_counter: u32,
587 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
588 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
589 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
591 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
592 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
594 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
595 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
597 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
598 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
599 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
600 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
602 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
603 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
605 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
607 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
609 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
610 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
611 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
612 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
613 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
614 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
616 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
617 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
618 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
619 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
620 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
622 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
623 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
624 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
625 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
626 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
627 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
628 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
629 channel_creation_height: u32,
631 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
634 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
636 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
639 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
644 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
646 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
648 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
649 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
652 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
659 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
665 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
667 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
668 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
670 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
674 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
676 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
678 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
679 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
680 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
681 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
683 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
684 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
685 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
687 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
688 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
689 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
691 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
692 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
693 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
694 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
696 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
698 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
700 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
701 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
702 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
703 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
704 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
706 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
707 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
710 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
711 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
712 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
713 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
714 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
715 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
716 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
718 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
719 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
721 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
722 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
723 // the channel's funding UTXO.
725 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
726 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
727 // associated channel mapping.
729 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
730 // to store all of them.
731 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
733 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
734 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
735 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
736 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
737 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
739 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
740 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
743 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
744 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
748 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
750 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
751 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
752 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
756 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
758 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
761 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
765 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
769 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
771 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
772 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
773 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
774 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
775 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
777 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
778 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
780 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
782 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
783 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
785 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
786 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
787 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
788 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
789 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
790 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
792 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
793 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
795 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
796 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
797 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
798 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
799 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
801 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
802 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
804 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
805 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
807 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
808 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
809 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
810 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
816 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
817 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
819 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
821 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
826 macro_rules! secp_check {
827 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
830 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
835 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
836 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
837 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
838 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
840 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
842 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
843 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
844 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
846 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
849 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
851 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
854 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
855 /// required by us according to the configured or default
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
858 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
860 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
861 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
862 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
863 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
864 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
867 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
868 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
869 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
870 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
871 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
872 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
873 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
876 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
877 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
880 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
881 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
882 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
883 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
884 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
885 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
886 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
887 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
892 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
893 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
894 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
895 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
896 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
897 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
898 // We've exhausted our options
901 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
902 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
906 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
907 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
908 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
909 outbound_scid_alias: u64
910 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
911 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
912 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
914 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
916 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
917 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
918 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
919 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
921 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
922 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
924 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
927 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
928 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
929 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
931 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
932 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
934 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
935 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
936 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
937 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
938 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
941 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
943 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
944 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
945 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
946 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
949 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
950 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
952 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
953 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
956 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
957 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
958 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
965 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
966 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
967 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
968 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
973 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
975 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
976 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
977 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
979 channel_value_satoshis,
981 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
984 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
985 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
987 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
988 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
991 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
992 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
993 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
994 pending_update_fee: None,
995 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
996 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
997 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
998 update_time_counter: 1,
1000 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1002 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1003 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1004 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1005 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1006 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1007 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1009 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1010 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1011 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1012 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1014 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1015 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1016 closing_fee_limits: None,
1017 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1019 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1021 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1022 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1023 short_channel_id: None,
1024 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1026 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1027 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1028 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1029 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1030 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1031 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1032 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1033 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1034 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1035 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1036 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1038 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1040 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1041 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1042 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1043 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1044 counterparty_parameters: None,
1045 funding_outpoint: None,
1046 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1047 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1049 funding_transaction: None,
1051 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1052 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1053 counterparty_node_id,
1055 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1057 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1059 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1060 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1062 announcement_sigs: None,
1064 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1065 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1066 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1067 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1069 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1071 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1072 outbound_scid_alias,
1074 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1076 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1077 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1079 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1084 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1085 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1086 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1088 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1089 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1090 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1091 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1092 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1093 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1094 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1097 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1098 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1099 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1100 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1101 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1102 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1103 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1104 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1106 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1107 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1116 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1117 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1118 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1119 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1120 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1121 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1122 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1123 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1124 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1127 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1128 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1130 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1131 // support this channel type.
1132 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1133 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1137 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1138 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1141 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1142 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1143 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1144 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1145 // publicly announced.
1146 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1147 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1148 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1151 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1155 channel_type.clone()
1157 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1159 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1160 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1163 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1164 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1165 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1166 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1167 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1168 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1169 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1170 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1171 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1174 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1178 // Check sanity of message fields:
1179 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1182 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1185 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1188 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1189 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1190 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1192 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1193 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1195 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1198 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1200 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1201 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1204 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1207 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1211 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1212 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1215 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1218 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1221 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1224 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1227 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1230 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1234 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1236 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1237 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1242 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1243 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1244 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1245 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1248 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1251 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1252 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1253 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1255 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1259 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1260 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1261 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1262 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1263 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1267 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1268 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1269 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1270 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1274 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1275 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1276 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1277 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1278 if script.len() == 0 {
1281 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1284 Some(script.clone())
1287 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1288 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1294 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1295 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1298 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1299 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1304 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1305 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1307 let chan = Channel {
1310 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1311 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1313 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1318 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1320 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1321 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1322 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1325 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1328 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1329 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1331 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1332 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1333 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1335 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1336 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1337 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1338 pending_update_fee: None,
1339 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1340 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1341 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1342 update_time_counter: 1,
1344 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1346 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1347 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1348 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1349 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1350 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1351 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1353 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1354 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1355 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1356 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1358 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1359 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1360 closing_fee_limits: None,
1361 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1363 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1365 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1366 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1367 short_channel_id: None,
1368 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1370 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1371 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1372 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1373 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1374 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1375 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1376 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1377 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1378 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1379 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1380 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1381 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1383 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1385 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1386 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1387 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1388 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1389 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1390 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1391 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1393 funding_outpoint: None,
1394 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1395 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1397 funding_transaction: None,
1399 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1400 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1401 counterparty_node_id,
1403 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1405 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1407 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1408 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1410 announcement_sigs: None,
1412 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1413 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1414 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1415 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1417 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1419 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1420 outbound_scid_alias,
1422 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1424 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1425 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1434 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1435 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1436 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1437 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1438 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1440 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1441 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1442 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1443 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1444 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1445 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1446 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1448 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1449 where L::Target: Logger
1451 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1452 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1453 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1455 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1456 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1457 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1458 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1460 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1461 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1462 if match update_state {
1463 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1464 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1465 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1466 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1467 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1469 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1473 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1474 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1475 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1476 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1478 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1479 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1480 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1482 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1483 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1484 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1485 transaction_output_index: None
1490 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1491 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1492 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1493 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1494 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1497 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1499 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1500 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1501 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1503 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1504 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1507 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1508 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1511 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1513 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1514 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1515 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1517 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1518 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1524 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1525 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1526 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1527 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1528 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1529 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1530 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1534 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1535 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1537 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1539 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1540 if generated_by_local {
1541 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1542 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1551 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1553 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1554 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1555 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1556 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1557 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1558 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1559 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1562 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1563 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1564 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1565 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1569 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1570 preimages.push(preimage);
1574 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1575 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1577 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1579 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1580 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1582 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1583 if !generated_by_local {
1584 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1592 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1593 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1594 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1595 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1596 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1597 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1598 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1599 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1601 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1603 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1604 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1605 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1606 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1608 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1610 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1611 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1612 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1613 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1616 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1617 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1618 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1619 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1621 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1624 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1625 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1626 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1627 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1629 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1632 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1633 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1638 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1639 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1644 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1646 let channel_parameters =
1647 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1648 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1649 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1652 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1657 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1660 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1661 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1662 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1663 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1665 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1666 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1667 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1675 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1676 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1682 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1683 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1684 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1685 // outside of those situations will fail.
