1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
483 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
486 /// See [`Channel::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
487 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
489 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
490 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
491 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
492 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
493 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
495 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
499 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
500 (0, update, required),
501 (2, blocked, required),
504 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
505 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
506 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
509 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
510 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
511 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
512 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
514 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
515 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
516 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
517 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
519 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
523 channel_id: [u8; 32],
524 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
527 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
528 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
530 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
531 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
532 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
534 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
535 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
536 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
537 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
539 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
540 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
542 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
544 holder_signer: Signer,
545 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
546 destination_script: Script,
548 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
549 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
550 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
552 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
553 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
554 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
555 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
556 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
557 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
559 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
560 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
561 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
562 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
563 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
564 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
566 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
568 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
569 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
570 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
572 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
573 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
574 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
575 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
576 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
577 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
578 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
580 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
582 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
583 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
584 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
585 // HTLCs with similar state.
586 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
587 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
588 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
589 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
590 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
591 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
592 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
593 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
594 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
597 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
598 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
599 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
601 update_time_counter: u32,
603 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
604 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
605 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
606 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
607 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
608 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
610 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
611 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
613 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
614 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
615 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
616 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
618 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
619 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
621 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
623 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
625 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
626 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
627 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
628 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
629 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
630 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
632 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
633 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
634 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
635 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
636 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
638 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
639 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
640 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
641 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
642 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
643 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
644 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
645 channel_creation_height: u32,
647 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
650 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
652 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
655 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
657 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
660 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
662 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
664 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
665 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
668 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
670 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
672 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
673 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
675 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
677 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
678 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
679 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
681 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
683 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
684 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
686 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
687 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
688 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
690 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
692 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
694 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
695 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
696 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
697 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
699 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
700 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
701 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
703 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
704 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
705 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
707 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
708 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
709 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
710 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
711 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
712 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
713 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
714 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
716 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
717 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
718 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
719 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
720 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
722 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
723 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
725 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
726 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
727 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
728 /// unblock the state machine.
730 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
731 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
732 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
734 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
735 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
736 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
738 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
739 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
740 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
741 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
742 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
743 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
744 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
745 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
747 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
748 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
750 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
751 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
752 // the channel's funding UTXO.
754 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
755 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
756 // associated channel mapping.
758 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
759 // to store all of them.
760 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
762 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
763 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
764 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
765 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
766 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
768 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
769 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
771 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
772 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
774 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
775 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
776 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
778 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
779 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
780 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
781 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
782 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
785 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
786 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
788 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
789 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
790 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
794 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
796 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
797 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
798 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
799 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
803 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
805 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
807 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
809 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
810 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
811 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
812 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
813 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
815 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
816 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
818 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
820 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
821 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
823 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
824 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
825 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
826 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
827 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
828 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
830 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
831 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
833 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
834 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
835 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
836 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
837 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
839 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
840 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
842 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
843 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
845 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
846 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
847 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
848 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
854 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
855 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
857 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
858 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
859 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
864 macro_rules! secp_check {
865 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
868 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
873 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
874 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
875 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
876 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
878 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
880 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
881 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
882 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
884 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
887 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
889 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
892 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
893 /// required by us according to the configured or default
894 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
896 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
898 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
899 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
900 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
901 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
902 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
905 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
906 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
907 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
908 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
909 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
910 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
911 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
914 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
915 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
918 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
919 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
920 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
921 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
922 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
923 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
924 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
925 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
926 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
927 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
930 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
931 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
932 // `only_static_remotekey`.
934 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
935 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
936 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
937 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
944 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
945 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
946 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
947 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
948 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
949 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
950 // We've exhausted our options
953 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
954 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
957 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
958 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
959 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
960 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
962 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
963 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
964 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
965 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
966 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
967 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
969 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
971 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
975 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
976 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
977 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
978 outbound_scid_alias: u64
979 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
980 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
981 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
982 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
984 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
985 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
986 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
987 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
989 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
990 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
992 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
993 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
995 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
996 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
999 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1000 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1002 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
1003 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1004 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1005 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
1009 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1010 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1012 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
1014 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1015 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1016 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
1017 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1020 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1021 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1023 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1024 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1025 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1026 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1030 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1031 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1032 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1036 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1037 Ok(script) => script,
1038 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1041 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1046 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1047 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1048 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1049 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1054 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1056 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1057 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1058 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1059 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1061 channel_value_satoshis,
1063 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1066 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1069 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1070 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1073 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1074 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1075 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1076 pending_update_fee: None,
1077 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1078 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1079 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1080 update_time_counter: 1,
1082 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1084 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1085 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1086 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1087 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1088 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1089 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1091 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1092 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1093 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1094 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1096 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1097 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1098 closing_fee_limits: None,
1099 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1101 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1103 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1104 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1105 short_channel_id: None,
1106 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1108 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1109 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1110 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1111 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1112 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1113 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1114 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1115 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1116 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1117 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1118 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1119 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1121 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1123 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1124 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1125 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1126 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1127 counterparty_parameters: None,
1128 funding_outpoint: None,
1129 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1130 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1132 funding_transaction: None,
1134 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1135 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1136 counterparty_node_id,
1138 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1140 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1142 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1143 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1145 announcement_sigs: None,
1147 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1148 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1149 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1150 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1152 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1153 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1155 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1156 outbound_scid_alias,
1158 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1159 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1161 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1162 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1167 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1171 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1172 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1173 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1175 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1176 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1177 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1178 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1179 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1180 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1181 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1184 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1185 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1186 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1187 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1188 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1189 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1190 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1191 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1193 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1194 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1203 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1204 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1205 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1206 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1207 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1208 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1209 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1210 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1211 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1212 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1213 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1216 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1218 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1219 // support this channel type.
1220 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1221 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1225 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1226 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1227 // `static_remote_key`.
