1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
301 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
304 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
306 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
308 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
310 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
312 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
315 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
317 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
319 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
323 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
324 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
328 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
330 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
332 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
333 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
335 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
337 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
339 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
340 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
342 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
343 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
345 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
346 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
351 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
354 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
355 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
356 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
357 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
358 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
359 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
360 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
361 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
362 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
363 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
364 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
365 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
366 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
367 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
371 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
373 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
374 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
375 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
376 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
377 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
378 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
379 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
380 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
381 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
382 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
387 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
388 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
389 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
390 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
391 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
392 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
397 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
398 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
399 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
400 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
401 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
402 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
403 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
404 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
405 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
406 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
407 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
412 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
413 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
414 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
415 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
416 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
417 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
418 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
424 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
425 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
426 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
427 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
428 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
430 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
431 /// funding transaction to confirm.
432 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
433 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
435 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
436 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
437 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
441 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
442 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
444 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
447 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
456 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
458 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
462 fn $clear(&mut self) {
465 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
467 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
471 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
472 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
474 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
475 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
480 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
482 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
483 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
485 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
486 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
487 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
488 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
489 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
490 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
491 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
492 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
500 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
502 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
503 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
504 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
505 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
506 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
510 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
511 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
514 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
515 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
518 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
520 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
521 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
522 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
526 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
528 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
529 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
530 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
531 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
533 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
539 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
540 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
541 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
542 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
543 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
544 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
545 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
546 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
547 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
548 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
549 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
550 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
551 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
552 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
553 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
554 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
557 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
559 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
561 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
564 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
575 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
576 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
577 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
578 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
580 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
581 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
583 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
585 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
586 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
588 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
589 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
590 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
591 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
592 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
593 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
595 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
596 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
598 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
599 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
600 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
601 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
602 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
604 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
605 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
607 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
608 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
610 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
611 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
612 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
613 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
619 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
622 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
623 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
624 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
629 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
630 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
632 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
633 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
639 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
641 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
642 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
645 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
646 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
647 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
648 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
649 self.logger.log(record)
653 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
654 where L::Target: Logger {
655 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
656 where S::Target: SignerProvider
660 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
661 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
666 macro_rules! secp_check {
667 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
675 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
676 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
677 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
678 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
679 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
680 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
681 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
682 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
684 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
686 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
688 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
692 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
694 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
695 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
696 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
698 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
699 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
701 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
702 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
703 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
704 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
705 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
707 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
708 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
712 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
718 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
721 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
723 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
724 holding_cell_msat: u64,
725 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
728 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
729 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
730 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
731 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
732 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
733 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
734 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
735 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
736 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
737 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
738 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
741 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
742 struct HTLCCandidate {
744 origin: HTLCInitiator,
748 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
756 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
758 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
760 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
761 htlc_value_msat: u64,
762 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
767 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
768 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
769 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
770 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
771 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
773 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
774 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
775 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
776 htlc_value_msat: u64,
778 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
779 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
783 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
784 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
785 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
786 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
787 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
788 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
789 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
790 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
791 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
792 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
793 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
796 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
798 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
799 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
800 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
804 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
805 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
806 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
807 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
808 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
809 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
810 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
811 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
814 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
816 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
817 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
818 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
819 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
820 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
821 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
822 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
823 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
824 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
825 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
826 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
827 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
828 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
829 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
830 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
833 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
834 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
835 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
836 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
837 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
838 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
839 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
840 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
841 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
842 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
843 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
844 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
845 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
846 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
847 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
849 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
850 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
851 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
852 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
854 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
855 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
856 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
857 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
859 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
860 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
861 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
862 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
863 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
865 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
866 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
867 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
868 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
870 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
871 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
872 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
874 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
875 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
876 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
877 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
878 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
880 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
881 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
884 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
885 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
887 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
888 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
889 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
890 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
892 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
893 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
895 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
896 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
899 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
900 (0, update, required),
903 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
904 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
905 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
906 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
907 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
911 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
912 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
913 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
915 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
917 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
919 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
923 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
925 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
926 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
927 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
932 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
933 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
934 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
935 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
936 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
938 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
939 /// in a timely manner.
940 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
943 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
944 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
945 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
947 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
948 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
949 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
950 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
954 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
955 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
956 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
958 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
959 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
960 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
961 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
963 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
967 /// The current channel ID.
968 channel_id: ChannelId,
969 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
970 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
971 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
972 channel_state: ChannelState,
974 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
975 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
977 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
978 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
979 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
981 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
982 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
983 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
984 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
986 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
987 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
989 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
991 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
992 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
993 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
995 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
996 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
997 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
999 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1000 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1001 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1002 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1003 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1004 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1006 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1007 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1008 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1009 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1010 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1011 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1013 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1015 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1016 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1017 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1019 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1020 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1021 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1022 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1023 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1024 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1025 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1027 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1028 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1029 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1031 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1032 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1033 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1034 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1035 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1036 /// outbound or inbound.
1037 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1039 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1041 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1042 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1043 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1044 // HTLCs with similar state.
1045 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1046 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1047 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1048 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1049 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1050 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1051 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1052 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1053 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1054 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1056 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1057 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1058 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1060 update_time_counter: u32,
1062 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1063 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1064 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1065 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1066 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1067 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1069 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1070 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1072 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1073 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1074 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1075 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1077 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1078 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1080 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1082 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1084 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1085 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1086 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1087 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1088 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1090 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1091 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1093 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1094 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1095 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1097 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1098 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1099 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1100 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1101 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1102 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1103 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1104 channel_creation_height: u32,
1106 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1109 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1111 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1114 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1116 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1119 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1121 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1123 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1124 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1127 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1129 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1131 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1132 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1134 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1136 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1137 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1138 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1140 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1142 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1143 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1144 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1146 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1147 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1148 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1150 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1152 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1154 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1155 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1156 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1157 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1159 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1160 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1161 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1163 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1164 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1165 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1167 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1168 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1169 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1170 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1171 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1172 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1173 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1174 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1176 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1177 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1178 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1179 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1180 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1182 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1183 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1185 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1186 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1187 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1188 /// unblock the state machine.
1190 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1191 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1192 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1194 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1195 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1196 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1198 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1199 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1200 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1201 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1202 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1203 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1204 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1205 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1207 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1208 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1210 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1211 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1212 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1214 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1215 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1216 // associated channel mapping.
1218 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1219 // to store all of them.
1220 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1222 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1223 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1224 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1225 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1226 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1228 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1229 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1231 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1232 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1234 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1235 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1236 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1238 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1239 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1240 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1243 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1244 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1245 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1246 self.update_time_counter
1249 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1250 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1253 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1254 self.config.announced_channel
1257 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1258 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1261 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1262 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1263 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1264 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1267 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1268 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1269 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1272 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1273 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1274 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1275 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1276 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1277 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1278 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1281 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1282 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1283 match self.channel_state {
1284 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1285 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1286 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1287 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1288 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1289 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1290 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1292 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1294 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1295 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1299 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1300 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1301 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1302 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1303 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1304 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1307 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1308 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1309 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1313 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1314 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1315 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1316 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1317 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1320 // Public utilities:
1322 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1326 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1328 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1329 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1330 self.temporary_channel_id
1333 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1337 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1338 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1339 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1343 /// Gets the channel's type
1344 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1348 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1350 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1351 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1352 self.short_channel_id
1355 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1356 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1357 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1360 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1361 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1362 self.outbound_scid_alias
1365 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1367 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1368 return &self.holder_signer
1371 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1372 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1373 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1374 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1375 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1376 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1379 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1380 /// get_funding_created.
