1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
436 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
437 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
438 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
441 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
442 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
443 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
444 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
445 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
446 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
447 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
448 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
449 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
450 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
451 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
452 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
453 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
454 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
455 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
457 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
458 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
459 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
460 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
462 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
463 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
464 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
465 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
467 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
468 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
469 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
470 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
471 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
473 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
474 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
475 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
476 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
478 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
479 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
480 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
482 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
483 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
484 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
485 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
486 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
488 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
489 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
490 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
491 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
492 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
494 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
498 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
499 (0, update, required),
500 (2, blocked, required),
503 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
504 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
505 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
508 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
509 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
510 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
511 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
513 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
514 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
515 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
516 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
518 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
522 channel_id: [u8; 32],
523 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
526 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
527 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
529 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
530 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
531 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
533 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
534 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
535 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
536 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
538 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
539 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
541 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
543 holder_signer: Signer,
544 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
545 destination_script: Script,
547 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
548 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
549 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
551 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
552 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
553 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
554 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
555 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
556 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
558 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
559 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
560 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
561 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
562 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
563 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
565 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
567 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
568 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
569 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
571 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
572 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
573 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
574 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
575 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
576 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
577 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
579 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
581 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
582 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
583 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
584 // HTLCs with similar state.
585 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
586 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
587 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
588 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
589 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
590 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
591 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
592 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
593 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
596 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
597 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
598 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
600 update_time_counter: u32,
602 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
603 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
604 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
605 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
606 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
607 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
609 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
610 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
612 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
613 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
614 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
615 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
617 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
618 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
620 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
622 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
624 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
625 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
626 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
627 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
628 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
629 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
631 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
632 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
633 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
634 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
635 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
637 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
638 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
639 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
640 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
641 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
642 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
643 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
644 channel_creation_height: u32,
646 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
649 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
651 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
654 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
656 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
659 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
661 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
663 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
664 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
667 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
669 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
671 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
672 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
674 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
676 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
677 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
678 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
680 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
682 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
683 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
685 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
686 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
687 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
689 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
691 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
693 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
694 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
695 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
696 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
698 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
699 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
700 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
702 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
703 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
704 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
706 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
707 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
708 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
709 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
712 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
713 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
715 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
716 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
717 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
718 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
719 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
721 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
722 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
724 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
725 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
726 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
727 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
728 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
729 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
730 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
731 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
733 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
734 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
736 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
737 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
738 // the channel's funding UTXO.
740 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
741 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
742 // associated channel mapping.
744 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
745 // to store all of them.
746 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
748 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
749 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
750 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
751 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
752 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
754 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
755 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
757 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
758 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
760 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
761 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
762 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
764 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
765 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
766 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
767 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
768 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
771 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
772 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
774 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
775 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
776 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
780 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
782 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
783 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
784 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
785 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
789 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
791 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
793 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
795 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
796 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
797 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
798 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
799 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
801 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
802 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
804 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
806 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
807 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
809 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
810 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
811 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
812 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
813 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
814 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
816 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
817 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
819 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
820 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
821 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
822 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
823 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
825 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
826 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
828 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
829 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
831 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
832 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
833 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
834 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
840 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
841 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
843 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
844 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
845 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
850 macro_rules! secp_check {
851 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
854 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
859 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
860 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
861 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
862 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
864 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
866 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
867 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
868 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
870 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
873 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
875 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
878 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
879 /// required by us according to the configured or default
880 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
882 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
884 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
885 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
886 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
887 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
888 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
891 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
892 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
893 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
894 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
895 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
896 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
897 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
900 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
901 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
904 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
905 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
906 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
907 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
908 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
909 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
910 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
911 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
912 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
913 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
916 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
917 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
918 // `only_static_remotekey`.
920 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
921 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
922 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
923 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
930 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
931 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
932 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
933 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
934 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
935 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
936 // We've exhausted our options
939 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
940 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
943 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
944 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
945 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
946 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
948 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
949 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
950 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
951 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
952 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
953 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
955 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
957 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
961 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
962 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
963 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
964 outbound_scid_alias: u64
965 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
966 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
967 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
968 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
970 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
971 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
972 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
973 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
975 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
976 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
978 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
981 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
982 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
983 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
985 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
988 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
989 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
990 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
991 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
992 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
995 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
996 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
998 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
1000 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1001 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1002 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
1003 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1006 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1007 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1009 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1010 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1011 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1012 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1016 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1017 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1018 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1022 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1023 Ok(script) => script,
1024 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1027 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1032 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1033 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1034 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1035 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1040 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1042 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1043 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1044 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1045 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1047 channel_value_satoshis,
1049 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1052 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1055 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1056 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1059 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1060 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1061 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1062 pending_update_fee: None,
1063 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1064 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1065 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1066 update_time_counter: 1,
1068 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1070 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1071 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1072 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1073 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1074 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1075 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1077 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1078 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1079 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1080 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1082 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1083 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1084 closing_fee_limits: None,
1085 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1087 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1089 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1090 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1091 short_channel_id: None,
1092 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1094 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1095 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1096 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1097 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1098 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1099 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1100 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1101 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1102 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1103 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1104 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1105 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1107 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1109 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1110 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1111 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1112 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1113 counterparty_parameters: None,
1114 funding_outpoint: None,
1115 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1116 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1118 funding_transaction: None,
1120 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1121 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1122 counterparty_node_id,
1124 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1126 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1128 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1129 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1131 announcement_sigs: None,
1133 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1134 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1135 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1136 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1138 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1140 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1141 outbound_scid_alias,
1143 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1144 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1146 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1147 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1152 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1156 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1157 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1158 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1160 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1161 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1162 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1163 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1164 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1165 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1166 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1169 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1170 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1171 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1172 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1173 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1174 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1175 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1176 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1178 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1179 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1188 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1189 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1190 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1191 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1192 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1193 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1194 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1195 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1196 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1197 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1198 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1201 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1203 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1204 // support this channel type.
1205 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1206 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1210 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1211 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1212 // `static_remote_key`.
