1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
483 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
485 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
486 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
488 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
492 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
493 (0, update, required),
494 (2, blocked, required),
497 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
498 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
499 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
502 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
503 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
504 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
505 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
507 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
508 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
509 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
510 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
512 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
516 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
520 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
521 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
523 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
524 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
525 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
527 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
528 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
530 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
532 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
533 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
535 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
537 holder_signer: Signer,
538 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
539 destination_script: Script,
541 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
542 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
543 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
545 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
546 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
547 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
548 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
549 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
550 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
552 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
553 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
554 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
555 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
556 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
557 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
559 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
561 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
562 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
563 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
565 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
566 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
567 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
568 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
569 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
570 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
571 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
573 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
575 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
576 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
577 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
578 // HTLCs with similar state.
579 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
580 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
581 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
582 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
583 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
584 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
585 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
586 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
587 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
590 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
591 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
592 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
594 update_time_counter: u32,
596 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
597 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
598 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
599 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
600 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
601 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
603 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
604 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
606 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
607 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
608 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
609 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
611 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
612 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
614 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
616 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
618 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
619 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
620 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
621 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
622 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
623 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
625 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
626 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
627 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
628 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
629 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
631 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
632 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
633 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
634 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
635 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
636 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
637 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
638 channel_creation_height: u32,
640 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
645 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
648 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
650 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
653 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
655 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
657 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
658 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
661 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
663 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
665 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
666 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
668 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
670 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
671 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
672 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
674 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
676 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
677 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
679 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
680 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
681 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
683 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
685 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
687 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
688 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
689 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
690 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
692 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
693 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
694 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
696 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
697 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
698 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
700 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
701 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
702 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
703 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
704 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
705 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
707 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
709 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
710 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
711 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
712 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
713 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
715 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
716 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
718 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
719 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
720 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
721 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
722 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
723 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
724 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
725 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
727 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
728 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
730 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
731 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
732 // the channel's funding UTXO.
734 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
735 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
736 // associated channel mapping.
738 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
739 // to store all of them.
740 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
742 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
743 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
744 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
745 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
746 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
748 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
749 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
751 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
752 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
754 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
755 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
756 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
758 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
759 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
760 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
761 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
762 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
766 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
768 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
769 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
770 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
774 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
776 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
777 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
778 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
779 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
783 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
785 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
787 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
789 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
790 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
791 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
792 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
793 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
795 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
796 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
798 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
800 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
801 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
803 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
804 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
805 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
806 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
807 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
808 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
810 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
811 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
813 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
814 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
815 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
816 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
817 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
819 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
820 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
822 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
823 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
825 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
826 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
827 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
828 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
834 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
835 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
837 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
838 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
839 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
844 macro_rules! secp_check {
845 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
848 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
853 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
854 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
855 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
858 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
860 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
861 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
862 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
864 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
867 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
869 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
872 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
873 /// required by us according to the configured or default
874 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
876 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
878 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
879 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
880 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
881 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
882 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
885 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
886 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
887 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
888 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
889 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
890 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
891 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
894 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
895 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
898 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
899 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
900 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
901 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
902 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
903 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
904 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
905 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
906 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
907 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
910 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
911 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
912 // `only_static_remotekey`.
914 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
915 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
916 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
917 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
924 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
925 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
926 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
927 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
928 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
929 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
930 // We've exhausted our options
933 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
934 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
937 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
938 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
939 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
940 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
942 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
943 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
944 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
945 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
946 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
947 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
949 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
951 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
955 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
956 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
957 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
958 outbound_scid_alias: u64
959 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
960 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
961 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
962 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
964 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
965 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
966 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
967 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
969 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
970 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
972 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
973 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
975 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
976 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
979 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
982 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
983 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
984 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
985 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
989 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
990 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
992 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
994 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
995 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
996 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1000 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1001 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1003 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1004 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1005 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1006 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1010 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1011 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1012 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1016 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1017 Ok(script) => script,
1018 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1021 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1026 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1027 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1028 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1029 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1034 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1036 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1037 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1038 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1039 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1041 channel_value_satoshis,
1043 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1046 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1049 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1050 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1053 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1054 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1055 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1056 pending_update_fee: None,
1057 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1058 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1059 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1060 update_time_counter: 1,
1062 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1064 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1065 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1066 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1067 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1068 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1069 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1071 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1072 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1073 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1074 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1076 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1077 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1078 closing_fee_limits: None,
1079 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1081 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1083 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1084 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1085 short_channel_id: None,
1086 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1088 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1089 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1090 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1091 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1092 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1093 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1094 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1095 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1096 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1097 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1098 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1099 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1101 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1103 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1104 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1105 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1106 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1107 counterparty_parameters: None,
1108 funding_outpoint: None,
1109 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1110 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1112 funding_transaction: None,
1114 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1115 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1116 counterparty_node_id,
1118 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1120 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1122 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1123 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1125 announcement_sigs: None,
1127 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1128 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1129 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1130 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1132 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1134 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1135 outbound_scid_alias,
1137 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1138 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1140 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1141 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1146 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1150 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1151 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1152 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1154 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1155 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1156 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1157 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1158 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1159 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1160 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1163 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1164 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1165 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1166 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1167 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1168 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1169 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1170 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1172 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1173 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1182 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1183 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1184 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1185 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1186 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1187 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1188 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1189 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1190 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1191 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1192 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1195 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1197 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1198 // support this channel type.
1199 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1200 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1204 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1205 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1206 // `static_remote_key`.
1207 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1210 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1211 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1214 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1217 channel_type.clone()
1219 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1220 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1225 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1227 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1228 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1229 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1230 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1231 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1232 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1233 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1234 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1235 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1238 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1242 // Check sanity of message fields:
1243 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1246 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1249 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1252 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1253 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1256 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1259 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1262 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1264 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1265 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1268 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1271 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1275 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1276 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1279 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1282 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1285 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1288 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1291 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1294 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1298 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1300 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1301 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1306 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1307 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1308 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1309 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1312 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1315 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1316 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1317 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1319 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1323 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1324 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1325 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1326 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1327 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1331 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1332 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1333 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1334 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1338 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1339 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1340 &Some(ref script) => {
1341 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1342 if script.len() == 0 {
1345 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1348 Some(script.clone())
1351 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1358 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1359 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1360 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1361 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1365 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1366 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1367 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1371 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1372 Ok(script) => script,
1373 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1376 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1377 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1379 let chan = Channel {
1382 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1383 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1385 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1390 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1392 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1393 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1394 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1395 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1398 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1401 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1404 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1405 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1406 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1408 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1409 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1410 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1411 pending_update_fee: None,
1412 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1413 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1414 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1415 update_time_counter: 1,
1417 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1419 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1420 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1421 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1422 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1423 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1424 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1426 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1427 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1428 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1429 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1431 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1432 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1433 closing_fee_limits: None,
1434 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1436 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1438 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1439 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1440 short_channel_id: None,
1441 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1443 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1444 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1445 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1446 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1447 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1448 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1449 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1450 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1451 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1452 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1453 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1454 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1455 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1457 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1459 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1460 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1461 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1462 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1463 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1464 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1465 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1467 funding_outpoint: None,
1468 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1469 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1471 funding_transaction: None,
1473 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1474 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1475 counterparty_node_id,
1477 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1479 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1481 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1482 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1484 announcement_sigs: None,
1486 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1487 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1488 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1489 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1491 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1493 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1494 outbound_scid_alias,
1496 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1497 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1499 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1500 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1505 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1511 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1512 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1513 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1514 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1515 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1517 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1518 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1519 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1520 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1521 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1522 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1523 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1525 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1526 where L::Target: Logger
1528 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1529 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1530 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1532 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1533 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1534 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1535 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1537 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1538 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1539 if match update_state {
1540 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1541 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1542 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1543 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1544 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1546 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1550 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1551 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1552 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1553 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1555 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1556 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1557 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1559 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1560 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1561 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1562 transaction_output_index: None
1567 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1568 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1569 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1570 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1571 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1574 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1576 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1577 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1578 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1580 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1581 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1584 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1585 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1588 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1590 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1591 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1592 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1594 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1595 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1601 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1602 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1603 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1604 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1605 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1606 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1607 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1611 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1612 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1614 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1616 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1617 if generated_by_local {
1618 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1619 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1628 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1630 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1631 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1632 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1633 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1634 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1635 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1636 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1639 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1640 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1641 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1642 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1646 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1647 preimages.push(preimage);
1651 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1652 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1654 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1656 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1657 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1659 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1660 if !generated_by_local {
1661 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1669 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1670 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1671 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1672 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1673 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1674 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1675 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1676 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1678 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1680 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1681 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1682 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1683 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1685 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1687 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1688 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1689 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1690 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1693 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1694 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1695 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1696 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1698 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1701 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1702 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1703 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1704 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1706 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1709 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1710 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1715 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1721 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1723 let channel_parameters =
1724 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1725 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1726 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1729 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1734 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1737 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1738 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1739 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1740 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1742 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1743 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1744 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1752 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1753 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1759 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1760 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1761 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1762 // outside of those situations will fail.