1381 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1382 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1385 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1386 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1387 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1388 if conf_height > 0 {
1395 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1396 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1397 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1400 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1401 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1402 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1403 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1407 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1410 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1411 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1414 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1415 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1418 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1419 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1420 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1423 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1424 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1428 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1429 self.counterparty_node_id
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1433 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1434 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1437 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1438 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1439 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1442 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1443 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1445 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1446 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1447 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1448 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1450 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1455 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1456 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1459 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1460 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1461 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1464 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1465 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1466 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1468 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1469 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1474 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1475 self.channel_value_satoshis
1478 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1479 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1482 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1483 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1486 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1487 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1488 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1490 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1491 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1492 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1493 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1494 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1496 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1500 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1501 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1502 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1505 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1507 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1510 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1512 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1515 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1517 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1520 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1521 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1522 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1525 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1526 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1527 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1530 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1531 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1532 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1533 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1534 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1537 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1539 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1540 self.prev_config = None;
1544 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1545 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1549 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1550 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1551 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1552 let did_channel_update =
1553 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1554 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1555 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1556 if did_channel_update {
1557 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1558 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1559 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1560 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1562 self.config.options = *config;
1566 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1567 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1568 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1569 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1570 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1573 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1574 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1575 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1576 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1577 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1579 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1580 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1581 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1582 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1583 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1584 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1585 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1587 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1588 where L::Target: Logger
1590 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1591 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1592 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1594 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1595 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1596 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1597 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1599 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1600 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1601 if match update_state {
1602 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1603 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1604 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1605 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1606 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1608 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1612 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1613 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1614 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1616 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1618 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1619 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1620 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1622 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1623 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1624 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1625 transaction_output_index: None
1630 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1631 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1632 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1633 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1634 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1637 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1639 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1640 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1641 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1643 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1644 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1647 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1648 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1651 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1653 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1654 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1655 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1657 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1658 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1664 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1666 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1667 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1668 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1669 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1670 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1671 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1672 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1676 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1677 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1679 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1681 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1682 if generated_by_local {
1683 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1684 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1685 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1695 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1697 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1698 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1699 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1700 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1701 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1702 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1703 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1706 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1707 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1708 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1709 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1713 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1714 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1718 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1719 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1721 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1723 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1724 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1726 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1727 if !generated_by_local {
1728 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1736 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1737 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1738 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1739 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1740 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1741 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1742 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1743 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1745 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1747 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1748 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1749 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1750 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1752 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1754 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1755 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1756 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1757 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1760 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1761 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1762 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1763 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1765 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1768 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1769 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1770 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1771 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1773 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1776 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1777 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1782 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1783 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1788 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1790 let channel_parameters =
1791 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1792 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1793 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1800 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1803 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1804 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1805 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1806 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1814 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1815 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1816 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1817 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1822 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1823 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1824 /// our counterparty!)
1825 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1826 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1827 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1828 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1829 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1830 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1831 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1833 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1837 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1838 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1839 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1840 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1841 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1842 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1843 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1845 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1848 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1849 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1850 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1851 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1852 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1855 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1856 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1859 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1863 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1864 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1865 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1866 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1867 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1868 // which are near the dust limit.
1869 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1870 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1871 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1872 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1873 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1875 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1876 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1878 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
1879 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
1882 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1883 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1884 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1887 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1888 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1890 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1891 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1892 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1893 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1894 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1895 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1896 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1899 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1902 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1903 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1904 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1906 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1908 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1909 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1910 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1911 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1914 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1920 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1921 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1923 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1924 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1925 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1926 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1927 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1928 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1929 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1932 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1935 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1936 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1937 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1939 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1940 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1941 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1942 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1943 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1944 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1946 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1947 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1951 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1952 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1953 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1954 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1955 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1956 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1957 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1959 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1960 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1962 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1969 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1970 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1971 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1972 /// corner case properly.
1973 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1974 -> AvailableBalances
1975 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1977 let context = &self;
1978 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1979 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1980 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1982 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1983 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1984 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1985 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1988 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1990 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1991 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1993 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1995 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1997 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1998 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2002 if context.is_outbound() {
2003 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2004 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2006 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2007 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2009 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2010 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2011 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2012 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2015 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2016 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2017 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2018 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2019 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2020 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2021 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2024 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2025 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2026 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2027 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2028 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2029 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2030 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2031 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2032 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2033 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2034 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2036 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2039 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2040 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2041 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2042 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2043 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2046 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2047 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2049 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2050 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2051 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2053 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2054 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2055 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2056 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2060 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2062 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2063 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2064 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2065 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2066 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2067 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2068 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2070 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2071 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2073 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2074 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2075 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2077 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2078 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2079 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2080 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2081 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2084 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2085 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2086 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2087 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2088 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2089 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2092 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2093 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2094 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2096 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2100 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2101 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2103 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2104 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2108 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2109 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2110 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2111 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2113 outbound_capacity_msat,
2114 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2115 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2120 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2121 let context = &self;
2122 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2125 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2126 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2128 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2129 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2131 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2132 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2134 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2135 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2136 let context = &self;
2137 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2139 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2142 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2143 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2145 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2146 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2148 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2149 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2151 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2152 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2156 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2157 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2164 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2165 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2168 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2169 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2170 included_htlcs += 1;
2173 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2174 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2178 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2179 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2180 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2181 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2182 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2183 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2188 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2191 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2196 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2197 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2201 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2202 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2203 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2206 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2207 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2209 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2210 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2211 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2213 total_pending_htlcs,
2214 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2215 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2216 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2218 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2219 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2220 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2222 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2224 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2229 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2230 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2232 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2233 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2235 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2236 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2238 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2239 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2240 let context = &self;
2241 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2243 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2246 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2247 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2249 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2250 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2252 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2253 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2255 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2256 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2260 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2261 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2267 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2268 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2269 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2270 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2271 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2272 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2275 included_htlcs += 1;
2278 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2279 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2282 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2283 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2285 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2286 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2287 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2292 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2293 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2298 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2300 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2301 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2303 total_pending_htlcs,
2304 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2305 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2306 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2308 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2309 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2310 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2312 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2314 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2319 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2320 match self.channel_state {
2321 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2322 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2323 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2324 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2334 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2336 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2337 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2340 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2342 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2343 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2344 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2348 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2349 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2350 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2353 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2355 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2356 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2359 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2360 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2361 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2362 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2363 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2364 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
2365 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2366 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2367 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2368 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2369 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2371 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2372 // return them to fail the payment.
2373 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2374 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2375 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2377 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2378 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2383 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2384 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2385 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2386 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2387 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2388 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2389 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2390 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2391 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2392 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2395 if generate_monitor_update {
2396 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2397 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2398 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2399 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2400 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2401 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
2405 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2406 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
2408 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2409 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2413 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2414 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2415 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2416 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
2417 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2418 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2419 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
2420 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
2424 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2425 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2426 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2427 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2429 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2430 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2431 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2432 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2434 match &self.holder_signer {
2435 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2436 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2437 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2438 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2439 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2442 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2446 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2447 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2448 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2450 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2451 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2452 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2454 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2455 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2456 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2459 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2460 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2462 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2469 // Internal utility functions for channels
2471 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2472 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2473 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2475 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2477 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2478 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2479 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2481 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2484 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2486 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2489 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2490 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2491 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2493 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2495 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2496 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2497 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2498 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2499 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2502 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2503 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2504 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2505 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2506 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2507 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2508 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2511 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2512 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2514 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2515 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2518 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2519 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2520 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2521 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2522 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2523 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2526 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2527 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2528 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2529 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2532 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2533 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2535 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2536 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2537 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2541 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2542 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2543 trait FailHTLCContents {
2544 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2545 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2546 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2547 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2549 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2550 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2551 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2552 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2554 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2555 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2557 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2558 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2561 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
2562 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
2563 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2564 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2567 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2568 failure_code: self.1
2571 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2572 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
2574 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2575 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2577 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2578 failure_code: self.1
2583 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2584 fn name() -> &'static str;
2586 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2587 fn name() -> &'static str {
2591 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2592 fn name() -> &'static str {
2593 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2597 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2598 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2599 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2601 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2602 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2603 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2604 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2606 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2607 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2609 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2611 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2612 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2613 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2614 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2616 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2617 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2621 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2627 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2628 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2629 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2630 // outside of those situations will fail.
2631 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2635 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2640 1 + // script length (0)
2644 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2645 2 + // witness marker and flag
2646 1 + // witness element count
2647 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2648 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2649 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2650 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2651 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2652 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2654 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2655 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2656 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2662 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2663 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2664 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2665 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2667 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2668 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2669 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2671 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2672 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2673 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2674 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2675 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2676 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2679 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2680 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2683 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2684 value_to_holder = 0;
2687 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2688 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2689 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2690 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2692 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2693 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2696 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2697 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2700 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2703 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2704 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2706 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2708 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2709 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2710 where L::Target: Logger {
2711 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2712 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2713 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2714 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2715 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2716 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2717 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2718 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2722 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2723 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2724 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2725 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2727 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2728 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2731 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2732 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2733 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2735 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2736 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2737 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2738 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2739 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2740 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2741 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2743 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2744 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2745 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2747 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2748 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2750 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2753 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2754 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2758 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2762 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2763 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2764 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2765 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2766 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2767 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2770 // Now update local state:
2772 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2773 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2774 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2775 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2776 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2777 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
2778 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2779 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2781 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
2784 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2785 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2786 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2787 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2788 // do not not get into this branch.
2789 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2790 match pending_update {
2791 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2792 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2793 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2794 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2795 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2796 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2797 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2800 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2801 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2803 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2804 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2805 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2806 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2807 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2808 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2814 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2815 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2816 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2818 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2819 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2820 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2822 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2823 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2826 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2827 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2829 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2830 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2832 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2833 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2836 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2839 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2840 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2841 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2842 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2847 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2848 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2849 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2850 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2851 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2852 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2853 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2854 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2855 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2856 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2857 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2858 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2859 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2860 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2861 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2863 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2864 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2865 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2866 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2867 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2870 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2871 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2872 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2878 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2879 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2881 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2885 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2886 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2887 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2888 /// before we fail backwards.
2890 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2891 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2892 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2893 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2894 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2895 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2896 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2899 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
2900 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
2902 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
2903 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
2904 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
2905 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2906 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
2907 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2910 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2911 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2912 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2913 /// before we fail backwards.