1228 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1229 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1231 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1232 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1235 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1238 channel_type.clone()
1240 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1241 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1246 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1248 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1249 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1250 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1251 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1252 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1253 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1254 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1255 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1256 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1259 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1263 // Check sanity of message fields:
1264 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1265 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1267 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1270 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1273 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1274 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1277 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1280 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1283 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1285 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1286 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1289 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1290 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1292 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1296 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1297 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1300 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1301 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1303 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1306 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1307 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1309 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1312 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1315 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1319 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1321 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1322 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1327 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1328 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1329 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1330 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1333 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1334 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1336 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1337 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1338 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1340 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1344 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1345 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1346 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1347 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1348 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1349 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1352 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1353 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1354 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1355 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1359 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1360 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1361 &Some(ref script) => {
1362 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1363 if script.len() == 0 {
1366 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1367 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1369 Some(script.clone())
1372 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1379 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1380 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1381 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1382 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1386 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1387 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1388 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1392 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1393 Ok(script) => script,
1394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1397 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1398 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1400 let chan = Channel {
1403 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1404 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1406 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1411 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1413 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1414 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1415 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1416 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1419 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1422 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1425 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1426 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1427 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1429 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1430 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1431 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1432 pending_update_fee: None,
1433 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1434 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1435 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1436 update_time_counter: 1,
1438 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1440 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1441 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1442 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1443 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1444 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1445 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1447 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1448 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1449 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1450 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1452 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1453 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1454 closing_fee_limits: None,
1455 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1457 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1459 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1460 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1461 short_channel_id: None,
1462 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1464 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1465 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1466 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1467 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1468 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1469 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1470 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1471 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1472 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1473 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1474 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1475 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1476 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1478 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1480 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1481 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1482 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1483 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1484 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1485 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1486 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1488 funding_outpoint: None,
1489 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1490 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1492 funding_transaction: None,
1494 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1495 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1496 counterparty_node_id,
1498 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1500 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1502 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1503 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1505 announcement_sigs: None,
1507 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1508 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1509 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1510 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1512 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1513 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1515 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1516 outbound_scid_alias,
1518 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1519 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1521 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1522 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1527 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1533 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1534 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1535 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1536 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1537 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1539 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1540 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1541 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1542 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1543 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1544 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1545 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1547 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1548 where L::Target: Logger
1550 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1551 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1552 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1554 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1555 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1556 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1557 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1559 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1560 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1561 if match update_state {
1562 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1563 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1564 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1565 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1566 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1568 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1572 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1573 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1574 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1575 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1577 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1578 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1579 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1581 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1582 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1583 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1584 transaction_output_index: None
1589 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1590 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1591 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1592 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1593 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1596 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1598 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1599 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1600 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1602 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1603 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1606 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1607 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1610 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1612 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1613 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1614 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1616 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1617 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1623 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1624 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1625 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1626 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1627 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1628 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1629 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1633 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1634 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1636 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1638 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1639 if generated_by_local {
1640 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1641 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1650 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1652 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1653 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1654 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1655 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1656 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1657 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1658 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1661 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1662 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1663 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1664 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1668 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1669 preimages.push(preimage);
1673 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1674 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1676 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1678 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1679 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1681 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1682 if !generated_by_local {
1683 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1691 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1692 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1693 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1694 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1695 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1696 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1697 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1698 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1700 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1702 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1703 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1704 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1705 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1707 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1709 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1710 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1711 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1712 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1715 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1716 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1717 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1718 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1720 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1723 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1724 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1725 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1726 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1728 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1731 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1732 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1737 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1738 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1743 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1745 let channel_parameters =
1746 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1747 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1748 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1751 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1756 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1759 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1760 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1761 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1762 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1764 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1765 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1766 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1774 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1775 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1781 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1782 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1783 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1784 // outside of those situations will fail.
1785 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1789 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1794 1 + // script length (0)
1798 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1799 2 + // witness marker and flag
1800 1 + // witness element count
1801 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1802 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1803 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1804 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1805 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1806 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1808 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1809 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1810 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1816 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1817 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1818 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1819 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1821 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1822 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1823 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1825 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1826 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1827 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1828 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1829 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1830 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1833 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1834 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1837 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1838 value_to_holder = 0;
1841 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1842 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1843 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1844 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1846 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1847 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1850 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1851 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1855 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1856 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1857 /// our counterparty!)
1858 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1859 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1860 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1861 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1862 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1863 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1864 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1866 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1870 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1871 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1872 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1873 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1874 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1875 //may see payments to it!
1876 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1877 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1878 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1880 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1883 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1884 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1885 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1886 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1887 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1890 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1893 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1894 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1896 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1898 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1899 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1900 where L::Target: Logger {
1901 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1902 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1903 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1904 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1905 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1906 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1907 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1908 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1912 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1913 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1914 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1915 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1917 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1918 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1920 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1922 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1924 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1925 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1926 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1928 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1929 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1930 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1931 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1932 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1934 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1935 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1936 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1938 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1939 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1941 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1944 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1945 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1949 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1953 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1954 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1955 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1956 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1957 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1958 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1961 // Now update local state:
1963 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1964 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1965 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1966 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1967 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1968 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1969 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1973 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1974 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1975 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1976 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1977 // do not not get into this branch.
1978 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1979 match pending_update {
1980 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1981 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1982 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1983 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1984 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1985 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1986 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1989 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1990 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1991 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1992 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1993 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1994 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1995 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2001 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
2002 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2003 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2005 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2006 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2007 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2009 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2010 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2013 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2014 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2016 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2017 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2019 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2020 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2023 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2026 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2027 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2028 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2029 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2034 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2035 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2036 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2037 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2038 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2039 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2040 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2041 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2042 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2043 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2044 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2045 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2046 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2047 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2048 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2049 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2050 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2052 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2054 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2055 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2056 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2057 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2058 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2059 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2060 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2062 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2063 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2066 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2067 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2068 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2069 update, blocked: true,
2074 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2075 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2076 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2077 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2081 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2085 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2086 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2087 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2088 /// before we fail backwards.
2090 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2091 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2092 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2093 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2094 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2095 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2096 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2099 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2100 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2101 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2102 /// before we fail backwards.
2104 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2105 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2106 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2107 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2108 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2109 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2110 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2112 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2114 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2115 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2116 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2118 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2119 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2120 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2122 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2123 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2124 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2126 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2131 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2132 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2138 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2139 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2140 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2141 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2142 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2146 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2147 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2148 force_holding_cell = true;
2151 // Now update local state:
2152 if force_holding_cell {
2153 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2154 match pending_update {
2155 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2156 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2157 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2158 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2162 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2163 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2164 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2165 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2171 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2172 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2173 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2179 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2181 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2182 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2185 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2186 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2187 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2192 // Message handlers:
2194 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2195 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2197 // Check sanity of message fields:
2198 if !self.is_outbound() {
2199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2201 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2202 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2204 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2205 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2207 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2210 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2213 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2215 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2217 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2218 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2221 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2222 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2225 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2226 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2228 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2232 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2233 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2236 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2237 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2239 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2242 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2245 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2248 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2251 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2255 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2256 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2259 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2260 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2262 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2263 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2266 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2269 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2270 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2271 &Some(ref script) => {
2272 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2273 if script.len() == 0 {
2276 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2279 Some(script.clone())
2282 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2289 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2290 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2291 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2292 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2293 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2295 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2296 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2298 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2301 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2302 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2303 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2304 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2305 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2306 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2309 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2310 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2311 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2314 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2315 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2317 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2318 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2323 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2324 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2326 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2327 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2329 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2330 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2331 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2332 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2333 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2334 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2335 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2336 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2337 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2340 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2341 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2343 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2344 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2345 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2346 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2348 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2349 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2351 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2352 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2355 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2356 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2359 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2360 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2361 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2363 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2366 if self.is_outbound() {
2367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2369 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2370 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2371 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2373 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2375 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2378 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2379 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2380 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2381 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2384 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2385 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2386 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2387 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2388 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2390 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2392 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2393 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2394 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2397 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2398 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2399 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2403 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2404 initial_commitment_tx,
2407 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2408 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2411 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2412 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2414 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2416 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2417 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2418 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2419 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2420 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2421 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2422 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2423 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2424 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2425 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2426 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2428 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2430 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2432 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2433 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2434 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2435 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2437 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2439 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2440 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2442 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2443 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2446 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2447 }, channel_monitor))
2450 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2451 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2452 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2453 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2454 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2456 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2459 if !self.is_outbound() {
2460 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2462 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2463 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2465 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2466 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2467 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2468 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2471 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2473 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2474 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2475 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2476 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2478 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2479 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2481 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2482 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2484 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2485 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2486 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2487 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2488 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2489 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2493 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2494 initial_commitment_tx,
2497 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2498 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2501 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2502 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2505 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2506 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2507 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2508 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2509 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2510 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2511 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2512 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2513 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2514 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2515 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2516 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2518 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2520 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2522 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2523 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2524 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2525 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2527 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2529 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2530 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2534 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2535 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2537 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2538 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2539 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2540 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2542 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2545 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2546 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2547 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2550 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2551 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2552 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2553 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2554 // when routing outbound payments.
