1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
483 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
485 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
486 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
488 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
492 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
493 (0, update, required),
494 (2, blocked, required),
497 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
498 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
499 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
502 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
503 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
504 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
505 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
507 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
508 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
509 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
510 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
512 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
516 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
520 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
521 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
523 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
524 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
525 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
527 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
528 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
530 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
532 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
533 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
535 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
537 holder_signer: Signer,
538 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
539 destination_script: Script,
541 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
542 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
543 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
545 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
546 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
547 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
548 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
549 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
550 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
552 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
553 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
554 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
555 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
556 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
557 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
559 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
561 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
562 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
563 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
565 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
566 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
567 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
568 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
569 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
570 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
571 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
573 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
575 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
576 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
577 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
578 // HTLCs with similar state.
579 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
580 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
581 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
582 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
583 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
584 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
585 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
586 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
587 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
590 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
591 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
592 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
594 update_time_counter: u32,
596 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
597 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
598 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
599 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
600 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
601 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
603 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
604 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
606 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
607 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
608 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
609 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
611 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
612 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
614 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
616 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
618 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
619 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
620 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
621 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
622 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
623 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
625 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
626 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
627 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
628 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
629 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
631 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
632 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
633 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
634 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
635 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
636 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
637 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
638 channel_creation_height: u32,
640 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
645 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
648 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
650 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
653 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
655 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
657 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
658 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
661 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
663 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
665 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
666 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
668 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
670 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
671 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
672 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
674 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
676 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
677 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
679 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
680 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
681 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
683 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
685 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
687 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
688 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
689 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
690 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
692 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
693 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
694 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
696 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
697 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
698 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
700 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
701 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
702 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
703 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
704 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
705 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
707 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
709 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
710 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
711 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
712 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
713 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
715 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
716 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
718 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
719 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
720 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
721 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
722 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
723 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
724 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
725 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
727 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
728 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
730 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
731 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
732 // the channel's funding UTXO.
734 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
735 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
736 // associated channel mapping.
738 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
739 // to store all of them.
740 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
742 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
743 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
744 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
745 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
746 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
748 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
749 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
751 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
752 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
754 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
755 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
756 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
758 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
759 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
760 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
761 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
762 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
766 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
768 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
769 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
770 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
774 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
776 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
777 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
778 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
779 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
783 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
785 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
787 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
789 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
790 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
791 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
792 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
793 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
795 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
796 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
798 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
800 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
801 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
803 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
804 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
805 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
806 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
807 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
808 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
810 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
811 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
813 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
814 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
815 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
816 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
817 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
819 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
820 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
822 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
823 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
825 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
826 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
827 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
828 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
834 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
835 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
837 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
838 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
839 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
844 macro_rules! secp_check {
845 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
848 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
853 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
854 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
855 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
858 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
860 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
861 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
862 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
864 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
867 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
869 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
872 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
873 /// required by us according to the configured or default
874 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
876 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
878 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
879 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
880 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
881 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
882 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
885 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
886 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
887 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
888 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
889 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
890 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
891 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
894 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
895 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
898 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
899 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
900 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
901 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
902 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
903 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
904 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
905 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
906 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
907 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
910 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
911 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
912 // `only_static_remotekey`.
914 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
915 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
916 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
917 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
924 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
925 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
926 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
927 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
928 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
929 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
930 // We've exhausted our options
933 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
934 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
937 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
938 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
939 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
940 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
942 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
943 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
944 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
945 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
946 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
947 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
949 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
951 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
955 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
956 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
957 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
958 outbound_scid_alias: u64
959 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
960 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
961 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
962 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
964 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
965 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
966 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
967 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
969 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
970 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
972 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
973 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
975 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
976 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
979 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
982 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
983 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
984 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
985 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
989 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
990 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
992 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
994 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
995 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
996 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1000 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1001 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1003 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1004 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1007 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1008 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1009 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1013 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1018 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1019 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1020 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1021 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1026 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1028 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1029 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1030 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1031 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1033 channel_value_satoshis,
1035 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1038 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1039 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1041 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1042 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1045 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1046 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1047 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1048 pending_update_fee: None,
1049 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1050 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1051 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1052 update_time_counter: 1,
1054 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1056 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1057 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1058 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1059 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1060 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1061 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1063 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1064 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1065 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1066 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1068 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1069 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1070 closing_fee_limits: None,
1071 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1073 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1075 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1076 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1077 short_channel_id: None,
1078 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1080 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1081 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1082 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1083 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1084 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1085 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1086 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1087 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1088 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1089 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1090 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1091 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1093 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1095 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1096 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1097 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1098 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1099 counterparty_parameters: None,
1100 funding_outpoint: None,
1101 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1102 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1104 funding_transaction: None,
1106 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1107 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1108 counterparty_node_id,
1110 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1112 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1114 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1115 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1117 announcement_sigs: None,
1119 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1120 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1121 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1122 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1124 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1126 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1127 outbound_scid_alias,
1129 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1130 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1132 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1133 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1138 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1142 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1143 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1144 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1146 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1147 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1148 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1149 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1150 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1151 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1152 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1155 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1156 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1157 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1158 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1159 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1160 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1161 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1162 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1164 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1165 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1174 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1175 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1176 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1177 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1178 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1179 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1180 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1181 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1182 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1183 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1184 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1187 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1189 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1190 // support this channel type.
1191 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1192 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1196 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1197 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1198 // `static_remote_key`.
1199 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1200 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1202 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1203 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1206 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1209 channel_type.clone()
1211 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1212 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1213 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1217 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1219 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1220 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1221 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1222 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1223 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1224 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1225 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1226 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1227 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1230 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1234 // Check sanity of message fields:
1235 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1238 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1241 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1244 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1245 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1248 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1251 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1254 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1256 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1257 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1260 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1263 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1267 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1268 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1271 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1274 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1277 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1280 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1283 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1286 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1290 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1292 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1293 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1298 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1299 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1300 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1301 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1304 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1307 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1308 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1309 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1311 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1315 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1316 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1317 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1318 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1319 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1323 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1324 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1325 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1326 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1330 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1331 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1332 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1333 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1334 if script.len() == 0 {
1337 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1338 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1340 Some(script.clone())
1343 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1344 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1350 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1351 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1354 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1355 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1356 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1360 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1361 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1363 let chan = Channel {
1366 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1367 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1369 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1374 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1376 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1377 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1378 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1379 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1382 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1385 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1386 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1388 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1389 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1390 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1392 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1393 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1394 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1395 pending_update_fee: None,
1396 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1397 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1398 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1399 update_time_counter: 1,
1401 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1403 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1404 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1405 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1406 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1407 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1408 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1410 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1411 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1412 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1413 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1415 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1416 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1417 closing_fee_limits: None,
1418 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1420 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1422 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1423 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1424 short_channel_id: None,
1425 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1427 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1428 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1429 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1430 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1431 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1432 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1433 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1434 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1435 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1436 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1437 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1438 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1439 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1441 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1443 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1444 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1445 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1446 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1447 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1448 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1449 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1451 funding_outpoint: None,
1452 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1453 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1455 funding_transaction: None,
1457 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1458 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1459 counterparty_node_id,
1461 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1463 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1465 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1466 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1468 announcement_sigs: None,
1470 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1471 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1472 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1473 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1475 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1477 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1478 outbound_scid_alias,
1480 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1481 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1483 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1484 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1489 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1495 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1496 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1497 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1498 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1499 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1501 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1502 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1503 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1504 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1505 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1506 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1507 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1509 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1510 where L::Target: Logger
1512 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1513 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1514 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1516 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1517 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1518 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1519 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1521 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1522 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1523 if match update_state {
1524 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1525 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1526 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1527 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1528 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1530 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1534 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1535 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1536 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1537 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1539 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1540 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1541 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1543 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1544 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1545 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1546 transaction_output_index: None
1551 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1552 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1553 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1554 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1555 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1558 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1560 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1561 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1562 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1564 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1565 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1568 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1569 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1572 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1574 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1575 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1576 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1578 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1579 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1585 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1586 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1587 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1588 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1589 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1590 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1591 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1595 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1596 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1598 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1600 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1601 if generated_by_local {
1602 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1603 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1612 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1614 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1615 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1616 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1617 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1618 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1619 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1620 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1623 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1624 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1625 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1626 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1630 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1631 preimages.push(preimage);
1635 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1636 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1638 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1640 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1641 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1643 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1644 if !generated_by_local {
1645 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1653 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1654 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1655 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1656 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1657 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1658 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1659 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1660 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1662 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1664 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1665 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1666 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1667 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1669 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1671 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1672 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1673 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1674 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1677 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1678 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1679 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1680 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1682 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1685 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1686 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1687 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1688 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1690 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1693 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1694 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1699 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1700 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1705 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1707 let channel_parameters =
1708 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1709 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1710 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1713 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1718 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1721 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1722 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1723 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1724 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1726 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1727 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1728 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1736 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1737 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1743 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1744 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1745 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1746 // outside of those situations will fail.