1686 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1690 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1695 1 + // script length (0)
1699 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1700 2 + // witness marker and flag
1701 1 + // witness element count
1702 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1703 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1704 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1705 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1706 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1707 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1709 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1710 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1711 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1717 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1718 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1719 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1720 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1722 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1723 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1724 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1726 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1727 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1728 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1729 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1730 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1731 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1734 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1735 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1738 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1739 value_to_holder = 0;
1742 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1743 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1744 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1745 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1747 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1748 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1751 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1752 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1756 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1757 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1758 /// our counterparty!)
1759 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1760 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1761 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1762 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1763 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1764 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1765 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1767 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1771 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1772 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1773 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1774 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1775 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1776 //may see payments to it!
1777 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1778 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1779 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1781 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1784 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1785 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1786 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1787 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1788 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1791 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1794 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1795 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1797 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1799 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1800 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1801 where L::Target: Logger {
1802 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1803 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1804 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1805 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1806 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1807 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1808 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1809 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1813 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1814 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1815 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1816 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1818 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1819 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1821 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1823 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1825 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1826 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1827 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1829 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1830 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1831 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1832 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1833 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1835 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1836 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1837 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1839 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1840 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1842 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1845 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1846 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1850 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1854 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1855 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1856 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1857 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1858 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1859 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1862 // Now update local state:
1864 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1865 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1866 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1867 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1868 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1869 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1870 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1874 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1875 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1876 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1877 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1878 // do not not get into this branch.
1879 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1880 match pending_update {
1881 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1882 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1883 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1884 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1885 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1886 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1887 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1890 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1891 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1892 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1893 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1894 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1895 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1896 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1902 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1903 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1904 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1906 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1907 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1908 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1910 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1911 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1914 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1915 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1917 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1918 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1920 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1921 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1924 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1927 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1928 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1929 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1930 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1935 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1936 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1937 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1938 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1939 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1942 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1943 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1944 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1945 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1946 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1948 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1949 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1950 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1954 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1955 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1956 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1957 /// before we fail backwards.
1959 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1960 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1961 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1962 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
1963 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1964 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
1965 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
1968 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1969 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1970 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1971 /// before we fail backwards.
1973 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1974 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1975 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1976 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
1977 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1978 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1979 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1981 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1983 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1984 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1985 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1987 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1988 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1989 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1991 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1992 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1993 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1995 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2000 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2001 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2007 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2008 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2009 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2010 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2011 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2015 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2016 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2017 force_holding_cell = true;
2020 // Now update local state:
2021 if force_holding_cell {
2022 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2023 match pending_update {
2024 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2025 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2026 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2027 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2031 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2032 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2033 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2034 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2040 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2041 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2042 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2048 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2050 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2051 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2054 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2055 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2056 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2061 // Message handlers:
2063 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2064 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2066 // Check sanity of message fields:
2067 if !self.is_outbound() {
2068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2070 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2073 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2074 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2076 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2079 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2080 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2082 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2084 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2086 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2087 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2088 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2090 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2091 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2092 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2094 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2097 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2101 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2102 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2105 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2106 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2108 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2109 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2111 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2114 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2115 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2117 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2120 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2121 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2124 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2125 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2128 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2129 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2131 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2134 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2135 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2136 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2137 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2138 if script.len() == 0 {
2141 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2144 Some(script.clone())
2147 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2148 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2154 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2155 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2156 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2157 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2158 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2160 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2161 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2163 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2166 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2167 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2168 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2169 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2170 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2171 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2174 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2175 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2176 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2179 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2180 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2182 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2183 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2188 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2189 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2191 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2192 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2194 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2195 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2196 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2197 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2198 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2199 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2200 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2201 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2202 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2205 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2206 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2208 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2209 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2210 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2211 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2213 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2214 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2216 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2217 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2220 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2221 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2224 pub fn funding_created<K: Deref, L: Deref>(
2225 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, keys_source: &K, logger: &L
2226 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2228 K::Target: KeysInterface,
2231 if self.is_outbound() {
2232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2234 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2235 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2236 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2240 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2243 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2244 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2245 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2246 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2249 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2250 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2251 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2252 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2253 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2255 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2257 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2258 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2262 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2263 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2264 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2268 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2269 initial_commitment_tx,
2272 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2273 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2276 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2277 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2279 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2281 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2282 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2283 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2284 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2285 let mut monitor_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2286 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2287 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2288 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2289 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2290 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2291 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2293 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2295 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2297 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2298 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2299 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2300 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2302 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2304 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2305 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2307 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2310 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2311 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2312 pub fn funding_signed<K: Deref, L: Deref>(
2313 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, keys_source: &K, logger: &L
2314 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2316 K::Target: KeysInterface,
2319 if !self.is_outbound() {
2320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2322 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2325 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2326 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2327 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2328 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2331 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2333 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2334 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2335 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2336 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2338 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2339 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2341 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2342 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2344 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2345 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2346 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2347 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2348 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2353 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2354 initial_commitment_tx,
2357 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2358 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2361 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2362 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2365 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2366 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2367 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2368 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2369 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2370 let mut monitor_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2371 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2372 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2373 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2374 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2375 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2376 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2378 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2380 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2382 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2383 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2384 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2385 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2387 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2389 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2392 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2393 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2395 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2396 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2397 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2398 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2401 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2402 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2403 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2404 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2405 // when routing outbound payments.
2406 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2410 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2412 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2413 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2414 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2415 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2416 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2417 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2418 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2419 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2420 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2422 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2423 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2424 let expected_point =
2425 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2426 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2428 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2429 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2430 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2431 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2432 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2433 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2435 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2436 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2437 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2438 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2439 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2441 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2446 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2449 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2450 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2452 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2454 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2457 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2458 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2459 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2460 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2466 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2467 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2468 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2469 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2470 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2471 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2472 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2473 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2474 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2477 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2480 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2481 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2482 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2484 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2485 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2486 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2487 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2488 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2489 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2491 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2492 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2498 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2499 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2500 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2501 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2502 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2503 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2504 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2505 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2506 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2509 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2512 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2513 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2514 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2516 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2517 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2518 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2519 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2520 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2521 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2523 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2524 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2528 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2529 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2530 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2531 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2532 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2533 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2534 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2536 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2537 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2539 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2546 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2547 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2548 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2549 /// corner case properly.