2555 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2559 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2561 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2562 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2563 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2564 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2565 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2566 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2567 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2568 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2569 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2571 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2572 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2573 let expected_point =
2574 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2575 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2577 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2578 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2579 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2580 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2581 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2582 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2584 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2585 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2586 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2587 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2588 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2590 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2591 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2598 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2599 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2601 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2603 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2606 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2607 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2608 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2609 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2615 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2616 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2617 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2618 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2619 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2620 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2621 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2622 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2623 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2626 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2629 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2630 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2631 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2633 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2634 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2635 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2636 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2637 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2638 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2640 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2641 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2647 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2648 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2649 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2650 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2651 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2652 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2653 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2654 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2655 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2658 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2661 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2662 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2663 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2665 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2666 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2667 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2668 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2669 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2670 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2672 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2673 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2677 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2678 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2679 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2680 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2681 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2682 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2683 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2685 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2686 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2688 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2695 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2696 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2697 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2698 /// corner case properly.
2699 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2700 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2701 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2703 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2704 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2705 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2706 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2709 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2711 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2712 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2713 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2716 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2717 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2718 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2719 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2721 outbound_capacity_msat,
2722 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2723 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2724 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2730 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2731 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2734 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2735 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2736 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2737 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2738 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2739 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2742 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2743 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2745 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2746 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2749 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2750 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2751 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2753 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2754 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2756 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2759 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2760 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2762 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2763 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2765 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2766 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2768 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2769 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2773 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2774 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2780 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2781 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2782 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2785 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2786 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2787 included_htlcs += 1;
2790 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2791 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2795 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2796 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2797 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2798 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2799 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2800 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2805 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2807 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2808 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2813 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2814 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2818 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2819 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2820 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2823 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2824 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2826 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2827 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2828 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2830 total_pending_htlcs,
2831 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2832 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2833 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2835 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2836 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2837 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2839 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2841 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2846 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2847 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2848 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2850 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2851 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2853 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2856 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2857 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2859 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2860 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2862 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2863 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2865 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2866 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2870 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2871 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2877 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2878 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2879 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2880 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2881 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2882 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2885 included_htlcs += 1;
2888 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2889 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2892 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2893 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2895 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2896 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2897 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2902 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2903 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2904 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2907 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2908 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2910 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2911 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2913 total_pending_htlcs,
2914 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2915 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2916 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2918 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2919 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2920 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2922 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2924 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2929 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2930 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2931 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2932 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2933 if local_sent_shutdown {
2934 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2936 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2937 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2938 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2941 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2944 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2947 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2950 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2951 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2954 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2955 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2956 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2957 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2959 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2960 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2962 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2963 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2964 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2965 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2966 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2967 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2968 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2969 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2970 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2971 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2972 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2974 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2975 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2976 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2977 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2978 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2979 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2983 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2986 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2987 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2988 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2990 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2991 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2992 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2993 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2994 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2995 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2996 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3000 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3001 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3002 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3003 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3004 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3005 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3006 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3010 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3011 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3012 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3013 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3014 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3015 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3018 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3019 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3020 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3021 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3022 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3024 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3025 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3028 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3032 if !self.is_outbound() {
3033 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3034 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3035 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3036 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3037 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3038 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3039 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3040 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3041 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3042 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3043 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3044 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3045 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3046 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3047 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3050 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3051 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3052 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3053 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3057 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3058 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3060 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3064 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3065 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3066 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3070 // Now update local state:
3071 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3072 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3073 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3074 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3075 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3076 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3077 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3082 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3084 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3085 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3086 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3087 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3088 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3089 None => fail_reason.into(),
3090 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3091 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3092 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3093 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3095 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3099 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3101 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3102 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3104 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3110 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3113 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3114 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3117 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3121 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3124 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3125 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3128 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3129 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3132 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3136 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3137 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3138 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3140 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3144 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3148 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3149 where L::Target: Logger
3151 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3154 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3157 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3161 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3163 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3165 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3166 let commitment_txid = {
3167 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3168 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3169 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3171 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3172 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3173 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3174 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3175 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3180 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3182 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3183 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3184 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3185 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3188 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3189 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3190 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3194 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3196 if self.is_outbound() {
3197 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3198 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3199 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3200 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3201 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3202 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3203 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3204 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3205 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3206 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3212 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3216 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3217 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3218 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3219 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3220 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3221 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3222 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3223 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3224 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3225 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3226 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3227 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3228 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3231 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3232 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3233 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3234 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3235 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3236 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3237 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3239 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3240 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3241 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3242 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3243 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3244 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3245 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3248 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3249 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3252 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3254 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3255 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3256 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3259 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3262 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3263 commitment_stats.tx,
3265 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3266 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3267 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3270 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3271 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3273 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3274 let mut need_commitment = false;
3275 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3276 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3277 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3278 need_commitment = true;
3282 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3283 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3284 Some(forward_info.clone())
3286 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3287 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3288 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3289 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3290 need_commitment = true;
3293 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3294 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3295 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3296 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3297 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3298 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3299 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3300 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3301 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3302 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3303 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3304 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3305 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3306 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3308 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3310 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3311 need_commitment = true;
3315 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3316 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3317 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3318 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3319 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3320 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3322 nondust_htlc_sources,
3326 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3327 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3328 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3329 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3331 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3332 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3333 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3334 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3335 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3336 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3337 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3338 // includes the right HTLCs.
3339 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3340 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3341 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3342 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3343 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3344 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3346 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3347 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3348 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3351 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3352 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3353 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3354 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3355 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3356 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3357 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3358 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3359 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3363 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3364 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3365 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3366 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3369 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3370 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3371 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3372 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3373 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3374 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3375 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3376 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3379 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3380 /// for our counterparty.
3381 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3382 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3383 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3384 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3385 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3387 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3388 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3389 updates: Vec::new(),
3392 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3393 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3394 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3395 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3396 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3397 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3398 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3399 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3400 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3401 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3402 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3403 // to rebalance channels.
3404 match &htlc_update {
3405 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3406 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3407 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3410 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3411 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3412 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3413 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3414 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3415 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3416 // into the holding cell without ever being
3417 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3418 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3419 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3422 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3428 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3429 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3430 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3431 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3432 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3433 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3434 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3435 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3436 (msg, monitor_update)
3437 } else { unreachable!() };
3438 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3439 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3441 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3442 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3443 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3444 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3445 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3446 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3447 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3448 // for a full revocation before failing.
3449 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3452 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3454 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3461 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3462 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3464 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3465 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3470 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3471 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3472 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3473 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3474 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3476 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3477 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3478 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3480 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3481 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3487 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3488 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3489 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3490 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3491 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3492 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3493 where L::Target: Logger,
3495 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3496 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3498 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3501 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3502 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3505 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3507 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3508 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3509 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3513 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3514 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3515 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3516 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3517 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3518 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3519 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3520 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3521 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3524 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3526 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3527 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3530 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3531 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3533 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3535 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3536 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3537 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3538 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3539 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3540 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3541 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3542 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3546 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3547 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3548 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3549 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3550 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3551 self.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3552 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3553 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3554 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3556 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3557 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3560 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3561 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3562 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3563 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3564 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3565 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3566 let mut require_commitment = false;
3567 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3570 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3571 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3572 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3574 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3575 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3576 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3577 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3578 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3579 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3584 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3585 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3586 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3587 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3588 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3590 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3591 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3592 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3597 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3598 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3600 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3604 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3605 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3607 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3608 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3609 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3610 require_commitment = true;
3611 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3612 match forward_info {
3613 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3614 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3615 require_commitment = true;
3617 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3618 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3619 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3621 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3622 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3623 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3627 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3628 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3629 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3630 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3636 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3637 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3638 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3639 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3641 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3642 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3643 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3644 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3645 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3646 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3647 require_commitment = true;
3651 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3653 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3654 match update_state {
3655 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3656 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3657 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3658 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3659 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3661 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3662 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3663 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3664 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3665 require_commitment = true;
3666 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3667 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3672 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3673 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3674 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3675 if require_commitment {
3676 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3677 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3678 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3679 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3680 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3681 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3682 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3683 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3684 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3686 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3687 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3688 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3689 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3690 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3693 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3694 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3695 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3696 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3697 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3698 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3699 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3701 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3702 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3704 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3705 if require_commitment {
3706 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3708 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3709 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3710 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3711 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3713 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3714 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3715 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3716 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3718 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3719 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3720 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3726 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3727 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3728 /// commitment update.