1747 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1751 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1756 1 + // script length (0)
1760 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1761 2 + // witness marker and flag
1762 1 + // witness element count
1763 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1764 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1765 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1766 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1767 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1768 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1770 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1771 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1772 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1778 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1779 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1780 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1781 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1783 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1784 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1785 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1787 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1788 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1789 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1790 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1791 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1792 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1795 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1796 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1799 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1800 value_to_holder = 0;
1803 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1804 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1805 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1806 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1808 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1809 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1812 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1813 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1817 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1818 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1819 /// our counterparty!)
1820 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1821 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1822 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1823 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1824 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1825 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1826 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1828 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1832 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1833 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1834 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1835 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1836 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1837 //may see payments to it!
1838 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1839 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1840 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1842 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1845 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1846 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1847 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1848 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1849 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1852 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1855 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1856 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1858 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1860 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1861 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1862 where L::Target: Logger {
1863 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1864 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1865 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1866 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1867 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1868 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1869 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1870 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1874 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1875 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1876 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1877 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1879 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1880 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1882 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1884 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1886 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1887 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1888 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1890 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1891 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1892 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1893 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1894 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1896 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1897 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1898 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1900 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1901 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1903 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1906 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1907 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1911 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1915 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1916 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1917 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1918 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1919 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1920 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1923 // Now update local state:
1925 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1926 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1927 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1928 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1929 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1930 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1931 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1935 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1936 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1937 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1938 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1939 // do not not get into this branch.
1940 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1941 match pending_update {
1942 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1943 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1944 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1945 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1946 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1947 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1948 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1951 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1952 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1953 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1954 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1955 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1956 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1957 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1963 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1964 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1965 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1968 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1969 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1971 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1972 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1975 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1976 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1978 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1979 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1981 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1982 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1985 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1988 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1989 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1990 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1991 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1996 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1997 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
1998 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1999 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2000 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2001 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2002 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2003 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2004 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2005 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2006 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2007 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2008 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2009 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2010 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2011 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2012 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2014 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2016 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2017 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2018 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2019 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2020 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2021 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2022 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2024 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2025 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2028 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2029 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2030 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2031 update, blocked: true,
2036 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2037 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2038 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2039 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2043 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2047 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2048 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2049 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2050 /// before we fail backwards.
2052 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2053 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2054 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2055 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2056 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2057 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2058 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2061 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2062 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2063 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2064 /// before we fail backwards.
2066 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2067 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2068 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2069 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2070 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2071 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2072 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2074 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2076 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2077 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2078 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2080 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2081 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2082 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2084 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2085 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2086 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2088 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2093 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2094 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2100 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2101 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2102 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2103 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2104 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2108 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2109 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2110 force_holding_cell = true;
2113 // Now update local state:
2114 if force_holding_cell {
2115 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2116 match pending_update {
2117 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2118 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2119 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2120 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2124 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2125 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2126 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2127 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2133 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2134 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2135 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2141 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2143 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2144 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2147 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2148 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2149 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2154 // Message handlers:
2156 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2157 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2159 // Check sanity of message fields:
2160 if !self.is_outbound() {
2161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2163 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2166 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2169 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2170 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2172 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2175 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2176 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2177 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2179 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2180 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2183 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2184 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2187 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2190 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2194 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2195 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2198 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2199 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2201 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2204 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2205 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2207 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2210 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2213 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2217 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2218 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2221 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2222 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2224 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2225 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2226 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2228 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2231 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2232 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2233 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2234 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2235 if script.len() == 0 {
2238 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2241 Some(script.clone())
2244 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2245 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2251 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2252 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2253 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2254 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2255 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2257 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2258 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2260 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2263 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2264 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2265 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2266 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2267 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2268 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2271 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2272 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2273 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2276 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2277 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2279 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2280 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2285 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2286 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2288 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2289 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2291 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2292 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2293 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2294 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2295 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2296 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2297 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2298 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2299 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2302 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2303 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2305 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2306 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2307 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2308 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2310 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2311 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2313 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2314 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2317 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2318 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2321 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2322 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2323 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2325 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2328 if self.is_outbound() {
2329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2331 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2332 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2333 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2337 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2340 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2341 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2342 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2343 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2346 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2347 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2348 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2349 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2350 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2352 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2354 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2355 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2356 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2359 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2360 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2361 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2365 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2366 initial_commitment_tx,
2369 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2370 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2373 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2374 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2376 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2378 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2379 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2380 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2381 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2382 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2383 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2384 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2385 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2386 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2387 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2388 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2390 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2392 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2394 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2395 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2396 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2397 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2399 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2401 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2402 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2404 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2405 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2408 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2409 }, channel_monitor))
2412 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2413 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2414 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2415 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2416 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2418 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2421 if !self.is_outbound() {
2422 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2424 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2427 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2428 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2429 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2430 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2433 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2435 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2436 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2437 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2438 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2440 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2441 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2443 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2444 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2446 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2447 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2448 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2449 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2450 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2455 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2456 initial_commitment_tx,
2459 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2460 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2463 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2464 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2467 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2468 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2469 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2470 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2471 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2472 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2473 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2474 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2475 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2476 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2477 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2478 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2480 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2482 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2484 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2485 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2486 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2487 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2489 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2491 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2492 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2496 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2497 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2499 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2500 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2501 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2502 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2504 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2507 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2508 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2509 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2512 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2513 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2514 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2515 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2516 // when routing outbound payments.