2550 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2551 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2552 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2554 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2555 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2556 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2557 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2560 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2562 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2563 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2564 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2567 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2568 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2569 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2570 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2572 outbound_capacity_msat,
2573 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2574 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2575 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2581 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2582 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2585 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2586 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2587 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2588 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2589 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2590 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2593 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2594 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2596 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2597 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2600 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2601 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2602 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2604 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2605 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2607 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2610 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2611 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2613 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2614 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2616 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2617 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2619 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2620 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2624 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2625 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2631 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2632 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2633 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2636 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2637 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2638 included_htlcs += 1;
2641 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2642 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2646 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2647 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2648 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2649 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2650 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2651 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2656 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2658 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2659 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2664 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2665 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2669 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2670 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2671 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2674 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2675 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2677 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2678 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2679 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2681 total_pending_htlcs,
2682 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2683 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2684 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2686 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2687 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2688 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2690 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2692 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2697 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2698 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2699 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2701 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2702 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2704 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2707 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2708 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2710 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2711 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2713 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2714 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2716 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2717 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2721 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2722 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2728 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2729 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2730 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2731 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2732 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2733 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2736 included_htlcs += 1;
2739 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2740 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2743 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2744 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2746 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2747 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2748 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2753 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2754 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2755 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2758 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2759 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2761 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2762 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2764 total_pending_htlcs,
2765 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2766 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2767 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2769 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2770 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2771 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2773 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2775 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2780 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2781 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2782 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2783 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2784 if local_sent_shutdown {
2785 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2787 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2788 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2789 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2790 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2792 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2793 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2795 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2796 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2798 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2799 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2801 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2802 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2805 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2806 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2807 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2808 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2810 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2811 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2813 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2814 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2815 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2816 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2817 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2818 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2819 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2820 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2821 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2822 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2823 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2825 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2826 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2827 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2828 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2829 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2830 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2834 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2837 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2838 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2839 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2841 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2842 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2843 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2844 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2845 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2846 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2847 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2851 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2852 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2853 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2854 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2855 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2856 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2857 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2861 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2862 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2863 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2864 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2865 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2869 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2870 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2871 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2872 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2873 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2875 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2879 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2883 if !self.is_outbound() {
2884 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2885 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2886 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2887 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2888 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2889 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2890 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2891 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2892 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2893 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2894 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2895 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2896 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2897 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2898 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2901 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2902 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2903 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2904 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2908 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2909 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2911 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2912 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2915 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2916 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2917 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2921 // Now update local state:
2922 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2923 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2924 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2925 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2926 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2927 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2928 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2933 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2935 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2936 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2937 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2938 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2939 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2940 None => fail_reason.into(),
2941 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2942 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2943 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2944 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2946 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2950 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2951 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2952 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2953 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2955 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2956 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2961 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2964 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2965 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2968 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2969 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2972 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2975 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2976 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2979 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2983 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2987 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2988 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2989 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2991 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2995 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2999 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
3000 where L::Target: Logger
3002 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3003 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
3005 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3006 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
3008 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3009 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
3012 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3014 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3016 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3017 let commitment_txid = {
3018 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3019 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3020 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3022 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3023 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3024 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3025 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3026 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3027 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3031 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3033 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3034 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3035 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3036 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3039 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3040 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3041 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3042 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3045 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3047 if self.is_outbound() {
3048 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3049 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3050 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3051 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3052 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3053 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3054 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3055 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3056 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3057 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3063 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3064 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3067 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3068 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3069 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3070 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3071 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3072 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3073 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3075 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3076 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3077 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3078 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3079 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3080 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3081 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3082 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3084 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3086 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3090 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3091 commitment_stats.tx,
3093 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3094 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3095 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3098 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3099 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3100 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3101 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3103 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3104 let mut need_commitment = false;
3105 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3106 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3107 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3108 need_commitment = true;
3112 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3113 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3114 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3115 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3116 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3117 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3121 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3122 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3123 Some(forward_info.clone())
3125 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3126 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3127 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3128 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3129 need_commitment = true;
3132 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3133 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3134 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3135 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3136 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3137 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3138 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3139 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3140 need_commitment = true;
3144 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3145 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3146 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3147 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3149 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3150 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3151 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3152 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3153 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3154 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3155 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3156 // includes the right HTLCs.
3157 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3158 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3159 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3160 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3161 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3162 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3164 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3165 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3166 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3169 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3170 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3171 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3172 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3173 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3174 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3175 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3176 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3177 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3181 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3182 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3184 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3185 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3186 per_commitment_secret,
3187 next_per_commitment_point,
3188 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3191 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3192 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3193 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3194 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3195 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3196 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3197 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3198 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3201 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3202 /// for our counterparty.
3203 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3204 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3205 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3206 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3207 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3209 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3210 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3211 updates: Vec::new(),
3214 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3215 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3216 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3217 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3218 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3219 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3220 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3221 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3222 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3223 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3224 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3225 // to rebalance channels.
3226 match &htlc_update {
3227 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3228 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3229 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3232 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3233 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3234 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3235 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3236 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3237 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3238 // into the holding cell without ever being
3239 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3240 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3241 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3244 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3250 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3251 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3252 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3253 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3254 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3255 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3256 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3257 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3258 (msg, monitor_update)
3259 } else { unreachable!() };
3260 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3261 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3263 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3264 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3265 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3266 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3267 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3268 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3269 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3270 // for a full revocation before failing.
3271 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3274 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3276 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3283 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3284 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3286 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3287 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3292 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3293 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3294 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3295 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3296 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3298 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3299 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3300 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3302 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3304 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3306 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3309 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3311 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3315 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3316 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3317 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3318 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3319 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3320 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3321 where L::Target: Logger,
3323 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3324 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3326 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3329 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3330 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3333 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3335 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3336 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3341 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3342 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3343 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3344 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3345 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3346 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3347 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3348 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3352 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3354 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3355 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3358 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3359 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3361 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3363 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3364 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3365 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3366 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3367 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3368 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3369 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3370 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3374 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3375 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3376 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3377 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3378 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3379 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3380 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3381 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3383 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3384 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3387 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3388 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3389 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3390 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3391 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3392 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3393 let mut require_commitment = false;
3394 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3397 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3398 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3399 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3401 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3402 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3403 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3404 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3405 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3406 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3411 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3412 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3413 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3414 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3415 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3417 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3418 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3419 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3424 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3425 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3427 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3431 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3432 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3434 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3435 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3436 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3437 require_commitment = true;
3438 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3439 match forward_info {
3440 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3441 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3442 require_commitment = true;
3444 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3445 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3446 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3448 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3449 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3450 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3454 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3455 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3456 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3457 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3463 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3464 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3465 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3466 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3468 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3469 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3470 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3471 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3472 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3473 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3474 require_commitment = true;
3478 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3480 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3481 match update_state {
3482 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3483 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3484 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3485 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3486 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3488 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3489 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3490 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3491 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3492 require_commitment = true;
3493 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3494 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3499 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3500 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3501 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3502 if require_commitment {
3503 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3504 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3505 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3506 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3507 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3508 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3509 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3510 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3511 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3513 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3514 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3515 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3516 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3517 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3518 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3519 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3521 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3525 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3526 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3527 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3528 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3529 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3531 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3532 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3533 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3536 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3537 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3538 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3539 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3542 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3543 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3544 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3545 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3547 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3550 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3551 if require_commitment {
3552 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3554 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3555 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3556 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3557 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3559 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3560 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3562 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3563 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3564 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3566 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3570 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3571 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3572 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3575 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3577 commitment_update: None,
3578 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3579 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3580 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3587 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3588 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3589 /// commitment update.
