1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
34 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
35 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
36 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
39 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
41 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
42 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
43 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
46 use crate::prelude::*;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
49 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
50 use crate::sync::Mutex;
51 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
55 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
56 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
58 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
62 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
65 pub struct AvailableBalances {
66 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
67 pub balance_msat: u64,
68 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
69 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
71 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
73 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
78 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
80 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
81 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
82 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
83 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
84 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
85 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
87 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
91 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
92 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
93 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
94 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
97 enum InboundHTLCState {
98 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
99 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
100 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
101 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
102 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
103 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
104 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
105 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
106 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
107 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
108 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
109 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
110 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
111 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
112 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
114 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
115 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
116 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
118 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
119 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
120 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
122 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
123 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
124 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
125 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
126 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
127 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
129 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
130 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
131 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
132 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
133 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
134 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
135 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
139 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
141 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
142 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
143 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
144 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
145 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
146 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
147 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
148 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
151 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
155 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
156 state: InboundHTLCState,
159 enum OutboundHTLCState {
160 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
161 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
162 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
163 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
164 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
165 /// money back (though we won't), and,
166 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
167 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
168 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
169 /// we'll never get out of sync).
170 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
171 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
172 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
174 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
175 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
176 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
177 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
178 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
179 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
180 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
181 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
182 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
187 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
188 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
193 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
194 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
197 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
198 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
200 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
201 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
206 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
207 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
209 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
215 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
219 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
220 state: OutboundHTLCState,
224 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
225 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
226 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
230 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
235 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
240 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
244 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
245 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
246 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
247 /// move on to ChannelReady.
248 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
249 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
250 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
252 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
253 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
254 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
255 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
256 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
257 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
258 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
260 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
261 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
262 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
264 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
265 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
266 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
271 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
272 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
274 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
275 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
276 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
277 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
278 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
279 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
280 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
281 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
282 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
284 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
285 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
286 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
287 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
288 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
289 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
290 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
291 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
292 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
293 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
294 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
295 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
297 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
298 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
300 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
302 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
303 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
304 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
305 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
306 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
307 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
308 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
309 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
311 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
313 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
315 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
319 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
321 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
322 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
323 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
325 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
326 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
328 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
329 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
330 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
331 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
332 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
334 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
335 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
339 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
345 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
348 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
349 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
350 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 holding_cell_msat: u64,
352 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
355 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
356 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
357 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
358 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
359 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
360 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
361 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
362 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
363 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
367 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
368 struct HTLCCandidate {
370 origin: HTLCInitiator,
374 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
382 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
384 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
386 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
387 htlc_value_msat: u64,
388 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
393 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
394 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
395 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
396 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
397 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
399 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
400 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
401 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
402 htlc_value_msat: u64,
403 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
404 /// in the holding cell).
405 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
414 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
417 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
418 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
419 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
420 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
423 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
424 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
425 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
426 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
427 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
428 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
429 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
430 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
431 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
432 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
436 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
437 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
438 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
439 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
440 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
441 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
442 pub mon_update: Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
443 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
444 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
445 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
448 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
449 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
450 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
451 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
452 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
453 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
454 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
455 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
456 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
457 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
458 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
459 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
460 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
461 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
462 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
464 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
465 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
466 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
467 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
469 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
470 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
471 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
472 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
474 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
475 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
476 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
477 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
478 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
480 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
481 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
482 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
483 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
485 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
486 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
487 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
489 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
490 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
491 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
492 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
493 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
495 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
496 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
497 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
500 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
501 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
502 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
503 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
505 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
506 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
507 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
508 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
510 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
514 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
518 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
520 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
521 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
522 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
524 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
525 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
526 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
527 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
530 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
532 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
534 holder_signer: Signer,
535 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
536 destination_script: Script,
538 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
539 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
540 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
542 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
544 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
545 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
546 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
547 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
549 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
550 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
551 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
552 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
553 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
554 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
556 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
558 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
559 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
560 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
561 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
562 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
563 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
565 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
567 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
568 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
569 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
570 // HTLCs with similar state.