2517 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2521 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2523 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2524 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2525 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2526 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2527 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2528 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2529 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2530 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2531 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2533 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2534 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2535 let expected_point =
2536 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2537 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2539 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2540 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2541 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2542 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2543 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2544 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2546 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2547 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2548 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2549 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2550 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2552 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2553 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2557 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2560 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2561 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2563 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2565 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2568 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2569 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2570 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2571 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2577 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2578 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2579 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2580 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2581 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2582 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2583 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2584 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2585 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2588 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2591 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2592 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2593 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2595 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2596 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2597 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2598 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2599 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2600 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2602 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2603 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2609 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2610 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2611 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2612 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2613 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2614 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2615 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2616 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2617 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2620 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2623 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2624 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2625 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2627 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2628 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2629 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2630 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2631 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2632 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2634 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2635 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2639 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2640 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2641 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2642 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2643 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2644 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2645 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2647 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2648 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2650 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2657 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2658 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2659 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2660 /// corner case properly.
2661 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2662 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2663 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2665 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2666 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2667 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2668 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2671 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2673 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2674 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2675 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2678 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2679 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2680 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2681 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2683 outbound_capacity_msat,
2684 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2685 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2686 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2692 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2693 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2696 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2697 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2698 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2699 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2700 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2701 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2704 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2705 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2707 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2708 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2711 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2712 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2713 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2715 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2716 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2718 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2721 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2722 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2724 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2725 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2727 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2728 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2730 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2731 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2735 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2736 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2742 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2743 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2744 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2747 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2748 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2749 included_htlcs += 1;
2752 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2753 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2757 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2758 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2759 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2760 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2761 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2762 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2767 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2769 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2770 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2775 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2776 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2780 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2781 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2782 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2785 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2786 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2788 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2789 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2790 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2792 total_pending_htlcs,
2793 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2794 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2795 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2797 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2798 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2799 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2801 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2803 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2808 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2809 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2810 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2812 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2813 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2815 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2818 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2819 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2821 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2822 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2824 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2825 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2827 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2828 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2832 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2833 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2839 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2840 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2841 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2842 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2843 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2844 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2847 included_htlcs += 1;
2850 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2851 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2854 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2855 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2857 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2858 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2859 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2864 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2865 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2866 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2869 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2870 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2872 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2873 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2875 total_pending_htlcs,
2876 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2877 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2878 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2880 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2881 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2882 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2884 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2886 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2891 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2892 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2893 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2894 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2895 if local_sent_shutdown {
2896 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2898 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2899 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2900 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2903 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2906 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2907 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2909 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2910 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2912 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2916 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2917 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2918 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2919 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2921 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2922 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2924 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2925 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2926 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2927 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2928 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2929 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2930 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2931 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2932 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2933 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2934 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2936 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2937 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2938 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2939 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2940 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2941 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2945 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2948 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2949 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2950 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2952 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2953 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2954 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2955 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2956 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2957 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2958 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2962 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2963 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2964 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2965 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2966 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2967 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2968 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2972 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2973 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2974 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2975 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2976 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2980 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2981 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2982 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2983 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2984 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2986 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2990 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2994 if !self.is_outbound() {
2995 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2996 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2997 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2998 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2999 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3000 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3001 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3002 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3003 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3004 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3005 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3006 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3007 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3008 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3009 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3012 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3013 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3014 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3015 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3016 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3019 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3022 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3023 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3026 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3027 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3028 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3032 // Now update local state:
3033 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3034 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3035 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3036 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3037 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3038 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3039 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3044 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3046 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3047 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3048 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3049 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3050 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3051 None => fail_reason.into(),
3052 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3053 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3054 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3055 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3057 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3061 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3063 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3064 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3066 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3072 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3075 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3076 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3079 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3083 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3086 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3087 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3090 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3091 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3094 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3098 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3099 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3102 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3103 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3106 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3110 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3111 where L::Target: Logger
3113 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3116 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3117 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3119 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3123 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3125 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3127 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3128 let commitment_txid = {
3129 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3130 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3131 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3133 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3134 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3135 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3136 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3137 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3138 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3142 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3144 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3145 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3146 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3147 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3150 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3151 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3152 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3156 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3158 if self.is_outbound() {
3159 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3160 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3161 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3162 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3163 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3164 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3165 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3166 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3167 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3168 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3174 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3175 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3178 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3179 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3180 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3181 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3182 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3183 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3184 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3185 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3186 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3187 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3188 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3189 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3190 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3193 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3194 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3195 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3196 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3197 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3198 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3199 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3201 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3202 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3203 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3204 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3205 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3206 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3207 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3210 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3211 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3214 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3216 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3217 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3218 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3221 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3224 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3225 commitment_stats.tx,
3227 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3228 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3229 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3232 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3233 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3235 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3236 let mut need_commitment = false;
3237 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3238 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3239 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3240 need_commitment = true;
3244 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3245 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3246 Some(forward_info.clone())
3248 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3249 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3250 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3251 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3252 need_commitment = true;
3255 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3256 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3257 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3258 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3259 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3260 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3261 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3262 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3263 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3264 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3265 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3266 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3267 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3268 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3270 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3272 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3273 need_commitment = true;
3277 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3278 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3279 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3280 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3281 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3282 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3284 nondust_htlc_sources,
3288 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3289 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3290 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3291 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3293 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3294 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3295 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3296 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3297 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3298 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3299 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3300 // includes the right HTLCs.
3301 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3302 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3303 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3304 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3305 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3306 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3308 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3309 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3310 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3313 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3314 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3315 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3316 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3317 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3318 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3319 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3320 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3321 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3325 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3326 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3327 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3328 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3331 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3332 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3333 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3334 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3335 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3336 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3337 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3338 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3341 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3342 /// for our counterparty.
3343 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3344 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3345 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3346 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3347 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3349 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3350 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3351 updates: Vec::new(),
3354 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3355 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3356 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3357 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3358 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3359 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3360 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3361 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3362 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3363 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3364 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3365 // to rebalance channels.
3366 match &htlc_update {
3367 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3368 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3369 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3372 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3373 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3374 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3375 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3376 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3377 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3378 // into the holding cell without ever being
3379 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3380 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3381 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3384 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3390 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3391 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3392 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3393 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3394 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3395 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3396 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3397 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3398 (msg, monitor_update)
3399 } else { unreachable!() };
3400 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3401 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3403 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3404 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3405 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3406 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3407 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3408 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3409 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3410 // for a full revocation before failing.
3411 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3414 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3416 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3423 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3424 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3426 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3427 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3432 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3433 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3434 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3435 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3436 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3438 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3439 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3440 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3442 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3443 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3449 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3450 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3451 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3452 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3453 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3454 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3455 where L::Target: Logger,
3457 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3458 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3460 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3463 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3464 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3467 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3469 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3470 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3475 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3476 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3477 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3478 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3479 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3480 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3481 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3482 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3486 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3488 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3489 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3492 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3493 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3495 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3497 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3498 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3499 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3500 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3501 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3502 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3503 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3504 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3508 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3509 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3510 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3511 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3512 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3513 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3514 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3515 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3517 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3518 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3521 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3522 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3523 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3524 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3525 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3526 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3527 let mut require_commitment = false;
3528 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3531 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3532 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3533 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3535 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3536 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3537 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3538 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3539 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3540 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3545 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3546 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3547 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3548 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3549 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3551 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3552 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3553 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3558 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3559 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3561 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3565 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3566 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3568 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3569 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3570 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3571 require_commitment = true;
3572 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3573 match forward_info {
3574 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3575 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3576 require_commitment = true;
3578 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3579 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3580 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3582 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3583 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3584 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3588 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3589 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3590 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3591 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3597 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3598 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3599 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3600 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3602 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3603 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3604 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3605 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3606 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3607 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3608 require_commitment = true;
3612 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3614 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3615 match update_state {
3616 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3617 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3618 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3619 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3620 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3622 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3623 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3624 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3625 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3626 require_commitment = true;
3627 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3628 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3633 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3634 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3635 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3636 if require_commitment {
3637 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3638 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3639 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3640 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3641 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3642 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3643 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3644 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3645 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3647 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3648 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3649 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3650 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3651 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3654 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3655 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3656 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3657 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3658 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3659 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3660 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3662 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3663 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3665 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3666 if require_commitment {
3667 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3669 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3670 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3671 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3672 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3674 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3675 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3676 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3677 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3679 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3680 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3681 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3687 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3688 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3689 /// commitment update.