3590 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3591 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3592 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3595 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3596 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3597 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3598 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3600 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3601 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3602 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3603 if !self.is_outbound() {
3604 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3606 if !self.is_usable() {
3607 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3609 if !self.is_live() {
3610 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3613 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3614 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3615 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3616 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3617 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3618 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3619 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3620 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3621 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3622 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3626 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3627 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3628 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3629 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3630 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3633 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3634 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3638 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3639 force_holding_cell = true;
3642 if force_holding_cell {
3643 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3647 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3648 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3650 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3651 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3656 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3657 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3659 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3661 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3662 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3663 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3664 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3668 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3669 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3670 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3674 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3675 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3678 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3679 // will be retransmitted.
3680 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3681 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3682 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3684 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3685 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3687 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3688 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3689 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3690 // this HTLC accordingly
3691 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3694 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3695 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3696 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3697 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3700 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3701 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3702 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3703 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3704 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3705 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3710 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3712 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3713 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3714 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3715 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3719 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3720 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3721 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3722 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3723 // the update upon reconnection.
3724 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3728 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3729 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3732 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3733 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3734 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3735 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3736 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3737 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3739 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3740 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3741 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3742 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3743 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3744 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3746 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3747 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3748 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3749 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3750 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3751 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3752 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3755 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3756 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3757 /// to the remote side.
3758 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3759 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3760 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3762 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3763 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3764 // first received the funding_signed.
3765 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3766 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3767 self.funding_transaction.take()
3769 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3770 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3771 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3772 funding_broadcastable = None;
3775 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3776 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3777 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3778 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3779 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3780 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3781 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3782 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3783 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3784 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3785 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3786 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3787 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3788 next_per_commitment_point,
3789 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3793 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3795 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3796 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3797 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3798 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3799 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3800 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3802 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3803 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3804 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3805 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3806 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3807 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3811 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3812 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3814 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3815 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3818 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3819 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3820 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3821 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3822 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3823 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3824 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3825 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3826 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3830 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3831 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3833 if self.is_outbound() {
3834 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3836 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3839 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3840 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3842 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3843 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3844 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3845 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3846 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3847 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3848 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3849 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3850 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3851 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3852 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3853 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3854 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3856 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3858 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3864 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3865 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3866 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3867 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3868 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3869 per_commitment_secret,
3870 next_per_commitment_point,
3874 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3875 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3876 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3877 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3878 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3880 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3881 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3882 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3883 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3884 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3885 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3886 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3887 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3888 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3893 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3894 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3896 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3897 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3898 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3899 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3900 reason: err_packet.clone()
3903 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3904 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3905 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3906 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3907 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3908 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3911 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3912 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3913 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3914 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3915 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3922 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3923 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3924 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3925 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3929 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3930 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3931 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3932 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3933 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3934 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3938 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3939 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3941 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3942 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3943 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3944 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3945 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3946 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3947 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3948 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3949 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3950 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3951 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3955 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3956 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3957 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3960 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3961 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3962 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3963 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3964 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3965 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3966 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3969 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3970 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3971 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3972 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3973 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3976 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3977 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3978 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3979 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3980 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3981 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3982 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3983 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3986 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3990 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3991 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3992 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3993 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3995 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3999 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4000 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4001 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4003 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4004 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4005 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4006 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4007 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4011 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
4013 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4014 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4015 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4016 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4017 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4018 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4020 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4021 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4022 channel_ready: None,
4023 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4024 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4025 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4029 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4030 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4031 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4032 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4033 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4034 next_per_commitment_point,
4035 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4037 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4038 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4039 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4043 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4044 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4045 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4047 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4048 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4049 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4052 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4058 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4059 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4060 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4061 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4062 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4064 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4065 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4066 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4067 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4068 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4069 next_per_commitment_point,
4070 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4074 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4075 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4076 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4078 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4081 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4082 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4083 raa: required_revoke,
4084 commitment_update: None,
4085 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4087 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4088 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4089 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4091 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4094 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4095 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4096 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4097 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4098 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4099 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4102 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4103 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4104 raa: required_revoke,
4105 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4106 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4110 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4114 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4115 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4116 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4117 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4119 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4121 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4123 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4124 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4125 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4126 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4127 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4128 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4130 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4131 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4132 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4133 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4134 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4136 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4137 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4138 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4139 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4142 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4143 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4144 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4145 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4146 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4147 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4148 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4149 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4150 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4151 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4152 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4153 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4154 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4155 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4156 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4158 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4161 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4162 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4165 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4166 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4167 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4168 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4169 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4170 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4171 self.channel_state &
4172 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4173 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4174 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4175 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4178 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4179 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4180 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4181 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4182 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4183 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4186 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4192 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4193 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4194 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4195 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4197 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4198 return Ok((None, None));
4201 if !self.is_outbound() {
4202 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4203 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4205 return Ok((None, None));
4208 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4210 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4211 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4212 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4213 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4215 let sig = self.holder_signer
4216 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4217 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4219 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4220 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4221 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4222 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4224 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4225 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4226 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4231 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4232 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4233 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4234 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4236 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4239 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4240 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4241 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4242 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4245 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4246 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4247 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4250 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4252 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4253 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4256 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4257 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4258 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4261 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4264 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4265 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4266 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4267 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4269 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4272 assert!(send_shutdown);
4273 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4274 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4277 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4282 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4284 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4285 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4287 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4288 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4289 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4290 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4291 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4292 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4296 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4297 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4298 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4299 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4303 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4304 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4305 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4306 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4307 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4308 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4310 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4311 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4318 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4319 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4321 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4324 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4325 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4327 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4329 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4330 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4331 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4332 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4333 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4334 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4335 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4336 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4337 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4339 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4340 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4343 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4347 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4348 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4349 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4350 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4352 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4355 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4358 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4361 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4365 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4366 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4369 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4370 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4371 return Ok((None, None));
4374 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4375 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4376 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4377 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4379 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4381 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4384 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4385 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4386 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4387 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4388 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4392 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4393 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4398 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4399 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4400 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4401 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4402 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4403 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4404 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4408 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4410 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4411 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4412 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4413 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4415 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4418 let sig = self.holder_signer
4419 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4420 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4422 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4423 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4424 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4425 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4429 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4430 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4431 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4432 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4434 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4435 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4436 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4442 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4443 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4444 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4446 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4447 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4449 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4450 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4453 if !self.is_outbound() {
4454 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4455 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4456 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4457 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4459 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4460 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4461 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4463 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4464 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4467 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4468 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4469 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4470 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4471 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4472 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4473 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4474 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4476 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4479 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4480 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4481 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4482 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4484 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4488 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4489 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4490 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4491 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4493 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4499 // Public utilities:
4501 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4505 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4509 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4510 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4511 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4515 /// Gets the channel's type
4516 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4520 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4521 /// is_usable() returns true).