1763 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1767 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1772 1 + // script length (0)
1776 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1777 2 + // witness marker and flag
1778 1 + // witness element count
1779 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1780 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1781 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1782 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1783 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1784 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1786 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1787 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1788 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1794 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1795 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1796 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1797 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1799 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1800 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1801 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1803 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1804 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1805 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1806 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1807 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1808 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1811 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1812 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1815 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1816 value_to_holder = 0;
1819 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1820 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1821 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1822 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1824 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1825 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1828 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1829 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1833 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1834 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1835 /// our counterparty!)
1836 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1837 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1838 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1839 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1840 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1841 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1842 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1844 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1848 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1849 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1850 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1851 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1852 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1853 //may see payments to it!
1854 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1855 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1856 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1858 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1861 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1862 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1863 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1864 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1865 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1868 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1871 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1872 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1874 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1876 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1877 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1878 where L::Target: Logger {
1879 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1880 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1881 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1882 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1883 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1884 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1885 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1886 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1890 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1891 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1892 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1893 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1895 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1896 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1898 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1900 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1902 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1903 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1904 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1906 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1907 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1908 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1909 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1910 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1912 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1913 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1914 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1916 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1917 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1919 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1922 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1923 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1927 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1931 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1932 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1933 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1934 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1935 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1936 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1939 // Now update local state:
1941 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1942 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1943 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1944 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1945 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1946 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1947 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1951 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1952 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1953 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1954 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1955 // do not not get into this branch.
1956 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1957 match pending_update {
1958 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1959 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1960 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1961 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1962 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1963 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1964 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1967 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1968 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1969 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1970 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1971 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1972 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1973 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1979 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1980 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1981 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1983 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1984 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1985 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1987 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1988 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1991 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1992 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1994 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1995 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1997 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1998 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2001 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2004 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2005 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2006 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2007 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2012 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2013 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2014 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2015 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2016 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2017 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2018 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2019 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2020 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2021 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2022 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2023 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2024 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2025 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2026 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2027 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2028 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2030 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2032 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2033 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2034 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2035 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2036 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2037 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2038 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2040 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2041 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2044 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2045 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2046 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2047 update, blocked: true,
2052 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2053 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2054 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2055 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2059 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2063 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2064 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2065 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2066 /// before we fail backwards.
2068 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2069 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2070 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2071 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2072 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2073 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2074 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2077 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2078 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2079 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2080 /// before we fail backwards.
2082 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2083 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2084 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2085 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2086 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2087 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2088 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2090 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2092 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2093 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2094 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2096 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2097 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2098 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2100 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2101 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2102 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2104 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2109 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2116 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2117 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2118 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2119 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2120 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2124 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2125 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2126 force_holding_cell = true;
2129 // Now update local state:
2130 if force_holding_cell {
2131 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2132 match pending_update {
2133 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2134 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2135 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2136 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2140 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2141 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2142 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2143 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2149 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2150 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2151 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2157 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2159 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2160 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2163 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2164 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2165 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2170 // Message handlers:
2172 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2173 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2175 // Check sanity of message fields:
2176 if !self.is_outbound() {
2177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2179 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2182 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2185 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2188 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2191 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2193 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2195 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2196 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2199 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2200 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2203 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2206 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2210 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2211 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2214 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2217 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2220 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2226 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2229 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2233 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2234 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2237 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2238 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2240 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2241 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2244 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2247 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2248 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2249 &Some(ref script) => {
2250 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2251 if script.len() == 0 {
2254 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2257 Some(script.clone())
2260 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2267 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2268 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2269 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2270 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2271 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2273 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2274 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2276 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2279 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2280 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2281 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2282 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2283 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2284 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2287 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2288 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2289 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2292 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2293 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2295 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2296 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2301 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2302 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2304 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2305 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2307 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2308 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2309 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2310 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2311 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2312 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2313 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2314 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2315 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2318 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2319 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2321 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2322 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2323 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2324 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2326 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2327 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2329 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2330 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2333 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2334 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2337 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2338 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2339 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2341 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2344 if self.is_outbound() {
2345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2347 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2348 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2349 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2353 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2356 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2357 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2358 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2359 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2362 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2363 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2364 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2365 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2366 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2368 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2370 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2371 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2372 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2375 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2376 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2377 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2381 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2382 initial_commitment_tx,
2385 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2386 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2389 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2390 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2392 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2394 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2395 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2396 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2397 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2398 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2399 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2400 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2401 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2402 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2403 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2404 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2406 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2408 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2410 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2411 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2412 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2413 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2415 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2417 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2418 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2420 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2421 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2424 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2425 }, channel_monitor))
2428 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2429 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2430 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2431 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2432 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2434 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2437 if !self.is_outbound() {
2438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2440 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2441 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2443 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2444 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2445 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2446 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2449 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2451 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2452 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2453 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2454 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2456 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2457 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2459 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2460 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2462 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2463 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2464 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2465 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2466 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2471 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2472 initial_commitment_tx,
2475 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2476 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2479 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2480 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2483 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2484 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2485 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2486 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2487 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2488 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2489 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2490 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2491 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2492 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2493 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2494 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2496 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2498 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2500 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2501 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2502 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2503 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2505 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2507 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2508 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2512 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2513 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2515 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2516 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2517 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2518 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2520 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2523 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2524 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2525 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2528 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2529 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2530 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2531 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2532 // when routing outbound payments.