2915 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2916 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2917 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2918 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2919 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2921 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2922 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2923 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2926 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2927 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2928 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2930 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2931 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2932 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2934 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2935 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2936 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2938 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2943 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2944 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2950 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2951 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2952 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2953 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2954 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2958 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2959 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2960 force_holding_cell = true;
2963 // Now update local state:
2964 if force_holding_cell {
2965 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2966 match pending_update {
2967 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2968 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2969 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2970 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2974 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2975 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2977 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2978 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2979 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2985 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2986 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
2990 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
2991 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
2993 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2994 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
2997 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3000 // Message handlers:
3001 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3002 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3003 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3004 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3005 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3006 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3007 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3010 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3012 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3014 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3015 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3016 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3017 debug_assert!(matches!(
3018 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3020 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3021 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3024 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3025 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3027 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3028 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3029 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3030 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3032 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3035 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3036 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3037 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3040 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3041 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3042 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3043 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3044 // when routing outbound payments.
3045 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3049 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3050 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3051 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3052 match &self.context.channel_state {
3053 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3054 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
3055 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3056 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3057 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3058 check_reconnection = true;
3059 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3060 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3061 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3062 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3063 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3065 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3066 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3069 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3070 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3071 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3073 if check_reconnection {
3074 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3075 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3076 let expected_point =
3077 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3078 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3080 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3081 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3082 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3083 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3084 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3085 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3087 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3088 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3089 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3090 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3091 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3093 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3094 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3099 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3100 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3102 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3104 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3107 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3108 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3109 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3110 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3111 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3112 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3114 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3117 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3118 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3119 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3121 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3122 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3125 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3128 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3129 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3131 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3134 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3138 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3139 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3140 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3143 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3147 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3148 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3149 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3150 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3151 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3152 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3153 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3154 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3155 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3156 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3157 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3159 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3160 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3161 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3162 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3163 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3164 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3168 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3169 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3172 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3173 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3174 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3176 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3177 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3178 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3179 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3180 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3181 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3182 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3186 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3187 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3188 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3189 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3190 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3191 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3192 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3196 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3197 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3198 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3199 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3200 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3204 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3205 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3207 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3208 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3209 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3211 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3212 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3216 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3219 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3220 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3224 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3225 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3229 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3230 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3231 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3232 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3233 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3234 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3235 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3236 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3237 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3239 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3240 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3241 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3242 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3243 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3246 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3247 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3248 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3249 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3253 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3256 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3260 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3261 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3262 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3266 // Now update local state:
3267 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3268 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3269 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3270 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3271 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3272 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3273 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3278 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3280 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3281 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3282 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3283 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3284 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3285 None => fail_reason.into(),
3286 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3287 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3288 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3291 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3295 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3297 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3298 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3300 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3306 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3309 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3310 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3313 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3314 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3317 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3320 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3321 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3324 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3328 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3332 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3333 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3336 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3340 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3344 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3345 where L::Target: Logger
3347 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3350 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3353 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3357 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3359 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3361 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3362 let commitment_txid = {
3363 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3364 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3365 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3367 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3368 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3369 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3370 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3371 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3376 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3378 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3379 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3380 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3381 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3384 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3385 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3386 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3390 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3392 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3393 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3394 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3395 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3396 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3397 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3398 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3399 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3400 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3401 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3402 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3408 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3409 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3412 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3413 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3414 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3415 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3416 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3417 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3418 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3419 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3420 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3421 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3422 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3423 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3424 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3427 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3428 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3429 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3430 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3431 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3432 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3433 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3435 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3436 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3437 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3438 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3439 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3440 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3441 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3444 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3445 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3448 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3450 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3451 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3452 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3455 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3458 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3459 commitment_stats.tx,
3461 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3462 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3463 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3466 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3467 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3469 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3470 let mut need_commitment = false;
3471 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3472 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3473 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3474 need_commitment = true;
3478 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3479 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3480 Some(forward_info.clone())
3482 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3483 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3484 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3485 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3486 need_commitment = true;
3489 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3490 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3491 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3492 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3493 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3494 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3495 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3496 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3497 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3498 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3499 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3500 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3501 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3502 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3504 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3506 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3507 need_commitment = true;
3511 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3512 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3513 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3514 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3515 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3516 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3517 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3519 nondust_htlc_sources,
3521 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3524 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3525 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3526 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3527 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3528 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3530 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3531 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3532 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3533 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3534 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3535 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3536 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3537 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3538 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3539 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3540 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3541 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3542 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3543 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3545 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3546 &self.context.channel_id);
3547 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3550 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3551 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3552 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3553 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3554 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3555 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3556 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3557 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3558 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3562 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3563 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3564 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3565 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3568 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3569 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3570 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3571 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3572 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3573 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3574 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3576 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3577 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3578 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3581 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3582 /// for our counterparty.
3583 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3584 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3585 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3586 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3588 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3589 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3590 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3591 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3593 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3594 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3595 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3596 updates: Vec::new(),
3597 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3600 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3601 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3602 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3603 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3604 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3605 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3606 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3607 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3608 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3609 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3610 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3611 // to rebalance channels.
3612 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
3613 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3614 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3615 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3617 match self.send_htlc(
3618 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3619 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3621 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3624 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3625 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3626 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3627 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3628 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3629 // into the holding cell without ever being
3630 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3631 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3632 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3635 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3642 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3643 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3644 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3645 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3646 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3647 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3648 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3649 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3650 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3651 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3652 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3653 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3656 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3657 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
3658 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3660 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3661 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
3662 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3665 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
3667 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
3668 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3669 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3670 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3671 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3672 // for a full revocation before failing.
3673 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
3674 update_fail_count += 1;
3676 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
3678 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3683 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3684 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3686 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3687 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3692 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3693 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3694 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3695 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3696 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3698 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3699 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3700 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3702 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3703 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3709 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3710 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3711 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3712 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3713 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3714 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3715 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3716 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3717 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3719 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3720 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3722 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3723 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3725 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3726 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3729 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3731 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3732 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3733 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3737 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3738 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3739 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3740 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3741 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3742 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3743 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3744 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3745 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3748 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3750 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3751 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3754 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3755 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3756 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3757 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3759 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3761 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3766 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3767 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3768 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3769 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3770 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3771 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3772 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3773 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3774 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3776 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3779 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3780 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3781 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3782 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3783 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3784 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3785 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3786 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3787 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3789 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3790 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3793 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3794 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3795 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3796 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3797 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3798 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3799 let mut require_commitment = false;
3800 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3803 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3804 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3805 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3806 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3808 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3809 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3810 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3811 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3812 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3813 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3815 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3819 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3820 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3821 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3822 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3823 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3825 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3826 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3827 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3832 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3833 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3835 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3839 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3840 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3842 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3843 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3844 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3845 require_commitment = true;
3846 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3847 match forward_info {
3848 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3849 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3850 require_commitment = true;
3852 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3853 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3854 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3856 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3857 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3858 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3862 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3863 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3864 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3865 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3871 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3872 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3873 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3874 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3875 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3877 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3878 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3879 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3880 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3881 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3882 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3883 require_commitment = true;
3887 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3889 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3890 match update_state {
3891 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3892 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3893 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3894 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3895 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3896 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3898 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3899 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3900 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3901 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3902 require_commitment = true;
3903 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3904 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3909 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3910 let release_state_str =
3911 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3912 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3913 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3914 if !release_monitor {
3915 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3916 update: monitor_update,
3918 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3920 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3925 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3926 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3927 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3928 if require_commitment {
3929 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3930 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3931 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3932 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3934 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3935 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3936 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3937 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3938 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3940 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3941 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3942 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3943 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3944 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3947 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3948 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3949 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3950 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3951 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3952 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3954 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3955 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3957 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3958 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3960 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3961 if require_commitment {
3962 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3964 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3965 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3966 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3967 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3969 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3970 &self.context.channel_id(),
3971 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3974 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3975 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3977 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3978 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3980 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3981 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3987 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3988 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3989 /// commitment update.
3990 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3991 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3992 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3994 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3995 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3998 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3999 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4000 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4001 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4003 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4004 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4005 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4006 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4007 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4008 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4009 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4011 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4012 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4014 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4015 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4017 if !self.context.is_live() {
4018 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4021 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4022 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4023 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4024 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4025 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4026 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4027 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4028 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4029 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4030 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4034 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4035 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4036 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4037 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4038 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4039 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4042 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4043 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4047 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4048 force_holding_cell = true;
4051 if force_holding_cell {
4052 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4056 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4057 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4059 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4060 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4065 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4066 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4068 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4070 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4071 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4072 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4073 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4077 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4078 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4079 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4083 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4084 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4087 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4088 // will be retransmitted.
4089 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4090 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4091 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4093 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4094 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4096 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4097 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4098 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4099 // this HTLC accordingly
4100 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4103 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4104 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4105 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4106 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4109 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4110 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4111 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4112 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4113 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4114 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4119 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4121 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4122 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4123 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4124 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4128 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4129 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4130 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4131 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4132 // the update upon reconnection.