4522 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4523 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4524 self.short_channel_id
4527 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4528 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4529 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4532 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4533 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4534 self.outbound_scid_alias
4536 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4537 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4538 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4539 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4540 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4543 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4544 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4545 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4546 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4549 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4550 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4551 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4554 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4555 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4556 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4557 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4561 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4564 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4565 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4568 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4569 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4572 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4573 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4574 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4577 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4578 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4581 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4582 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4583 self.counterparty_node_id
4586 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4587 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4588 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4591 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4592 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4593 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4596 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4597 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4599 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4600 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4601 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4602 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4604 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4608 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4609 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4610 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4613 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4614 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4615 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4618 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4619 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4620 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4622 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4623 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4628 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4629 self.channel_value_satoshis
4632 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4633 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4636 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4637 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4640 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4641 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4644 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4645 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4646 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4649 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4650 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4651 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4654 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4655 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4656 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4659 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4660 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4661 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4662 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4663 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4666 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4668 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4669 self.prev_config = None;
4673 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4674 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4678 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4679 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4680 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4681 let did_channel_update =
4682 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4683 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4684 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4685 if did_channel_update {
4686 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4687 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4688 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4689 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4691 self.config.options = *config;
4695 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4696 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4697 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4698 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4699 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4700 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4701 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4703 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4704 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4707 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4709 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4710 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4716 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4717 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4718 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4719 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4720 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4721 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4722 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4724 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4725 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4732 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4736 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4737 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4738 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4739 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4740 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4741 // which are near the dust limit.
4742 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4743 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4744 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4745 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4746 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4748 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4749 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4751 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4754 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4755 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4758 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4759 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4762 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4763 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4767 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4772 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4774 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4775 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4776 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4777 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4778 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4779 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4781 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4783 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4791 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4792 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4796 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4797 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4798 self.update_time_counter
4801 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4802 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4805 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4806 self.config.announced_channel
4809 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4810 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4813 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4814 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4815 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4816 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4819 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4820 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4821 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4824 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4825 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4826 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4827 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4828 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4831 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4832 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4833 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4834 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4835 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4838 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4839 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4840 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4841 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4844 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4845 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4846 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4849 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4850 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4851 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4853 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4854 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4855 if self.channel_state &
4856 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4857 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4858 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4859 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4860 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4863 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4864 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4865 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4866 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4867 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4868 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4870 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4871 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4872 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4874 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4875 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4876 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4877 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4878 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4879 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4885 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4886 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4887 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4890 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4891 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4892 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4895 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4896 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4897 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4900 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4901 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4902 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4903 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4904 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4905 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4910 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4911 self.channel_update_status
4914 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4915 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4916 self.channel_update_status = status;
4919 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4921 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4922 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4923 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4927 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4928 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4929 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4932 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4936 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4937 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4938 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4940 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4941 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4942 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4944 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4945 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4948 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4949 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4950 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4951 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4952 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4953 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4954 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4955 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4956 self.channel_state);
4958 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4962 if need_commitment_update {
4963 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4964 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4965 let next_per_commitment_point =
4966 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4967 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4968 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4969 next_per_commitment_point,
4970 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4974 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4980 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4981 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4982 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4983 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4984 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4985 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4986 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4987 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4988 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4989 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4990 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4991 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4992 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4993 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4994 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4995 if self.is_outbound() {
4996 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4997 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4998 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4999 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5000 // channel and move on.
5001 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5002 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5004 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5005 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5006 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5008 if self.is_outbound() {
5009 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5010 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5011 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5012 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5013 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5014 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5018 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5019 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5020 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5021 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5022 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5026 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5027 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5028 // may have already happened for this block).
5029 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5030 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5031 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
5032 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5035 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5036 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5037 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5038 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5046 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5047 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5048 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5049 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5051 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5052 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5055 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5057 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5058 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5059 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5062 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5063 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5064 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5065 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5066 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5068 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5069 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5071 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5072 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5073 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5081 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5083 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5084 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5085 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5087 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5088 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5091 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5092 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5093 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5094 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5095 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5096 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5097 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5098 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5099 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5102 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5103 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5104 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5105 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5107 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5108 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5109 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5111 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5112 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5113 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5114 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5116 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5117 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5118 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5119 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5120 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5121 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5122 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5125 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5126 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5128 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5131 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5132 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5133 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5134 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5135 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5136 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5137 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5138 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5139 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5140 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5141 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5142 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5143 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5144 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5145 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5146 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5147 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5153 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5158 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5159 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5161 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5162 if !self.is_outbound() {
5163 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5165 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5166 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5169 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5170 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5173 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5174 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5178 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5179 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5180 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5181 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5182 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5183 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5184 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5185 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5186 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5187 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5188 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5189 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5190 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5191 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5192 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5193 first_per_commitment_point,
5194 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5195 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5196 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5197 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5199 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5203 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5204 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5207 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5208 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5209 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5210 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5213 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5214 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5216 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5217 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5218 if self.is_outbound() {
5219 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5221 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5222 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5224 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5225 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5227 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5228 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5231 self.user_id = user_id;
5232 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5234 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5237 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5238 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5239 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5241 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5242 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5243 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5244 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5246 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5247 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5248 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5249 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5250 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5251 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5252 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5253 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5254 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5255 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5256 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5257 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5258 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5259 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5260 first_per_commitment_point,
5261 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5262 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5263 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5265 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5269 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5270 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5272 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5274 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5275 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5278 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5279 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5280 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5281 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5282 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5283 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5286 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5287 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5288 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5289 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5290 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5291 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5292 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5293 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5294 if !self.is_outbound() {
5295 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5297 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5298 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5300 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5301 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5302 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5303 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5306 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5307 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5309 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5312 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5313 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5318 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5320 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5322 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5323 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5324 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5326 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5327 temporary_channel_id,
5328 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5329 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5334 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5335 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5336 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5337 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5339 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5342 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5343 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5344 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5345 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5347 if !self.is_usable() {
5348 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5351 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5353 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5354 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5356 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5357 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5358 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5359 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5360 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5361 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5367 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5368 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5369 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5373 if !self.is_usable() {
5377 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5378 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5382 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5386 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5387 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5390 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5394 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5396 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5401 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5403 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5404 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5405 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5406 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5407 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5411 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5413 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5414 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5415 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5417 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5418 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5419 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5420 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5421 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5422 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5423 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5424 contents: announcement,
5427 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5431 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5432 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5433 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5434 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5435 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5437 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5439 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5440 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5441 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5442 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5444 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5445 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5446 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5447 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5450 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5451 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5452 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5453 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5456 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5459 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5460 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5461 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5462 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5465 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5467 Err(_) => return None,
5469 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5470 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5475 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5476 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5477 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5478 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5479 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5480 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5481 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5482 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5483 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5484 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5485 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5486 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5487 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5488 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5489 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5490 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5491 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5492 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5493 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5496 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5497 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5498 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5499 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5502 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5503 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5504 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5505 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5506 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5507 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5508 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5509 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5511 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5512 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5513 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5514 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5515 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5516 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5517 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5518 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5519 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5521 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5527 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5529 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5530 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5531 /// commitment update.