1213 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1216 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1217 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1220 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1223 channel_type.clone()
1225 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1226 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1231 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1233 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1234 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1235 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1236 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1237 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1238 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1239 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1240 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1241 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1244 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1248 // Check sanity of message fields:
1249 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1252 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1258 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1259 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1262 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1265 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1268 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1270 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1271 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1274 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1277 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1281 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1282 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1285 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1288 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1291 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1294 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1297 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1300 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1304 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1306 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1307 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1312 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1313 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1314 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1315 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1318 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1321 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1322 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1323 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1325 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1326 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1329 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1330 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1331 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1332 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1333 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1337 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1338 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1339 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1340 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1341 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1344 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1345 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1346 &Some(ref script) => {
1347 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1348 if script.len() == 0 {
1351 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1352 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1354 Some(script.clone())
1357 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1364 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1365 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1366 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1367 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1371 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1372 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1373 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1377 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1378 Ok(script) => script,
1379 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1382 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1383 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1385 let chan = Channel {
1388 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1389 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1391 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1396 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1398 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1399 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1400 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1401 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1404 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1407 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1410 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1411 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1412 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1414 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1415 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1416 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1417 pending_update_fee: None,
1418 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1419 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1420 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1421 update_time_counter: 1,
1423 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1425 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1426 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1427 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1428 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1429 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1430 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1432 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1433 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1434 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1435 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1437 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1438 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1439 closing_fee_limits: None,
1440 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1442 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1444 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1445 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1446 short_channel_id: None,
1447 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1449 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1450 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1451 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1452 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1453 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1454 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1455 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1456 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1457 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1458 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1459 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1460 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1461 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1463 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1465 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1466 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1467 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1468 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1469 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1470 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1471 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1473 funding_outpoint: None,
1474 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1475 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1477 funding_transaction: None,
1479 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1480 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1481 counterparty_node_id,
1483 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1485 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1487 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1488 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1490 announcement_sigs: None,
1492 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1493 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1494 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1495 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1497 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1499 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1500 outbound_scid_alias,
1502 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1503 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1505 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1506 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1511 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1517 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1518 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1519 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1520 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1521 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1523 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1524 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1525 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1526 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1527 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1528 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1529 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1531 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1532 where L::Target: Logger
1534 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1535 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1536 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1538 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1539 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1540 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1541 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1543 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1544 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1545 if match update_state {
1546 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1547 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1548 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1549 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1550 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1552 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1556 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1557 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1558 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1559 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1561 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1562 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1563 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1565 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1566 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1567 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1568 transaction_output_index: None
1573 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1574 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1575 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1576 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1577 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1580 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1582 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1583 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1584 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1586 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1587 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1590 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1591 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1594 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1596 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1597 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1598 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1600 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1601 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1607 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1608 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1609 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1610 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1611 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1612 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1613 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1617 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1618 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1620 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1622 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1623 if generated_by_local {
1624 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1625 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1634 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1636 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1637 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1638 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1639 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1640 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1641 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1642 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1645 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1646 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1647 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1648 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1652 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1653 preimages.push(preimage);
1657 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1658 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1660 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1662 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1663 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1665 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1666 if !generated_by_local {
1667 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1675 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1676 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1677 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1678 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1679 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1680 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1681 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1682 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1684 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1686 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1687 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1688 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1689 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1691 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1693 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1694 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1695 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1696 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1699 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1700 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1701 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1702 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1704 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1707 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1708 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1709 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1710 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1712 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1715 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1721 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1722 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1727 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1729 let channel_parameters =
1730 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1731 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1732 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1735 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1740 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1743 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1744 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1745 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1746 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1748 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1749 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1750 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1758 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1759 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1765 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1766 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1767 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1768 // outside of those situations will fail.
1769 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1773 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1778 1 + // script length (0)
1782 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1783 2 + // witness marker and flag
1784 1 + // witness element count
1785 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1786 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1787 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1788 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1789 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1790 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1792 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1793 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1794 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1800 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1801 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1802 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1803 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1805 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1806 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1807 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1809 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1810 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1811 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1812 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1813 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1814 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1817 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1818 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1821 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1822 value_to_holder = 0;
1825 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1826 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1827 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1828 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1830 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1831 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1834 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1835 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1839 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1840 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1841 /// our counterparty!)
1842 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1843 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1844 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1845 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1846 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1847 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1848 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1850 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1854 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1855 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1856 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1857 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1858 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1859 //may see payments to it!
1860 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1861 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1862 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1864 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1867 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1868 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1869 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1870 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1871 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1874 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1877 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1878 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1880 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1882 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1883 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1884 where L::Target: Logger {
1885 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1886 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1887 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1888 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1889 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1890 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1891 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1892 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1896 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1897 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1898 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1899 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1901 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1902 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1904 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1906 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1908 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1909 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1910 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1912 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1913 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1914 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1915 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1916 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1918 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1919 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1920 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1922 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1923 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1925 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1928 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1929 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1933 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1937 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1938 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1939 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1940 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1941 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1942 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1945 // Now update local state:
1947 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1948 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1949 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1950 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1951 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1952 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1953 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1957 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1958 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1959 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1960 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1961 // do not not get into this branch.
1962 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1963 match pending_update {
1964 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1965 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1966 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1967 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1968 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1969 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1970 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1973 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1974 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1975 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1976 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1977 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1978 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1979 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1985 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1986 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1987 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1989 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1990 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1991 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1994 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1997 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1998 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2000 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2001 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2003 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2004 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2007 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2010 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2011 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2012 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2013 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2018 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2019 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2020 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2021 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2022 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2023 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2024 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2025 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2026 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2027 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2028 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2029 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2030 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2031 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2032 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2033 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2034 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2036 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2038 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2039 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2040 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2041 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2042 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2043 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2044 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2046 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2047 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2050 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2051 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2052 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2053 update, blocked: true,
2058 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2059 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2060 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2061 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2065 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2069 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2070 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2071 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2072 /// before we fail backwards.
2074 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2075 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2076 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2077 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2078 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2079 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2080 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2083 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2084 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2085 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2086 /// before we fail backwards.
2088 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2089 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2090 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2091 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2092 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2093 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2094 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2096 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2098 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2099 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2100 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2102 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2103 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2104 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2106 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2107 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2108 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2110 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2115 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2122 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2123 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2124 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2125 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2126 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2130 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2131 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2132 force_holding_cell = true;
2135 // Now update local state:
2136 if force_holding_cell {
2137 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2138 match pending_update {
2139 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2140 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2141 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2142 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2146 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2147 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2148 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2149 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2155 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2156 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2157 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2163 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2165 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2166 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2169 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2170 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2171 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2176 // Message handlers:
2178 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2179 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2181 // Check sanity of message fields:
2182 if !self.is_outbound() {
2183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2185 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2188 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2191 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2194 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2197 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2199 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2201 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2202 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2205 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2206 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2209 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2212 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2216 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2217 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2220 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2223 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2226 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2229 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2232 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2235 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2239 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2240 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2243 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2244 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2246 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2247 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2250 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2253 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2254 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2255 &Some(ref script) => {
2256 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2257 if script.len() == 0 {
2260 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2263 Some(script.clone())
2266 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2273 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2274 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2275 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2276 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2277 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2279 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2280 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2282 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2285 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2286 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2287 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2288 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2289 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2290 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2293 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2294 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2295 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2298 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2299 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2301 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2302 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2307 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2308 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2310 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2311 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2313 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2314 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2315 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2316 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2317 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2318 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2319 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2320 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2321 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2324 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2325 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2327 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2328 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2329 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2330 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2332 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2333 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2335 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2336 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2339 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2340 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2343 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2344 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2345 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2347 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2350 if self.is_outbound() {
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2353 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2354 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2355 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2357 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2359 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2360 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2362 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2363 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2364 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2365 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2368 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2369 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2370 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2371 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2372 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2374 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2376 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2377 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2378 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2381 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2382 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2383 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2387 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2388 initial_commitment_tx,
2391 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2392 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2395 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2396 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2398 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2400 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2401 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2402 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2403 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2404 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2405 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2406 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2407 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2408 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2409 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2410 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2412 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2414 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2416 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2417 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2418 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2419 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2421 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2423 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2424 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2426 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2427 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2430 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2431 }, channel_monitor))
2434 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2435 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2436 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2437 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2438 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2440 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2443 if !self.is_outbound() {
2444 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2446 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2447 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2449 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2450 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2451 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2452 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2455 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2457 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2458 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2459 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2460 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2462 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2463 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2465 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2466 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2468 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2469 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2470 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2471 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2472 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2477 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2478 initial_commitment_tx,
2481 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2482 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2485 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2486 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2489 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2490 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2491 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2492 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2493 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2494 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2495 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2496 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2497 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2498 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2499 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2500 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2502 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2504 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2506 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2507 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2508 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2509 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2511 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2513 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2514 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2518 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2519 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2521 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2522 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2523 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2524 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2526 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2529 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2530 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2531 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2534 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2535 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2536 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2537 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2538 // when routing outbound payments.