2533 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2537 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2539 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2540 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2541 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2542 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2543 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2544 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2545 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2546 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2547 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2549 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2550 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2551 let expected_point =
2552 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2553 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2555 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2556 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2557 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2558 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2559 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2560 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2562 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2563 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2564 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2565 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2566 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2568 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2569 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2576 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2577 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2579 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2581 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2584 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2585 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2586 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2587 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2593 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2594 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2595 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2596 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2597 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2598 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2599 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2600 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2601 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2604 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2607 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2608 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2609 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2611 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2612 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2613 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2614 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2615 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2616 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2618 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2619 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2625 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2626 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2627 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2628 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2629 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2630 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2631 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2632 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2633 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2636 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2639 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2640 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2641 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2643 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2644 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2645 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2646 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2647 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2648 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2650 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2651 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2655 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2656 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2657 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2658 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2659 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2660 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2661 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2663 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2664 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2666 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2673 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2674 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2675 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2676 /// corner case properly.
2677 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2678 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2679 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2681 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2682 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2683 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2684 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2687 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2689 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2690 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2691 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2694 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2695 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2696 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2697 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2699 outbound_capacity_msat,
2700 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2701 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2702 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2708 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2709 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2712 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2713 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2714 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2715 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2716 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2717 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2720 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2721 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2723 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2724 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2727 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2728 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2729 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2731 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2732 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2734 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2737 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2738 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2740 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2741 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2743 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2744 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2746 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2747 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2751 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2752 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2758 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2759 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2760 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2763 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2764 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2765 included_htlcs += 1;
2768 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2769 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2773 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2774 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2775 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2776 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2777 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2778 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2783 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2785 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2786 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2791 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2792 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2796 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2797 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2801 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2802 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2804 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2805 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2806 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2808 total_pending_htlcs,
2809 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2810 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2811 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2813 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2814 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2815 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2817 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2819 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2824 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2825 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2826 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2828 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2829 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2831 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2834 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2835 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2837 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2838 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2840 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2841 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2843 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2844 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2848 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2849 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2855 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2856 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2857 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2858 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2859 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2860 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2863 included_htlcs += 1;
2866 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2867 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2870 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2871 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2873 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2874 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2875 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2880 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2881 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2882 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2885 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2886 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2888 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2889 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2891 total_pending_htlcs,
2892 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2893 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2894 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2896 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2897 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2898 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2900 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2902 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2907 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2908 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2909 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2910 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2911 if local_sent_shutdown {
2912 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2914 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2915 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2916 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2919 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2920 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2922 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2923 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2925 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2926 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2928 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2932 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2933 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2934 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2935 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2937 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2938 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2940 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2941 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2942 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2943 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2944 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2945 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2946 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2947 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2948 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2949 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2950 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2952 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2953 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2954 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2955 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2956 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2957 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2961 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2964 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2965 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2966 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2968 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2969 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2970 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2971 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2972 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2973 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2974 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2978 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2979 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2980 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2981 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2982 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2983 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2984 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2988 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2989 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2990 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2991 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2992 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2996 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2997 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2998 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2999 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3000 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3002 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3003 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3006 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3010 if !self.is_outbound() {
3011 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3012 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3013 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3014 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3015 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3016 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3017 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3018 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3019 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3020 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3021 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3022 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3023 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3024 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3025 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3028 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3029 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3030 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3031 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3032 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3035 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3038 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3042 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3043 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3044 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3048 // Now update local state:
3049 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3050 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3051 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3052 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3053 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3054 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3055 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3060 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3062 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3063 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3064 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3065 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3066 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3067 None => fail_reason.into(),
3068 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3069 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3070 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3073 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3077 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3079 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3080 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3082 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3088 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3091 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3092 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3093 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3095 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3099 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3102 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3103 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3106 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3107 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3110 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3114 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3115 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3118 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3119 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3122 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3126 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3127 where L::Target: Logger
3129 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3132 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3135 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3139 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3141 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3143 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3144 let commitment_txid = {
3145 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3146 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3147 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3149 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3150 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3151 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3152 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3153 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3158 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3160 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3161 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3162 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3163 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3166 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3167 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3168 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3172 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3174 if self.is_outbound() {
3175 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3176 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3177 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3178 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3179 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3180 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3181 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3182 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3183 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3184 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3190 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3194 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3195 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3196 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3197 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3198 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3199 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3200 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3201 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3202 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3203 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3204 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3205 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3206 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3209 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3210 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3211 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3212 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3213 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3214 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3215 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3217 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3218 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3219 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3220 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3221 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3222 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3223 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3226 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3227 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3230 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3232 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3233 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3234 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3237 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3240 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3241 commitment_stats.tx,
3243 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3244 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3245 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3248 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3249 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3251 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3252 let mut need_commitment = false;
3253 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3254 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3255 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3256 need_commitment = true;
3260 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3261 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3262 Some(forward_info.clone())
3264 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3265 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3266 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3267 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3268 need_commitment = true;
3271 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3272 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3273 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3274 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3275 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3276 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3277 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3278 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3279 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3280 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3281 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3282 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3283 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3284 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3286 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3288 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3289 need_commitment = true;
3293 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3294 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3295 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3296 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3297 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3298 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3300 nondust_htlc_sources,
3304 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3305 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3306 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3307 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3309 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3310 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3311 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3312 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3313 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3314 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3315 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3316 // includes the right HTLCs.
3317 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3318 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3319 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3320 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3321 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3322 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3324 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3325 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3326 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3329 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3330 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3331 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3332 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3333 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3334 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3335 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3336 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3337 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3341 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3342 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3343 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3344 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3347 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3348 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3349 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3350 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3351 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3352 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3353 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3354 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3357 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3358 /// for our counterparty.
3359 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3360 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3361 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3362 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3363 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3365 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3366 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3367 updates: Vec::new(),
3370 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3371 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3372 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3373 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3374 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3375 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3376 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3377 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3378 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3379 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3380 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3381 // to rebalance channels.
3382 match &htlc_update {
3383 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3384 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3385 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3388 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3389 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3390 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3391 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3392 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3393 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3394 // into the holding cell without ever being
3395 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3396 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3397 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3400 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3406 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3407 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3408 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3409 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3410 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3411 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3412 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3413 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3414 (msg, monitor_update)
3415 } else { unreachable!() };
3416 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3417 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3419 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3420 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3421 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3422 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3423 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3424 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3425 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3426 // for a full revocation before failing.
3427 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3430 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3432 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3439 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3440 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3442 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3443 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3448 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3449 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3450 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3451 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3452 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3454 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3455 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3456 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3458 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3459 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3465 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3466 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3467 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3468 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3469 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3470 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3471 where L::Target: Logger,
3473 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3474 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3476 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3479 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3483 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3485 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3486 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3491 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3492 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3493 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3494 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3495 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3496 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3497 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3498 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3502 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3504 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3505 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3508 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3509 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3511 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3513 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3514 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3515 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3516 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3517 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3518 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3519 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3520 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3524 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3525 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3526 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3527 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3528 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3529 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3530 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3531 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3533 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3534 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3537 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3538 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3539 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3540 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3541 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3542 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3543 let mut require_commitment = false;
3544 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3547 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3548 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3549 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3551 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3552 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3553 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3554 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3555 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3556 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3561 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3562 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3563 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3564 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3565 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3567 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3568 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3569 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3574 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3575 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3577 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3581 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3582 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3584 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3585 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3586 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3587 require_commitment = true;
3588 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3589 match forward_info {
3590 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3591 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3592 require_commitment = true;
3594 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3595 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3596 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3598 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3599 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3600 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3604 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3605 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3606 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3607 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3613 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3614 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3615 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3616 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3618 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3619 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3620 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3621 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3622 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3623 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3624 require_commitment = true;
3628 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3630 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3631 match update_state {
3632 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3633 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3634 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3635 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3636 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3638 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3639 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3640 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3641 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3642 require_commitment = true;
3643 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3644 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3649 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3650 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3651 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3652 if require_commitment {
3653 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3654 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3655 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3656 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3657 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3658 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3659 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3660 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3661 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3663 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3664 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3665 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3666 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3667 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3670 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3671 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3672 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3673 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3674 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3675 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3676 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3678 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3679 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3681 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3682 if require_commitment {
3683 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3685 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3686 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3687 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3688 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3690 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3691 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3692 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3693 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3695 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3696 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3697 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3703 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3704 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3705 /// commitment update.