3729 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3730 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3731 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3734 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3735 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3736 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3737 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3739 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3740 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3741 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3742 if !self.is_outbound() {
3743 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3745 if !self.is_usable() {
3746 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3748 if !self.is_live() {
3749 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3752 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3753 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3754 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3755 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3756 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3757 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3758 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3759 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3760 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3761 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3765 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3766 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3767 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3768 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3769 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3772 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3773 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3777 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3778 force_holding_cell = true;
3781 if force_holding_cell {
3782 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3786 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3787 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3789 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3790 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3795 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3796 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3798 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3800 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3801 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3802 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3803 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3807 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3808 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3809 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3813 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3814 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3817 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3818 // will be retransmitted.
3819 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3820 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3821 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3823 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3824 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3826 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3827 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3828 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3829 // this HTLC accordingly
3830 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3833 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3834 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3835 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3836 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3839 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3840 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3841 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3842 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3843 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3844 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3849 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3851 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3852 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3853 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3854 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3858 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3859 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3860 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3861 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3862 // the update upon reconnection.
3863 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3867 self.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3869 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3870 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3873 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3874 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3875 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3876 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3877 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3878 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3879 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3881 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3882 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3883 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3884 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3885 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3886 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3887 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3889 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3890 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3891 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3892 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3893 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3894 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3895 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3898 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3899 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3900 /// to the remote side.
3901 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3902 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3903 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3904 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3907 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3909 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3910 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3911 let mut found_blocked = false;
3912 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3913 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3914 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3918 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3919 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3920 // first received the funding_signed.
3921 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3922 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3923 self.funding_transaction.take()
3925 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3926 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3927 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3928 funding_broadcastable = None;
3931 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3932 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3933 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3934 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3935 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3936 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3937 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3938 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3939 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3940 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3941 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3942 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3943 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3944 next_per_commitment_point,
3945 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3949 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3951 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3952 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3953 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3954 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3955 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3956 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3958 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3959 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3960 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3961 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3962 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3963 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3967 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3968 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3970 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3971 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3972 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3975 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3976 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3977 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3978 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3979 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3980 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3981 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3982 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3983 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3987 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3988 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3990 if self.is_outbound() {
3991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3993 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3994 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3996 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3997 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3999 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4000 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4001 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4002 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4003 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4004 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4005 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4006 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4007 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4008 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4009 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4010 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4011 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4013 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4015 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4021 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4022 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4023 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4024 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4025 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4026 per_commitment_secret,
4027 next_per_commitment_point,
4029 next_local_nonce: None,
4033 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4034 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4035 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4036 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4037 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4039 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4040 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4041 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4042 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4043 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4044 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4045 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4046 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4047 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4052 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4053 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4055 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4056 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4057 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4058 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4059 reason: err_packet.clone()
4062 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4063 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4064 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4065 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4066 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4067 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4070 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4071 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4072 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4073 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4074 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4081 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4082 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4083 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4084 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4088 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4089 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4090 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4091 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4092 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4093 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4097 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4098 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4100 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4101 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4102 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4103 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4104 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4105 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4106 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4107 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4110 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4112 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4113 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4114 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4115 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4119 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4120 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4124 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4125 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4126 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4127 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4128 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4129 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4131 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4132 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4133 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4134 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4135 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4138 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4139 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4140 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4141 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4142 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4143 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4144 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4145 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4149 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4150 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4151 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4152 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4154 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4158 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4159 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4160 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4161 self.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4163 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4164 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4165 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4166 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4167 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4171 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4173 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4174 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4175 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4176 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4177 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4178 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4180 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4181 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4182 channel_ready: None,
4183 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4184 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4185 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4189 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4190 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4191 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4192 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4193 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4194 next_per_commitment_point,
4195 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4197 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4198 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4199 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4203 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4204 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4205 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4207 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4208 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4209 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4212 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4218 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4219 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4220 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4221 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4222 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4223 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4224 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4226 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4228 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4229 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4230 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4231 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4232 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4233 next_per_commitment_point,
4234 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4238 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4239 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4240 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4242 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4245 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4246 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4247 raa: required_revoke,
4248 commitment_update: None,
4249 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4251 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4252 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4253 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4255 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4258 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4259 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4260 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4261 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4262 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4263 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4266 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4267 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4268 raa: required_revoke,
4269 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4270 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4274 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4278 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4279 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4280 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4281 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4283 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4285 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4287 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4288 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4289 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4290 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4291 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4292 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4294 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4295 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4296 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4297 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4298 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4300 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4301 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4302 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4303 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4306 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4307 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4308 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4309 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4310 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4311 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4312 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4313 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4314 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4315 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4316 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4317 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4318 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4319 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4320 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4322 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4325 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4326 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4329 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4330 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4331 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4332 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4333 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4334 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4335 self.channel_state &
4336 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4337 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4338 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4339 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4342 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4343 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4344 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4345 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4346 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4347 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4350 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4356 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4357 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4358 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4359 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4361 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4362 return Ok((None, None));
4365 if !self.is_outbound() {
4366 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4367 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4369 return Ok((None, None));
4372 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4374 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4375 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4376 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4377 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4379 let sig = self.holder_signer
4380 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4381 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4383 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4384 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4385 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4386 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4388 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4389 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4390 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4395 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4396 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4398 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4399 self.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4402 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4403 /// within our expected timeframe.
4405 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4406 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4407 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4410 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4413 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4414 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4417 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4418 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4419 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4420 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4422 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4423 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4425 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4426 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4427 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4428 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4429 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4431 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4432 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4433 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4436 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4438 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4439 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4442 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4443 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4444 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4447 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4450 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4451 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4452 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4453 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4455 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4458 assert!(send_shutdown);
4459 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4460 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4461 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4463 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4464 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4466 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4471 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4473 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4474 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4476 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4477 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4478 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4479 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4480 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4481 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4484 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4485 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4486 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4489 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4490 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4491 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4492 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4496 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4497 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4498 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4499 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4500 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4501 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4503 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4504 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4511 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4512 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4514 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4517 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4518 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4520 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4522 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4523 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4524 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4525 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4526 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4527 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4528 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4529 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4530 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4532 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4533 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4536 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4540 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4541 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4542 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4543 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4545 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4548 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4549 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4551 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4554 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4555 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4558 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4562 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4563 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4564 return Ok((None, None));
4567 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4568 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4569 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4570 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4572 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4574 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4577 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4578 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4579 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4580 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4581 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4585 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4586 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4591 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4592 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4593 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4594 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4595 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4596 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4597 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4601 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4603 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4604 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4605 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4606 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4608 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4611 let sig = self.holder_signer
4612 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4613 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4615 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4616 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4617 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4618 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4622 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4623 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4624 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4625 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4627 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4628 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4629 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4635 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4636 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4639 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4640 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4642 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4643 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4646 if !self.is_outbound() {
4647 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4648 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4649 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4650 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4652 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4653 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4654 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4656 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4657 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4660 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4661 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4662 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4663 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4664 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4665 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4666 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4667 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4669 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4672 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4673 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4674 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4675 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4677 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4681 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4682 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4683 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4684 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4686 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4692 // Public utilities:
4694 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4698 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4700 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4701 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4702 self.temporary_channel_id
4705 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4709 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4710 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4711 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4715 /// Gets the channel's type
4716 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4720 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4721 /// is_usable() returns true).