2539 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2543 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2545 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2546 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2547 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2548 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2549 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2550 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2551 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2552 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2553 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2555 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2556 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2557 let expected_point =
2558 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2559 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2561 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2562 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2563 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2564 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2565 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2566 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2568 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2569 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2570 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2571 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2572 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2574 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2582 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2583 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2585 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2587 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2590 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2591 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2592 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2593 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2599 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2600 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2601 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2602 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2603 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2604 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2605 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2606 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2607 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2610 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2613 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2614 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2615 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2617 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2618 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2619 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2620 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2621 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2622 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2624 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2625 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2631 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2632 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2633 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2634 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2635 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2636 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2637 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2638 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2639 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2642 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2645 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2646 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2647 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2649 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2650 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2651 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2652 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2653 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2654 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2656 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2657 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2661 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2662 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2663 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2664 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2665 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2666 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2667 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2669 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2670 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2672 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2679 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2680 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2681 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2682 /// corner case properly.
2683 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2684 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2685 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2687 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2688 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2689 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2690 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2693 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2695 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2696 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2697 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2700 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2701 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2702 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2703 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2705 outbound_capacity_msat,
2706 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2707 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2708 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2714 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2715 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2718 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2719 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2720 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2721 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2722 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2723 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2726 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2727 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2729 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2730 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2733 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2734 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2735 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2737 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2738 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2740 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2743 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2744 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2746 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2747 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2749 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2750 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2752 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2753 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2757 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2758 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2764 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2765 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2766 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2769 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2770 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2771 included_htlcs += 1;
2774 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2775 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2779 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2780 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2781 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2782 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2783 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2784 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2789 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2791 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2792 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2797 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2798 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2802 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2803 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2807 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2808 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2810 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2811 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2812 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2814 total_pending_htlcs,
2815 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2816 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2817 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2819 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2820 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2821 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2823 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2825 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2830 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2831 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2832 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2834 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2835 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2837 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2840 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2841 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2843 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2844 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2846 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2847 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2849 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2850 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2854 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2855 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2861 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2862 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2863 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2864 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2865 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2866 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2869 included_htlcs += 1;
2872 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2873 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2876 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2877 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2879 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2880 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2881 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2886 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2887 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2888 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2891 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2892 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2894 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2895 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2897 total_pending_htlcs,
2898 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2899 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2900 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2902 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2903 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2904 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2906 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2908 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2913 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2914 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2915 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2916 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2917 if local_sent_shutdown {
2918 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2920 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2921 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2922 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2925 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2928 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2931 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2932 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2934 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2935 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2938 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2939 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2940 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2941 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2943 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2944 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2946 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2947 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2948 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2949 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2950 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2951 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2952 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2953 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2954 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2955 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2956 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2958 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2959 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2960 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2961 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2962 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2963 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2967 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2970 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2971 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2972 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2974 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2975 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2976 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2977 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2978 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2979 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2980 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2984 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2985 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2986 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2987 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2988 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2989 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2990 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2994 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2995 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2996 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2997 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2998 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3002 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3003 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3004 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3005 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3006 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3008 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3009 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3012 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3013 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3016 if !self.is_outbound() {
3017 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3018 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3019 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3020 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3021 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3022 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3023 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3024 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3025 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3026 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3027 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3028 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3029 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3030 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3031 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3034 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3035 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3036 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3037 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3041 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3044 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3048 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3049 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3050 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3054 // Now update local state:
3055 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3056 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3057 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3058 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3059 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3060 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3061 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3066 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3068 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3069 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3070 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3071 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3072 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3073 None => fail_reason.into(),
3074 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3075 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3076 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3077 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3079 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3083 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3085 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3086 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3088 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3094 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3097 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3098 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3101 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3105 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3108 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3109 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3112 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3116 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3120 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3121 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3124 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3125 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3128 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3132 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3133 where L::Target: Logger
3135 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3138 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3141 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3145 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3147 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3149 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3150 let commitment_txid = {
3151 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3152 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3153 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3155 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3156 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3157 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3158 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3159 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3160 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3164 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3166 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3167 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3168 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3169 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3172 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3173 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3174 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3178 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3180 if self.is_outbound() {
3181 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3182 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3183 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3184 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3185 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3186 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3187 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3188 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3189 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3190 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3196 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3200 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3201 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3202 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3203 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3204 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3205 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3206 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3207 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3208 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3209 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3210 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3211 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3212 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3215 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3216 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3217 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3218 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3219 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3220 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3221 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3223 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3224 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3225 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3226 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3227 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3228 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3229 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3232 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3233 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3236 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3238 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3239 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3240 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3243 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3246 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3247 commitment_stats.tx,
3249 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3250 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3251 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3254 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3255 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3257 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3258 let mut need_commitment = false;
3259 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3260 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3261 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3262 need_commitment = true;
3266 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3267 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3268 Some(forward_info.clone())
3270 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3271 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3272 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3273 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3274 need_commitment = true;
3277 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3278 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3279 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3280 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3281 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3282 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3283 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3284 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3285 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3286 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3287 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3288 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3289 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3290 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3292 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3294 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3295 need_commitment = true;
3299 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3300 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3301 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3302 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3303 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3304 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3306 nondust_htlc_sources,
3310 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3311 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3312 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3313 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3315 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3316 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3317 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3318 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3319 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3320 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3321 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3322 // includes the right HTLCs.
3323 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3324 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3325 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3326 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3327 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3328 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3330 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3331 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3332 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3335 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3336 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3337 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3338 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3339 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3340 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3341 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3342 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3343 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3347 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3348 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3349 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3350 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3353 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3354 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3355 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3356 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3357 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3358 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3359 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3360 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3363 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3364 /// for our counterparty.
3365 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3366 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3367 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3368 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3369 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3371 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3372 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3373 updates: Vec::new(),
3376 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3377 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3378 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3379 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3380 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3381 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3382 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3383 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3384 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3385 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3386 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3387 // to rebalance channels.
3388 match &htlc_update {
3389 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3390 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3391 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3394 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3395 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3396 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3397 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3398 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3399 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3400 // into the holding cell without ever being
3401 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3402 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3403 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3406 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3412 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3413 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3414 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3415 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3416 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3417 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3418 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3419 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3420 (msg, monitor_update)
3421 } else { unreachable!() };
3422 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3423 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3425 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3426 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3427 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3428 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3429 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3430 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3431 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3432 // for a full revocation before failing.
3433 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3436 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3438 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3445 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3446 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3448 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3449 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3454 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3455 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3456 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3457 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3458 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3460 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3461 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3462 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3464 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3465 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3471 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3472 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3473 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3474 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3475 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3476 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3477 where L::Target: Logger,
3479 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3482 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3485 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3486 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3489 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3491 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3492 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3493 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3497 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3498 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3499 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3500 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3501 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3502 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3503 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3504 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3505 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3508 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3510 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3511 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3514 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3515 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3517 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3519 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3520 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3521 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3522 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3523 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3524 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3525 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3526 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3530 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3531 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3532 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3533 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3534 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3535 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3536 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3537 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3539 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3540 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3543 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3544 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3545 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3546 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3547 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3548 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3549 let mut require_commitment = false;
3550 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3553 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3554 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3555 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3557 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3558 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3559 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3560 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3561 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3562 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3567 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3568 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3569 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3570 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3571 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3573 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3574 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3575 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3580 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3581 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3583 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3587 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3588 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3590 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3591 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3592 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3593 require_commitment = true;
3594 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3595 match forward_info {
3596 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3597 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3598 require_commitment = true;
3600 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3601 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3602 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3604 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3605 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3606 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3610 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3611 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3612 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3613 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3619 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3620 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3621 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3622 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3624 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3625 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3626 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3627 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3628 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3629 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3630 require_commitment = true;
3634 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3636 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3637 match update_state {
3638 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3639 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3640 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3641 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3642 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3644 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3645 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3646 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3647 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3648 require_commitment = true;
3649 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3650 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3655 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3656 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3657 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3658 if require_commitment {
3659 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3660 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3661 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3662 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3663 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3664 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3665 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3666 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3667 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3669 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3670 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3671 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3672 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3673 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3676 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3677 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3678 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3679 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3680 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3681 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3682 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3684 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3685 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3687 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3688 if require_commitment {
3689 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3691 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3692 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3693 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3694 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3696 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3697 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3698 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3699 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3701 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3702 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3703 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3709 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3710 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3711 /// commitment update.