3706 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3707 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3708 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3711 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3712 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3713 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3714 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3716 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3717 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3718 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3719 if !self.is_outbound() {
3720 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3722 if !self.is_usable() {
3723 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3725 if !self.is_live() {
3726 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3729 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3730 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3731 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3732 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3733 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3734 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3735 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3736 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3737 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3738 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3742 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3743 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3744 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3745 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3746 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3749 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3750 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3754 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3755 force_holding_cell = true;
3758 if force_holding_cell {
3759 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3763 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3764 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3766 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3767 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3772 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3773 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3775 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3777 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3778 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3779 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3780 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3784 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3785 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3786 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3790 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3791 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3794 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3795 // will be retransmitted.
3796 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3797 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3798 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3800 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3801 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3803 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3804 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3805 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3806 // this HTLC accordingly
3807 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3810 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3811 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3812 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3813 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3816 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3817 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3818 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3819 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3820 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3821 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3826 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3828 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3829 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3830 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3831 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3835 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3836 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3837 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3838 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3839 // the update upon reconnection.
3840 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3844 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3845 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3848 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3849 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3850 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3851 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3852 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3853 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3854 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3856 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3857 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3858 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3859 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3860 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3861 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3862 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3864 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3865 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3866 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3867 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3868 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3869 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3870 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3873 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3874 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3875 /// to the remote side.
3876 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3877 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3878 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3879 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3882 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3884 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3885 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3886 let mut found_blocked = false;
3887 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3888 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3889 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3893 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3894 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3895 // first received the funding_signed.
3896 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3897 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3898 self.funding_transaction.take()
3900 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3901 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3902 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3903 funding_broadcastable = None;
3906 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3907 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3908 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3909 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3910 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3911 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3912 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3913 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3914 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3915 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3916 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3917 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3918 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3919 next_per_commitment_point,
3920 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3924 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3926 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3927 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3928 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3929 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3930 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3931 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3933 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3934 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3935 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3936 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3937 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3938 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3942 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3943 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3945 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3946 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3949 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3950 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3951 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3952 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3953 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3954 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3955 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3956 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3957 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3961 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3962 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3964 if self.is_outbound() {
3965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3967 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3970 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3971 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3973 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3974 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3975 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3976 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3977 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3978 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3979 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3980 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3981 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3982 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3983 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3984 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3985 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3987 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3989 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3995 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3996 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3997 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3998 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3999 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4000 per_commitment_secret,
4001 next_per_commitment_point,
4003 next_local_nonce: None,
4007 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4008 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4009 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4010 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4011 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4013 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4014 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4015 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4016 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4017 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4018 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4019 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4020 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4021 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4026 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4027 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4029 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4030 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4031 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4032 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4033 reason: err_packet.clone()
4036 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4037 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4038 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4039 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4040 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4041 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4044 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4045 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4046 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4047 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4048 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4055 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4056 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4057 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4058 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4062 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4063 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4064 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4065 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4066 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4067 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4071 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4072 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4074 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4075 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4076 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4077 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4078 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4079 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4080 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4081 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4084 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4086 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4087 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4088 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4089 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4090 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4093 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4094 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4098 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4099 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4100 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4101 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4102 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4105 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4106 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4107 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4108 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4109 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4112 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4113 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4114 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4115 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4116 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4117 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4118 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4119 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4123 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4124 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4125 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4126 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4128 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4132 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4133 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4134 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4136 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4137 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4138 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4139 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4140 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4144 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4146 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4147 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4148 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4149 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4150 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4151 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4153 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4154 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4155 channel_ready: None,
4156 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4157 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4158 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4162 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4163 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4164 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4165 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4166 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4167 next_per_commitment_point,
4168 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4170 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4171 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4172 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4176 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4177 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4178 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4180 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4181 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4182 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4185 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4191 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4192 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4193 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4194 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4195 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4197 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4198 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4199 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4200 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4201 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4202 next_per_commitment_point,
4203 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4207 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4208 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4209 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4211 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4214 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4215 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4216 raa: required_revoke,
4217 commitment_update: None,
4218 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4220 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4221 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4222 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4224 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4227 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4228 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4229 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4230 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4231 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4232 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4235 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4236 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4237 raa: required_revoke,
4238 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4239 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4243 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4247 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4248 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4249 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4250 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4252 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4254 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4256 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4257 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4258 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4259 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4260 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4261 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4263 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4264 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4265 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4266 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4267 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4269 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4270 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4271 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4272 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4275 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4276 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4277 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4278 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4279 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4280 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4281 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4282 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4283 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4284 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4285 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4286 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4287 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4288 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4289 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4291 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4294 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4295 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4298 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4299 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4300 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4301 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4302 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4303 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4304 self.channel_state &
4305 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4306 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4307 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4308 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4311 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4312 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4313 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4314 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4315 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4316 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4317 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4319 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4325 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4326 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4327 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4328 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4330 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4331 return Ok((None, None));
4334 if !self.is_outbound() {
4335 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4336 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4338 return Ok((None, None));
4341 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4343 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4344 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4345 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4346 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4348 let sig = self.holder_signer
4349 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4350 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4352 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4353 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4354 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4355 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4357 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4358 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4359 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4364 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4365 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4366 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4367 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4369 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4372 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4373 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4374 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4375 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4378 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4379 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4380 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4383 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4385 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4386 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4389 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4390 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4391 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4394 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4397 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4398 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4399 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4400 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4402 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4405 assert!(send_shutdown);
4406 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4407 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4408 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4410 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4411 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4413 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4418 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4420 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4421 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4423 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4424 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4425 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4426 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4427 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4428 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4431 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4432 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4433 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4436 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4437 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4438 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4439 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4443 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4444 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4445 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4446 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4447 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4448 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4450 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4451 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4458 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4459 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4461 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4464 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4465 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4467 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4469 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4470 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4471 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4472 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4473 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4474 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4475 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4476 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4477 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4479 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4480 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4483 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4487 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4488 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4489 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4490 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4492 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4493 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4495 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4496 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4498 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4501 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4502 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4505 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4506 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4509 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4510 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4511 return Ok((None, None));
4514 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4515 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4516 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4517 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4519 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4521 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4524 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4525 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4526 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4527 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4528 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4532 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4533 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4538 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4539 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4540 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4541 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4542 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4543 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4544 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4548 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4550 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4551 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4552 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4553 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4555 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4558 let sig = self.holder_signer
4559 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4560 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4562 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4563 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4564 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4565 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4569 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4570 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4571 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4572 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4574 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4575 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4576 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4582 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4583 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4586 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4587 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4589 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4590 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4593 if !self.is_outbound() {
4594 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4595 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4596 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4597 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4599 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4600 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4601 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4603 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4604 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4607 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4608 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4609 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4610 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4611 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4612 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4613 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4614 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4616 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4619 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4620 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4621 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4622 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4624 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4628 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4629 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4630 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4631 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4633 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4639 // Public utilities:
4641 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4645 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4647 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4648 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4649 self.temporary_channel_id
4652 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4656 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4657 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4658 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4662 /// Gets the channel's type
4663 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4667 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4668 /// is_usable() returns true).