571 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
572 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
573 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
574 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
575 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
576 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
577 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
578 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
579 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
582 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
583 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
584 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
586 update_time_counter: u32,
588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
589 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
590 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
591 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
592 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
593 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
595 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
596 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
598 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
599 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
600 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
601 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
603 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
604 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
606 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
608 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
610 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
611 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
612 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
613 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
614 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
615 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
617 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
618 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
619 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
620 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
621 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
623 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
624 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
625 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
626 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
627 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
628 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
629 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
630 channel_creation_height: u32,
632 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
635 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
640 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
642 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
649 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
650 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
653 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
657 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
658 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
660 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
664 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
666 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
668 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
669 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
671 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
673 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
675 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
677 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
679 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
680 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
681 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
682 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
684 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
685 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
686 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
688 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
689 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
690 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
692 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
693 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
694 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
695 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
697 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
698 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
699 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
701 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
702 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
703 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
704 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
705 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
707 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
708 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
711 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
712 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
713 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
714 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
715 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
716 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
717 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
719 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
720 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
722 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
723 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
724 // the channel's funding UTXO.
726 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
727 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
728 // associated channel mapping.
730 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
731 // to store all of them.
732 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
734 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
735 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
736 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
737 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
738 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
740 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
741 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
744 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
745 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
747 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
748 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
749 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
753 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
755 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
756 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
757 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
758 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
762 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
764 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
766 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
768 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
769 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
770 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
771 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
772 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
774 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
775 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
777 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
779 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
780 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
782 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
783 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
784 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
785 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
786 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
787 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
789 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
790 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
792 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
793 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
794 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
795 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
796 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
798 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
799 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
801 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
802 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
804 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
805 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
806 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
807 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
813 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
814 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
816 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
817 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
818 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
823 macro_rules! secp_check {
824 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
827 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
832 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
833 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
834 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
835 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
837 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
839 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
840 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
841 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
843 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
846 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
848 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
851 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
852 /// required by us according to the configured or default
853 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
855 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
857 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
858 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
859 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
860 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
861 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
864 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
865 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
866 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
867 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
868 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
869 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
870 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
873 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
874 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
877 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
878 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
879 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
880 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
881 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
882 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
883 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
884 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
889 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
890 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
891 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
892 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
893 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
894 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
895 // We've exhausted our options
898 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
899 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
903 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
904 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
905 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
906 outbound_scid_alias: u64
907 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
908 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
909 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
911 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
913 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
914 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
915 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
917 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
920 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
923 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
924 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
925 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
927 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
928 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
930 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
931 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
932 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
933 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
934 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
937 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
939 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
940 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
941 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
942 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
945 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
946 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
948 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
949 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
952 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
953 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
954 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
961 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
962 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
963 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
964 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
969 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
971 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
972 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
973 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
975 channel_value_satoshis,
977 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
980 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
981 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
983 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
984 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
987 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
988 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
989 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
990 pending_update_fee: None,
991 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
992 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
993 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
994 update_time_counter: 1,
996 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
998 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
999 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1000 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1001 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1002 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1003 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1005 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1006 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1007 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1008 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1010 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1011 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1012 closing_fee_limits: None,
1013 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1015 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1017 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1018 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1019 short_channel_id: None,
1020 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1022 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1023 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1024 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1025 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1026 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1027 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1028 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1029 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1030 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1031 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1032 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1034 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1036 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1037 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1038 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1039 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1040 counterparty_parameters: None,
1041 funding_outpoint: None,
1042 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1044 funding_transaction: None,
1046 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1047 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1048 counterparty_node_id,
1050 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1052 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1054 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1055 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1057 announcement_sigs: None,
1059 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1060 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1061 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1062 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1064 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1066 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1067 outbound_scid_alias,
1069 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1071 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1072 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1074 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config),
1078 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1079 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1080 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1082 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1083 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1084 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1085 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1086 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1087 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1088 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1091 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1092 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1093 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1094 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1095 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1096 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1097 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1098 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1100 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1101 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1110 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1111 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1112 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1113 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1114 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1115 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1116 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1117 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1118 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1121 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1122 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1124 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1125 // support this channel type.
1126 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1127 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1131 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1135 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1136 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1137 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1138 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1139 // publicly announced.