3712 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3713 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3714 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3717 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3718 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3719 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3720 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3722 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3723 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3724 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3725 if !self.is_outbound() {
3726 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3728 if !self.is_usable() {
3729 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3731 if !self.is_live() {
3732 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3735 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3736 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3737 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3738 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3739 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3740 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3741 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3742 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3743 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3744 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3748 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3749 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3750 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3751 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3752 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3755 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3756 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3760 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3761 force_holding_cell = true;
3764 if force_holding_cell {
3765 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3769 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3770 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3772 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3773 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3778 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3779 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3781 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3783 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3784 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3785 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3786 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3790 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3791 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3792 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3796 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3797 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3800 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3801 // will be retransmitted.
3802 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3803 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3804 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3806 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3807 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3809 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3810 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3811 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3812 // this HTLC accordingly
3813 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3816 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3817 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3818 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3819 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3822 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3823 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3824 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3825 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3826 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3827 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3832 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3834 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3835 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3836 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3837 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3841 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3842 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3843 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3844 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3845 // the update upon reconnection.
3846 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3850 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3851 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3854 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3855 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3856 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3857 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3858 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3859 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3860 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3862 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3863 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3864 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3865 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3866 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3867 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3868 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3870 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3871 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3872 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3873 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3874 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3875 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3876 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3879 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3880 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3881 /// to the remote side.
3882 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3883 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3884 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3885 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3888 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3890 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3891 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3892 let mut found_blocked = false;
3893 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3894 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3895 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3899 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3900 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3901 // first received the funding_signed.
3902 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3903 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3904 self.funding_transaction.take()
3906 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3907 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3908 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3909 funding_broadcastable = None;
3912 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3913 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3914 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3915 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3916 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3917 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3918 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3919 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3920 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3921 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3922 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3923 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3924 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3925 next_per_commitment_point,
3926 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3930 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3932 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3933 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3934 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3935 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3936 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3937 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3939 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3940 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3941 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3942 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3943 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3944 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3948 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3949 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3951 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3952 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3955 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3956 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3957 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3958 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3959 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3960 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3961 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3962 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3963 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3967 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3968 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3970 if self.is_outbound() {
3971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3973 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3974 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3976 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3977 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3979 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3980 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3981 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3982 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3983 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3984 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3985 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3986 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3987 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3988 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3989 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3991 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3993 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3995 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4001 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4002 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4003 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4004 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4005 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4006 per_commitment_secret,
4007 next_per_commitment_point,
4009 next_local_nonce: None,
4013 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4014 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4015 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4016 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4017 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4019 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4020 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4021 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4022 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4023 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4024 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4025 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4026 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4027 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4032 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4033 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4035 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4036 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4037 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4038 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4039 reason: err_packet.clone()
4042 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4043 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4044 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4045 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4046 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4047 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4050 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4051 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4052 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4053 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4054 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4061 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4062 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4063 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4064 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4068 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4069 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4070 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4071 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4072 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4073 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4077 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4078 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4080 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4081 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4082 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4083 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4084 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4085 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4086 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4087 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4090 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4092 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4093 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4094 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4095 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4099 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4100 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4101 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4104 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4105 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4106 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4107 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4108 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4111 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4112 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4113 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4114 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4115 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4118 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4119 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4120 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4121 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4122 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4123 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4124 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4125 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4129 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4130 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4131 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4132 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4134 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4138 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4139 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4140 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4142 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4143 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4144 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4145 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4146 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4150 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4152 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4153 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4154 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4155 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4156 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4159 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4160 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4161 channel_ready: None,
4162 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4163 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4164 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4168 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4169 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4170 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4171 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4172 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4173 next_per_commitment_point,
4174 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4176 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4177 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4178 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4182 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4183 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4184 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4186 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4187 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4188 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4191 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4194 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4197 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4198 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4199 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4200 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4201 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4203 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4204 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4205 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4206 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4207 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4208 next_per_commitment_point,
4209 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4213 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4214 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4215 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4217 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4220 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4221 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4222 raa: required_revoke,
4223 commitment_update: None,
4224 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4226 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4227 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4228 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4230 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4233 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4234 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4235 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4236 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4237 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4238 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4241 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4242 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4243 raa: required_revoke,
4244 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4245 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4249 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4253 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4254 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4255 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4256 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4258 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4260 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4262 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4263 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4264 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4265 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4266 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4267 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4269 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4270 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4271 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4272 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4273 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4275 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4276 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4277 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4278 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4281 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4282 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4283 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4284 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4285 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4286 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4287 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4288 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4289 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4290 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4291 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4292 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4293 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4294 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4295 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4297 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4300 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4301 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4304 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4305 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4306 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4307 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4308 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4309 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4310 self.channel_state &
4311 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4312 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4313 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4314 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4317 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4318 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4319 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4320 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4321 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4322 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4325 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4331 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4332 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4333 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4334 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4336 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4337 return Ok((None, None));
4340 if !self.is_outbound() {
4341 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4342 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4344 return Ok((None, None));
4347 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4349 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4350 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4351 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4352 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4354 let sig = self.holder_signer
4355 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4356 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4358 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4359 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4360 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4361 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4363 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4364 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4365 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4370 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4371 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4372 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4373 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4375 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4378 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4379 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4380 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4381 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4382 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4384 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4385 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4389 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4391 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4395 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4396 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4397 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4400 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4403 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4404 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4405 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4406 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4408 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4411 assert!(send_shutdown);
4412 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4413 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4414 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4416 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4417 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4419 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4424 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4426 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4427 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4429 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4430 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4431 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4432 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4433 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4434 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4437 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4438 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4439 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4442 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4443 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4444 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4445 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4449 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4450 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4451 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4452 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4453 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4454 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4456 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4457 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4464 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4465 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4467 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4470 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4471 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4473 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4475 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4476 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4477 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4478 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4479 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4480 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4481 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4482 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4483 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4485 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4486 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4489 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4493 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4494 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4495 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4496 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4498 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4501 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4502 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4504 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4505 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4507 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4511 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4512 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4515 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4516 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4517 return Ok((None, None));
4520 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4521 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4522 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4523 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4525 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4527 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4530 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4531 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4532 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4533 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4534 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4538 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4539 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4540 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4544 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4545 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4546 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4547 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4548 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4549 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4550 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4554 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4556 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4557 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4558 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4559 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4561 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4564 let sig = self.holder_signer
4565 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4566 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4568 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4569 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4570 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4571 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4575 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4576 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4577 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4578 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4580 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4581 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4582 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4588 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4589 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4590 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4592 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4593 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4595 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4596 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4599 if !self.is_outbound() {
4600 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4601 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4602 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4603 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4605 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4606 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4607 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4609 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4610 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4613 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4614 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4615 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4616 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4617 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4618 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4619 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4620 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4622 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4625 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4626 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4627 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4628 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4630 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4634 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4635 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4636 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4637 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4639 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4645 // Public utilities:
4647 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4651 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4653 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4654 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4655 self.temporary_channel_id
4658 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4662 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4663 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4664 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4668 /// Gets the channel's type
4669 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4673 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4674 /// is_usable() returns true).