3690 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3691 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3692 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3695 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3696 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3697 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3698 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3700 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3701 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3702 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3703 if !self.is_outbound() {
3704 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3706 if !self.is_usable() {
3707 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3709 if !self.is_live() {
3710 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3713 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3714 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3715 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3716 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3717 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3718 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3719 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3720 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3721 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3722 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3726 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3727 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3728 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3729 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3730 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3733 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3734 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3738 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3739 force_holding_cell = true;
3742 if force_holding_cell {
3743 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3747 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3748 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3750 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3751 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3756 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3757 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3759 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3761 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3762 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3763 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3764 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3768 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3769 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3770 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3774 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3775 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3778 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3779 // will be retransmitted.
3780 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3781 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3782 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3784 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3785 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3787 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3788 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3789 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3790 // this HTLC accordingly
3791 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3794 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3795 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3796 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3797 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3800 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3801 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3802 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3803 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3804 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3805 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3810 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3812 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3813 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3814 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3815 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3819 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3820 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3821 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3822 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3823 // the update upon reconnection.
3824 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3828 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3829 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3832 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3833 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3834 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3835 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3836 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3837 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3838 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3840 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3841 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3842 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3843 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3844 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3845 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3846 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3848 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3849 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3850 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3851 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3852 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3853 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3854 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3857 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3858 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3859 /// to the remote side.
3860 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3861 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3862 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3863 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3866 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3868 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3869 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3870 let mut found_blocked = false;
3871 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3872 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3873 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3877 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3878 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3879 // first received the funding_signed.
3880 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3881 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3882 self.funding_transaction.take()
3884 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3885 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3886 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3887 funding_broadcastable = None;
3890 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3891 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3892 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3893 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3894 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3895 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3896 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3897 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3898 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3899 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3900 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3901 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3902 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3903 next_per_commitment_point,
3904 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3908 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3910 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3911 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3912 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3913 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3914 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3915 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3917 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3918 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3919 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3920 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3921 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3922 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3926 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3927 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3929 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3930 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3933 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3934 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3935 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3936 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3937 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3938 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3939 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3940 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3941 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3945 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3946 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3948 if self.is_outbound() {
3949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3951 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3952 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3954 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3955 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3957 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3958 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3959 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3960 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3961 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3962 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3963 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3964 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3965 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3966 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3967 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3968 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3969 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3971 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3972 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3973 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3979 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3980 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3981 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3982 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3983 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3984 per_commitment_secret,
3985 next_per_commitment_point,
3987 next_local_nonce: None,
3991 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3992 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3993 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3994 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3995 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3997 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3998 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3999 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4000 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4001 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4002 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4003 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4004 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4005 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4010 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4011 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4013 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4014 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4015 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4016 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4017 reason: err_packet.clone()
4020 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4021 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4022 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4023 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4024 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4025 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4028 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4029 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4030 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4031 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4032 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4039 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4040 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4041 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4042 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4046 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4047 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4048 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4049 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4050 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4051 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4055 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4056 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4058 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4059 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4060 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4061 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4062 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4063 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4064 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4065 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4068 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4070 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4071 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4072 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4073 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4077 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4078 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4082 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4083 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4084 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4085 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4086 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4087 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4088 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4089 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4091 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4092 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4093 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4094 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4095 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4098 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4099 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4100 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4101 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4102 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4103 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4104 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4105 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4108 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4112 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4113 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4114 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4115 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4117 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4121 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4122 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4123 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4125 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4126 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4127 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4128 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4129 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4133 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4135 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4136 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4137 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4138 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4139 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4142 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4143 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4144 channel_ready: None,
4145 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4146 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4147 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4151 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4152 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4153 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4154 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4155 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4156 next_per_commitment_point,
4157 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4159 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4160 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4161 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4165 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4166 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4167 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4169 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4170 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4171 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4174 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4180 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4181 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4182 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4183 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4184 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4186 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4187 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4188 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4189 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4190 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4191 next_per_commitment_point,
4192 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4196 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4197 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4198 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4200 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4203 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4204 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4205 raa: required_revoke,
4206 commitment_update: None,
4207 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4209 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4210 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4211 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4213 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4216 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4217 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4218 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4219 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4220 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4221 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4224 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4225 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4226 raa: required_revoke,
4227 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4228 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4232 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4236 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4237 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4238 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4239 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4241 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4243 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4245 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4246 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4247 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4248 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4249 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4250 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4252 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4253 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4254 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4255 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4256 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4258 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4259 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4260 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4261 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4264 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4265 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4266 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4267 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4268 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4269 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4270 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4271 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4272 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4273 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4274 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4275 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4276 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4277 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4278 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4280 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4283 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4284 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4287 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4288 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4289 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4290 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4291 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4292 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4293 self.channel_state &
4294 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4295 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4296 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4297 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4300 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4301 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4302 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4303 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4304 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4305 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4308 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4314 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4315 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4316 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4317 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4319 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4320 return Ok((None, None));
4323 if !self.is_outbound() {
4324 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4325 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4327 return Ok((None, None));
4330 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4332 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4333 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4334 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4335 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4337 let sig = self.holder_signer
4338 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4339 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4341 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4342 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4343 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4344 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4346 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4347 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4348 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4353 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4354 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4355 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4356 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4358 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4361 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4362 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4363 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4364 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4365 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4367 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4368 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4372 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4374 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4375 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4378 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4379 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4380 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4383 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4386 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4387 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4388 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4389 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4391 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4394 assert!(send_shutdown);
4395 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4396 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4397 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4399 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4404 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4406 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4407 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4409 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4410 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4411 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4412 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4413 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4414 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4417 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4418 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4419 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4422 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4423 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4424 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4425 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4429 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4430 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4431 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4432 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4433 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4434 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4436 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4437 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4444 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4445 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4447 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4450 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4451 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4453 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4455 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4456 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4457 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4458 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4459 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4460 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4461 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4462 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4463 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4465 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4466 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4469 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4473 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4474 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4475 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4476 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4478 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4481 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4484 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4485 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4487 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4488 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4491 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4492 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4495 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4496 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4497 return Ok((None, None));
4500 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4501 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4502 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4503 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4505 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4507 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4510 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4511 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4512 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4513 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4514 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4518 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4519 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4520 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4524 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4525 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4526 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4527 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4528 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4529 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4530 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4534 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4536 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4537 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4538 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4539 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4541 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4544 let sig = self.holder_signer
4545 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4546 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4548 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4549 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4550 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4551 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4555 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4556 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4557 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4558 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4560 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4561 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4562 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4568 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4569 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4570 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4572 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4573 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4575 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4576 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4579 if !self.is_outbound() {
4580 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4581 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4582 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4583 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4585 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4586 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4587 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4589 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4590 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4593 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4594 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4595 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4596 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4597 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4598 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4599 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4600 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4602 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4605 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4606 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4607 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4608 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4610 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4614 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4615 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4616 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4617 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4619 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4625 // Public utilities:
4627 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4631 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4633 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4634 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4635 self.temporary_channel_id
4638 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4642 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4643 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4644 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4648 /// Gets the channel's type
4649 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4653 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4654 /// is_usable() returns true).