5533 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5534 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5535 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5536 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5538 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5539 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5541 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5542 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5547 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5548 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5550 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5552 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5553 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5555 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5556 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5557 /// regenerate them.
5559 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5560 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5562 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5563 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5564 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5565 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5566 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5567 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5569 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5570 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5571 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5574 if amount_msat == 0 {
5575 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5578 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5579 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5582 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5583 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5584 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5585 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5586 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5587 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5588 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5589 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5592 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5593 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5594 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5595 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5597 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5598 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5599 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5602 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5603 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5604 if !self.is_outbound() {
5605 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5606 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5607 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5608 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5609 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5610 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5614 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5617 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5618 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5619 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5621 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5622 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5623 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5624 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5625 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5626 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5630 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5631 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5632 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5633 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5634 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5635 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5639 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5640 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5641 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5644 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5645 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5646 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5647 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5649 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5650 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5653 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5654 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5655 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5656 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5657 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5660 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5661 force_holding_cell = true;
5664 // Now update local state:
5665 if force_holding_cell {
5666 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5671 onion_routing_packet,
5676 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5677 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5679 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5681 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5685 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5686 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5687 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5691 onion_routing_packet,
5693 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5698 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5699 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5700 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5701 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5702 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5704 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5705 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5706 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5708 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5709 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5713 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5714 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5715 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5716 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5717 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5718 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5719 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5722 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5723 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5724 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5725 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5726 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5727 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5730 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5732 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5733 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5734 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5735 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5736 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5737 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5739 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5742 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5743 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5746 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5747 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5748 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5749 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5750 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5751 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5752 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5753 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5756 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5757 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5760 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5761 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5762 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5763 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5764 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5765 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5766 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5768 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5770 if !self.is_outbound() {
5771 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5772 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5773 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5774 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5775 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5776 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5777 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5778 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5779 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5780 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5787 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5788 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5792 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5793 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5795 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5797 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5798 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5799 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5800 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5802 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5803 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5804 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5805 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5806 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5807 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5811 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5812 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5815 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5818 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5819 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5821 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5822 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5823 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5824 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5825 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5826 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5827 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5833 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5834 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5835 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5838 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5839 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5842 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5843 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5844 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5845 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5851 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5852 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5853 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5854 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5855 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5856 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5857 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5858 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5861 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5862 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5863 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5865 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5866 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5869 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5870 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5871 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5874 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5877 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5878 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5879 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5881 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5886 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5887 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5888 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5889 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5891 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5893 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5895 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5896 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5897 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5898 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5899 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5900 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5904 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5905 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5906 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5909 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5910 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5911 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5912 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5913 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5915 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5916 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5923 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5926 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5927 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5928 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5929 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5930 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5931 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5932 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5933 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5934 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5935 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5936 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5938 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5939 // return them to fail the payment.
5940 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5941 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5942 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5944 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5945 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5950 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5951 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5952 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5953 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5954 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5955 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5956 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5957 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5958 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5959 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5960 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5961 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5962 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5967 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5968 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5969 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5972 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5973 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5974 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5976 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5977 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5981 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5985 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
5986 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5988 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5994 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5995 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5996 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5997 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5998 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6000 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6001 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6002 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6003 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6009 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6010 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6011 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6012 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6013 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6014 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6019 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6020 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6021 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6022 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6024 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6025 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6026 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6027 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6032 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6033 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6034 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6035 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6036 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6037 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6042 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6043 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6044 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6047 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6049 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6050 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6051 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6052 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6053 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6055 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6056 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6057 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6058 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6060 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6061 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6062 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6064 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6066 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6067 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6068 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6069 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6070 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6071 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6073 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6074 // deserialized from that format.
6075 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6076 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6077 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6079 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6081 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6082 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6083 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6085 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6086 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6087 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6088 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6091 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6092 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6093 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6096 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6097 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6098 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6099 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6101 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6102 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6104 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6106 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6108 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6110 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6113 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6115 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6120 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6122 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6123 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6124 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6125 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6126 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6127 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6128 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6130 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6132 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6134 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6137 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6138 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6139 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6142 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6144 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6145 preimages.push(preimage);
6147 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6148 reason.write(writer)?;
6150 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6152 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6153 preimages.push(preimage);
6155 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6156 reason.write(writer)?;
6161 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6162 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6164 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6166 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6167 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6168 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6169 source.write(writer)?;
6170 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6172 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6174 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6175 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6177 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6179 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6180 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6185 match self.resend_order {
6186 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6187 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6190 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6191 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6192 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6194 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6195 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6196 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6197 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6200 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6201 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6202 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6203 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6204 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6207 if self.is_outbound() {
6208 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6209 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6210 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6212 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6213 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6214 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6216 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6218 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6219 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6220 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6221 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6223 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6224 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6225 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6226 // consider the stale state on reload.
6229 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6230 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6231 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6233 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6234 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6235 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6237 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6238 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6240 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6241 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6242 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6244 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6245 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6247 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6250 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6251 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6252 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6254 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6257 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6258 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6260 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6261 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6262 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6264 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6266 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6268 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6270 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6271 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6272 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6273 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6274 htlc.write(writer)?;
6277 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6278 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6279 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6281 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6282 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6284 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6285 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6286 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6287 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6288 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6289 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6290 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6292 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6293 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6294 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6295 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6296 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6298 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6300 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6301 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6302 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6303 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6305 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6306 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6307 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6308 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6309 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6310 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6311 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6313 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6314 (2, chan_type, option),
6315 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6316 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6317 (5, self.config, required),
6318 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6319 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6320 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6321 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6322 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6323 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6324 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6325 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6326 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6327 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6328 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6329 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6336 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6337 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6338 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6339 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6340 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6341 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6343 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6344 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6345 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6346 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6348 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6350 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6351 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6352 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6353 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6354 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6356 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6357 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6360 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6361 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6362 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6364 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6366 let mut keys_data = None;
6368 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6369 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6370 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6371 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6372 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6373 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6374 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6375 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6376 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6377 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6381 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6382 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6383 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6386 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6388 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6389 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6390 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6392 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6393 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6394 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6395 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6396 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6397 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6398 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6399 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6400 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6401 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6402 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6403 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6404 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6405 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6410 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6411 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6412 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6413 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6414 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6415 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6416 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6417 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6418 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6419 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6420 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6421 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6423 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6424 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6427 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6428 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6431 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6432 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6434 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6439 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6440 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6441 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6442 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6443 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6444 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6445 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6446 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6447 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6448 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6450 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6451 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6452 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6454 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6455 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6456 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6458 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6462 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6463 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6464 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6465 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6468 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6469 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6470 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6472 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6474 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6475 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6478 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6479 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6480 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6481 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6484 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6486 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6488 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6489 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6490 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6491 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6493 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6494 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6495 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6496 // consider the stale state on reload.