4675 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4676 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4677 self.short_channel_id
4680 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4681 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4682 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4685 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4686 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4687 self.outbound_scid_alias
4689 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4690 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4691 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4692 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4693 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4696 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4697 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4698 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4699 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4702 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4703 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4704 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4707 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4708 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4709 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4710 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4714 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4717 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4718 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4721 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4722 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4725 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4726 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4727 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4730 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4731 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4734 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4735 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4736 self.counterparty_node_id
4739 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4740 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4741 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4744 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4745 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4746 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4749 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4750 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4752 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4753 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4754 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4755 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4757 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4761 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4762 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4763 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4766 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4767 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4768 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4771 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4772 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4773 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4775 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4776 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4781 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4782 self.channel_value_satoshis
4785 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4786 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4789 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4790 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4793 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4794 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4797 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4798 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4799 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4802 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4803 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4804 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4807 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4808 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4809 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4812 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4813 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4814 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4817 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4818 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4819 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4822 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4823 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4824 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4827 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4828 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4829 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4830 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4831 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4834 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4836 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4837 self.prev_config = None;
4841 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4842 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4846 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4847 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4848 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4849 let did_channel_update =
4850 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4851 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4852 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4853 if did_channel_update {
4854 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4855 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4856 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4857 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4859 self.config.options = *config;
4863 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4864 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4865 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4866 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4867 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4868 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4869 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4871 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4872 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4875 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4877 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4878 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4884 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4885 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4886 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4887 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4888 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4889 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4890 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4892 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4893 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4900 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4904 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4905 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4906 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4907 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4908 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4909 // which are near the dust limit.
4910 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4911 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4912 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4913 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4914 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4916 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4917 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4919 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4922 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4923 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4926 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4927 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4930 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4931 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4935 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4940 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4942 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4943 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4944 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4945 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4946 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4947 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4949 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4951 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4959 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4960 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4964 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4965 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4966 self.update_time_counter
4969 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4970 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4973 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4974 self.config.announced_channel
4977 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4978 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4981 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4982 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4983 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4984 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4987 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4988 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4989 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4992 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4993 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4994 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4995 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4996 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4999 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5000 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5001 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5002 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5003 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5006 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5007 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5008 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5009 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5012 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5013 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5014 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5017 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5018 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5019 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5020 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5021 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5022 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5023 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5024 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5030 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5031 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5032 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5033 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5034 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5035 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5040 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5041 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5043 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5044 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5045 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5046 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5049 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5050 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5053 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5054 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
5055 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
5056 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
5062 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5063 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5066 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
5067 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5068 self.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
5069 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
5072 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5073 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5074 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5077 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5078 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5079 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5081 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5082 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5083 if self.channel_state &
5084 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5085 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5086 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5087 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5088 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5091 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5092 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5093 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5094 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5095 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5096 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5098 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5099 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5100 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5102 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5103 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5104 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5105 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5106 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5107 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5113 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5114 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5115 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5118 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5119 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5120 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5123 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5124 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5125 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5128 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5129 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5130 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5131 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5132 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5133 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5138 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5139 self.channel_update_status
5142 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5143 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5144 self.channel_update_status = status;
5147 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5149 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5150 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5151 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5155 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5156 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5157 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5160 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5164 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5165 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5166 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5168 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5169 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5170 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5172 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5173 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5176 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5177 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5178 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5179 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5180 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5181 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5182 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5183 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5184 self.channel_state);
5186 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5190 if need_commitment_update {
5191 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5192 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5193 let next_per_commitment_point =
5194 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5195 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5196 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5197 next_per_commitment_point,
5198 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5202 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5208 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5209 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5210 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5211 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5212 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5213 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5214 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5216 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5219 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5220 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5221 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5222 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5223 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5224 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5225 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5226 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5227 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5228 if self.is_outbound() {
5229 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5230 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5231 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5232 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5233 // channel and move on.
5234 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5235 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5237 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5238 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5239 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5241 if self.is_outbound() {
5242 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5243 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5244 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5245 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5246 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5247 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5251 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5252 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5253 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5254 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5255 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5259 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5260 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5261 // may have already happened for this block).
5262 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5263 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5264 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5265 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5268 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5269 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5270 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5271 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5279 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5280 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5281 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5282 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5284 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5285 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5288 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5290 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5291 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5292 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5293 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5295 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5298 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5301 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5302 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5303 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5304 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5306 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5309 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5310 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5311 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5313 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5314 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5316 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5317 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5318 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5326 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5328 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5329 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5330 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5332 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5333 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5336 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5337 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5338 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5339 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5340 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5341 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5342 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5343 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5344 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5347 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5348 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5349 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5350 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5352 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5353 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5354 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5356 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5357 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5358 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5359 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5361 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5362 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5363 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5364 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5365 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5366 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5367 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5370 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5371 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5373 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5376 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5377 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5378 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5379 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5380 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5381 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5382 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5383 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5384 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5385 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5386 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5387 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5388 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5389 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5390 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5391 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5392 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5398 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5403 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5404 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5406 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5407 if !self.is_outbound() {
5408 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5410 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5411 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5414 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5415 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5418 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5419 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5423 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5424 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5425 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5426 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5427 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5428 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5429 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5430 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5431 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5432 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5433 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5434 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5435 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5436 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5437 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5438 first_per_commitment_point,
5439 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5440 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5441 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5442 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5444 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5448 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5449 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5452 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5453 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5454 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5455 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5458 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5459 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5461 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5462 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5463 if self.is_outbound() {
5464 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5466 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5467 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5469 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5470 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5472 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5473 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5476 self.user_id = user_id;
5477 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5479 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5482 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5483 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5484 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5486 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5487 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5488 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5489 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5491 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5492 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5493 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5494 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5495 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5496 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5497 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5498 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5499 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5500 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5501 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5502 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5503 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5504 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5505 first_per_commitment_point,
5506 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5507 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5508 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5510 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5512 next_local_nonce: None,
5516 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5517 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5519 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5521 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5522 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5525 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5526 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5527 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5528 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5529 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5530 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5533 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5534 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5535 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5536 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5537 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5538 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5539 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5540 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5541 if !self.is_outbound() {
5542 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5544 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5545 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5547 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5548 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5549 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5550 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5553 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5554 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5556 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5559 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5560 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5565 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5567 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5569 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5570 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5571 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5573 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5574 temporary_channel_id,
5575 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5576 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5579 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5581 next_local_nonce: None,
5585 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5586 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5587 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5588 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5590 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5593 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5594 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5595 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5596 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5597 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5598 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5600 if !self.is_usable() {
5601 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5604 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5605 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5606 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5607 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5609 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5610 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5612 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5613 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5614 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5615 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5616 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5617 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5623 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5624 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5625 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5626 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5628 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5631 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5635 if !self.is_usable() {
5639 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5640 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5644 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5648 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5649 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5652 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5656 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5658 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5663 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5665 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5670 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5672 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5673 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5674 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5675 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5676 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5680 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5682 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5683 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5684 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5685 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5686 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5687 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5688 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5690 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5691 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5692 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5693 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5694 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5695 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5696 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5697 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5698 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5699 contents: announcement,
5702 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5706 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5707 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5708 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5709 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5710 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5711 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5712 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5713 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5715 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5717 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5718 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5719 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5720 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5722 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5723 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5724 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5725 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5728 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5729 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5730 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5731 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5734 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5737 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5738 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5739 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5740 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5741 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5742 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5745 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5747 Err(_) => return None,
5749 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5750 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5755 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5756 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5757 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5758 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5759 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5760 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5761 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5762 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5763 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5764 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5765 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5766 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5767 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5768 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5769 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5770 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5773 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5776 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5777 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5778 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5779 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5780 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5781 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5782 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5783 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5785 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5786 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5787 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5788 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5789 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5790 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5791 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5792 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5793 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5795 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5796 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5797 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5798 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5799 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5800 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5801 next_funding_txid: None,
5806 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5808 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5809 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5810 /// commitment update.