4669 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4670 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4671 self.short_channel_id
4674 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4675 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4676 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4679 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4680 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4681 self.outbound_scid_alias
4683 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4684 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4685 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4686 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4687 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4690 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4691 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4692 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4693 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4696 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4697 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4698 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4701 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4702 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4703 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4704 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4708 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4711 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4712 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4715 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4716 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4719 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4720 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4721 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4724 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4725 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4728 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4729 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4730 self.counterparty_node_id
4733 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4734 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4735 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4738 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4739 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4740 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4743 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4744 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4746 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4747 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4748 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4749 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4751 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4755 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4756 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4757 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4760 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4761 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4762 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4765 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4766 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4767 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4769 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4770 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4775 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4776 self.channel_value_satoshis
4779 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4780 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4783 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4784 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4787 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4788 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4791 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4792 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4793 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4796 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4797 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4798 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4801 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4802 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4803 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4806 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4807 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4808 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4811 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4812 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4813 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4816 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4817 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4818 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4821 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4822 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4823 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4824 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4825 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4828 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4830 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4831 self.prev_config = None;
4835 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4836 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4840 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4841 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4842 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4843 let did_channel_update =
4844 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4845 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4846 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4847 if did_channel_update {
4848 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4849 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4850 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4851 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4853 self.config.options = *config;
4857 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4858 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4859 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4860 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4861 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4862 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4863 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4865 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4866 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4869 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4871 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4872 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4878 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4879 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4880 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4881 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4882 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4883 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4884 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4886 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4887 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4894 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4898 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4899 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4900 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4901 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4902 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4903 // which are near the dust limit.
4904 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4905 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4906 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4907 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4908 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4910 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4911 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4913 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4916 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4917 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4920 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4921 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4924 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4925 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4929 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4934 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4936 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4937 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4938 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4939 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4940 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4941 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4943 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4945 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4953 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4954 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4958 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4959 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4960 self.update_time_counter
4963 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4964 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4967 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4968 self.config.announced_channel
4971 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4972 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4975 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4976 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4977 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4978 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4981 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4982 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4983 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4986 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4987 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4988 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4989 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4990 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4993 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4994 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4995 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4996 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4997 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5000 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5001 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5002 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5003 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5006 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5007 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5008 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5011 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5012 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5013 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5014 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5015 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5016 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5017 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5018 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5024 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5025 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5026 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5027 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5028 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5029 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5034 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5035 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5037 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5038 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5039 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5040 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5043 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5044 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5047 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5048 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5051 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5052 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5053 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5056 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5057 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5058 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5060 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5061 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5062 if self.channel_state &
5063 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5064 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5065 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5066 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5067 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5070 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5071 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5072 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5073 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5074 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5075 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5077 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5078 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5079 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5081 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5082 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5083 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5084 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5085 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5086 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5092 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5093 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5094 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5097 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5098 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5099 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5102 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5103 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5104 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5107 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5108 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5109 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5110 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5111 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5112 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5117 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5118 self.channel_update_status
5121 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5122 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5123 self.channel_update_status = status;
5126 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5128 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5129 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5130 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5134 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5135 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5136 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5139 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5143 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5144 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5145 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5147 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5148 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5149 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5151 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5152 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5155 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5156 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5157 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5158 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5159 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5160 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5161 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5162 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5163 self.channel_state);
5165 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5169 if need_commitment_update {
5170 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5171 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5172 let next_per_commitment_point =
5173 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5174 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5175 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5176 next_per_commitment_point,
5177 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5181 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5187 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5188 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5189 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5190 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5191 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5192 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5193 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5195 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5198 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5199 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5200 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5201 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5202 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5203 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5204 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5205 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5206 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5207 if self.is_outbound() {
5208 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5209 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5210 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5211 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5212 // channel and move on.
5213 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5214 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5216 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5217 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5218 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5220 if self.is_outbound() {
5221 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5222 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5223 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5224 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5225 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5226 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5230 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5231 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5232 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5233 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5234 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5238 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5239 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5240 // may have already happened for this block).
5241 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5242 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5243 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5244 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5247 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5248 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5249 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5250 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5258 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5259 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5260 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5261 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5263 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5264 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5267 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5269 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5270 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5271 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5272 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5274 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5277 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5280 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5281 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5282 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5283 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5285 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5288 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5289 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5290 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5292 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5293 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5295 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5296 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5297 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5305 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5307 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5308 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5309 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5311 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5312 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5315 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5316 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5317 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5318 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5319 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5320 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5321 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5322 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5323 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5326 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5327 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5328 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5329 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5331 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5332 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5333 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5335 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5336 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5337 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5338 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5340 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5341 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5342 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5343 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5344 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5345 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5346 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5349 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5350 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5352 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5355 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5356 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5357 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5358 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5359 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5360 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5361 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5362 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5363 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5364 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5365 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5366 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5367 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5368 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5369 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5370 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5371 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5377 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5382 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5383 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5385 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5386 if !self.is_outbound() {
5387 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5389 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5390 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5393 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5394 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5397 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5398 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5402 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5403 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5404 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5405 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5406 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5407 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5408 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5409 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5410 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5411 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5412 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5413 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5414 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5415 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5416 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5417 first_per_commitment_point,
5418 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5419 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5420 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5421 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5423 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5427 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5428 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5431 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5432 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5433 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5434 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5437 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5438 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5440 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5441 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5442 if self.is_outbound() {
5443 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5445 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5446 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5448 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5449 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5451 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5452 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5455 self.user_id = user_id;
5456 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5458 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5461 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5462 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5463 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5465 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5466 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5467 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5468 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5470 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5471 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5472 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5473 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5474 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5475 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5476 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5477 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5478 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5479 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5480 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5481 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5482 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5483 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5484 first_per_commitment_point,
5485 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5486 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5487 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5489 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5491 next_local_nonce: None,
5495 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5496 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5498 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5500 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5501 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5504 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5505 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5506 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5507 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5508 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5509 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5512 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5513 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5514 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5515 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5516 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5517 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5518 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5519 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5520 if !self.is_outbound() {
5521 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5523 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5524 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5526 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5527 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5528 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5529 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5532 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5533 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5535 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5538 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5539 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5544 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5546 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5548 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5549 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5550 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5552 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5553 temporary_channel_id,
5554 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5555 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5558 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5560 next_local_nonce: None,
5564 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5565 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5566 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5567 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5569 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5572 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5573 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5574 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5575 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5576 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5577 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5579 if !self.is_usable() {
5580 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5583 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5584 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5585 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5586 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5588 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5589 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5591 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5592 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5593 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5594 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5595 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5596 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5602 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5603 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5604 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5605 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5607 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5610 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5614 if !self.is_usable() {
5618 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5619 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5623 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5627 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5628 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5631 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5635 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5637 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5642 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5644 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5649 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5651 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5652 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5653 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5654 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5655 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5659 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5661 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5662 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5663 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5664 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5665 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5666 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5667 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5669 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5670 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5671 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5672 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5673 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5674 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5675 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5676 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5677 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5678 contents: announcement,
5681 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5685 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5686 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5687 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5688 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5689 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5690 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5691 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5692 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5694 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5696 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5697 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5698 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5699 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5701 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5702 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5703 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5704 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5707 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5708 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5709 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5710 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5713 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5716 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5717 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5718 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5719 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5720 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5721 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5724 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5726 Err(_) => return None,
5728 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5729 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5734 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5735 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5736 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5737 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5738 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5739 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5740 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5741 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5742 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5743 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5744 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5745 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5746 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5747 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5748 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5749 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5752 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5755 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5756 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5757 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5758 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5759 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5760 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5761 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5762 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5764 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5765 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5766 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5767 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5768 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5769 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5770 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5771 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5772 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5774 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5775 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5776 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5781 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5783 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5784 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5785 /// commitment update.