1140 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1141 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1145 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1146 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1149 channel_type.clone()
1151 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1153 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1154 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1157 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
1158 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1159 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1160 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1161 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1162 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1163 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1164 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1167 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1171 // Check sanity of message fields:
1172 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1175 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1176 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1178 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1181 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1182 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1185 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1188 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1191 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1193 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1194 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1195 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1197 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1198 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1200 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1204 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1205 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1208 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1211 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1214 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1217 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1220 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1227 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1229 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1230 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1231 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1235 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1236 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1237 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1238 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1241 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1242 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1244 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1245 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1246 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1248 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1252 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1253 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1254 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1255 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1256 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1260 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1261 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1262 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1263 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1267 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1268 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1269 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1270 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1271 if script.len() == 0 {
1274 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1277 Some(script.clone())
1280 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1281 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1287 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1288 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1291 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1292 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1297 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1298 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1300 let chan = Channel {
1303 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1304 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1306 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1311 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1313 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1314 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1315 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1318 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1321 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1322 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1324 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1325 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1326 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1328 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1329 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1330 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1331 pending_update_fee: None,
1332 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1333 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1334 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1335 update_time_counter: 1,
1337 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1339 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1340 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1341 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1342 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1343 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1344 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1346 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1347 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1348 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1349 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1351 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1352 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1353 closing_fee_limits: None,
1354 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1356 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1358 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1359 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1360 short_channel_id: None,
1361 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1363 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1364 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1365 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1366 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1367 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1368 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1369 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1370 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1371 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1372 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1373 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1374 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1376 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1378 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1379 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1380 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1381 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1382 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1383 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1384 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1386 funding_outpoint: None,
1387 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1389 funding_transaction: None,
1391 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1392 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1393 counterparty_node_id,
1395 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1397 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1399 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1400 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1402 announcement_sigs: None,
1404 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1405 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1406 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1407 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1409 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1411 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1412 outbound_scid_alias,
1414 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1416 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1417 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1425 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1426 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1427 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1428 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1429 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1431 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1432 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1433 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1434 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1435 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1436 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1437 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1439 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1440 where L::Target: Logger
1442 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1443 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1444 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1446 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1447 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1448 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1449 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1451 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1452 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1453 if match update_state {
1454 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1455 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1456 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1457 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1458 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1460 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1464 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1465 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1466 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1467 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1469 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1470 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1471 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1473 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1474 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1475 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1476 transaction_output_index: None
1481 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1482 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1483 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1484 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1485 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1488 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1490 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1491 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1492 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1494 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1495 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1498 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1499 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1502 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1504 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1505 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1506 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1508 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1509 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1515 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1516 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1517 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1518 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1519 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1520 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1521 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1525 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1526 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1528 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1530 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1531 if generated_by_local {
1532 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1533 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1542 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1544 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1545 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1546 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1547 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1548 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1549 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1550 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1553 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1554 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1555 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1556 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1560 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1561 preimages.push(preimage);
1565 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1566 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1568 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1570 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1571 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1573 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1574 if !generated_by_local {
1575 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1583 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1584 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1585 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1586 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1587 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1588 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1589 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1590 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1592 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1594 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1595 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1596 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1597 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1599 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1601 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1602 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1603 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1604 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1607 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1608 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1609 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1610 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1612 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1615 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1616 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1617 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1618 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1620 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1623 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1624 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1629 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1630 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1635 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1637 let channel_parameters =
1638 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1639 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1640 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1643 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1648 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1651 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1652 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1653 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1654 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1656 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1657 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1658 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1666 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1667 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1673 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1674 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1675 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1676 // outside of those situations will fail.
1677 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1681 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1686 1 + // script length (0)
1690 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1691 2 + // witness marker and flag
1692 1 + // witness element count
1693 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1694 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1695 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1696 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1697 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1698 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1700 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1701 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1702 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1708 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1709 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1710 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1711 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1713 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1714 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1715 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1717 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1718 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1719 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1720 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1721 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1722 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1725 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1726 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1729 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1730 value_to_holder = 0;
1733 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1734 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1735 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1736 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1738 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1739 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1742 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1743 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1747 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1748 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1749 /// our counterparty!)
1750 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1751 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1752 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1753 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1754 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1755 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1756 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1758 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1762 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1763 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1764 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1765 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1766 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1767 //may see payments to it!
1768 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1769 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1770 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1772 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1775 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1776 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1777 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1778 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1779 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1782 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1785 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1786 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1788 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1790 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1791 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1792 where L::Target: Logger {
1793 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1794 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1795 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1796 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1797 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1798 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1799 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1800 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1804 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1805 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1806 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1807 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1809 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1810 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1812 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1814 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1816 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1817 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1818 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1820 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1821 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1822 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1823 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1824 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1826 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1827 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1828 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1830 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1831 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1833 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1836 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1837 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1841 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1845 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1846 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1847 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1848 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1849 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1850 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1853 // Now update local state:
1855 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1856 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1857 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1858 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1859 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1860 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1861 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1865 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1866 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1867 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1868 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1869 // do not not get into this branch.
1870 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1871 match pending_update {
1872 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1873 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1874 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1875 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1876 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1877 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1878 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1881 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1882 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1883 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1884 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1885 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1886 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1887 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1893 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1894 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1895 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1897 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1898 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1899 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1901 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1902 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1905 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1906 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1908 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1909 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1911 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1912 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1915 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1918 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1919 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1920 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1921 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1926 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1927 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1928 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1929 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1930 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1933 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1934 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1935 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1936 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1937 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1939 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1940 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1941 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1945 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1946 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1947 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1948 /// before we fail backwards.