5812 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5813 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5814 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5815 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5817 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5818 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5820 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5821 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5826 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5827 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5829 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5831 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5832 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5834 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5835 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5836 /// regenerate them.
5838 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5839 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5841 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5842 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5843 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5844 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5845 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5846 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5848 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5849 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5850 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5853 if amount_msat == 0 {
5854 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5857 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5858 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5861 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5862 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5863 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5864 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5865 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5866 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5867 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5868 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5871 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5872 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5873 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5874 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5876 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5877 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5878 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5881 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5882 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5883 if !self.is_outbound() {
5884 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5885 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5886 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5887 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5888 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5889 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5893 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5896 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5897 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5898 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5900 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5901 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5902 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5903 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5904 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5905 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5909 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5910 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5911 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5912 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5913 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5914 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5918 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5919 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5920 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5923 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5924 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5925 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5926 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5928 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5929 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5932 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5933 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5934 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5935 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5939 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5940 force_holding_cell = true;
5943 // Now update local state:
5944 if force_holding_cell {
5945 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5950 onion_routing_packet,
5955 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5956 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5958 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5960 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5964 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5965 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5966 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5970 onion_routing_packet,
5972 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5977 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5978 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5979 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5980 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5982 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5983 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5984 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5986 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5987 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5991 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5992 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5993 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5994 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5995 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5996 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5997 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6000 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6001 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6002 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6003 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6004 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6005 self.pending_update_fee = None;
6008 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6010 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6011 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6012 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6014 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6015 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6018 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6019 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6020 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6021 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6022 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6023 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6024 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6025 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6028 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6032 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6033 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6034 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6035 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6037 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6039 if !self.is_outbound() {
6040 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6041 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6042 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6043 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6044 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6045 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6046 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6047 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6048 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6049 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6055 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6058 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6059 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6060 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6061 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6062 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6063 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6065 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6066 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6067 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6068 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6071 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6072 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6076 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6077 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6079 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6081 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6082 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6083 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6084 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6086 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6087 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6088 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6089 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6090 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6091 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6095 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6096 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6100 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6101 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6104 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6105 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6107 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6108 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6109 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6110 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6111 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6114 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6115 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6116 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6122 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6123 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6124 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6127 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6128 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6129 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6131 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6132 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6133 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6134 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6140 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6141 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6143 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6144 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6145 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6146 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6147 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6148 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6149 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6150 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6151 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6154 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6155 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6156 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6158 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6159 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6162 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6163 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6165 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6166 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6167 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6170 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6171 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6172 let mut chan_closed = false;
6173 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6177 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6179 None if !chan_closed => {
6180 // use override shutdown script if provided
6181 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6182 Some(script) => script,
6184 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6185 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6186 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6187 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6191 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6192 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6194 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6200 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6201 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6202 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6203 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6205 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6207 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6209 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6210 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6211 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6212 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6213 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6214 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6217 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6218 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6219 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6222 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6223 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6224 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6227 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6228 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6229 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6230 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6231 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6233 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6234 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6241 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6242 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6244 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6247 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6248 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6249 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6250 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6251 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6252 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
6253 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6254 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6255 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6256 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6257 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6259 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6260 // return them to fail the payment.
6261 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6262 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6263 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6265 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6266 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6271 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6272 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6273 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6274 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6275 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6276 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6277 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6278 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6279 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6280 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6281 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6282 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6283 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6288 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6289 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6290 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6293 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6294 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6295 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6297 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6298 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6302 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6306 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6307 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6309 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6315 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6316 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6317 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6318 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6319 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6321 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6322 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6323 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6324 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6330 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6331 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6332 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6333 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6334 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6335 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6340 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6341 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6342 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6343 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6345 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6346 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6347 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6348 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6353 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6354 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6355 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6356 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6357 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6358 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6363 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6364 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6365 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6368 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6370 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6371 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6372 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6373 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6374 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6376 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6377 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6378 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6379 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6381 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6382 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6383 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6385 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6387 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6388 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6389 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6390 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6391 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6392 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6394 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6395 // deserialized from that format.
6396 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6397 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6398 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6400 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6402 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6403 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6404 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6406 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6407 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6408 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6409 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6412 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6413 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6414 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6417 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6418 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6419 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6420 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6422 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6423 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6425 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6427 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6429 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6431 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6434 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6436 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6441 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6443 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6444 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6445 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6446 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6447 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6448 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6449 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6451 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6453 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6455 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6458 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6459 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6460 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6463 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6465 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6466 preimages.push(preimage);
6468 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6469 reason.write(writer)?;
6471 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6473 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6474 preimages.push(preimage);
6476 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6477 reason.write(writer)?;
6482 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6483 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6485 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6487 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6488 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6489 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6490 source.write(writer)?;
6491 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6493 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6495 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6496 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6498 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6500 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6501 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6506 match self.resend_order {
6507 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6508 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6511 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6512 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6513 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6515 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6516 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6517 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6518 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6521 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6522 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6523 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6524 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6525 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6528 if self.is_outbound() {
6529 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6530 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6531 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6533 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6534 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6535 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6537 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6539 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6540 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6541 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6542 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6544 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6545 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6546 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6547 // consider the stale state on reload.
6550 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6551 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6552 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6554 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6555 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6556 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6558 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6559 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6561 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6562 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6563 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6565 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6566 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6568 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6571 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6572 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6573 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6575 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6578 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6579 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6581 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6582 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6583 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6585 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6587 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6589 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6591 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6592 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6593 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6594 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6595 htlc.write(writer)?;
6598 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6599 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6600 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6602 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6603 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6605 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6606 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6607 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6608 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6609 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6610 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6611 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6613 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6614 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6615 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6616 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6617 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6619 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6620 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6622 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6623 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6624 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6625 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6627 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6629 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6630 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6631 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6632 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6633 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6634 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6635 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6637 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6638 (2, chan_type, option),
6639 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6640 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6641 (5, self.config, required),
6642 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6643 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6644 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6645 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6646 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6647 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6648 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6649 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6650 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6651 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6652 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6653 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6654 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6655 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6656 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6657 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6664 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6665 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6667 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6668 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6670 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6671 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6672 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6674 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6675 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6676 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6677 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6679 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6681 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6682 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6683 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6684 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6685 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6687 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6688 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6691 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6692 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6693 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6695 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6697 let mut keys_data = None;
6699 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6700 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6701 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6702 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6703 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6704 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6705 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6706 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6707 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6708 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6712 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6713 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6714 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6717 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6719 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6720 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6721 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6723 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6725 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6726 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6727 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6728 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6729 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6730 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6731 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6732 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6733 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6734 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6735 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6736 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6737 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6742 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6743 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6744 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6745 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6746 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6747 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6748 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6749 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6750 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6751 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6752 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6753 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6755 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6756 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6759 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6760 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6763 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6764 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6766 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6771 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6772 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6773 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6774 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6775 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6776 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6777 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6778 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6779 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6780 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6782 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6783 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6784 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6786 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6787 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6788 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6790 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6794 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6795 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6796 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6797 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6800 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6801 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6802 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6804 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6805 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6806 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6807 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6810 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6811 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6812 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6813 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6816 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6820 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6821 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6822 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6823 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6826 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6827 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6828 // consider the stale state on reload.