4722 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4723 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4724 self.short_channel_id
4727 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4728 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4729 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4732 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4733 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4734 self.outbound_scid_alias
4736 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4737 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4738 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4739 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4740 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4743 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4744 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4745 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4746 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4749 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4750 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4751 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4754 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4755 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4756 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4757 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4761 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4764 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4765 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4768 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4769 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4772 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4773 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4774 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4777 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4778 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4781 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4782 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4783 self.counterparty_node_id
4786 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4787 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4788 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4791 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4792 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4793 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4796 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4797 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4799 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4800 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4801 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4802 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4804 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4808 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4809 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4810 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4813 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4814 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4815 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4818 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4819 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4820 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4822 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4823 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4828 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4829 self.channel_value_satoshis
4832 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4833 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4836 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4837 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4840 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4841 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4844 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4845 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4846 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4849 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4850 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4851 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4854 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4855 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4856 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4859 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4860 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4861 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4864 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4865 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4866 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4869 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4870 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4871 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4874 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4875 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4876 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4877 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4878 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4881 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4883 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4884 self.prev_config = None;
4888 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4889 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4893 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4894 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4895 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4896 let did_channel_update =
4897 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4898 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4899 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4900 if did_channel_update {
4901 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4902 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4903 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4904 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4906 self.config.options = *config;
4910 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4911 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4912 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4913 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4914 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4915 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4916 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4918 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4919 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4922 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4924 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4925 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4931 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4932 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4933 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4934 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4935 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4936 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4937 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4939 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4940 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4947 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4951 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4952 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4953 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4954 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4955 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4956 // which are near the dust limit.
4957 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4958 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4959 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4960 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4961 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4963 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4964 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4966 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4969 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4970 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4973 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4974 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4977 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4978 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4982 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4987 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4989 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4990 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4991 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4992 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4993 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4994 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4996 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4998 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5006 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5007 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5011 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5012 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
5013 self.update_time_counter
5016 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5017 self.latest_monitor_update_id
5020 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
5021 self.config.announced_channel
5024 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
5025 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
5028 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
5029 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5030 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
5031 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
5034 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
5035 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
5036 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
5039 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
5040 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5041 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
5042 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
5043 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
5046 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5047 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5048 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5049 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5050 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5053 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5055 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5056 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5059 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5060 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5061 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5064 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5065 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5066 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5067 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5068 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5069 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5070 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5071 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5077 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5078 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5079 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5080 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5081 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5082 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5087 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5088 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5090 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5091 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5092 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5093 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5096 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5097 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5100 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5101 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5104 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5105 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5106 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5109 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5110 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5111 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5113 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5114 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5115 if self.channel_state &
5116 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5117 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5118 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5119 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5120 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5123 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5124 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5125 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5126 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5127 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5128 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5130 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5131 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5132 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5134 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5135 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5136 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5137 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5138 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5139 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5145 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5146 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5147 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5150 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5151 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5152 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5155 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5156 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5157 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5160 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5161 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5162 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5163 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5164 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5165 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5170 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5171 self.channel_update_status
5174 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5175 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5176 self.channel_update_status = status;
5179 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5181 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5182 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5183 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5187 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5188 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5189 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5192 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5196 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5197 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5198 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5200 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5201 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5202 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5204 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5205 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5208 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5209 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5210 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5211 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5212 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5213 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5214 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5215 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5216 self.channel_state);
5218 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5222 if need_commitment_update {
5223 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5224 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5225 let next_per_commitment_point =
5226 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5227 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5228 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5229 next_per_commitment_point,
5230 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5234 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5240 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5241 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5242 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5243 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5244 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5245 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5246 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5248 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5251 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5252 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5253 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5254 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5255 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5256 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5257 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5258 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5259 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5260 if self.is_outbound() {
5261 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5262 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5263 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5264 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5265 // channel and move on.
5266 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5267 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5269 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5270 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5271 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5273 if self.is_outbound() {
5274 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5275 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5276 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5277 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5278 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5279 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5283 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5284 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5285 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5286 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5287 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5291 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5292 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5293 // may have already happened for this block).
5294 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5295 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5296 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5297 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5300 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5301 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5302 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5303 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5311 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5312 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5313 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5314 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5316 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5317 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5320 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5322 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5323 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5324 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5325 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5327 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5330 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5333 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5334 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5335 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5336 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5338 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5341 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5342 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5343 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5345 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5346 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5348 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5349 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5350 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5358 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5360 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5361 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5362 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5364 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5365 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5368 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5369 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5370 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5371 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5372 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5373 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5374 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5375 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5376 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5379 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5380 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5381 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5382 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5384 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5385 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5386 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5388 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5389 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5390 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5391 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5393 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5394 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5395 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5396 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5397 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5398 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5399 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5402 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5403 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5405 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5408 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5409 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5410 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5411 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5412 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5413 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5414 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5415 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5416 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5417 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5418 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5419 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5420 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5421 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5422 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5423 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5424 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5430 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5435 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5436 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5438 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5439 if !self.is_outbound() {
5440 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5442 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5443 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5446 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5447 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5450 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5451 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5455 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5456 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5457 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5458 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5459 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5460 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5461 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5462 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5463 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5464 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5465 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5466 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5467 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5468 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5469 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5470 first_per_commitment_point,
5471 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5472 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5473 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5474 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5476 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5480 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5481 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5484 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5485 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5486 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5487 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5490 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5491 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5493 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5494 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5495 if self.is_outbound() {
5496 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5498 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5499 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5501 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5502 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5504 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5505 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5508 self.user_id = user_id;
5509 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5511 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5514 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5515 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5516 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5518 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5519 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5520 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5521 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5523 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5524 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5525 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5526 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5527 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5528 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5529 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5530 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5531 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5532 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5533 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5534 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5535 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5536 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5537 first_per_commitment_point,
5538 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5539 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5540 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5542 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5544 next_local_nonce: None,
5548 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5549 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5551 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5553 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5554 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5557 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5558 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5559 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5560 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5561 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5562 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5565 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5566 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5567 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5568 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5569 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5570 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5571 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5572 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5573 if !self.is_outbound() {
5574 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5576 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5577 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5579 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5580 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5581 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5582 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5585 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5586 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5588 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5591 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5592 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5597 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5599 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5601 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5602 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5603 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5605 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5606 temporary_channel_id,
5607 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5608 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5611 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5613 next_local_nonce: None,
5617 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5618 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5619 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5620 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5622 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5625 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5626 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5627 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5628 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5629 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5630 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5632 if !self.is_usable() {
5633 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5636 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5637 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5638 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5639 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5641 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5642 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5644 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5645 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5646 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5647 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5648 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5649 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5655 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5656 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5657 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5658 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5660 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5663 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5667 if !self.is_usable() {
5671 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5672 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5676 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5680 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5681 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5684 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5688 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5690 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5695 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5697 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5702 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5704 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5705 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5706 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5707 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5708 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5712 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5714 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5715 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5716 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5717 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5718 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5719 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5720 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5722 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5723 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5724 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5725 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5726 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5727 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5728 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5729 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5730 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5731 contents: announcement,
5734 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5738 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5739 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5740 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5741 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5742 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5743 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5744 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5745 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5747 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5749 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5751 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5752 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5754 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5755 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5756 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5757 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5760 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5761 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5762 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5763 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5766 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5769 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5770 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5771 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5772 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5773 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5774 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5777 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5779 Err(_) => return None,
5781 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5782 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5787 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5788 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5789 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5790 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5791 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5792 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5793 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5794 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5795 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5796 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5797 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5798 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5799 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5800 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5801 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5802 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5805 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5808 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5809 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5810 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5811 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5812 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5813 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5814 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5815 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5816 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5818 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5819 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5820 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5821 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5822 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5823 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5824 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5825 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5826 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5828 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5829 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5830 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5831 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5832 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5833 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5834 next_funding_txid: None,
5839 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5841 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5842 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5843 /// commitment update.