5787 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5788 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5789 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5790 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5792 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5793 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5795 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5796 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5801 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5802 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5804 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5806 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5807 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5809 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5810 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5811 /// regenerate them.
5813 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5814 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5816 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5817 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5818 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5819 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5820 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5821 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5823 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5824 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5825 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5828 if amount_msat == 0 {
5829 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5832 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5833 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5836 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5837 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5838 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5839 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5840 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5841 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5842 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5843 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5846 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5847 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5848 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5849 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5851 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5852 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5853 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5856 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5857 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5858 if !self.is_outbound() {
5859 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5860 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5861 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5862 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5863 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5864 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5868 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5871 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5872 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5873 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5875 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5876 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5877 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5878 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5880 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5884 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5885 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5886 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5887 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5888 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5889 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5893 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5894 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5895 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5898 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5899 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5900 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5901 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5903 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5904 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5907 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5908 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5909 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5910 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5914 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5915 force_holding_cell = true;
5918 // Now update local state:
5919 if force_holding_cell {
5920 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5925 onion_routing_packet,
5930 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5931 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5933 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5935 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5939 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5940 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5941 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5945 onion_routing_packet,
5947 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5952 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5953 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5954 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5955 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5957 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5958 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5959 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5961 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5962 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5966 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5967 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5968 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5969 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5970 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5971 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5972 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5975 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5976 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5977 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5978 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5979 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5980 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5983 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5985 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5986 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5987 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5989 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5990 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5993 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5994 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5995 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5996 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5997 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5998 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5999 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6000 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6003 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6007 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6008 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6009 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6010 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6012 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6014 if !self.is_outbound() {
6015 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6016 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6017 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6018 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6019 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6020 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6021 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6022 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6023 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6024 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6030 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6033 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6034 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6035 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6036 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6037 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6038 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6040 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6041 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6042 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6043 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6046 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6047 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6051 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6052 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6054 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6056 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6057 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6058 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6059 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6061 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6062 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6063 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6064 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6065 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6066 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6070 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6071 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6075 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6076 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6079 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6080 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6082 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6083 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6084 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6085 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6086 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6089 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6090 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6091 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6097 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6098 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6099 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6102 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6103 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6106 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6107 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6108 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6109 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6115 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6116 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6118 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6119 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6120 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6121 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6122 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6123 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6124 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6125 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6126 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6129 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6130 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6131 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6133 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6134 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6137 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6138 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6140 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6141 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6142 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6145 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6146 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6147 let mut chan_closed = false;
6148 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6152 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6154 None if !chan_closed => {
6155 // use override shutdown script if provided
6156 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6157 Some(script) => script,
6159 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6160 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6161 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6162 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6166 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6167 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6169 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6175 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6176 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6177 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6178 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6180 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6182 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6184 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6185 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6186 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6187 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6188 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6189 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6192 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6193 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6194 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6197 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6198 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6199 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6202 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6203 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6204 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6205 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6206 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6208 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6209 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6216 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6217 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6219 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6222 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6223 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6224 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6225 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6226 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6227 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6228 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6229 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6230 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6231 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6232 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6234 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6235 // return them to fail the payment.
6236 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6237 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6238 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6240 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6241 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6246 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6247 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6248 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6249 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6250 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6251 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6252 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6253 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6254 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6255 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6256 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6257 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6258 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6263 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6264 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6265 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6268 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6269 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6270 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6272 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6273 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6277 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6281 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6282 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6284 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6290 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6291 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6292 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6293 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6294 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6296 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6297 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6298 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6299 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6305 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6306 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6307 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6308 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6309 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6310 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6315 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6316 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6317 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6318 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6320 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6321 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6322 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6323 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6328 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6329 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6330 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6331 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6332 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6333 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6338 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6339 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6340 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6343 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6345 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6346 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6347 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6348 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6349 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6351 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6352 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6353 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6354 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6356 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6357 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6358 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6360 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6362 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6363 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6364 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6365 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6366 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6367 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6369 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6370 // deserialized from that format.
6371 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6372 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6373 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6375 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6377 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6378 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6379 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6381 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6382 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6383 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6384 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6387 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6388 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6389 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6392 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6393 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6394 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6395 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6397 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6398 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6400 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6402 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6404 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6406 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6409 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6411 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6416 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6418 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6419 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6420 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6421 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6422 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6423 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6424 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6426 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6428 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6430 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6433 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6434 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6435 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6438 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6440 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6441 preimages.push(preimage);
6443 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6444 reason.write(writer)?;
6446 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6448 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6449 preimages.push(preimage);
6451 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6452 reason.write(writer)?;
6457 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6458 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6460 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6462 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6463 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6464 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6465 source.write(writer)?;
6466 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6468 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6470 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6471 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6473 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6475 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6476 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6481 match self.resend_order {
6482 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6483 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6486 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6487 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6488 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6490 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6491 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6492 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6493 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6496 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6497 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6498 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6499 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6500 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6503 if self.is_outbound() {
6504 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6505 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6506 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6508 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6509 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6510 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6512 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6514 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6515 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6516 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6517 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6519 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6520 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6521 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6522 // consider the stale state on reload.
6525 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6526 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6527 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6529 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6530 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6531 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6533 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6534 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6536 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6537 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6538 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6540 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6541 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6543 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6546 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6547 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6548 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6550 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6553 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6554 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6556 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6557 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6558 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6560 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6562 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6564 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6566 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6567 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6568 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6569 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6570 htlc.write(writer)?;
6573 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6574 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6575 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6577 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6578 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6580 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6581 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6582 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6583 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6584 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6585 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6586 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6588 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6589 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6590 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6591 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6592 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6594 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6595 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6597 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6598 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6599 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6600 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6602 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6604 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6605 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6606 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6607 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6608 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6609 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6610 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6612 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6613 (2, chan_type, option),
6614 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6615 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6616 (5, self.config, required),
6617 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6618 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6619 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6620 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6621 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6622 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6623 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6624 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6625 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6626 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6627 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6628 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6629 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6630 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6631 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6632 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6639 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6640 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6642 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6643 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6645 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6646 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6647 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6649 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6650 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6651 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6652 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6656 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6657 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6658 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6659 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6660 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6662 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6663 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6666 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6667 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6668 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6670 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6672 let mut keys_data = None;
6674 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6675 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6676 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6677 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6678 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6679 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6680 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6681 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6682 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6683 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6687 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6688 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6689 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6692 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6694 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6695 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6696 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6698 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6700 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6701 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6702 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6703 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6704 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6705 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6706 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6707 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6708 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6709 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6710 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6711 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6712 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6717 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6718 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6719 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6720 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6721 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6722 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6723 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6724 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6725 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6726 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6727 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6728 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6730 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6731 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6734 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6735 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6738 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6739 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6741 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6746 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6747 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6748 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6749 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6750 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6751 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6752 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6753 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6754 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6755 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6757 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6758 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6759 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6761 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6762 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6763 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6765 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6769 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6770 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6771 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6772 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6775 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6776 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6777 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6779 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6780 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6781 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6782 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6785 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6786 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6787 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6788 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6791 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6793 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6795 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6796 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6797 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6798 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6800 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6801 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6802 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6803 // consider the stale state on reload.