4655 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4656 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4657 self.short_channel_id
4660 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4661 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4662 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4665 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4666 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4667 self.outbound_scid_alias
4669 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4670 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4671 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4672 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4673 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4676 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4677 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4678 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4679 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4682 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4683 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4684 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4687 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4688 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4689 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4690 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4694 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4697 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4698 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4701 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4702 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4705 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4706 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4707 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4710 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4711 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4714 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4715 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4716 self.counterparty_node_id
4719 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4720 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4721 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4724 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4725 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4726 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4729 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4730 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4732 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4733 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4734 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4735 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4737 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4741 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4742 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4743 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4746 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4747 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4748 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4751 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4752 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4753 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4755 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4756 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4761 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4762 self.channel_value_satoshis
4765 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4766 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4769 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4770 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4773 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4774 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4777 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4778 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4779 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4782 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4783 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4784 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4787 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4788 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4789 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4792 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4793 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4794 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4797 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4798 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4799 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4802 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4803 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4804 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4807 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4808 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4809 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4810 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4811 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4814 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4816 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4817 self.prev_config = None;
4821 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4822 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4826 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4827 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4828 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4829 let did_channel_update =
4830 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4831 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4832 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4833 if did_channel_update {
4834 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4835 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4836 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4837 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4839 self.config.options = *config;
4843 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4844 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4845 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4846 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4847 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4848 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4849 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4851 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4852 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4855 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4857 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4858 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4864 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4865 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4866 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4867 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4868 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4869 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4870 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4872 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4873 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4880 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4884 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4885 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4886 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4887 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4888 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4889 // which are near the dust limit.
4890 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4891 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4892 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4893 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4894 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4896 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4897 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4899 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4902 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4903 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4906 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4907 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4910 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4911 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4915 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4920 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4922 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4923 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4924 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4925 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4926 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4927 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4929 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4931 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4939 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4940 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4944 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4945 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4946 self.update_time_counter
4949 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4950 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4953 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4954 self.config.announced_channel
4957 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4958 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4961 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4962 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4963 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4964 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4967 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4968 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4969 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4972 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4973 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4974 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4975 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4976 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4979 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4980 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4981 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4982 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4983 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4986 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4987 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4988 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4989 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4992 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4993 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4994 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4997 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4998 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4999 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5000 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5001 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5002 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5003 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5004 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5010 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5011 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5012 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5013 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5014 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5015 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5020 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5021 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5023 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5024 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5025 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5026 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5029 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5030 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5033 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5034 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5037 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5038 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5039 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5042 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5043 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5044 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5046 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5047 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5048 if self.channel_state &
5049 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5050 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5051 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5052 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5053 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5056 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5057 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5058 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5059 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5060 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5061 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5063 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5064 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5065 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5067 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5068 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5069 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5070 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5071 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5072 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5078 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5079 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5080 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5083 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5084 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5085 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5088 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5089 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5090 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5093 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5094 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5095 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5096 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5097 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5098 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5103 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5104 self.channel_update_status
5107 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5108 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5109 self.channel_update_status = status;
5112 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5114 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5115 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5116 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5120 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5121 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5122 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5125 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5129 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5130 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5131 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5133 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5134 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5135 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5137 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5138 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5141 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5142 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5143 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5144 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5145 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5146 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5147 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5148 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5149 self.channel_state);
5151 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5155 if need_commitment_update {
5156 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5157 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5158 let next_per_commitment_point =
5159 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5160 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5161 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5162 next_per_commitment_point,
5163 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5167 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5173 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5174 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5175 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5176 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5177 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5178 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5179 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5181 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5184 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5185 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5186 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5187 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5188 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5189 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5190 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5191 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5192 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5193 if self.is_outbound() {
5194 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5195 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5196 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5197 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5198 // channel and move on.
5199 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5200 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5202 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5203 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5204 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5206 if self.is_outbound() {
5207 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5208 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5209 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5210 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5211 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5212 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5216 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5217 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5218 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5219 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5220 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5224 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5225 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5226 // may have already happened for this block).
5227 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5228 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5229 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5230 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5233 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5234 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5235 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5236 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5244 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5245 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5246 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5247 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5249 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5250 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5253 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5255 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5256 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5257 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5258 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5260 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5263 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5266 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5267 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5268 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5269 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5271 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5274 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5275 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5276 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5278 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5279 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5281 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5282 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5283 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5291 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5293 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5294 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5295 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5297 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5298 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5301 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5302 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5303 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5304 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5305 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5306 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5307 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5308 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5309 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5312 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5313 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5314 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5315 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5317 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5318 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5319 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5321 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5322 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5323 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5324 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5326 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5327 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5328 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5329 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5330 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5331 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5332 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5335 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5336 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5338 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5341 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5342 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5343 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5344 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5345 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5346 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5347 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5348 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5349 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5350 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5351 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5352 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5353 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5354 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5355 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5356 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5357 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5363 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5368 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5369 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5371 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5372 if !self.is_outbound() {
5373 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5375 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5376 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5379 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5380 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5383 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5384 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5388 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5389 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5390 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5391 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5392 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5393 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5394 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5395 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5396 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5397 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5398 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5399 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5400 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5401 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5402 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5403 first_per_commitment_point,
5404 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5405 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5406 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5407 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5409 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5413 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5414 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5417 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5418 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5419 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5420 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5423 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5424 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5426 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5427 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5428 if self.is_outbound() {
5429 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5431 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5432 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5434 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5435 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5437 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5438 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5441 self.user_id = user_id;
5442 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5444 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5447 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5448 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5449 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5451 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5452 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5453 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5454 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5456 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5457 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5458 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5459 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5460 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5461 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5462 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5463 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5464 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5465 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5466 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5467 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5468 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5469 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5470 first_per_commitment_point,
5471 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5472 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5473 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5475 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5477 next_local_nonce: None,
5481 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5482 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5484 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5486 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5487 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5490 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5491 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5492 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5493 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5494 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5495 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5498 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5499 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5500 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5501 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5502 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5503 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5504 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5505 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5506 if !self.is_outbound() {
5507 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5509 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5510 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5512 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5513 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5514 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5515 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5518 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5519 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5521 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5524 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5525 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5530 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5532 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5534 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5535 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5536 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5538 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5539 temporary_channel_id,
5540 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5541 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5544 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5546 next_local_nonce: None,
5550 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5551 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5552 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5553 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5555 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5558 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5559 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5560 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5561 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5562 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5563 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5565 if !self.is_usable() {
5566 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5569 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5570 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5571 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5572 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5574 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5575 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5577 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5578 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5579 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5580 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5581 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5582 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5588 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5589 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5590 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5591 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5593 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5596 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5600 if !self.is_usable() {
5604 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5605 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5609 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5613 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5614 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5617 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5621 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5623 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5628 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5630 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5635 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5637 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5638 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5639 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5640 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5641 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5645 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5647 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5648 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5649 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5650 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5651 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5652 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5653 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5655 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5656 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5657 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5658 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5659 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5660 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5661 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5662 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5663 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5664 contents: announcement,
5667 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5671 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5672 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5673 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5674 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5675 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5676 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5677 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5678 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5680 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5682 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5683 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5684 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5685 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5687 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5689 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5690 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5693 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5694 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5695 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5696 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5699 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5702 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5703 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5704 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5705 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5706 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5707 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5710 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5712 Err(_) => return None,
5714 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5715 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5720 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5721 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5722 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5723 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5724 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5725 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5726 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5727 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5728 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5729 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5730 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5731 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5732 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5733 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5734 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5735 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5736 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5737 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5738 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5741 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5742 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5743 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5744 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5747 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5748 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5749 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5750 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5751 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5752 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5753 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5754 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5756 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5757 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5758 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5759 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5760 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5761 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5762 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5763 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5764 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5766 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5772 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5774 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5775 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5776 /// commitment update.