1949 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1950 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1951 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1952 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1953 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1955 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1957 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1958 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1959 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1961 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1962 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1963 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1965 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1966 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1967 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1969 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1974 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1975 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1981 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1982 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1983 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1984 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1985 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1989 // Now update local state:
1990 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1991 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1992 match pending_update {
1993 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1994 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1995 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1996 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2000 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2001 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2002 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2003 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2009 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2010 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2011 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2017 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2019 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2020 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2023 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2024 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2025 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2030 // Message handlers:
2032 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2033 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2035 // Check sanity of message fields:
2036 if !self.is_outbound() {
2037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2039 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2042 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2045 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2046 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2048 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2049 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2051 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2052 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2053 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2055 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2056 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2059 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2060 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2061 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2063 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2066 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2067 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2070 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2071 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2074 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2075 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2077 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2080 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2083 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2084 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2086 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2089 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2093 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2094 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2097 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2098 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2100 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2103 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2104 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2105 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2106 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2107 if script.len() == 0 {
2110 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2113 Some(script.clone())
2116 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2117 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2123 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2124 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2125 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2126 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2127 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2129 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2130 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2132 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2135 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2136 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2137 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2138 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2139 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2140 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2143 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2144 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2145 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2148 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2149 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2151 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2152 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2157 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2158 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2160 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2161 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2163 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2164 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2165 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2166 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2167 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2168 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2169 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2170 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2171 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2174 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2175 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2177 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2178 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2179 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2180 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2182 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2183 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2185 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2186 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2189 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2190 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2193 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2194 if self.is_outbound() {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2197 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2198 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2199 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2203 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2206 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2207 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2208 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2209 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2212 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2213 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2214 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2215 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2216 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2218 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2220 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2221 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2225 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2226 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2227 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2231 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2232 initial_commitment_tx,
2235 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2236 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2239 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2240 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2242 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2244 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2245 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2246 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2247 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2248 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2249 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2250 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2251 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2252 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2254 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2256 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2258 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2259 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2260 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2261 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2263 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2265 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2266 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2268 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2271 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2272 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2273 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2274 if !self.is_outbound() {
2275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2277 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2280 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2281 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2282 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2283 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2286 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2288 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
2289 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2290 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2291 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2293 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2294 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2296 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
2297 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2299 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2300 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2301 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2302 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2303 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2308 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2309 initial_commitment_tx,
2312 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2313 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2316 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2317 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2320 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2321 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2322 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2323 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2324 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2325 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
2326 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2327 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2328 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2329 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2331 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2333 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2335 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2336 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2337 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2338 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2340 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2342 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2345 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2346 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2348 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2349 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2350 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2354 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2355 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2356 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2357 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2358 // when routing outbound payments.
2359 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2363 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2365 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2366 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2367 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2368 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2369 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2370 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2371 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2372 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2373 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2375 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2376 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2377 let expected_point =
2378 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2379 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2381 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2383 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2384 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2385 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2386 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2387 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2389 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2397 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2398 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2400 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2402 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2405 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2406 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2407 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2408 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2414 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2415 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2416 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2417 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2418 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2419 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2420 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2421 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2422 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2425 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2428 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2429 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2430 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2432 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2433 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2434 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2435 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2436 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2437 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2439 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2440 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2446 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2447 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2448 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2449 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2450 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2451 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2452 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2453 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2454 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2457 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2460 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2461 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2462 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2464 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2465 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2466 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2467 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2468 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2469 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2471 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2472 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2476 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2477 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2478 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2479 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2480 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2481 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2482 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2484 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2485 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2487 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2494 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2495 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2496 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2497 /// corner case properly.