6829 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6832 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6834 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6836 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6839 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6841 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6843 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6845 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6846 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6848 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6849 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6851 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6852 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6854 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6855 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6858 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6860 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6861 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6863 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6864 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6869 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6870 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6871 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6872 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6874 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6877 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6880 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6882 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6890 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6891 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6894 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6896 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6900 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6901 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6902 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6904 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6910 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6911 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6912 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6913 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6914 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6915 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6916 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6917 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6918 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6919 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6921 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6922 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6923 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6924 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6925 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6926 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6927 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6929 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6930 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6931 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6932 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6934 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6936 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6937 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6938 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6939 (2, channel_type, option),
6940 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6941 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6942 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6943 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6944 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6945 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6946 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6947 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6948 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6949 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6950 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6951 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6952 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6953 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6954 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6955 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6956 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6957 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6958 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6961 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6962 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6963 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6964 // required channel parameters.
6965 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6966 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6967 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6969 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6971 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6972 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6973 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6974 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6977 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6978 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6979 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6981 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6982 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6984 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6985 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6990 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6991 if iter.next().is_some() {
6992 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6996 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6997 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6998 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6999 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7000 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7003 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7004 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7006 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7007 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7008 // separate u64 values.
7009 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7011 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7016 config: config.unwrap(),
7020 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7021 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7022 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7025 temporary_channel_id,
7027 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7029 channel_value_satoshis,
7031 latest_monitor_update_id,
7034 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7037 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7038 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7041 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7042 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7043 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7044 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7048 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7049 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7050 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7051 monitor_pending_forwards,
7052 monitor_pending_failures,
7053 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7056 holding_cell_update_fee,
7057 next_holder_htlc_id,
7058 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7059 update_time_counter,
7062 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7063 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7064 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7065 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7067 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7068 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7069 closing_fee_limits: None,
7070 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7072 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7074 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7075 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7077 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7079 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7080 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7081 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7082 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7083 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7084 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7085 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7086 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7087 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7090 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7092 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7093 funding_transaction,
7095 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7096 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7097 counterparty_node_id,
7099 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7103 channel_update_status,
7104 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7108 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7109 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7110 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7111 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7113 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7115 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7116 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7117 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7119 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7120 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7122 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7123 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7125 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7128 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7136 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7137 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7138 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7139 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7140 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7142 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7143 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7145 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7146 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7147 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7148 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7149 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7150 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7151 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7152 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7153 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7154 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7155 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7156 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7157 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7158 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7159 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7160 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7161 use crate::util::test_utils;
7162 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7163 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7164 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7165 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7166 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7167 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7168 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7169 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7170 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7171 use crate::prelude::*;
7173 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7176 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7177 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7183 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7184 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7185 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7186 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7190 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7191 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7192 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7193 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7194 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7195 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7196 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7200 signer: InMemorySigner,
7203 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7204 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7207 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7208 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7210 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7211 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7214 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7218 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7220 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7221 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7222 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7223 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7224 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7227 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7228 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7229 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7230 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7234 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7235 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7236 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7240 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7241 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7242 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7243 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7245 let seed = [42; 32];
7246 let network = Network::Testnet;
7247 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7248 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7249 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7252 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7253 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7254 let config = UserConfig::default();
7255 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7256 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7257 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7259 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7260 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7264 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7265 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7267 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7268 let original_fee = 253;
7269 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7270 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7271 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7272 let seed = [42; 32];
7273 let network = Network::Testnet;
7274 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7276 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7277 let config = UserConfig::default();
7278 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7280 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7281 // same as the old fee.
7282 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7283 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7284 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7288 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7289 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7290 // dust limits are used.
7291 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7292 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7293 let seed = [42; 32];
7294 let network = Network::Testnet;
7295 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7296 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7298 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7299 // they have different dust limits.
7301 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7302 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7303 let config = UserConfig::default();
7304 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7306 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7307 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7308 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7309 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7310 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7312 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7313 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7314 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7315 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7316 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7318 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7319 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7320 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7322 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7323 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7324 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7325 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7328 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7330 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7331 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7332 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7333 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7334 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7335 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7336 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7337 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7338 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7342 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7343 // the dust limit check.
7344 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7345 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7346 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7347 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7349 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7350 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7351 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7352 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7353 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7354 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7355 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7359 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7360 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7361 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7362 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7363 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7364 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7365 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7366 let seed = [42; 32];
7367 let network = Network::Testnet;
7368 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7370 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7371 let config = UserConfig::default();
7372 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7374 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7375 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7377 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7378 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7379 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7380 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7381 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7382 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7384 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7385 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7386 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7387 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7388 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7390 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7392 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7393 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7394 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7395 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7396 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7398 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7399 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7400 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7401 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7402 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7406 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7407 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7408 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7409 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7410 let seed = [42; 32];
7411 let network = Network::Testnet;
7412 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7413 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7414 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7416 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7418 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7419 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7420 let config = UserConfig::default();
7421 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7423 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7424 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7425 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7426 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7428 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7429 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7430 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7432 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7433 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7434 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7435 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7437 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7438 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7439 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7441 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7442 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7444 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7445 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7446 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7447 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7448 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7449 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7450 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7452 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7454 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7455 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7456 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7457 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7458 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7462 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7463 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7464 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7465 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7466 let seed = [42; 32];
7467 let network = Network::Testnet;
7468 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7469 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7470 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7472 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7473 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7474 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7475 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7476 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7477 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7478 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7479 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7481 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7482 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7483 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7484 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7485 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7486 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7488 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7489 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7490 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7491 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7493 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7495 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7496 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7497 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7498 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7499 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7500 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7502 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7503 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7504 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7505 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7507 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7508 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7509 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7510 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7511 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7513 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7514 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7516 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7517 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7518 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7520 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7521 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7522 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7523 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7524 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7526 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7527 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7529 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7530 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7531 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7535 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7537 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7538 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7539 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7541 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7542 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7543 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7544 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7546 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7547 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7548 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7550 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7552 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7553 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7556 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7557 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7558 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7559 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7560 let seed = [42; 32];
7561 let network = Network::Testnet;
7562 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7563 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7564 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7567 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7568 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7569 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7571 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7572 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7574 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7575 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7576 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7578 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7579 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7581 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7583 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7584 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7586 // Channel Negotiations failed
7587 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7588 assert!(result.is_err());
7593 fn channel_update() {
7594 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7595 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7596 let seed = [42; 32];
7597 let network = Network::Testnet;
7598 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7599 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7601 // Create a channel.