5778 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5779 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5780 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5781 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5783 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5784 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5786 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5787 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5792 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5793 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5795 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5797 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5798 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5800 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5801 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5802 /// regenerate them.
5804 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5805 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5807 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5808 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5809 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5810 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5811 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5812 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5814 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5815 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5816 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5819 if amount_msat == 0 {
5820 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5823 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5824 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5827 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5828 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5829 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5830 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5831 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5832 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5833 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5834 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5837 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5838 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5839 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5840 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5842 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5843 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5844 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5847 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5848 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5849 if !self.is_outbound() {
5850 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5851 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5852 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5853 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5854 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5855 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5859 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5862 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5863 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5864 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5866 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5867 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5868 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5869 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5870 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5871 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5875 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5876 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5877 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5878 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5880 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5884 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5885 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5886 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5889 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5890 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5891 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5892 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5894 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5895 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5898 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5899 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5900 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5901 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5902 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5905 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5906 force_holding_cell = true;
5909 // Now update local state:
5910 if force_holding_cell {
5911 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5916 onion_routing_packet,
5921 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5922 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5924 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5926 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5930 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5931 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5932 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5936 onion_routing_packet,
5938 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5943 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5944 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5945 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5946 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5948 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5949 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5950 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5952 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5953 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5957 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5958 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5959 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5960 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5961 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5962 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5963 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5966 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5967 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5968 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5969 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5970 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5971 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5974 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5976 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5977 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5978 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5980 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5981 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5984 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5985 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5986 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5987 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5988 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5989 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5990 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5991 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5994 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5998 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5999 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6000 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6001 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6003 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6005 if !self.is_outbound() {
6006 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6007 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6008 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6009 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6010 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6011 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6012 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6013 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6014 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6015 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6021 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6024 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6025 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6026 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6027 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6028 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6029 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6031 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6032 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6033 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6034 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6037 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6038 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6042 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6043 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6045 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6047 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6048 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6049 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6050 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6052 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6053 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6054 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6055 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6056 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6057 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6061 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6062 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6066 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6067 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6070 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6071 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6073 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6074 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6075 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6076 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6077 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6080 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6081 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6082 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6088 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6089 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6090 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6093 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6094 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6097 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6098 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6099 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6100 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6106 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6107 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6109 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6110 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6111 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6112 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
6113 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6114 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6115 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6116 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6117 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6120 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6121 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6122 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6124 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6125 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6128 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6129 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6130 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6133 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6134 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6135 let mut chan_closed = false;
6136 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6140 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6142 None if !chan_closed => {
6143 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6144 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6145 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6147 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6153 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6154 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6155 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6156 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6158 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6160 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6162 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6163 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6164 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6165 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6166 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6167 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6170 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6171 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6172 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6175 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6176 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6177 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6180 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6181 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6182 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6183 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6184 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6186 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6187 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6194 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6195 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6197 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6200 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6201 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6202 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6203 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6204 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6205 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6206 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6207 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6208 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6209 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6210 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6212 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6213 // return them to fail the payment.
6214 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6215 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6216 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6218 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6219 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6224 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6225 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6226 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6227 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6228 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6229 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6230 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6231 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6232 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6233 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6234 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6235 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6236 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6241 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6242 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6243 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6246 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6247 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6248 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6250 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6251 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6255 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6259 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6260 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6262 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6268 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6269 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6270 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6271 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6272 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6274 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6275 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6276 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6277 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6283 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6284 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6285 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6286 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6287 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6288 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6293 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6294 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6295 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6296 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6298 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6299 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6300 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6301 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6306 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6307 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6308 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6309 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6310 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6311 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6316 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6317 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6318 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6321 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6323 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6324 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6325 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6326 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6327 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6329 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6330 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6331 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6332 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6334 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6335 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6336 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6338 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6340 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6341 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6342 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6343 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6344 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6345 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6347 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6348 // deserialized from that format.
6349 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6350 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6351 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6353 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6355 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6356 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6357 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6359 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6360 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6361 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6362 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6365 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6366 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6367 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6370 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6371 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6372 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6373 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6375 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6376 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6378 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6380 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6382 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6384 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6387 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6389 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6394 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6396 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6397 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6398 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6399 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6400 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6401 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6402 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6404 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6406 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6408 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6411 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6412 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6413 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6416 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6418 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6419 preimages.push(preimage);
6421 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6422 reason.write(writer)?;
6424 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6426 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6427 preimages.push(preimage);
6429 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6430 reason.write(writer)?;
6435 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6436 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6438 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6440 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6441 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6442 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6443 source.write(writer)?;
6444 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6446 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6448 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6449 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6451 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6453 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6454 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6459 match self.resend_order {
6460 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6461 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6464 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6465 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6466 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6468 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6469 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6470 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6471 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6474 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6475 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6476 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6477 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6478 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6481 if self.is_outbound() {
6482 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6483 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6484 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6486 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6487 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6488 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6490 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6492 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6493 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6494 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6495 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6497 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6498 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6499 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6500 // consider the stale state on reload.
6503 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6504 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6505 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6507 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6508 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6509 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6511 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6512 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6514 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6515 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6516 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6518 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6519 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6521 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6524 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6525 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6526 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6528 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6531 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6532 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6534 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6535 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6536 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6538 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6540 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6542 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6544 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6545 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6546 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6547 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6548 htlc.write(writer)?;
6551 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6552 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6553 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6555 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6556 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6558 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6559 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6560 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6561 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6562 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6563 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6564 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6566 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6567 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6568 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6569 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6570 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6572 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6573 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6575 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6576 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6577 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6578 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6580 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6582 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6583 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6584 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6585 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6586 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6587 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6588 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6590 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6591 (2, chan_type, option),
6592 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6593 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6594 (5, self.config, required),
6595 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6596 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6597 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6598 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6599 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6600 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6601 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6602 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6603 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6604 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6605 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6606 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6607 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6608 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6609 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6610 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6617 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6618 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6620 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6621 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6623 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6624 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6625 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6627 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6628 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6629 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6630 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6632 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6634 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6635 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6636 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6637 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6638 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6640 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6641 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6644 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6646 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6648 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6650 let mut keys_data = None;
6652 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6653 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6654 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6655 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6656 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6657 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6658 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6659 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6660 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6661 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6665 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6666 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6667 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6670 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6672 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6673 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6674 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6676 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6678 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6679 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6680 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6681 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6682 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6683 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6684 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6685 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6686 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6687 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6688 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6689 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6690 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6695 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6696 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6697 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6698 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6699 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6700 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6701 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6702 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6703 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6704 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6705 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6706 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6708 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6709 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6712 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6713 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6716 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6717 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6719 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6724 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6725 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6726 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6727 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6728 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6729 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6730 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6731 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6732 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6733 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6735 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6736 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6737 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6739 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6740 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6741 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6743 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6747 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6748 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6749 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6750 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6753 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6754 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6755 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6757 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6758 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6759 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6760 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6763 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6764 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6765 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6766 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6769 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6771 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6773 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6774 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6775 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6776 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6778 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6779 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6780 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6781 // consider the stale state on reload.