4133 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4137 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4139 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4140 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4144 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4145 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4146 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4147 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4148 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4149 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4150 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4152 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4153 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4154 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4155 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4156 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4157 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4158 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4160 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4161 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4162 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4163 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4164 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4165 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4166 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4169 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4170 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4171 /// to the remote side.
4172 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4173 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4174 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4175 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4178 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4180 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4181 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4183 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4184 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4185 // first received the funding_signed.
4186 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4187 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4188 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4189 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4191 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4193 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4194 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4195 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4196 funding_broadcastable = None;
4199 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4200 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4201 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4202 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4203 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4204 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4205 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4206 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4207 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4208 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4209 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4210 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4211 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4212 next_per_commitment_point,
4213 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4217 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4219 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4220 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4221 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4222 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4223 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4224 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4226 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4227 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4228 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4229 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4230 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4231 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4235 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4236 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4238 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4239 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4241 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4242 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4245 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4246 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4247 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4248 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4249 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4250 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4251 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4252 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4253 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4257 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4258 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4260 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4263 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4266 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4268 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4269 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4270 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4271 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4272 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4273 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4274 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4275 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4276 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4277 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4279 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4281 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4283 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4289 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4291 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4292 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4293 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4294 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4296 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4297 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4299 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4300 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4303 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4304 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4305 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4306 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4308 SignerResumeUpdates {
4315 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4316 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4317 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4318 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4319 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4320 per_commitment_secret,
4321 next_per_commitment_point,
4323 next_local_nonce: None,
4327 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4328 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4329 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4330 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4331 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4332 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4334 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4335 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4336 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4337 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4338 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4339 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4340 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4341 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4342 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4343 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4344 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4349 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4350 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4352 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4353 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4354 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4355 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4356 reason: err_packet.clone()
4359 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4360 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4361 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4362 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4363 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4364 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4367 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4368 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4369 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4370 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4371 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4378 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4379 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4380 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4381 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4385 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4386 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4387 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4388 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4389 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4390 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4391 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4395 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4396 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4398 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4399 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4400 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4401 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4406 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4407 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4412 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4413 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4414 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4415 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4416 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4417 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4418 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4423 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4424 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4426 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4427 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4428 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4429 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4430 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4431 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4432 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4433 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4436 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4438 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4439 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4440 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4441 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4445 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4446 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4447 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4450 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4451 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4452 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4453 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4454 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4455 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4456 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4458 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4459 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4460 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4461 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4462 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4465 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4466 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4467 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4468 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4469 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4470 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4471 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4472 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4476 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4477 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4478 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4479 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4480 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4481 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4482 our_commitment_transaction
4486 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4487 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4488 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4489 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4491 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4493 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4495 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4496 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4497 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4498 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4499 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4500 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4502 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4503 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4504 channel_ready: None,
4505 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4506 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4507 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4511 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4512 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4513 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4514 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4515 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4516 next_per_commitment_point,
4517 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4519 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4520 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4521 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4525 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4526 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4527 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4529 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4530 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4531 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4534 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4537 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4538 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4539 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4540 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4541 our_commitment_transaction
4545 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4546 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4547 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4548 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4549 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4550 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4551 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4553 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4555 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4556 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4557 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4558 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4559 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4560 next_per_commitment_point,
4561 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4565 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4566 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4567 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4569 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4572 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4573 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4574 raa: required_revoke,
4575 commitment_update: None,
4576 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4578 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4579 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4580 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4582 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4585 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4586 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4587 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4588 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4589 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4590 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4593 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4594 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4595 raa: required_revoke,
4596 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4597 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4600 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4601 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4602 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4603 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4604 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4607 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4608 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4609 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4610 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4615 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4616 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4617 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4618 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4620 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4622 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4624 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4625 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4626 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4627 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4628 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4629 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4630 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4631 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4633 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4634 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4635 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4636 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4637 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4639 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4640 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4641 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4642 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4645 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4646 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4647 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4648 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4649 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4650 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4651 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4652 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4653 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4654 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4655 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4656 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4657 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4658 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4659 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4661 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4664 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4665 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4668 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4669 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4670 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4671 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4672 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4673 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4676 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4677 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4678 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4679 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4680 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4681 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4684 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4690 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4691 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4692 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4693 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4695 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4696 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4697 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4698 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4699 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4700 return Ok((None, None, None));
4703 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4704 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4705 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4707 return Ok((None, None, None));
4710 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4711 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4712 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4713 return Ok((None, None, None));
4716 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4718 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4719 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4720 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4721 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4723 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4724 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4726 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4727 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4729 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4730 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4731 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4732 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4734 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4735 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4736 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4740 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4746 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4747 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4749 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4750 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4753 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4754 /// within our expected timeframe.
4756 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4757 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4758 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4761 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4764 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4765 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4769 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4770 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4772 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4773 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4775 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4776 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4777 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4778 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4781 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4782 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4786 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4788 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4789 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4792 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4793 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4794 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4797 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4800 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4801 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4802 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4803 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4805 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4808 assert!(send_shutdown);
4809 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4810 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4811 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4813 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4816 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4821 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4823 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4824 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4826 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4827 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4828 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4829 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4830 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4831 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4832 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4834 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4836 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4837 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4839 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4840 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4841 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4842 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4846 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4847 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4848 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4849 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4850 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4851 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4853 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4854 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4861 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4862 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4864 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4867 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4868 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4870 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4872 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4873 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4874 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4875 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4876 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4877 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4878 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4879 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4880 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4882 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4883 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4886 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4890 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4891 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4892 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4893 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4895 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4898 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4901 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4902 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4904 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4908 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4912 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4913 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4914 return Ok((None, None, None));
4917 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4918 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4919 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4920 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4922 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4924 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4927 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4928 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4929 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4930 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4931 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4935 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4936 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4941 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4942 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4943 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4944 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4945 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4946 monitor_update: None,
4947 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4948 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4949 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4950 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4951 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4952 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4953 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4954 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
4956 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4957 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4958 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4959 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4963 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4965 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4966 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4967 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4968 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4970 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4973 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4974 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4976 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4977 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4978 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4979 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4980 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4981 monitor_update: None,
4982 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4983 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4984 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4985 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4986 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4987 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4988 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4989 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
4991 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4992 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4993 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4994 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4999 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5000 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5001 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5002 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5004 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5005 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5006 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5008 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5010 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5017 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5018 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5021 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5022 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5024 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5025 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5028 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5029 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5030 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5031 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5032 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5034 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5035 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5036 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5038 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5039 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5042 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5043 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5044 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5045 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5046 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5047 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5048 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5049 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5051 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5054 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5055 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5056 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5057 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5063 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5064 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5065 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5066 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5068 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5074 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5075 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5076 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5077 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5078 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5079 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5080 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5082 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5083 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5086 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5088 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5089 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5095 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5096 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5097 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5098 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5099 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5100 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5101 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5103 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5104 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5111 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5112 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5115 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5116 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5119 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5120 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5124 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5125 &self.context.holder_signer
5129 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5131 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5132 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5133 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5134 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5135 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5136 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5138 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5140 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5148 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5149 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5153 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5154 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5155 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5156 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5159 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5160 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5161 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5162 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5165 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5166 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5167 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5168 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5169 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5170 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5173 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5174 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5175 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5176 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5177 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5178 if !release_monitor {
5179 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5188 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5189 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5192 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5193 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5194 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5196 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5197 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5199 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5200 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5202 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5203 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5204 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5207 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5208 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5209 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5210 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5211 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5212 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5214 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5215 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5216 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5218 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5219 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5220 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5221 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5222 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5223 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5229 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5230 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5231 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5232 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5235 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5236 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5237 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5240 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5241 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5242 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5245 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5246 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5247 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5248 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5249 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5252 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5253 self.context.channel_update_status
5256 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5257 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5258 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5261 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5263 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5264 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5265 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5269 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5270 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5271 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5274 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5278 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5279 // channel_ready yet.
5280 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5284 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5285 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5286 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5287 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5289 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5290 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5291 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5293 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5294 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5297 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5298 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5300 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5301 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5302 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5303 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5304 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5305 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5306 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5307 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5309 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5313 if need_commitment_update {
5314 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5315 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5316 let next_per_commitment_point =
5317 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5318 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5319 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5320 next_per_commitment_point,
5321 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5325 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5331 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5332 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5333 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5334 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5335 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5336 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5337 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5339 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5342 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5343 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5344 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5345 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5346 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5347 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5348 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5349 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5350 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5351 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5352 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5353 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5354 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5355 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5356 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5357 // channel and move on.
5358 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5359 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5361 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5362 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5363 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5365 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5366 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5367 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5368 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5369 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5370 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5371 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5372 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5377 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5378 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5379 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5380 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5381 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5384 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5385 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5386 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5387 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5388 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5389 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5392 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5393 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5394 // may have already happened for this block).