7602 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7603 let config = UserConfig::default();
7604 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7605 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7606 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7607 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7609 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7610 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7611 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7613 short_channel_id: 0,
7616 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7617 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7618 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7620 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7621 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7623 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7625 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7627 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7628 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7629 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7630 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7632 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7633 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7634 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7636 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7640 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7642 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7643 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7644 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7645 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7646 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7647 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7648 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7649 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7650 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7651 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7652 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7653 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7654 use crate::sync::Arc;
7656 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7657 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7658 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7659 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7661 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7663 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7664 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7665 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7666 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7667 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7669 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7670 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7676 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7677 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7678 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7680 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7681 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7682 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7683 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7684 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7685 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7687 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7689 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7690 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7691 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7692 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7693 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7694 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7696 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7697 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7698 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7699 selected_contest_delay: 144
7701 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7702 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7704 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7705 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7707 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7708 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7710 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7711 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7713 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7714 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7715 // build_commitment_transaction.
7716 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7717 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7718 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7719 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7720 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7722 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7723 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7724 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7725 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7729 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7730 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7731 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7732 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7736 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7737 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7738 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7740 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7741 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7743 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7744 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7746 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7748 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7749 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7750 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7751 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7752 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7753 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7754 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7756 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7757 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7758 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7759 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7761 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7762 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7763 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7765 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7767 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7768 commitment_tx.clone(),
7769 counterparty_signature,
7770 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7771 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7772 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7774 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7775 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7777 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7778 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7779 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7781 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7782 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7785 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7786 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7788 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7789 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7790 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7791 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7792 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7793 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7794 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7795 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7797 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7800 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7801 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7802 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7806 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7809 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7810 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7811 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7813 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7814 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7815 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7816 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7817 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7818 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7819 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7820 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7822 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7826 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7827 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7828 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7829 "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", {});
7831 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7832 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7834 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7835 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7836 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7838 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7839 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7840 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7841 "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", {});
7843 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7844 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7846 amount_msat: 1000000,
7848 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7849 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7851 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7854 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7855 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7857 amount_msat: 2000000,
7859 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7860 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7862 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7865 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7866 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7868 amount_msat: 2000000,
7870 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7871 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7872 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7874 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7877 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7878 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7880 amount_msat: 3000000,
7882 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7883 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7884 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7886 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7889 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7890 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7892 amount_msat: 4000000,
7894 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7895 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7897 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7901 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7902 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7903 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7905 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7906 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7907 "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", {
7910 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7911 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7912 "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" },
7915 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7916 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7917 "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" },
7920 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7921 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7922 "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" },
7925 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7926 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7927 "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" },
7930 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7931 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7932 "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" }
7935 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7936 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7937 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7939 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7940 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7941 "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", {
7944 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7945 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7946 "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" },
7949 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7950 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7951 "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" },
7954 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7955 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7956 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7959 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7960 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7961 "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" },
7964 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7965 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7966 "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" }
7969 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7970 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7971 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7973 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7974 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7975 "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", {
7978 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7979 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7980 "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" },
7983 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7984 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7985 "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" },
7988 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7989 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7990 "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" },
7993 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7994 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7995 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7998 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7999 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8000 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8001 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8003 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8004 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8005 "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", {
8008 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8009 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8010 "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" },
8013 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8014 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8015 "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" },
8018 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8019 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8020 "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" },
8023 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8024 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8025 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8028 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8029 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8030 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8031 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8033 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8034 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8035 "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", {
8038 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8039 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8040 "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" },
8043 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8044 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8045 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8048 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8049 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8050 "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" },
8053 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8054 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8055 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8058 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8059 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8060 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8062 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8063 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8064 "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", {
8067 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8068 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8069 "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" },
8072 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8073 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8074 "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" },
8077 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8078 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8079 "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" }
8082 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8083 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8084 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8086 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8087 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8088 "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", {
8091 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8092 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8093 "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" },
8096 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8097 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8098 "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" },
8101 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8102 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8103 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8106 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8107 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8108 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8110 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8111 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8112 "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", {
8115 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8116 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8117 "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" },
8120 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8121 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8122 "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" }
8125 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8126 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8127 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8128 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8130 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8131 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8132 "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", {
8135 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8136 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8137 "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" },
8140 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8141 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8142 "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" }
8145 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8146 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8147 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8148 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8150 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8151 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8152 "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", {
8155 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8156 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8157 "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" },
8160 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8161 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8162 "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" }
8165 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8166 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8167 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8169 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8170 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8171 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484eb936a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e101483045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8174 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8175 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8176 "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" }
8179 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8180 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8181 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8182 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8184 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8185 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8186 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8189 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8190 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8191 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8194 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8195 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8196 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8197 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8199 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8200 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8201 "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", {
8204 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8205 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8206 "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" }
8209 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8210 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8211 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8212 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8214 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8215 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8216 "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", {});
8218 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8219 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8220 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8221 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8223 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8224 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8225 "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", {});
8227 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8228 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8229 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8230 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8232 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8233 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8234 "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", {});
8236 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8237 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8238 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8240 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8241 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8242 "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", {});
8244 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8245 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8246 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8247 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8249 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8250 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8251 "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", {});
8253 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8254 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8255 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8256 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8258 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8259 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8260 "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", {});
8262 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8263 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8264 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8265 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8266 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8267 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8269 amount_msat: 2000000,
8271 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8272 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8274 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8277 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8278 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8279 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8281 amount_msat: 5000001,
8283 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8284 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8285 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8287 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8290 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8291 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8293 amount_msat: 5000000,
8295 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8296 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8297 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8299 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8303 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8304 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8305 "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", {
8308 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8309 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
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8314 "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" },
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8318 "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" }
8321 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8322 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8323 "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", {
8326 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8327 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8328 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8330 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8331 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8332 "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" },
8334 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8335 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8336 "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" }
8341 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8342 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8344 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8345 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8346 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8347 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8349 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8350 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8351 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8353 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8354 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8356 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8357 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8359 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8360 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8361 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8365 fn test_key_derivation() {
8366 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8367 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8369 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8370 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8372 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8373 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8375 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8376 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8378 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8379 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8381 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8382 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8384 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8385 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8387 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8388 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8392 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8393 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8394 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8395 let seed = [42; 32];
8396 let network = Network::Testnet;
8397 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8398 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8400 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8401 let config = UserConfig::default();
8402 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8403 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8405 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8406 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8408 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8409 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8410 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8411 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8412 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8413 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8414 assert!(res.is_ok());
8419 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8420 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8421 // resulting `channel_type`.
8422 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8423 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8424 let network = Network::Testnet;
8425 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8426 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8428 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8429 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8431 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8432 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8434 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8435 // need to signal it.
8436 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8437 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8438 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8441 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8443 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8444 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8445 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8447 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8448 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8449 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8452 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8453 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8454 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8455 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8456 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8459 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8460 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8465 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8466 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8467 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8468 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8469 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8470 let network = Network::Testnet;
8471 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8472 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8474 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8475 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8477 let config = UserConfig::default();
8479 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8480 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8481 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8482 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8483 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8485 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8486 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8487 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8490 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8491 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8492 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8494 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8495 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8496 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8497 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8498 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8499 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8501 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8506 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8507 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8509 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8510 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8511 let network = Network::Testnet;
8512 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8513 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8515 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8516 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8518 let config = UserConfig::default();
8520 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8521 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8522 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8523 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8524 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8525 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8526 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8527 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8529 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8530 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8531 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8532 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8533 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8534 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8537 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8538 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8540 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8541 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8542 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8543 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8545 assert!(res.is_err());
8547 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8548 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8549 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8551 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8552 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8553 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8556 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8558 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8559 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8560 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8561 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8564 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8565 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8567 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8568 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8570 assert!(res.is_err());