6782 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6785 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6786 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6787 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6789 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6792 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6793 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6794 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6796 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6797 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6798 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6799 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6801 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6802 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6804 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6805 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6807 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6808 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6809 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6811 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6813 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6814 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6816 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6817 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6820 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6822 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6823 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6824 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6825 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6827 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6830 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6831 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6835 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6836 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6838 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6839 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6841 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6843 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6844 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6845 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6847 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6849 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6853 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6854 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6855 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6857 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6863 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6864 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6865 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6866 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6867 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6868 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6869 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6870 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6871 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6872 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6874 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6875 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6876 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6877 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6878 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6879 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6880 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6882 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6883 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6884 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6885 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6887 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6889 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6890 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6891 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6892 (2, channel_type, option),
6893 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6894 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6895 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6896 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6897 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6898 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6899 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6900 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6901 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6902 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6903 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6904 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6905 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6906 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6907 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6908 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6909 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6910 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6911 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6914 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6915 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6916 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6917 // required channel parameters.
6918 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6919 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6920 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6922 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6924 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6925 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6926 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6927 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6930 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6931 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6932 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6934 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6935 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6937 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6938 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6943 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6944 if iter.next().is_some() {
6945 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6949 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6950 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6951 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6952 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6953 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6956 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6957 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6959 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6960 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6961 // separate u64 values.
6962 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6964 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
6969 config: config.unwrap(),
6973 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6974 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6975 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6978 temporary_channel_id,
6980 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6982 channel_value_satoshis,
6984 latest_monitor_update_id,
6987 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6990 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6991 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6994 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6995 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6996 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6997 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7001 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7002 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7003 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7004 monitor_pending_forwards,
7005 monitor_pending_failures,
7006 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7009 holding_cell_update_fee,
7010 next_holder_htlc_id,
7011 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7012 update_time_counter,
7015 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7016 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7017 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7018 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7020 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7021 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7022 closing_fee_limits: None,
7023 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7025 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7027 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7028 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7030 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7032 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7033 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7034 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7035 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7036 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7037 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7038 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7039 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7040 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7043 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7045 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7046 funding_transaction,
7048 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7049 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7050 counterparty_node_id,
7052 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7056 channel_update_status,
7057 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7061 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7062 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7063 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7064 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7066 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7068 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7069 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7070 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7072 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7073 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7076 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7078 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7081 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7089 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7090 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7091 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7092 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7093 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7095 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7096 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7098 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7099 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7100 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7101 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7102 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7103 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7104 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7105 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7106 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7107 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7108 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7109 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7110 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7111 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7112 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7113 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7114 use crate::util::test_utils;
7115 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7116 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7117 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7118 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7119 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7120 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7121 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7122 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7123 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7124 use crate::prelude::*;
7126 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7129 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7130 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7136 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7137 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7138 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7139 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7143 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7144 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7145 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7146 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7147 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7148 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7149 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7153 signer: InMemorySigner,
7156 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7157 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7160 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7161 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7163 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7164 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7167 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7171 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7173 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7174 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7175 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7176 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7177 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7180 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7181 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7182 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7183 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7187 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7188 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7189 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7193 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7194 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7195 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7196 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7198 let seed = [42; 32];
7199 let network = Network::Testnet;
7200 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7201 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7202 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7205 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7206 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7207 let config = UserConfig::default();
7208 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7209 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7210 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7212 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7213 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7217 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7218 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7220 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7221 let original_fee = 253;
7222 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7223 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7224 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7225 let seed = [42; 32];
7226 let network = Network::Testnet;
7227 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7229 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7230 let config = UserConfig::default();
7231 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7233 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7234 // same as the old fee.
7235 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7236 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7237 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7241 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7242 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7243 // dust limits are used.
7244 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7245 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7246 let seed = [42; 32];
7247 let network = Network::Testnet;
7248 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7249 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7251 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7252 // they have different dust limits.
7254 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7255 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7256 let config = UserConfig::default();
7257 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7259 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7260 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7261 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7262 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7263 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7265 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7266 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7267 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7268 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7269 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7271 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7272 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7273 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7275 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7276 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7277 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7278 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7281 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7283 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7284 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7285 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7286 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7287 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7288 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7289 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7290 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7291 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7295 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7296 // the dust limit check.
7297 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7298 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7299 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7300 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7302 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7303 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7304 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7305 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7306 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7307 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7308 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7312 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7313 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7314 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7315 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7316 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7317 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7318 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7319 let seed = [42; 32];
7320 let network = Network::Testnet;
7321 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7323 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7324 let config = UserConfig::default();
7325 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7327 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7328 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7330 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7331 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7332 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7333 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7334 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7335 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7337 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7338 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7339 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7340 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7341 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7343 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7345 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7346 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7347 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7348 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7349 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7351 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7352 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7353 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7354 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7355 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7359 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7360 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7361 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7362 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7363 let seed = [42; 32];
7364 let network = Network::Testnet;
7365 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7366 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7367 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7369 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7371 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7372 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7373 let config = UserConfig::default();
7374 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7376 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7377 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7378 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7379 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7381 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7382 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7383 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7385 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7386 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7387 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7388 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7390 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7391 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7392 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7394 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7395 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7397 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7398 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7399 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7400 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7401 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7402 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7403 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7404 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7405 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7410 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7412 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7413 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7414 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7415 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7416 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7417 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7418 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7425 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7426 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7427 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7428 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7429 let seed = [42; 32];
7430 let network = Network::Testnet;
7431 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7432 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7433 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7435 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7436 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7437 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7438 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7439 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7440 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7441 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7442 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7444 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7445 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7446 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7447 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7448 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7449 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7451 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7452 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7453 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7454 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7456 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7458 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7459 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7460 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7461 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7462 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7463 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7465 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7466 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7467 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7468 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7470 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7471 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7472 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7473 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7474 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7476 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7477 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7479 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7480 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7481 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7483 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7484 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7485 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7486 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7487 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7489 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7490 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7492 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7493 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7494 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7498 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7500 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7501 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7502 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7504 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7505 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7506 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7507 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7509 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7510 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7511 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7513 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7515 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7516 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7519 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7520 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7521 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7522 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7523 let seed = [42; 32];
7524 let network = Network::Testnet;
7525 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7526 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7527 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7530 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7531 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7532 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7534 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7535 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7537 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7538 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7539 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7541 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7542 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7544 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7546 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7547 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7549 // Channel Negotiations failed
7550 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7551 assert!(result.is_err());
7556 fn channel_update() {
7557 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7558 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7559 let seed = [42; 32];
7560 let network = Network::Testnet;
7561 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7562 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7564 // Create a channel.