6497 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6500 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6501 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6507 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6508 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6509 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6511 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6512 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6513 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6514 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6516 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6517 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6519 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6520 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6522 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6526 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6528 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6529 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6531 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6532 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6535 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6537 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6538 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6539 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6540 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6542 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6545 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6546 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6548 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6550 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6553 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6554 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6556 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6558 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6559 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6560 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6562 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6563 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6564 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6568 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6569 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6570 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6572 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6578 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6579 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6580 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6581 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6582 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6583 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6584 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6585 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6586 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6587 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6589 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6590 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6591 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6592 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6593 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6594 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6596 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6597 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6599 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6600 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6601 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6602 (2, channel_type, option),
6603 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6604 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6605 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6606 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6607 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6608 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6609 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6610 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6611 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6612 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6613 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6614 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6615 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6616 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6617 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6620 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6621 let mut holder_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6622 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6623 // required channel parameters.
6624 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6625 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6626 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6628 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6630 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6631 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6632 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6633 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6636 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6637 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6638 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6640 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6641 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6643 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6644 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6649 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6650 if iter.next().is_some() {
6651 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6655 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6656 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6657 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6658 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6659 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6662 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6663 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6664 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6667 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6668 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6670 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6671 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6672 // separate u64 values.
6673 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6678 config: config.unwrap(),
6682 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6683 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6684 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6688 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6690 channel_value_satoshis,
6692 latest_monitor_update_id,
6695 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6698 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6699 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6702 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6703 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6704 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6708 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6709 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6710 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6711 monitor_pending_forwards,
6712 monitor_pending_failures,
6713 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6716 holding_cell_update_fee,
6717 next_holder_htlc_id,
6718 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6719 update_time_counter,
6722 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6723 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6724 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6725 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6727 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6728 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6729 closing_fee_limits: None,
6730 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6732 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6734 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6735 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6737 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6739 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6740 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6741 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6742 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6743 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6744 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6745 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6746 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6747 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6750 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6752 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6753 funding_transaction,
6755 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6756 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6757 counterparty_node_id,
6759 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6763 channel_update_status,
6764 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6768 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6769 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6770 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6771 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6773 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6775 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6776 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6777 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6779 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6781 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6782 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6784 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6793 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6794 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6795 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6796 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6797 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6799 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6800 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6801 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6802 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6803 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6804 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6805 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6806 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6807 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6808 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6809 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6810 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
6811 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6812 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6813 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6814 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6815 use crate::util::test_utils;
6816 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6817 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6818 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6819 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6820 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6821 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6822 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6823 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6824 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6825 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6826 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6827 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6828 use crate::prelude::*;
6830 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6833 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6834 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6840 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6841 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6842 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6843 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6847 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6848 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6849 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6850 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6851 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6852 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6853 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6857 signer: InMemorySigner,
6860 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6861 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6864 impl NodeSigner for Keys {
6865 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6867 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
6868 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6869 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &self.get_node_secret(recipient)?))
6872 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6874 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6876 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6879 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6880 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6882 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6883 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6886 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6890 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6892 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6893 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6894 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6895 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6896 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6899 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6900 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6901 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6902 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6906 impl KeysInterface for Keys {}
6908 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6909 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6910 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6914 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6915 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6916 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6917 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6919 let seed = [42; 32];
6920 let network = Network::Testnet;
6921 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6922 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6923 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6926 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6927 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6928 let config = UserConfig::default();
6929 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6930 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6931 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6933 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6934 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6938 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6939 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6941 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6942 let original_fee = 253;
6943 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6944 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6945 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6946 let seed = [42; 32];
6947 let network = Network::Testnet;
6948 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6950 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6951 let config = UserConfig::default();
6952 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6954 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6955 // same as the old fee.
6956 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6957 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6958 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6962 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6963 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6964 // dust limits are used.
6965 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6966 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6967 let seed = [42; 32];
6968 let network = Network::Testnet;
6969 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6970 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6972 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6973 // they have different dust limits.
6975 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6976 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6977 let config = UserConfig::default();
6978 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6980 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6981 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6982 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6983 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6984 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6986 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6987 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6988 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6989 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6990 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6992 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6993 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6994 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6996 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6997 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6998 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6999 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7002 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7004 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7005 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7006 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7007 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7008 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7010 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7011 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7012 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7013 payment_secret: None,
7014 payment_params: None,
7018 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7019 // the dust limit check.
7020 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7021 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7022 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7023 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7025 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7026 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7027 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7028 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7029 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7030 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7031 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7035 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7036 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7037 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7038 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7039 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7040 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7041 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7042 let seed = [42; 32];
7043 let network = Network::Testnet;
7044 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7046 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7047 let config = UserConfig::default();
7048 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7050 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7051 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7053 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7054 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7055 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7056 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7057 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7058 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7060 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7061 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7062 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7063 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7064 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7066 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7068 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7069 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7070 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7071 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7072 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7074 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7075 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7076 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7077 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7078 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7082 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7083 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7084 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7085 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7086 let seed = [42; 32];
7087 let network = Network::Testnet;
7088 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7089 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7090 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7092 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7094 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7095 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7096 let config = UserConfig::default();
7097 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7099 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7100 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7101 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7102 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7104 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7105 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7106 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7108 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7109 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7110 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7111 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7113 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7114 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7115 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7117 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7118 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7120 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7121 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7122 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7123 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7124 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7125 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7126 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7127 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7128 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7133 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7135 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7136 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7137 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7138 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7139 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7140 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7141 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7148 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7149 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7150 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7151 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7152 let seed = [42; 32];
7153 let network = Network::Testnet;
7154 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7155 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7156 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7158 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7159 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7160 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7161 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7162 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7163 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7164 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7165 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7167 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7168 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7169 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7170 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7171 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7172 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7174 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7175 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7176 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7177 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7179 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7181 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7182 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7183 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7184 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7185 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7186 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7188 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7189 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7190 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7191 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7193 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7194 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7195 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7196 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7197 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7199 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7200 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7202 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7203 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7204 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7206 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7207 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7208 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7209 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7210 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7212 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7213 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7215 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7216 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7217 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7221 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7223 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7224 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7225 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7227 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7228 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7229 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7230 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7232 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7233 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7234 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7236 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7238 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7239 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7242 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7243 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7244 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7245 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7246 let seed = [42; 32];
7247 let network = Network::Testnet;
7248 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7249 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7250 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7253 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7254 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7255 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7257 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7258 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7260 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7261 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7262 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7264 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7265 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7267 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7269 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7270 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7272 // Channel Negotiations failed
7273 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7274 assert!(result.is_err());
7279 fn channel_update() {
7280 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7281 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7282 let seed = [42; 32];
7283 let network = Network::Testnet;
7284 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7285 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7287 // Create a channel.