6804 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6807 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6808 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6809 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6811 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6814 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6815 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6816 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6819 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6820 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6821 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6823 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6824 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6826 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6827 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6829 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6830 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6831 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6835 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6836 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6838 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6839 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6842 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6844 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6845 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6846 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6847 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6849 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6852 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6853 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6855 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6858 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6860 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6861 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6863 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6865 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6866 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6867 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6869 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6870 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6871 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6875 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6876 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6877 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6879 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6885 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6886 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6887 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6888 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6889 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6890 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6891 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6892 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6893 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6894 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6896 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6897 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6898 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6899 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6900 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6901 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6902 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6904 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6905 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6906 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6907 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6909 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6911 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6912 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6913 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6914 (2, channel_type, option),
6915 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6916 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6917 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6918 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6919 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6920 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6921 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6922 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6923 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6924 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6925 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6926 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6927 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6928 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6929 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6930 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6931 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6932 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6933 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6936 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6937 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6938 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6939 // required channel parameters.
6940 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6941 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6942 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6944 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6946 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6947 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6948 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6949 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6952 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6953 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6954 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6956 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6957 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6959 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6960 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6965 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6966 if iter.next().is_some() {
6967 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6971 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6972 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6973 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6974 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6975 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6978 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6979 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6981 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6982 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6983 // separate u64 values.
6984 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6986 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
6991 config: config.unwrap(),
6995 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6996 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6997 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7000 temporary_channel_id,
7002 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7004 channel_value_satoshis,
7006 latest_monitor_update_id,
7009 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7012 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7013 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7016 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7017 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7018 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7019 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7023 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7024 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7025 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7026 monitor_pending_forwards,
7027 monitor_pending_failures,
7028 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7031 holding_cell_update_fee,
7032 next_holder_htlc_id,
7033 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7034 update_time_counter,
7037 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7038 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7039 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7040 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7042 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7043 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7044 closing_fee_limits: None,
7045 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7047 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7049 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7050 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7052 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7054 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7055 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7056 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7057 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7058 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7059 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7060 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7061 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7062 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7065 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7067 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7068 funding_transaction,
7070 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7071 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7072 counterparty_node_id,
7074 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7078 channel_update_status,
7079 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7083 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7084 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7085 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7086 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7088 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7090 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7091 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7092 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7094 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7095 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7097 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7098 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7100 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7103 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7111 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7112 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7113 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7114 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7115 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7117 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7118 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7120 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7121 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7122 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7123 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7124 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7125 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7126 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7127 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7128 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7129 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7130 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7131 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7132 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7133 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7134 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7135 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7136 use crate::util::test_utils;
7137 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7138 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7139 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7140 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7141 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7142 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7143 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7144 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7145 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7146 use crate::prelude::*;
7148 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7151 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7152 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7158 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7159 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7160 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7161 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7165 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7166 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7167 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7168 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7169 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7170 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7171 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7175 signer: InMemorySigner,
7178 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7179 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7182 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7183 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7185 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7186 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7189 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7193 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7195 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7196 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7197 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7198 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7199 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7202 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7203 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7204 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7205 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7209 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7210 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7211 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7215 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7216 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7217 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7218 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7220 let seed = [42; 32];
7221 let network = Network::Testnet;
7222 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7223 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7224 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7227 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7228 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7229 let config = UserConfig::default();
7230 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7231 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7232 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7234 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7235 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7239 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7240 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7242 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7243 let original_fee = 253;
7244 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7245 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7246 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7247 let seed = [42; 32];
7248 let network = Network::Testnet;
7249 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7251 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7252 let config = UserConfig::default();
7253 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7255 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7256 // same as the old fee.
7257 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7258 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7259 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7263 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7264 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7265 // dust limits are used.
7266 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7267 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7268 let seed = [42; 32];
7269 let network = Network::Testnet;
7270 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7271 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7273 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7274 // they have different dust limits.
7276 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7277 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7278 let config = UserConfig::default();
7279 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7281 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7282 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7283 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7284 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7285 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7287 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7288 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7289 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7290 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7291 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7293 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7294 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7295 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7297 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7298 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7299 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7300 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7303 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7305 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7306 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7307 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7308 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7309 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7310 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7311 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7312 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7313 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7317 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7318 // the dust limit check.
7319 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7320 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7321 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7322 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7324 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7325 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7326 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7327 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7328 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7329 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7330 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7334 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7335 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7336 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7337 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7338 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7339 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7340 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7341 let seed = [42; 32];
7342 let network = Network::Testnet;
7343 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7345 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7346 let config = UserConfig::default();
7347 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7349 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7350 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7352 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7353 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7354 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7355 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7356 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7357 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7359 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7360 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7361 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7362 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7363 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7365 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7367 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7368 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7369 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7370 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7371 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7373 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7374 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7375 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7376 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7377 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7381 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7382 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7383 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7384 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7385 let seed = [42; 32];
7386 let network = Network::Testnet;
7387 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7388 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7389 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7391 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7393 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7394 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7395 let config = UserConfig::default();
7396 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7398 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7399 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7400 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7401 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7403 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7404 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7405 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7407 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7408 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7409 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7410 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7412 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7413 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7414 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7416 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7417 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7419 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7420 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7421 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7422 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7423 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7424 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7425 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7427 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7429 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7430 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7431 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7432 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7433 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7437 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7438 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7439 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7440 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7441 let seed = [42; 32];
7442 let network = Network::Testnet;
7443 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7444 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7445 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7447 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7448 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7449 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7450 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7451 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7452 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7453 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7454 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7456 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7457 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7458 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7459 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7460 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7461 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7463 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7464 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7465 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7466 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7468 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7470 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7471 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7472 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7473 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7474 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7475 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7477 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7478 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7479 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7480 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7482 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7483 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7484 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7485 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7486 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7488 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7489 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7491 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7492 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7493 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7495 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7496 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7497 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7498 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7499 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7501 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7502 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7504 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7505 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7506 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7510 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7512 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7513 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7514 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7516 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7517 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7518 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7519 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7521 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7522 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7523 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7525 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7527 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7528 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7531 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7532 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7533 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7534 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7535 let seed = [42; 32];
7536 let network = Network::Testnet;
7537 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7538 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7539 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7542 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7543 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7544 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7546 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7547 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7549 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7550 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7551 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7553 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7554 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7556 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7558 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7559 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7561 // Channel Negotiations failed
7562 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7563 assert!(result.is_err());
7568 fn channel_update() {
7569 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7570 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7571 let seed = [42; 32];
7572 let network = Network::Testnet;
7573 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7574 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7576 // Create a channel.