7565 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7566 let config = UserConfig::default();
7567 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7568 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7569 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7570 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7572 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7573 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7574 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7576 short_channel_id: 0,
7579 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7580 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7581 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7583 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7584 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7586 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7588 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7590 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7591 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7592 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7593 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7595 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7596 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7597 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7599 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7603 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7605 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7606 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7607 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7608 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7609 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7610 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7611 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7612 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7613 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7614 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7615 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7616 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7617 use crate::sync::Arc;
7619 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7620 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7621 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7622 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7624 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7626 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7627 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7628 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7629 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7630 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7632 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7633 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7639 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7640 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7641 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7643 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7644 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7645 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7646 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7647 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7648 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7650 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7652 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7653 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7654 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7655 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7656 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7657 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7659 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7660 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7661 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7662 selected_contest_delay: 144
7664 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7665 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7667 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7668 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7670 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7671 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7673 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7674 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7676 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7677 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7678 // build_commitment_transaction.
7679 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7680 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7681 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7682 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7683 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7685 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7686 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7687 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7688 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7692 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7693 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7694 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7695 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7699 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7700 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7701 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7703 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7704 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7706 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7707 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7709 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7711 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7712 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7713 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7714 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7715 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7716 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7717 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7719 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7720 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7721 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7722 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7724 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7725 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7726 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7728 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7730 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7731 commitment_tx.clone(),
7732 counterparty_signature,
7733 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7734 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7735 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7737 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7738 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7740 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7741 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7742 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7744 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7745 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7748 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7749 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7751 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7752 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7753 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7754 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7755 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7756 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7757 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7758 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7760 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7763 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7764 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7765 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7769 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7772 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7773 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7774 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7776 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7777 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7778 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7779 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7780 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7781 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7782 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7783 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7785 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7789 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7790 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7791 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7792 "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", {});
7794 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7795 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7797 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7798 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7799 "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", {});
7801 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7802 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7803 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7804 "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", {});
7806 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7807 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7809 amount_msat: 1000000,
7811 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7812 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7814 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7817 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7818 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7820 amount_msat: 2000000,
7822 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7823 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7825 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7828 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7829 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7831 amount_msat: 2000000,
7833 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7834 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7835 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7837 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7840 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7841 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7843 amount_msat: 3000000,
7845 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7846 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7847 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7849 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7852 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7853 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7855 amount_msat: 4000000,
7857 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7858 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7860 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7864 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7865 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7866 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7868 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7869 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7870 "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", {
7873 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7874 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7875 "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" },
7878 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7879 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7880 "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" },
7883 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7884 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7885 "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" },
7888 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7889 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7890 "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" },
7893 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7894 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7895 "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" }
7898 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7899 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7900 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7902 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7903 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7904 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7907 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7908 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7909 "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" },
7912 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7913 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7914 "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" },
7917 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7918 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7919 "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" },
7922 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7923 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7924 "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" },
7927 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7928 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7929 "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" }
7932 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7933 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7934 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7936 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7937 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7938 "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", {
7941 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7942 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7943 "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" },
7946 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7947 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7948 "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" },
7951 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7952 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7953 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7956 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7957 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7958 "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" }
7961 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7962 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7963 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7964 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7966 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7967 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7968 "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", {
7971 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7972 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7973 "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" },
7976 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7977 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7978 "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" },
7981 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7982 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7983 "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" },
7986 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7987 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7988 "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" }
7991 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7992 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7993 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7994 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7996 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7997 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7998 "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", {
8001 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8002 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8003 "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" },
8006 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8007 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8008 "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" },
8011 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8012 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8013 "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" },
8016 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8017 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8018 "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" }
8021 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8022 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8023 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8025 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8026 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8027 "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", {
8030 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8031 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8032 "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" },
8035 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8036 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8037 "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" },
8040 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8041 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8042 "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" }
8045 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8046 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8047 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8049 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8050 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8051 "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", {
8054 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8055 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8056 "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" },
8059 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8060 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8061 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8064 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8065 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8066 "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" }
8069 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8070 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8071 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8073 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8074 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8075 "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", {
8078 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8079 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8080 "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" },
8083 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8084 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8085 "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" }
8088 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8089 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8090 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8091 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8093 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8094 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8095 "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", {
8098 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8099 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8100 "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" },
8103 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8104 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8105 "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" }
8108 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8109 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8110 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8111 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8113 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8114 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8115 "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", {
8118 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8119 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8120 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8123 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8124 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8125 "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" }
8128 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8129 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8130 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8132 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8133 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8134 "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", {
8137 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8138 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8139 "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" }
8142 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8143 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8144 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8145 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8147 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8148 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8149 "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", {
8152 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8153 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8154 "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" }
8157 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8158 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8159 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8160 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8162 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8163 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8164 "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", {
8167 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8168 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8169 "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" }
8172 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8173 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8174 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8175 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8177 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8178 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8179 "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", {});
8181 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8182 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8183 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8184 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8186 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8187 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8188 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8190 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8191 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8192 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8193 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8195 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8196 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8197 "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", {});
8199 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8200 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8201 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8203 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8204 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8205 "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", {});
8207 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8208 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8209 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8210 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8212 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8213 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8214 "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", {});
8216 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8217 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8218 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8219 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8221 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8222 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8223 "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", {});
8225 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8226 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8227 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8228 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8229 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8230 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8232 amount_msat: 2000000,
8234 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8235 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8237 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8240 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8241 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8242 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8244 amount_msat: 5000001,
8246 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8247 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8248 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8250 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8253 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8254 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8256 amount_msat: 5000000,
8258 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8259 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8260 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8262 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8266 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8267 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8268 "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", {
8271 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8272 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8273 "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" },
8275 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8276 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8277 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
8279 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8280 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8281 "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" }
8284 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8285 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8286 "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", {
8289 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8290 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8291 "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" },
8293 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8294 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8295 "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" },
8297 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8298 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8299 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a183483045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
8304 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8305 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8307 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8308 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8309 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8310 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8312 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8313 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8314 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8316 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8317 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8319 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8320 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8322 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8323 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8324 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8328 fn test_key_derivation() {
8329 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8330 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8332 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8333 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8335 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8336 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8338 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8339 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8341 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8342 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8344 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8345 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8347 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8348 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8350 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8351 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8355 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8356 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8357 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8358 let seed = [42; 32];
8359 let network = Network::Testnet;
8360 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8361 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8363 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8364 let config = UserConfig::default();
8365 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8366 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8368 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8369 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8371 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8372 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8373 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8374 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8375 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8376 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8377 assert!(res.is_ok());
8382 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8383 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8384 // resulting `channel_type`.
8385 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8386 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8387 let network = Network::Testnet;
8388 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8389 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8391 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8392 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8394 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8395 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8397 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8398 // need to signal it.
8399 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8400 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8401 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8404 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8406 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8407 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8408 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8410 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8411 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8412 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8415 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8416 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8417 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8418 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8419 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8422 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8423 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8428 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8429 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8430 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8431 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8432 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8433 let network = Network::Testnet;
8434 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8435 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8437 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8438 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8440 let config = UserConfig::default();
8442 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8443 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8444 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8445 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8446 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8448 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8449 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8450 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8453 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8454 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8455 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8457 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8458 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8459 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8460 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8461 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8462 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8464 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8469 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8470 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8472 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8473 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8474 let network = Network::Testnet;
8475 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8476 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8478 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8479 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8481 let config = UserConfig::default();
8483 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8484 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8485 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8486 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8487 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8488 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8489 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8490 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8492 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8493 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8494 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8495 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8496 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8497 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8500 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8501 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8503 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8504 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8505 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8506 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8508 assert!(res.is_err());
8510 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8511 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8512 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8514 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8515 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8516 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8519 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8521 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8522 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8523 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8524 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8527 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8528 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8530 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8531 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8533 assert!(res.is_err());