5395 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5396 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5397 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5398 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5401 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5402 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5403 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5404 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5412 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5413 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5414 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5415 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5417 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5418 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5421 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5423 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5424 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5425 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5426 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5428 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5431 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5434 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5435 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5436 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5437 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5439 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5442 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5443 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5444 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5446 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5447 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5449 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5450 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5451 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5459 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5461 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5462 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5463 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5465 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5466 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5469 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5470 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5471 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5472 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5473 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5474 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5475 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5476 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5479 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5480 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5481 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5482 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5484 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5485 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5486 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5488 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5489 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5490 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5491 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5493 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5494 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5495 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5496 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5497 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5498 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5499 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5502 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5503 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5505 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5508 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5509 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5510 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5511 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5512 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5513 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5514 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5515 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5516 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5517 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5518 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5519 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5520 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5521 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5522 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5523 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5524 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5530 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5535 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5536 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5538 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5539 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5540 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5541 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5543 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5546 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5548 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5549 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5550 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5551 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5552 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5553 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5555 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5556 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5559 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5560 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5561 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5562 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5563 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5564 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5566 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5567 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5570 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5571 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5572 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5573 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5574 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5580 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5581 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5582 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5583 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5585 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5588 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5592 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5596 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5597 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5601 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5605 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5606 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5609 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5613 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5615 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5620 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5621 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5622 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5624 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5629 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5631 None => return None,
5634 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5636 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5637 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5639 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5640 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5643 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5649 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5651 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5652 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5653 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5654 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5655 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5656 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5657 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5659 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5660 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5661 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5662 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5663 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5664 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5665 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5666 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5667 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5668 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5669 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5670 contents: announcement,
5673 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5678 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5682 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5683 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5684 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5685 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5686 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5687 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5688 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5689 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5691 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5693 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5694 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5695 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5696 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5698 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5699 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5700 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5701 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5704 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5705 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5706 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5707 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5710 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5713 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5714 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5715 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5716 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5717 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5718 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5721 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5723 Err(_) => return None,
5725 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5726 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5731 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5732 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5733 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5734 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5735 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5736 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5737 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5738 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5739 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5740 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5741 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5742 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5743 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5744 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5745 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5746 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5749 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5752 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5753 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5754 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5755 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5756 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5757 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5758 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5759 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5760 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5762 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5763 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5764 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5765 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5766 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5767 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5768 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5769 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5770 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5772 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5773 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5774 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5775 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5776 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5777 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5778 next_funding_txid: None,
5783 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5785 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5786 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5787 /// commitment update.
5789 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5790 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5791 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5792 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5793 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5794 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5795 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5798 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5799 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5800 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5802 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5803 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5808 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5809 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5811 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5813 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5814 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5816 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5817 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5818 /// regenerate them.
5820 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5821 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5823 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5824 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5825 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5826 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5827 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5828 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5829 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5830 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5832 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5833 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5834 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5836 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5838 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5839 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5840 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5843 if amount_msat == 0 {
5844 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5847 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5848 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5849 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5850 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5853 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5854 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5855 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5858 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5859 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5860 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5861 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5862 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5863 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5864 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5865 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5868 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5869 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5870 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5871 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5872 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5873 else { "to peer" });
5875 if need_holding_cell {
5876 force_holding_cell = true;
5879 // Now update local state:
5880 if force_holding_cell {
5881 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5886 onion_routing_packet,
5893 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5894 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5896 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5898 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5904 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5905 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5906 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5910 onion_routing_packet,
5914 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5919 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5920 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5921 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5922 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5924 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5925 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5926 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5928 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5929 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5933 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5934 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5935 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5936 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5937 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5938 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5939 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5942 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5943 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5944 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5945 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5946 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5947 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5950 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5952 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5953 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5954 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5955 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5956 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5958 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5959 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5962 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5963 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5964 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5965 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5966 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5967 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5968 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5969 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5970 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5971 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5972 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5973 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5975 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5977 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5981 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5982 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5983 where L::Target: Logger
5985 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5986 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5987 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5989 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5991 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5992 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5993 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5994 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5995 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5996 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5997 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5998 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5999 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6000 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6001 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6007 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6010 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6011 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6012 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6013 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6014 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6015 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6017 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6018 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6019 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6021 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6022 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6023 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6026 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6027 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6031 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6032 &commitment_stats.tx,
6033 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6034 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6035 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6036 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6038 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6040 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6041 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6042 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6043 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6045 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6046 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6047 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6048 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6049 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6050 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6054 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6055 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6059 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6060 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6062 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6068 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6069 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6071 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6072 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6073 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6074 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6075 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6076 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6077 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6078 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6080 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6081 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6082 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6085 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6086 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6087 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6093 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6095 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6096 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6097 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6098 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6099 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6101 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6103 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6109 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6110 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6111 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6112 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6113 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6115 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6116 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6117 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6120 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6121 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6123 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6124 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6126 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6127 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6129 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6130 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6131 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6134 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6137 // use override shutdown script if provided
6138 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6139 Some(script) => script,
6141 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6142 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6143 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6144 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6148 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6149 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6151 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6156 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6157 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6158 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6159 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6161 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6162 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6163 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6164 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6165 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6166 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6167 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6169 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6171 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6172 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6174 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6175 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6176 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6179 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6180 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6181 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6182 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6183 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6185 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6186 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6193 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6194 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6196 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6199 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6200 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6201 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6203 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6204 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6208 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6212 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6213 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6214 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6215 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6218 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6219 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6220 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6221 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6222 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6223 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6224 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6225 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6227 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6228 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6229 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6230 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6232 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6233 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6235 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6236 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6238 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6239 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6240 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6242 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6243 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6245 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6246 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6247 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6248 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6249 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6252 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6253 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6255 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6256 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6258 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6260 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6262 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6263 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6264 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6265 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6268 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6269 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6271 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6272 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6273 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6274 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6278 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6279 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6280 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6284 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6285 Ok(script) => script,
6286 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6289 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6292 context: ChannelContext {
6295 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6296 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6297 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6298 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6303 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6305 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6306 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6307 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6308 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6310 channel_value_satoshis,
6312 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6314 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6315 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6318 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6319 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6322 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6323 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6324 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6325 pending_update_fee: None,
6326 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6327 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6328 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6329 update_time_counter: 1,
6331 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6333 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6334 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6335 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6336 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6337 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6338 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6340 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6341 signer_pending_funding: false,
6343 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6344 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6345 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6346 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6348 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6349 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6350 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6351 closing_fee_limits: None,
6352 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6354 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6355 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6356 short_channel_id: None,
6357 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6359 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6360 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6361 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6362 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6363 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6364 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6365 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6366 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6367 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6368 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6369 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6370 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6372 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6374 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6375 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6376 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6377 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6378 counterparty_parameters: None,
6379 funding_outpoint: None,
6380 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6382 funding_transaction: None,
6383 is_batch_funding: None,
6385 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6386 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6387 counterparty_node_id,
6389 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6391 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6393 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6394 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6396 announcement_sigs: None,
6398 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6399 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6400 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6401 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6403 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6404 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6406 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6407 outbound_scid_alias,
6409 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6410 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6412 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6413 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6418 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6420 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6424 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6425 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6426 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6427 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6428 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6429 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6430 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6431 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6432 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6434 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6439 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6440 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6441 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6444 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6445 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6446 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6447 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6450 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6452 next_local_nonce: None,
6456 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6457 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6458 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6459 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6460 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6461 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6462 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6463 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6464 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6465 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6466 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6469 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6470 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6472 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6474 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6475 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6476 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6477 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6480 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6481 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6483 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6485 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6486 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
6488 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6489 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6490 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6491 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6492 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6493 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6496 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6497 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6499 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6500 if funding_created.is_none() {
6501 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6502 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6504 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6505 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6506 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6507 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6515 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6516 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6517 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6518 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6519 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6520 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6521 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6522 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6523 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6524 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6527 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6528 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6529 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6530 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6531 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6532 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6538 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6539 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6540 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6541 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6542 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6543 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6545 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6547 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6549 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6550 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6555 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6556 // We've exhausted our options
6559 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6560 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6563 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6564 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6565 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6566 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6568 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6569 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6570 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6571 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6572 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6573 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6575 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6577 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6578 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6581 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6582 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6583 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6585 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6586 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6589 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6590 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6593 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6594 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6598 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6599 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6600 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6601 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6602 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6603 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6604 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6605 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6606 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6607 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6608 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6609 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6610 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6611 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6612 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6613 first_per_commitment_point,
6614 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6615 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6616 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6617 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6619 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6624 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6625 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6627 // Check sanity of message fields:
6628 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6629 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6631 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6632 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6634 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6635 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6637 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6638 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6640 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6641 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6643 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6644 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6645 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6647 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6648 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6649 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6651 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6652 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6653 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6655 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6656 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6658 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6659 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6662 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6663 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6666 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6667 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6669 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6670 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6672 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6673 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6675 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6676 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6678 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6679 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6681 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6682 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6685 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6686 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6689 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6690 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6692 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6693 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6696 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6697 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6700 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6701 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6702 &Some(ref script) => {
6703 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6704 if script.len() == 0 {
6707 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6708 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6710 Some(script.clone())
6713 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6715 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6720 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6721 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6722 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6723 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6724 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6726 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6727 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6729 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6732 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6733 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6734 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6735 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6736 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6737 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6740 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6741 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6742 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6745 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6746 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6748 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6749 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6751 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6756 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6757 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6758 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6759 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6760 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6764 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6765 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6767 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6768 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6770 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6771 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6772 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6773 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6776 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6778 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6779 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6780 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6781 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6783 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6784 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6786 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6787 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6789 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6790 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6791 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6792 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6793 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6794 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6798 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6799 initial_commitment_tx,
6802 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6803 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6807 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6808 if validated.is_err() {
6809 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6812 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6813 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6814 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6815 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6816 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6817 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6818 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6819 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6820 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6821 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6822 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6823 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6825 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
6826 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6827 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6828 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6829 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6830 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6831 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6832 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6834 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6835 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6836 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6838 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6840 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6841 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6843 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6845 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6847 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6848 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6849 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6852 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6854 #[cfg(async_signing)]
6855 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6856 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6857 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6858 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6863 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6864 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6865 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6866 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6869 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
6870 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
6871 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
6872 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6873 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
6874 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
6875 if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6876 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6880 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6881 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6882 // `static_remote_key`.