5845 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5846 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5847 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5848 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5850 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5851 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5853 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5854 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5859 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5860 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5862 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5864 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5865 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5867 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5868 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5869 /// regenerate them.
5871 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5872 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5874 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5875 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5876 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5877 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5878 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5881 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5882 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5883 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5886 if amount_msat == 0 {
5887 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5890 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5891 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5894 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5895 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5896 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5897 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5898 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5899 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5900 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5901 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5904 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5905 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5906 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5907 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5909 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5910 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5914 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5915 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5916 if !self.is_outbound() {
5917 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5918 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5919 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5920 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5921 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5922 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5926 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5929 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5930 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5931 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5933 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5934 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5935 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5936 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5937 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5938 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5942 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5943 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5944 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5945 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5946 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5947 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5951 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5952 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5953 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5956 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5957 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5958 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5959 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5961 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5962 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5965 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5966 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5967 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5968 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5972 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5973 force_holding_cell = true;
5976 // Now update local state:
5977 if force_holding_cell {
5978 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5983 onion_routing_packet,
5988 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5989 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5991 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5993 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5997 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5998 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5999 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6003 onion_routing_packet,
6005 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6010 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6011 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6012 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6013 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6015 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6016 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6017 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6019 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6020 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6024 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6025 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6026 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6027 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6028 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6029 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6030 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6033 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6034 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6035 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6036 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6037 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6038 self.pending_update_fee = None;
6041 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6043 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6044 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6045 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6047 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6048 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6051 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6052 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6053 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6054 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6055 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6056 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6057 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6058 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6061 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6065 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6066 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6067 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6068 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6070 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6072 if !self.is_outbound() {
6073 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6074 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6075 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6076 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6077 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6078 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6079 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6080 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6081 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6082 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6088 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6091 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6092 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6093 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6094 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6095 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6096 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6098 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6099 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6100 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6101 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6104 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6105 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6109 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6110 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6112 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6114 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6115 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6116 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6117 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6119 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6120 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6121 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6122 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6123 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6124 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6128 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6129 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6133 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6134 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6137 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6138 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6140 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6141 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6142 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6143 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6144 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6147 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6148 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6149 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6155 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6156 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6157 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6160 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6161 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6162 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6164 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6165 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6166 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6167 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6173 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6174 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6176 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6177 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6178 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6179 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6180 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6181 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6182 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6183 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6184 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6187 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6188 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6189 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6191 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6192 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6195 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6196 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6198 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6199 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6200 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6203 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6204 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6205 let mut chan_closed = false;
6206 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6210 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6212 None if !chan_closed => {
6213 // use override shutdown script if provided
6214 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6215 Some(script) => script,
6217 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6218 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6219 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6220 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6224 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6225 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6227 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6233 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6234 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6235 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6236 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6238 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6240 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6242 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6243 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6244 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6245 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6246 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6247 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6250 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6251 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6252 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6255 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6256 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6257 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6260 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6261 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6262 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6263 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6264 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6266 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6267 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6274 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6275 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6277 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6280 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6281 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6282 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6283 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6284 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6285 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6286 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6287 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6288 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6289 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6290 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6292 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6293 // return them to fail the payment.
6294 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6295 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6296 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6298 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6299 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6304 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6305 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6306 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6307 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6308 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6309 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6310 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6311 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6312 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6313 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6314 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6315 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6316 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6321 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6322 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6323 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6326 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6327 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6328 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6330 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6331 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6335 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6339 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6340 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6342 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6348 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6349 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6350 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6351 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6352 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6354 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6355 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6356 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6357 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6363 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6364 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6365 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6366 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6367 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6368 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6373 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6374 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6375 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6376 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6378 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6379 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6380 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6381 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6386 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6387 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6388 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6389 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6390 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6391 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6396 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6397 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6398 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6401 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6403 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6404 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6405 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6406 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6407 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6409 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6410 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6411 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6412 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6414 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6415 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6416 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6418 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6420 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6421 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6422 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6423 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6424 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6425 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6427 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6428 // deserialized from that format.
6429 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6430 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6431 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6433 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6435 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6436 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6437 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6439 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6440 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6441 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6442 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6445 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6446 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6447 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6450 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6451 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6452 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6453 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6455 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6456 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6458 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6460 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6462 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6464 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6467 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6469 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6474 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6476 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6477 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6478 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6479 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6480 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6481 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6482 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6484 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6486 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6488 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6491 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6492 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6493 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6496 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6498 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6499 preimages.push(preimage);
6501 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6502 reason.write(writer)?;
6504 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6506 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6507 preimages.push(preimage);
6509 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6510 reason.write(writer)?;
6515 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6516 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6518 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6520 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6521 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6522 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6523 source.write(writer)?;
6524 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6526 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6528 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6529 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6531 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6533 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6534 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6539 match self.resend_order {
6540 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6541 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6544 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6545 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6546 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6548 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6549 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6550 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6551 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6554 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6555 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6556 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6557 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6558 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6561 if self.is_outbound() {
6562 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6563 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6564 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6566 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6567 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6568 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6570 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6572 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6573 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6574 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6575 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6577 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6578 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6579 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6580 // consider the stale state on reload.
6583 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6584 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6585 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6587 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6588 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6589 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6591 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6592 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6594 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6595 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6596 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6598 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6599 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6601 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6604 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6605 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6606 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6608 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6611 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6612 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6614 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6615 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6616 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6618 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6620 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6622 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6624 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6625 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6626 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6627 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6628 htlc.write(writer)?;
6631 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6632 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6633 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6635 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6636 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6638 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6639 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6640 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6641 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6642 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6643 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6644 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6646 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6647 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6648 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6649 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6650 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6652 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6653 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6655 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6656 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6657 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6658 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6660 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6662 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6663 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6664 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6665 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6666 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6667 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6668 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6670 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6671 (2, chan_type, option),
6672 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6673 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6674 (5, self.config, required),
6675 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6676 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6677 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6678 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6679 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6680 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6681 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6682 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6683 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6684 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6685 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6686 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6687 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6688 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6689 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6690 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6697 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6698 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6700 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6701 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6703 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6704 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6705 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6707 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6708 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6709 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6710 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6712 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6714 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6715 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6716 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6717 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6718 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6720 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6721 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6724 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6725 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6726 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6728 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6730 let mut keys_data = None;
6732 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6733 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6734 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6735 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6736 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6737 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6738 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6739 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6740 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6741 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6745 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6746 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6747 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6750 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6752 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6753 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6754 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6756 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6758 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6759 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6760 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6761 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6762 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6763 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6764 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6765 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6766 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6767 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6768 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6769 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6770 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6775 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6776 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6777 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6778 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6779 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6780 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6781 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6782 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6783 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6784 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6785 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6786 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6788 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6789 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6792 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6793 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6796 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6797 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6799 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6804 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6805 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6806 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6807 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6808 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6809 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6810 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6811 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6812 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6813 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6815 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6816 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6817 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6819 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6820 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6821 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6823 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6827 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6828 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6829 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6830 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6833 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6834 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6835 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6837 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6838 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6839 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6840 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6843 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6845 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6846 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6849 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6851 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6853 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6854 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6855 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6856 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6858 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6859 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6860 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6861 // consider the stale state on reload.