7288 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7289 let config = UserConfig::default();
7290 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7291 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7292 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7293 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7295 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7296 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7297 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7299 short_channel_id: 0,
7302 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7303 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7304 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7306 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7307 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7309 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7311 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7313 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7314 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7315 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7316 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7318 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7319 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7320 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7322 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7326 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7328 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7329 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7330 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7331 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7332 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7333 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7334 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7335 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7336 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7337 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7338 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7339 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7340 use crate::sync::Arc;
7342 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7343 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7344 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7345 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7347 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7349 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7350 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7351 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7352 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7353 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7354 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7356 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7357 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7362 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7363 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7364 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7366 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7367 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7368 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7369 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7370 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7371 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7373 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7375 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7376 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7377 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7378 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7379 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7380 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7382 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7383 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7384 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7385 selected_contest_delay: 144
7387 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7388 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7390 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7391 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7393 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7394 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7396 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7397 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7399 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7400 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7401 // build_commitment_transaction.
7402 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7403 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7404 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7405 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7406 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7408 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7409 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7410 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7411 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7415 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7416 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7417 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7418 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7422 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7423 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7424 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7426 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7427 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7429 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7430 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7432 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7434 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7435 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7436 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7437 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7438 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7439 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7440 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7442 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7443 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7444 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7445 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7447 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7448 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7449 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7451 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7453 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7454 commitment_tx.clone(),
7455 counterparty_signature,
7456 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7457 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7458 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7460 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7461 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7463 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7464 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7465 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7467 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7468 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7471 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7472 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7474 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7475 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7476 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7477 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7478 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7479 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7480 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7481 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7483 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7486 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7487 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7488 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7492 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7495 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7496 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7497 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7499 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7500 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7501 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7502 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7503 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7504 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7505 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7506 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7508 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7512 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7513 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7515 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7516 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7517 "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", {});
7519 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7520 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7521 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7522 "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", {});
7524 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7525 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7527 amount_msat: 1000000,
7529 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7530 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7532 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7535 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7536 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7538 amount_msat: 2000000,
7540 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7541 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7543 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7546 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7547 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7549 amount_msat: 2000000,
7551 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7552 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7553 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7555 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7558 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7559 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7561 amount_msat: 3000000,
7563 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7564 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7565 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7567 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7570 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7571 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7573 amount_msat: 4000000,
7575 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7576 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7578 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7582 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7583 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7584 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7586 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7587 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7588 "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", {
7591 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7592 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7593 "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" },
7596 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7597 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7598 "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" },
7601 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7602 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7603 "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" },
7606 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7607 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7608 "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" },
7611 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7612 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7613 "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" }
7616 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7617 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7618 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7620 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7621 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7622 "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", {
7625 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7626 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7627 "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" },
7630 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7631 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7632 "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" },
7635 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7636 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7637 "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" },
7640 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7641 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7642 "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" },
7645 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7646 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7647 "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" }
7650 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7651 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7652 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7654 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7655 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7656 "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", {
7659 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7660 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7661 "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" },
7664 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7665 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7666 "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" },
7669 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7670 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7671 "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" },
7674 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7675 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7676 "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" }
7679 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7680 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7681 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7682 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7684 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7685 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7686 "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", {
7689 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7690 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7691 "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" },
7694 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7695 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7696 "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" },
7699 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7700 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7701 "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" },
7704 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7705 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7706 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7709 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7710 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7711 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7712 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7714 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7715 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7716 "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", {
7719 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7720 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7721 "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" },
7724 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7725 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7726 "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" },
7729 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7730 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7731 "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" },
7734 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7735 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7736 "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" }
7739 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7740 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7741 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7743 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7744 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7745 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7748 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7749 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7750 "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" },
7753 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7754 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7755 "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" },
7758 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7759 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7760 "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" }
7763 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7764 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7765 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7767 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7768 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7769 "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", {
7772 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7773 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7774 "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" },
7777 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7778 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7779 "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" },
7782 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7783 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7784 "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" }
7787 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7788 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7789 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7791 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7792 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7793 "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", {
7796 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7797 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7798 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7801 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7802 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7803 "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" }
7806 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7807 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7808 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7809 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7811 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7812 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7813 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7816 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7817 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7818 "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" },
7821 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7822 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7823 "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" }
7826 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7827 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7828 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7829 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7831 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7832 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7833 "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", {
7836 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7837 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7838 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7841 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7842 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7843 "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" }
7846 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7847 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7848 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7850 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7851 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7852 "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", {
7855 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7856 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7857 "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" }
7860 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7861 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7862 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7863 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7865 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7866 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7867 "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", {
7870 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7871 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7872 "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" }
7875 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7876 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7877 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7878 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7880 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7881 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7882 "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", {
7885 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7886 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7887 "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" }
7890 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7891 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7892 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7893 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7895 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7896 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7897 "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", {});
7899 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7900 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7901 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7902 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7904 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7905 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7906 "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", {});
7908 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7909 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7910 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7911 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7913 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7914 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7915 "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", {});
7917 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7918 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7919 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7921 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7922 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7923 "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", {});
7925 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7926 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7927 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7928 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7930 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7931 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7932 "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", {});
7934 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7935 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7936 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7937 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7939 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7940 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7941 "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", {});
7943 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7944 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7945 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7946 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7947 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7948 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7950 amount_msat: 2000000,
7952 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7953 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7955 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7958 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7959 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7960 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7962 amount_msat: 5000000,
7964 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7965 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7966 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7968 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7971 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7972 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7974 amount_msat: 5000000,
7976 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7977 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7978 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7980 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7984 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7985 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7986 "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", {
7989 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7990 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7991 "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" },
7993 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7994 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7995 "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" },
7997 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7998 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7999 "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" }
8002 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8003 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8004 "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", {
8007 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8008 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8009 "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" },
8011 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8012 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8013 "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" },
8015 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8016 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8017 "02000000000101aa443fb63abc1e8c754f98a7b96c27cb02b21d891d1242a16b630dc32c2afe290400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e83473044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced401008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
8022 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8023 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8025 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8026 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8027 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8028 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8030 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8031 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8032 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8034 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8035 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8037 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8038 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8040 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8041 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8042 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8046 fn test_key_derivation() {
8047 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8048 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8050 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8051 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8053 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8054 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8056 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8057 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8059 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8060 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8062 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8063 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8065 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8066 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8068 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8069 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8073 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8074 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8075 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8076 let seed = [42; 32];
8077 let network = Network::Testnet;
8078 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8079 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8081 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8082 let config = UserConfig::default();
8083 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8084 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8086 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8087 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8089 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8090 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8091 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8092 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8093 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8094 assert!(res.is_ok());