6883 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6886 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6887 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6890 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6891 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6894 Ok(channel_type.clone())
6896 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6897 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6904 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6905 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6906 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6907 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6908 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6909 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6910 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6911 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6912 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6913 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6914 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6917 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6918 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6920 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6921 // support this channel type.
6922 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
6924 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6925 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6926 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6927 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6928 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6929 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6930 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6931 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6932 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6935 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6936 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6939 // Check sanity of message fields:
6940 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6941 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6943 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6944 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6946 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6947 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6949 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6950 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6951 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6953 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6956 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6957 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6959 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6961 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6962 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6965 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6968 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6972 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6973 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6974 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6976 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6977 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6979 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6980 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6982 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6983 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6985 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6986 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6988 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6989 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6991 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6995 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6997 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6998 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
7003 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
7004 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7005 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7006 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7007 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7009 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
7010 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
7012 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7013 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
7014 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7016 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
7017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7020 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
7021 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
7022 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7023 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7027 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7028 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7029 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7033 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7034 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7035 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7036 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7040 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7041 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7042 &Some(ref script) => {
7043 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7044 if script.len() == 0 {
7047 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7050 Some(script.clone())
7053 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7055 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7060 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7061 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7062 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7063 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7067 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7068 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7069 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7073 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7074 Ok(script) => script,
7075 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7078 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7079 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7081 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7084 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7088 context: ChannelContext {
7091 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7092 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7094 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7099 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7101 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7102 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7103 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7104 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7106 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7109 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7111 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7112 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7115 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7116 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7117 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7119 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7120 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7121 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7122 pending_update_fee: None,
7123 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7124 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7125 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7126 update_time_counter: 1,
7128 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7130 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7131 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7132 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7133 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7134 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7135 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7137 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7138 signer_pending_funding: false,
7140 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7141 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7142 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7143 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7145 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7146 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7147 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7148 closing_fee_limits: None,
7149 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7151 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7152 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7153 short_channel_id: None,
7154 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7156 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7157 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7158 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7159 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7160 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7161 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7162 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7163 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7164 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7165 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7166 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7167 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7170 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7172 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7173 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7174 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7175 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7176 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7177 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7178 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7180 funding_outpoint: None,
7181 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7183 funding_transaction: None,
7184 is_batch_funding: None,
7186 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7187 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7188 counterparty_node_id,
7190 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7192 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7194 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7195 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7197 announcement_sigs: None,
7199 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7200 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7201 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7202 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7204 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7205 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7207 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7208 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7210 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7211 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7213 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7214 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7219 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7221 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7227 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7228 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7230 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7231 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7232 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7233 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7236 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7237 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7239 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7241 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7242 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7245 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7248 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7249 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7250 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7252 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7253 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7254 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7255 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7257 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7258 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7259 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7260 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7261 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7262 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7263 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7264 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7265 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7266 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7267 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7268 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7269 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7270 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7271 first_per_commitment_point,
7272 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7273 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7274 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7276 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7278 next_local_nonce: None,
7282 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7283 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7285 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7287 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7288 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7291 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7292 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7294 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7295 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7296 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7297 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7298 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7299 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7300 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7301 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7302 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7303 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7304 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7306 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7309 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7310 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7311 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7315 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7316 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7319 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7320 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7322 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7323 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7325 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7327 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7328 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7329 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7330 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7333 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7334 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7335 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7336 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7337 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7339 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7341 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7342 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7343 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7346 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7347 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7348 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7352 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7353 initial_commitment_tx,
7356 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7357 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7360 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7361 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7364 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7366 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7367 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7368 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7369 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7371 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7373 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7374 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7375 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7376 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7377 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7378 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7379 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7380 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7381 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7382 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7383 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7385 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7386 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7387 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7388 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7389 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7390 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7391 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7393 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7394 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7396 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7397 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7398 let mut channel = Channel {
7399 context: self.context,
7401 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7402 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7404 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7408 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7409 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7411 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7417 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7418 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7419 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7420 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7421 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7423 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7424 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7425 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7426 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7432 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7433 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7434 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7435 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7436 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7437 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7442 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7443 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7444 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7445 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7447 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7448 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7449 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7450 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7455 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7456 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7457 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7458 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7459 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7460 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7465 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7466 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7467 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7470 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7472 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7473 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7474 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7475 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7476 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7478 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7479 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7480 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7481 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7483 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7485 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7486 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7487 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7489 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7491 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7493 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7495 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7496 // deserialized from that format.
7497 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7498 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7499 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7501 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7503 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7504 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7505 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7507 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7508 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7509 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7510 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7513 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7514 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7515 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7518 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7519 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7520 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7521 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7523 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7524 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7526 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7528 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7530 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7532 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7535 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7537 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7542 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7543 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7544 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7546 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7547 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7548 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7549 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7550 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7551 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7552 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7554 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7556 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7558 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7561 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7562 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7563 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7566 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7568 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7569 preimages.push(preimage);
7571 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7572 reason.write(writer)?;
7574 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7576 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7577 preimages.push(preimage);
7579 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7580 reason.write(writer)?;
7583 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7584 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7587 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7588 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7589 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7590 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7591 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7592 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7594 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7595 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7596 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7599 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7600 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7601 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7602 source.write(writer)?;
7603 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7605 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7606 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7608 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7610 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7611 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7613 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7615 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7616 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7618 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7619 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7621 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7622 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7623 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7625 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7627 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7628 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7633 match self.context.resend_order {
7634 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7635 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7638 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7639 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7640 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7642 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7643 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7644 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7645 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7648 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7649 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7650 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7651 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7652 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7655 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7656 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7657 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7658 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7660 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7661 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7662 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7664 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7666 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7667 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7668 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7669 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7671 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7672 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7673 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7674 // consider the stale state on reload.
7677 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7678 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7679 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7681 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7682 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7683 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7685 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7686 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7688 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7689 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7690 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7692 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7693 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7695 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7698 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7699 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7700 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7702 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7705 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7706 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7708 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7709 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7710 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7712 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7714 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7716 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7718 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7719 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7720 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7721 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7722 htlc.write(writer)?;
7725 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7726 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7727 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7729 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7730 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7732 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7733 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7734 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7735 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7736 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7737 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7738 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7740 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7741 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7742 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7743 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7744 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7746 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7747 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7749 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7750 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7751 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7752 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7754 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7756 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7757 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7758 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7759 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7760 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7761 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7762 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7764 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7765 (2, chan_type, option),
7766 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7767 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7768 (5, self.context.config, required),
7769 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7770 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7771 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7772 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7773 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7774 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7775 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7776 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7777 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7778 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7779 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7780 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7781 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7782 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7783 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7784 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7785 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7786 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7787 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7788 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7789 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7790 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7797 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7798 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7800 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7801 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7803 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7804 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7805 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7807 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7808 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7809 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7810 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7812 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7814 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7815 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7816 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7817 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7818 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7820 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7821 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7824 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7825 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7826 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7828 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7830 let mut keys_data = None;
7832 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7833 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7834 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7835 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7836 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7837 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7838 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7839 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7840 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7841 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7845 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7846 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7847 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7850 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7852 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7853 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7854 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7856 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7858 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7859 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7860 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7861 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7862 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7863 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7864 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7865 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7866 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7867 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7868 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7869 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7870 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7875 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7876 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7877 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7878 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7879 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7880 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7881 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7882 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7883 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7884 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7885 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7886 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7888 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7889 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7892 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7893 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7896 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7897 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7899 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7901 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7902 blinding_point: None,
7906 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7907 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7908 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7909 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7910 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7911 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7912 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7913 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7914 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7915 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7916 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7917 blinding_point: None,
7919 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7920 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7921 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7923 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7924 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7925 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7927 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7931 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7932 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7933 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7934 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7937 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7938 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7939 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7941 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7942 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7943 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7944 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7947 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7948 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7949 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7950 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7953 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7955 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7957 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7958 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7959 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7960 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7962 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7963 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7964 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7965 // consider the stale state on reload.