7577 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7578 let config = UserConfig::default();
7579 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7580 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7581 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7582 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7584 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7585 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7586 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7588 short_channel_id: 0,
7591 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7592 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7593 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7595 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7596 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7598 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7600 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7602 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7603 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7604 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7605 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7607 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7608 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7609 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7611 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7615 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7617 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7618 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7619 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7620 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7621 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7622 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7623 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7624 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7625 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7626 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7627 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7628 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7629 use crate::sync::Arc;
7631 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7632 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7633 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7634 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7636 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7638 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7639 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7640 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7641 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7642 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7644 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7645 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7651 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7652 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7653 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7655 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7656 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7657 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7658 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7659 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7660 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7662 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7664 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7665 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7666 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7667 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7668 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7669 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7671 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7672 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7673 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7674 selected_contest_delay: 144
7676 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7677 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7679 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7680 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7682 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7683 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7685 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7686 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7688 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7689 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7690 // build_commitment_transaction.
7691 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7692 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7693 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7694 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7695 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7697 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7698 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7699 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7700 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7704 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7705 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7706 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7707 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7711 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7712 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7713 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7715 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7716 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7718 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7719 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7721 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7723 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7724 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7725 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7726 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7727 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7728 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7729 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7731 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7732 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7733 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7734 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7736 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7737 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7738 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7740 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7742 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7743 commitment_tx.clone(),
7744 counterparty_signature,
7745 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7746 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7747 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7749 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7750 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7752 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7753 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7754 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7756 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7757 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7760 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7761 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7763 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7764 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7765 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7766 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7767 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7768 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7769 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7770 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7772 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7775 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7776 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7777 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7781 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7784 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7785 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7786 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7788 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7789 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7790 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7791 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7792 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7793 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7794 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7795 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7797 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7801 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7802 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7803 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7804 "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", {});
7806 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7807 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7809 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7810 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7811 "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", {});
7813 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7814 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7815 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7816 "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", {});
7818 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7819 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7821 amount_msat: 1000000,
7823 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7824 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7826 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7829 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7830 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7832 amount_msat: 2000000,
7834 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7835 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7837 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7840 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7841 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7843 amount_msat: 2000000,
7845 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7846 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7847 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7849 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7852 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7853 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7855 amount_msat: 3000000,
7857 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7858 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7859 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7861 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7864 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7865 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7867 amount_msat: 4000000,
7869 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7870 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7872 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7876 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7877 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7878 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7880 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7881 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7882 "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", {
7885 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7886 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7887 "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" },
7890 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7891 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7892 "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" },
7895 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7896 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7897 "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" },
7900 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7901 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7902 "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" },
7905 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7906 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7907 "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" }
7910 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7911 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7912 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7914 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7915 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7916 "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", {
7919 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7920 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7921 "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" },
7924 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7925 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7926 "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" },
7929 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7930 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7931 "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" },
7934 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7935 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7936 "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" },
7939 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7940 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7941 "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" }
7944 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7945 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7946 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7948 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7949 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7950 "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", {
7953 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7954 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7955 "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" },
7958 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7959 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7960 "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" },
7963 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7964 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7965 "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" },
7968 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7969 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7970 "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" }
7973 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7974 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7975 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7976 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7978 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7979 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7980 "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", {
7983 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7984 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7985 "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" },
7988 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7989 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7990 "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" },
7993 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7994 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7995 "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" },
7998 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7999 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8000 "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" }
8003 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8004 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8005 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8006 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8008 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8009 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8010 "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", {
8013 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8014 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8015 "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" },
8018 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8019 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8020 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8023 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8024 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8025 "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" },
8028 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8029 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8030 "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" }
8033 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8034 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8035 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8037 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8038 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8039 "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", {
8042 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8043 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8044 "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" },
8047 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8048 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8049 "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" },
8052 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8053 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8054 "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" }
8057 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8058 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8059 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8061 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8062 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8063 "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", {
8066 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8067 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8068 "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" },
8071 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8072 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8073 "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" },
8076 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8077 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8078 "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" }
8081 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8082 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8083 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8085 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8086 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8087 "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", {
8090 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8091 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8092 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8095 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8096 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8097 "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" }
8100 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8101 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8102 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8103 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8105 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8106 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8107 "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", {
8110 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8111 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8112 "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" },
8115 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8116 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8117 "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" }
8120 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8121 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8122 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8123 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8125 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8126 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8127 "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", {
8130 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8131 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8132 "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" },
8135 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8136 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8137 "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" }
8140 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8141 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8142 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8144 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8145 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8146 "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", {
8149 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8150 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8151 "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" }
8154 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8155 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8156 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8157 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8159 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8160 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8161 "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", {
8164 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8165 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8166 "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" }
8169 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8170 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8171 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8172 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8174 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8175 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8176 "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", {
8179 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8180 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8181 "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" }
8184 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8185 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8186 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8187 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8189 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8190 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8191 "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", {});
8193 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8194 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8195 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8196 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8198 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8199 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8200 "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", {});
8202 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8203 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8204 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8205 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8207 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8208 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8209 "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", {});
8211 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8212 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8213 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8215 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8216 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8217 "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", {});
8219 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8220 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8221 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8222 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8224 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8225 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8226 "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", {});
8228 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8229 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8230 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8231 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8233 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8234 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8235 "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", {});
8237 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8238 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8239 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8240 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8241 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8242 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8244 amount_msat: 2000000,
8246 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8247 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8249 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8252 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8253 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8254 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8256 amount_msat: 5000001,
8258 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8259 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8260 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8262 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8265 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8266 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8268 amount_msat: 5000000,
8270 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8271 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8272 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8274 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8278 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8279 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8280 "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", {
8283 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8284 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8285 "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" },
8287 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8288 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8289 "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" },
8291 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8292 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8293 "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" }
8296 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8297 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8298 "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", {
8301 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8302 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8303 "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" },
8305 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8306 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8307 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
8309 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8310 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8311 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a183483045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
8316 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8317 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8319 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8320 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8321 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8322 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8324 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8325 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8326 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8328 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8329 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8331 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8332 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8334 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8335 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8336 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8340 fn test_key_derivation() {
8341 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8342 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8344 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8345 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8347 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8348 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8350 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8351 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8353 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8354 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8356 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8357 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8359 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8360 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8362 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8363 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8367 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8368 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8369 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8370 let seed = [42; 32];
8371 let network = Network::Testnet;
8372 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8373 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8375 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8376 let config = UserConfig::default();
8377 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8378 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8380 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8381 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8383 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8384 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8385 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8386 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8387 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8388 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8389 assert!(res.is_ok());
8394 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8395 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8396 // resulting `channel_type`.
8397 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8398 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8399 let network = Network::Testnet;
8400 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8401 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8403 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8404 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8406 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8407 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8409 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8410 // need to signal it.
8411 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8412 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8413 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8416 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8418 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8419 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8420 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8422 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8423 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8424 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8427 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8428 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8429 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8430 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8431 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8434 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8435 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8440 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8441 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8442 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8443 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8444 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8445 let network = Network::Testnet;
8446 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8447 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8449 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8450 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8452 let config = UserConfig::default();
8454 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8455 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8456 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8457 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8458 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8460 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8461 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8462 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8465 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8466 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8467 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8469 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8470 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8471 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8472 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8473 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8474 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8476 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8481 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8482 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8484 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8485 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8486 let network = Network::Testnet;
8487 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8488 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8490 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8491 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8493 let config = UserConfig::default();
8495 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8496 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8497 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8498 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8499 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8500 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8501 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8502 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8504 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8505 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8506 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8507 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8508 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8509 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8512 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8513 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8515 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8516 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8517 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8518 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8520 assert!(res.is_err());
8522 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8523 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8524 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8526 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8527 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8528 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8531 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8533 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8534 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8535 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8536 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8539 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8540 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8542 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8543 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8545 assert!(res.is_err());