6862 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6865 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6866 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6867 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6872 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6876 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6877 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6878 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6881 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6882 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6884 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6885 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6889 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6891 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6893 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6894 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6896 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6897 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6900 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6902 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6903 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6904 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6905 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6907 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6910 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6911 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6913 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6915 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6916 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6918 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6919 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6923 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6924 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6925 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6927 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6928 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6929 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6933 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6934 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6935 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6937 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6943 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6944 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6945 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6946 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6947 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6948 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6949 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6950 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6951 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6952 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6954 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6955 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6956 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6957 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6958 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6959 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6960 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6962 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6963 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6964 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6965 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6967 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6969 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6970 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6971 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6972 (2, channel_type, option),
6973 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6974 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6975 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6976 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6977 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6978 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6979 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6980 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6981 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6982 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6983 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6984 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6985 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6986 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6987 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6988 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6989 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6990 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6991 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6994 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6995 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6996 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6997 // required channel parameters.
6998 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6999 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7000 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7002 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7004 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7005 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7006 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7007 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7010 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7011 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7012 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7014 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7015 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7017 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7018 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7023 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7024 if iter.next().is_some() {
7025 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7029 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7030 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7031 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7032 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7033 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7036 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7037 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7039 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7040 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7041 // separate u64 values.
7042 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7044 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7049 config: config.unwrap(),
7053 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7054 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7055 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7058 temporary_channel_id,
7060 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7062 channel_value_satoshis,
7064 latest_monitor_update_id,
7067 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7070 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7071 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7074 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7075 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7076 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7077 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7081 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7082 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7083 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7084 monitor_pending_forwards,
7085 monitor_pending_failures,
7086 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7089 holding_cell_update_fee,
7090 next_holder_htlc_id,
7091 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7092 update_time_counter,
7095 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7096 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7097 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7098 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7100 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7101 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7102 closing_fee_limits: None,
7103 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7105 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7107 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7108 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7110 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7112 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7113 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7114 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7115 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7116 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7117 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7118 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7119 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7120 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7123 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7125 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7126 funding_transaction,
7128 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7129 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7130 counterparty_node_id,
7132 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7136 channel_update_status,
7137 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7141 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7142 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7143 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7144 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7146 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7147 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7149 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7150 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7151 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7153 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7154 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7156 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7157 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7159 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7162 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7170 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7171 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7172 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7173 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7174 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7176 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7177 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7179 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7180 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7181 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7182 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7183 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7184 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7185 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7186 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7187 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7188 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7189 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7190 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7191 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7192 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7193 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7194 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7195 use crate::util::test_utils;
7196 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7197 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7198 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7199 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7200 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7201 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7202 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7203 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7204 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7205 use crate::prelude::*;
7207 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7210 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7211 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7217 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7218 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7219 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7220 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7224 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7225 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7226 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7227 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7228 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7229 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7230 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7234 signer: InMemorySigner,
7237 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7238 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7241 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7242 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7244 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7245 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7248 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7252 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7254 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7255 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7256 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7257 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7258 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7261 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7262 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7263 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7264 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7268 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7269 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7270 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7274 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7275 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7276 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7277 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7279 let seed = [42; 32];
7280 let network = Network::Testnet;
7281 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7282 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7283 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7286 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7287 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7288 let config = UserConfig::default();
7289 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7290 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7291 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7293 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7294 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7298 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7299 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7301 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7302 let original_fee = 253;
7303 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7304 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7305 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7306 let seed = [42; 32];
7307 let network = Network::Testnet;
7308 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7310 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7311 let config = UserConfig::default();
7312 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7314 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7315 // same as the old fee.
7316 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7317 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7318 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7322 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7323 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7324 // dust limits are used.
7325 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7326 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7327 let seed = [42; 32];
7328 let network = Network::Testnet;
7329 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7330 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7332 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7333 // they have different dust limits.
7335 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7336 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7337 let config = UserConfig::default();
7338 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7340 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7341 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7342 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7343 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7344 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7346 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7347 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7348 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7349 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7350 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7352 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7353 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7354 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7356 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7357 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7358 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7359 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7362 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7364 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7365 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7366 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7367 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7368 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7369 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7370 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7371 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7372 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7376 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7377 // the dust limit check.
7378 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7379 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7380 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7381 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7383 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7384 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7385 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7386 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7387 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7388 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7389 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7393 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7394 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7395 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7396 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7397 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7398 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7399 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7400 let seed = [42; 32];
7401 let network = Network::Testnet;
7402 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7404 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7405 let config = UserConfig::default();
7406 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7408 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7409 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7411 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7412 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7413 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7414 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7415 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7416 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7418 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7419 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7420 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7421 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7422 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7424 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7426 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7427 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7428 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7429 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7430 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7432 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7433 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7434 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7435 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7436 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7440 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7441 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7442 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7443 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7444 let seed = [42; 32];
7445 let network = Network::Testnet;
7446 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7447 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7448 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7450 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7452 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7453 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7454 let config = UserConfig::default();
7455 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7457 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7458 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7459 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7460 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7462 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7463 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7464 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7466 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7467 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7468 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7469 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7471 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7472 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7473 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7475 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7476 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7478 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7479 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7480 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7481 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7482 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7483 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7484 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7486 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7488 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7489 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7490 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7491 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7492 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7496 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7497 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7498 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7499 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7500 let seed = [42; 32];
7501 let network = Network::Testnet;
7502 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7503 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7504 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7506 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7507 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7508 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7509 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7510 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7511 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7512 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7513 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7515 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7516 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7517 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7518 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7519 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7520 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7522 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7523 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7524 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7525 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7527 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7529 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7530 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7531 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7532 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7533 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7534 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7536 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7537 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7538 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7539 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7541 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7542 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7543 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7544 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7545 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7547 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7548 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7550 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7551 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7552 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7554 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7555 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7556 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7557 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7558 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7560 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7561 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7563 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7564 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7565 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7569 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7571 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7572 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7573 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7575 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7576 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7577 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7578 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7580 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7581 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7582 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7584 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7586 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7587 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7590 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7591 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7592 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7593 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7594 let seed = [42; 32];
7595 let network = Network::Testnet;
7596 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7597 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7598 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7601 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7602 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7603 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7605 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7606 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7608 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7609 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7610 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7612 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7613 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7615 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7617 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7618 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7620 // Channel Negotiations failed
7621 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7622 assert!(result.is_err());
7627 fn channel_update() {
7628 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7629 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7630 let seed = [42; 32];
7631 let network = Network::Testnet;
7632 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7633 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7635 // Create a channel.