7966 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7969 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7970 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7971 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7973 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7976 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7977 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7978 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7980 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7981 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7982 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7983 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7985 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7986 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7988 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7989 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7991 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7992 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7993 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7995 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7997 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7998 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8000 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8001 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8004 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8006 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8007 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8008 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8009 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8011 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8014 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8015 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8017 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8019 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8020 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8022 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8023 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8025 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8027 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8028 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
8029 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8031 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8032 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8033 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8037 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8038 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8039 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8041 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8047 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8048 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8049 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8050 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8051 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8052 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8053 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8054 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8055 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8056 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8058 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8059 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8060 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8061 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8062 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8063 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8064 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8066 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8067 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8068 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8069 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8071 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8073 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8074 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8076 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8078 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8079 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8081 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8083 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8084 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8085 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8086 (2, channel_type, option),
8087 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8088 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8089 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8090 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8091 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8092 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8093 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8094 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8095 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8096 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8097 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8098 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8099 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8100 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8101 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8102 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8103 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8104 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8105 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8106 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8107 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8108 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8109 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8110 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8111 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8114 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8115 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8116 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8117 // required channel parameters.
8118 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8119 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8121 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8123 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8124 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8125 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8126 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8129 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8130 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8131 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8133 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8134 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8136 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8137 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8142 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8143 if iter.next().is_some() {
8144 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8148 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8149 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8150 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8151 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8152 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8155 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8156 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8157 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8159 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8160 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8162 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8163 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8164 // separate u64 values.
8165 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8167 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8169 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8170 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8171 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8172 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8174 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8175 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8177 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8178 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8179 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8180 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8181 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8184 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8185 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8187 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8188 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8189 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8190 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8192 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8193 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8195 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8196 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8197 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8198 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8199 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8202 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8203 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8206 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8207 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8208 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8209 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8210 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8211 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8214 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8215 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8216 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8218 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8223 context: ChannelContext {
8226 config: config.unwrap(),
8230 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8231 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8232 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8235 temporary_channel_id,
8237 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8239 channel_value_satoshis,
8241 latest_monitor_update_id,
8243 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8244 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8247 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8248 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8251 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8252 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8253 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8254 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8258 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8259 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8260 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8261 monitor_pending_forwards,
8262 monitor_pending_failures,
8263 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8265 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8266 signer_pending_funding: false,
8269 holding_cell_update_fee,
8270 next_holder_htlc_id,
8271 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8272 update_time_counter,
8275 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8276 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8277 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8278 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8280 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8281 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8282 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8283 closing_fee_limits: None,
8284 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8286 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8287 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8289 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8291 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8292 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8293 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8294 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8295 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8296 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8297 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8298 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8299 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8302 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8304 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8305 funding_transaction,
8308 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8309 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8310 counterparty_node_id,
8312 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8316 channel_update_status,
8317 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8321 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8322 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8323 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8324 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8326 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8327 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8329 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8330 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8331 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8333 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8334 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8336 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8337 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8339 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8342 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8351 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8352 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8353 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8354 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8355 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8356 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8357 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8358 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8359 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8360 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8361 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8362 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8363 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8364 use crate::ln::msgs;
8365 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8366 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8367 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8368 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8369 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8370 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8371 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8372 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8373 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8374 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8375 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8376 use crate::util::test_utils;
8377 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8378 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8379 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8380 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8381 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8382 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8383 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8384 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8385 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8386 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8387 use crate::prelude::*;
8389 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8392 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8393 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8399 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8400 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8401 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8402 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8406 signer: InMemorySigner,
8409 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8410 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8413 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8414 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8416 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8418 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8419 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8422 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8426 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8428 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8429 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8430 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8431 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8432 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8435 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8436 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8437 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8438 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8442 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8443 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8444 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8448 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8449 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8450 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8451 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8454 let seed = [42; 32];
8455 let network = Network::Testnet;
8456 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8457 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8458 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8461 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8462 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8463 let config = UserConfig::default();
8464 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8465 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8466 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8468 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8469 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8473 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8474 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8476 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8477 let original_fee = 253;
8478 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8479 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8480 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8481 let seed = [42; 32];
8482 let network = Network::Testnet;
8483 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8485 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8486 let config = UserConfig::default();
8487 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8489 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8490 // same as the old fee.
8491 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8492 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8493 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8497 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8498 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8499 // dust limits are used.
8500 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8501 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8502 let seed = [42; 32];
8503 let network = Network::Testnet;
8504 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8505 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8506 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8508 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8509 // they have different dust limits.
8511 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8512 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8513 let config = UserConfig::default();
8514 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8516 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8517 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8518 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8519 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8520 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8522 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8523 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8524 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8525 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8526 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8528 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8529 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8530 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8531 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8533 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8534 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8535 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8537 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8538 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8539 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8541 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8542 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8543 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8545 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8546 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8547 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8548 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8551 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8553 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8554 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8555 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8556 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8557 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8558 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8559 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8560 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8561 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8563 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8564 blinding_point: None,
8567 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8568 // the dust limit check.
8569 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8570 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8571 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8572 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8574 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8575 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8576 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8577 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8578 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8579 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8580 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8584 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8585 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8586 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8587 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8588 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8589 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8590 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8591 let seed = [42; 32];
8592 let network = Network::Testnet;
8593 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8595 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8596 let config = UserConfig::default();
8597 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8599 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8600 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8602 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8603 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8604 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8605 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8606 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8607 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8609 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8610 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8611 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8612 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8613 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8615 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8617 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8618 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8619 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8620 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8621 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8623 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8624 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8625 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8626 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8627 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8631 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8632 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8633 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8634 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8635 let seed = [42; 32];
8636 let network = Network::Testnet;
8637 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8638 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8639 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8641 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8643 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8644 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8645 let config = UserConfig::default();
8646 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8648 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8649 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8650 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8651 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8653 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8654 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8655 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8657 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8658 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8659 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8660 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8662 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8663 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8664 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8666 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8667 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8668 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8670 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8671 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8672 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8673 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8674 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8675 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8676 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8678 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8680 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8681 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8682 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8683 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8684 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8688 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8689 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8690 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8691 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8692 let seed = [42; 32];
8693 let network = Network::Testnet;
8694 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8695 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8696 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8698 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8699 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8700 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8701 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8702 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8703 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8704 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8705 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8707 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8708 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8709 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8710 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8711 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8712 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8714 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8715 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8716 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8717 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8719 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8721 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8722 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8723 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8724 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8725 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8726 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8728 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8729 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8730 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8731 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8733 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8734 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8735 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8736 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8737 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8739 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8740 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8742 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8743 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8744 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8746 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8747 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8748 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8749 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8750 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8752 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8753 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8755 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8756 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8757 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8761 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8763 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8764 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8765 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8767 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8768 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8769 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8770 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8772 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8773 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8774 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8776 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8778 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8779 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8782 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8783 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8784 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8785 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8786 let seed = [42; 32];
8787 let network = Network::Testnet;
8788 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8789 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8790 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8793 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8794 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8795 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8797 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8798 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8800 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8801 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8802 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8804 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8805 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8807 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8809 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8810 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8812 // Channel Negotiations failed
8813 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8814 assert!(result.is_err());
8819 fn channel_update() {
8820 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8821 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8822 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8823 let seed = [42; 32];
8824 let network = Network::Testnet;
8825 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8826 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8827 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8829 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8830 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8831 let config = UserConfig::default();
8832 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8834 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8835 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8836 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8837 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8838 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8840 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8841 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8842 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8843 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8844 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8846 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8847 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8848 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8849 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8851 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8852 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8853 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8855 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8856 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8857 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8859 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8860 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8861 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8863 short_channel_id: 0,
8866 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8867 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8868 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8870 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8871 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8873 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8875 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8877 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8878 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8879 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8880 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8882 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8883 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8884 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8886 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8889 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8893 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
8894 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
8896 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8897 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8898 let seed = [42; 32];
8899 let network = Network::Testnet;
8900 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8902 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8903 let config = UserConfig::default();
8904 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8905 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8906 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8908 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8910 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8911 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8912 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8913 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8917 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8918 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8919 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8921 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8924 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8926 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8927 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8928 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8929 blinding_point: None,
8931 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8932 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8934 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8937 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8940 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8942 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8945 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8946 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8947 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8949 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8950 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8953 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8954 blinding_point: None,
8956 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8957 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8960 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8961 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
8963 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8964 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
8966 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
8969 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8970 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
8971 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8972 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
8973 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8974 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8975 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8976 } = &mut dummy_add {
8977 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8978 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8980 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8981 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
8982 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
8984 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
8987 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8989 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8990 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8991 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8992 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8993 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8994 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8995 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8996 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8999 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9001 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9002 use bitcoin::sighash;
9003 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9004 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9005 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9006 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9007 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9008 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9009 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9010 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9011 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9012 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9013 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9014 use crate::sync::Arc;
9015 use core::str::FromStr;
9016 use hex::DisplayHex;
9018 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9019 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9020 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9021 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9023 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9025 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9026 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9027 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9028 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9029 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9031 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9032 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9038 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9039 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9040 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9042 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9043 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9044 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9045 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9046 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9047 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9049 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9051 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9052 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9053 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9054 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9055 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9056 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9058 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9059 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9060 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9061 selected_contest_delay: 144
9063 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9064 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9066 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9067 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9069 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9070 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9072 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9073 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9075 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9076 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9077 // build_commitment_transaction.
9078 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9079 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9080 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9081 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9082 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9084 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9085 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9086 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9087 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9091 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9092 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9093 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9094 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9098 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9099 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9100 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9102 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9103 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9105 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9106 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9108 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9110 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9111 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9112 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9113 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9114 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9115 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9116 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9118 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9119 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9120 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9121 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9123 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9124 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9125 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9127 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9129 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9130 commitment_tx.clone(),
9131 counterparty_signature,
9132 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9133 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9134 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9136 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9137 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9139 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9140 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9141 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9143 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9144 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9147 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9148 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9150 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9151 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9152 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9153 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9154 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9155 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9156 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9157 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9159 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9162 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9163 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9164 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9168 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9171 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9172 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9173 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9174 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9175 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9176 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9178 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9179 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9180 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9181 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9183 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9184 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9185 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9186 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9187 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9189 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9190 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9191 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9192 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9193 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9194 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9196 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9200 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9201 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9202 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9203 "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", {});
9205 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9206 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9208 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9209 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9210 "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", {});
9212 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9213 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9214 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9215 "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", {});
9217 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9218 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9220 amount_msat: 1000000,
9222 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9223 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9225 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9228 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9229 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9231 amount_msat: 2000000,
9233 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9234 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9236 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9239 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9240 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9242 amount_msat: 2000000,
9244 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9245 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9246 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9247 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9248 blinding_point: None,
9250 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9253 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9254 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9256 amount_msat: 3000000,
9258 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9259 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9260 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9261 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9262 blinding_point: None,
9264 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9267 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9268 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9270 amount_msat: 4000000,
9272 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9273 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9275 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9279 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9280 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9281 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9283 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9284 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9285 "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", {
9288 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9289 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9290 "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" },
9293 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9294 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9295 "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" },
9298 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9299 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9300 "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" },
9303 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9304 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9305 "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" },
9308 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9309 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9310 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9313 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9314 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9315 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9317 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9318 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9319 "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", {
9322 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9323 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9324 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
9327 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9328 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9329 "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" },
9332 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9333 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9334 "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" },
9337 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9338 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9339 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9342 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9343 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9344 "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" }
9347 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9348 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9349 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9351 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9352 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9353 "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", {
9356 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9357 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9358 "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" },
9361 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9362 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9363 "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" },
9366 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9367 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9368 "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" },
9371 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9372 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9373 "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" }
9376 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9377 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9378 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9379 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9381 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9382 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9383 "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", {
9386 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9387 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9388 "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" },
9391 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9392 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9393 "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" },
9396 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9397 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9398 "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" },
9401 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9402 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9403 "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" }
9406 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9407 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9408 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9409 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9411 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9412 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9413 "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", {
9416 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9417 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9418 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9421 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9422 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9423 "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" },
9426 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9427 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9428 "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" },
9431 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9432 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9433 "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" }
9436 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9437 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9438 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9440 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9441 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9442 "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", {
9445 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9446 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9447 "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" },
9450 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9451 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9452 "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" },
9455 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9456 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9457 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9460 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9461 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9462 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9464 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9465 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9466 "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", {
9469 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9470 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9471 "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" },
9474 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9475 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9476 "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" },
9479 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9480 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9481 "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" }
9484 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9485 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9486 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9488 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9489 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9490 "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", {
9493 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9494 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9495 "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" },
9498 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9499 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9500 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9503 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9504 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9505 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9506 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9507 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9508 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9510 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9511 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9512 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9515 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9516 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9517 "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" },
9520 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9521 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9522 "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" }
9525 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9526 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9527 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9528 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9529 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9531 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9532 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9533 "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", {
9536 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9537 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9538 "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" },
9541 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9542 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9543 "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" }
9546 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9547 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9548 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9550 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9551 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9552 "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", {
9555 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9556 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9557 "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" }
9560 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9561 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9562 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9563 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9564 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9566 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9567 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9568 "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", {
9571 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9572 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9573 "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" }
9576 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9577 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9578 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9579 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9580 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9582 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9583 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9584 "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", {
9587 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9588 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9589 "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" }
9592 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9593 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9594 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9595 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9597 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9598 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9599 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
9601 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9602 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9603 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9604 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9605 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9607 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9608 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9609 "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", {});
9611 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9612 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9613 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9614 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9615 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9617 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9618 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9619 "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", {});
9621 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9622 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9623 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9625 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9626 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9627 "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", {});
9629 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9630 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9631 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9632 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9633 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9635 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9636 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9637 "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", {});
9639 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9640 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9641 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9642 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9643 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9645 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9646 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9647 "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", {});
9649 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9650 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9651 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9652 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9653 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9654 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9656 amount_msat: 2000000,
9658 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9659 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9661 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9664 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9665 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9666 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9668 amount_msat: 5000001,
9670 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9671 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9672 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9673 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9674 blinding_point: None,
9676 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9679 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9680 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9682 amount_msat: 5000000,
9684 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9685 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9686 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9687 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9688 blinding_point: None,
9690 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9694 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9695 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9696 "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", {
9699 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9700 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9701 "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" },
9703 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9704 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9705 "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" },
9707 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9708 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9709 "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" }
9712 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9713 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9714 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9715 "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", {
9718 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9719 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9720 "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" },
9722 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9723 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9724 "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" },
9726 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9727 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9728 "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" }
9733 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9734 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9736 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9737 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9738 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9739 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9741 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9742 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9743 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9745 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9746 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9748 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9749 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9751 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9752 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9753 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9757 fn test_key_derivation() {
9758 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9759 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9761 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9762 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9764 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9765 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9767 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9768 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9770 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9771 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9773 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9774 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9776 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9777 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9781 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9782 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9783 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9784 let seed = [42; 32];
9785 let network = Network::Testnet;
9786 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9787 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9789 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9790 let config = UserConfig::default();
9791 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9792 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9794 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9795 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9797 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9798 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9799 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9800 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9801 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9802 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9803 assert!(res.is_ok());
9807 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9808 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9809 // resulting `channel_type`.
9810 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9811 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9812 let network = Network::Testnet;
9813 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9814 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9816 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9817 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9819 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9820 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9822 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9823 // need to signal it.
9824 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9825 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9826 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9827 &config, 0, 42, None
9829 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9831 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9832 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9833 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9835 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9836 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9837 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9841 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9842 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9843 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9844 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9845 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9848 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9849 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9853 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9854 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9855 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9856 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9857 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9858 let network = Network::Testnet;
9859 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9860 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9862 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9863 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9865 let config = UserConfig::default();
9867 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9868 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9869 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9870 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9871 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9873 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9874 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9875 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9879 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9880 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9881 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9883 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9884 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9885 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9886 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9887 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9888 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9890 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9894 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9895 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9897 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9898 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9899 let network = Network::Testnet;
9900 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9901 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9903 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9904 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9906 let config = UserConfig::default();
9908 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9909 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9910 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9911 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9912 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9913 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9914 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9915 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9917 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9918 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9919 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9920 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9921 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9922 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9926 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9927 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9929 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9930 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9931 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9932 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9934 assert!(res.is_err());
9936 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9937 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9938 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9940 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9941 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9942 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9945 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9947 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9948 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9949 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9950 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9953 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9954 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9956 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9957 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9959 assert!(res.is_err());
9963 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9964 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9965 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9966 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9967 let seed = [42; 32];
9968 let network = Network::Testnet;
9969 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9970 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9971 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9973 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9974 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9975 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9976 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9978 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9979 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9980 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9985 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9995 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9996 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9997 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10002 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10003 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10009 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10012 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10013 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10014 &accept_channel_msg,
10015 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10016 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10019 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10020 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10021 let tx = Transaction {
10023 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10027 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10030 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10033 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10034 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10035 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10036 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10037 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10038 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10042 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10043 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10051 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10052 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10053 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10054 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10056 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10057 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10064 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10065 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10066 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10067 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10068 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10070 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10071 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10072 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10080 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10081 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10084 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10085 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10086 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10087 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());