7636 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7637 let config = UserConfig::default();
7638 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7639 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7640 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7641 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7643 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7644 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7645 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7647 short_channel_id: 0,
7650 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7651 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7652 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7654 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7655 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7657 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7659 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7661 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7662 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7663 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7664 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7666 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7667 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7668 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7670 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7674 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7676 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7677 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7678 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7679 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7680 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7681 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7682 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7683 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7684 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7685 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7686 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7687 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7688 use crate::sync::Arc;
7690 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7691 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7692 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7693 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7695 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7697 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7698 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7699 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7700 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7701 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7703 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7704 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7710 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7711 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7712 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7714 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7715 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7716 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7717 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7718 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7719 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7721 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7723 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7724 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7725 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7726 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7727 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7728 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7730 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7731 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7732 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7733 selected_contest_delay: 144
7735 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7736 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7738 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7739 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7741 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7742 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7744 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7745 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7747 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7748 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7749 // build_commitment_transaction.
7750 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7751 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7752 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7753 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7754 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7756 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7757 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7758 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7759 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7763 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7764 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7765 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7766 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7770 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7771 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7772 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7774 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7775 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7777 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7778 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7780 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7782 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7783 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7784 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7785 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7786 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7787 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7788 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7790 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7791 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7792 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7793 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7795 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7796 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7797 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7799 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7801 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7802 commitment_tx.clone(),
7803 counterparty_signature,
7804 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7805 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7806 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7808 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7809 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7811 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7812 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7813 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7815 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7816 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7819 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7820 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7822 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7823 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7824 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7825 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7826 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7827 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7828 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7829 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7831 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7834 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7835 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7836 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7840 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7843 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7844 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7845 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7847 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7848 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7849 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7850 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7851 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7852 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7853 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7854 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7856 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7860 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7861 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7862 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7863 "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", {});
7865 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7866 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7868 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7869 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7870 "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", {});
7872 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7873 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7874 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7875 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7877 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7878 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7880 amount_msat: 1000000,
7882 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7883 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7885 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7888 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7889 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7891 amount_msat: 2000000,
7893 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7894 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7896 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7899 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7900 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7902 amount_msat: 2000000,
7904 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7905 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7906 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7908 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7911 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7912 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7914 amount_msat: 3000000,
7916 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7917 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7918 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7920 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7923 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7924 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7926 amount_msat: 4000000,
7928 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7929 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7931 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7935 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7936 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7937 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7939 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7940 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7941 "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", {
7944 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7945 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7946 "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" },
7949 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7950 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7951 "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" },
7954 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7955 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7956 "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" },
7959 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7960 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7961 "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" },
7964 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7965 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7966 "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" }
7969 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7970 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7971 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7973 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7974 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7975 "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", {
7978 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7979 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7980 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
7983 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7984 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7985 "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" },
7988 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7989 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7990 "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" },
7993 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7994 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7995 "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" },
7998 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7999 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8000 "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" }
8003 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8004 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8005 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8007 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8008 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8009 "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", {
8012 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8013 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8014 "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" },
8017 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8018 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8019 "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" },
8022 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8023 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8024 "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" },
8027 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8028 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8029 "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" }
8032 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8033 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8034 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8035 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8037 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8038 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8039 "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", {
8042 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8043 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8044 "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" },
8047 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8048 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8049 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8052 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8053 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8054 "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" },
8057 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8058 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8059 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8062 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8063 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8064 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8065 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8067 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8068 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8069 "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", {
8072 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8073 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8074 "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" },
8077 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8078 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8079 "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" },
8082 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8083 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8084 "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" },
8087 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8088 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8089 "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" }
8092 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8093 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8094 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8096 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8097 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8098 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8101 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8102 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8103 "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" },
8106 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8107 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8108 "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" },
8111 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8112 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8113 "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" }
8116 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8117 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8118 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8120 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8121 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8122 "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", {
8125 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8126 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8127 "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" },
8130 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8131 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8132 "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" },
8135 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8136 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8137 "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" }
8140 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8141 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8142 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8144 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8145 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8146 "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", {
8149 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8150 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8151 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8154 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8155 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8156 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8159 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8160 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8161 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8162 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8164 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8165 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8166 "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", {
8169 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8170 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8171 "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" },
8174 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8175 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8176 "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" }
8179 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8180 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8181 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8182 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8184 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8185 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8186 "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", {
8189 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8190 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8191 "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" },
8194 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8195 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8196 "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" }
8199 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8200 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8201 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8203 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8204 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8205 "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", {
8208 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8209 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8210 "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" }
8213 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8214 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8215 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8216 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8218 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8219 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8220 "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", {
8223 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8224 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8225 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8228 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8229 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8230 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8231 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8233 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8234 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8235 "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", {
8238 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8239 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8240 "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" }
8243 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8244 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8245 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8246 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8248 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8249 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8250 "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", {});
8252 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8253 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8254 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8255 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8257 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8258 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8259 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8261 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8262 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8263 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8264 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8266 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8267 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8268 "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", {});
8270 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8271 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8272 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8274 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8275 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8276 "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", {});
8278 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8279 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8280 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8281 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8283 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8284 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8285 "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", {});
8287 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8288 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8289 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8290 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8292 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8293 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8294 "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", {});
8296 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8297 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8298 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8299 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8300 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8301 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8303 amount_msat: 2000000,
8305 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8306 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8308 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8311 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8312 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8313 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8315 amount_msat: 5000001,
8317 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8318 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8319 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8321 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8324 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8325 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8327 amount_msat: 5000000,
8329 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8330 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8331 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8333 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8337 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8338 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8339 "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", {
8342 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8343 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8344 "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" },
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8347 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8348 "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" },
8350 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8351 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8352 "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" }
8355 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8356 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8357 "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", {
8360 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8361 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8362 "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" },
8364 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8365 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8366 "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" },
8368 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8369 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8370 "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" }
8375 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8376 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8378 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8379 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8380 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8381 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8383 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8384 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8385 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8387 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8388 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8390 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8391 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8393 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8394 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8395 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8399 fn test_key_derivation() {
8400 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8401 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8403 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8404 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8406 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8407 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8409 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8410 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8412 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8413 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8415 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8416 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8418 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8419 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8421 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8422 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8426 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8427 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8428 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8429 let seed = [42; 32];
8430 let network = Network::Testnet;
8431 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8432 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8434 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8435 let config = UserConfig::default();
8436 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8437 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8439 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8440 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8442 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8443 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8444 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8445 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8446 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8447 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8448 assert!(res.is_ok());
8453 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8454 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8455 // resulting `channel_type`.
8456 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8457 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8458 let network = Network::Testnet;
8459 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8460 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8462 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8463 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8465 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8466 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8468 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8469 // need to signal it.
8470 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8471 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8472 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8475 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8477 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8478 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8479 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8481 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8482 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8483 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8486 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8487 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8488 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8489 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8490 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8493 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8494 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8499 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8500 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8501 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8502 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8503 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8504 let network = Network::Testnet;
8505 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8506 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8508 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8509 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8511 let config = UserConfig::default();
8513 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8514 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8515 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8516 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8517 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8519 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8520 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8521 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8524 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8525 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8526 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8528 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8529 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8530 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8531 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8532 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8533 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8535 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8540 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8541 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8543 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8544 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8545 let network = Network::Testnet;
8546 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8547 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8549 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8550 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8552 let config = UserConfig::default();
8554 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8555 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8556 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8557 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8558 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8559 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8560 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8561 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8563 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8564 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8565 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8566 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8567 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8568 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8571 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8572 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8574 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8575 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8576 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8577 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8579 assert!(res.is_err());
8581 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8582 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8583 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8585 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8586 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8587 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8590 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8592 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8593 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8594 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8595 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8598 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8599 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8601 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8602 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8604 assert!(res.is_err());