2498 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2499 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2500 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2502 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2503 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2504 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2505 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2508 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2510 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2511 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2512 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2515 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2516 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2517 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2518 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2520 outbound_capacity_msat,
2521 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2522 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2523 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2529 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2530 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2533 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2534 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2535 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2536 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2537 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2538 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2541 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2542 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2544 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2545 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2548 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2549 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2550 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2552 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2553 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2555 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2558 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2559 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2561 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2562 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2564 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2565 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2567 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2568 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2572 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2573 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2579 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2580 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2581 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2584 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2585 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2586 included_htlcs += 1;
2589 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2590 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2594 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2595 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2596 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2597 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2598 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2599 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2604 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2606 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2607 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2612 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2613 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2617 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2618 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2619 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2622 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2623 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2625 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2626 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2627 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2629 total_pending_htlcs,
2630 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2631 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2632 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2634 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2635 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2636 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2638 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2640 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2645 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2646 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2647 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2649 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2650 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2652 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2655 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2656 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2658 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2659 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2661 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2662 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2664 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2665 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2669 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2670 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2676 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2677 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2678 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2679 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2680 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2681 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2684 included_htlcs += 1;
2687 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2688 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2691 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2692 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2694 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2695 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2696 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2701 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2702 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2703 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2706 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2707 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2709 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2710 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2712 total_pending_htlcs,
2713 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2714 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2715 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2717 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2718 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2719 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2721 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2723 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2728 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2729 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2730 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2731 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2732 if local_sent_shutdown {
2733 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2735 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2736 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2737 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2740 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2743 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2744 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2746 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2749 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2753 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2754 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2755 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2756 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2758 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2759 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2761 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2762 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2763 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2764 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2765 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2766 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2767 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2768 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2769 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2770 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2771 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2773 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2774 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2775 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2776 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2777 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2778 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2782 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2785 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2786 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2787 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2789 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2790 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2791 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2792 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2793 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2794 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2795 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2799 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2800 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2801 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2802 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2803 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2804 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2805 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2809 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2810 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2811 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2812 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2813 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2814 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2817 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2818 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2819 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2820 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2821 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2823 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2824 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2827 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2831 if !self.is_outbound() {
2832 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2833 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2834 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2835 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2836 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2837 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2838 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2839 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2840 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2841 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2842 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2843 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2844 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2845 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2846 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2849 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2850 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2851 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2852 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2856 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2859 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2863 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2864 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2865 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2869 // Now update local state:
2870 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2871 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2872 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2873 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2874 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2875 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2876 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2881 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2883 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2884 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2885 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2886 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2887 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2888 None => fail_reason.into(),
2889 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2890 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2891 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2892 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2894 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2898 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2899 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2900 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2901 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2903 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2904 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2909 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2912 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2913 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2914 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2916 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2917 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2920 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2923 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2924 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2927 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2928 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2931 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2935 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2936 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2939 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2943 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2947 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2948 where L::Target: Logger
2950 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2951 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2953 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2954 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2956 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2957 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2960 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2962 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2964 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2965 let commitment_txid = {
2966 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2967 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2968 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2970 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2971 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2972 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2973 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2974 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2975 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2979 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2981 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2982 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2983 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2984 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2987 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2988 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2989 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2990 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2995 if self.is_outbound() {
2996 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2997 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2998 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2999 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3000 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3001 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3002 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3003 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3004 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3005 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3011 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3012 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3015 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3016 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3017 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3018 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3019 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3020 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3021 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3023 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3024 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3025 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3026 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3027 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3028 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3029 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3030 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3032 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3034 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3038 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3039 commitment_stats.tx,
3041 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3042 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3043 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3046 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3047 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3048 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3049 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3051 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3052 let mut need_commitment = false;
3053 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3054 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3055 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3056 need_commitment = true;
3060 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3061 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3062 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3063 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3064 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3065 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3069 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3070 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3071 Some(forward_info.clone())
3073 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3074 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3075 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3076 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3077 need_commitment = true;
3080 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3081 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3082 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3083 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3084 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3085 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3086 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3087 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3088 need_commitment = true;
3092 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3093 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3094 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3095 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3097 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3098 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3099 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3100 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3101 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3102 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3103 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3104 // includes the right HTLCs.
3105 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3106 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3107 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3108 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3109 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3110 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3112 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3113 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3114 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3117 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3118 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3119 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3120 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3121 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3122 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3123 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3124 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3125 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3129 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3130 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3132 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3133 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3134 per_commitment_secret,
3135 next_per_commitment_point,
3136 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3139 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3140 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3141 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3142 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3143 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3144 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3145 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3146 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3149 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
3150 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
3151 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3152 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3153 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3154 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3155 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3157 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3158 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3159 updates: Vec::new(),
3162 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3163 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3164 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3165 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3166 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3167 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3168 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3169 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3170 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3171 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3172 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3173 // to rebalance channels.
3174 match &htlc_update {
3175 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3176 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), logger) {
3177 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3180 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3181 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3182 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3183 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3184 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3185 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3186 // into the holding cell without ever being
3187 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3188 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3189 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3192 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3198 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3199 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3200 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3201 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3202 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3203 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3204 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3205 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3206 (msg, monitor_update)
3207 } else { unreachable!() };
3208 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3209 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3211 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3212 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
3213 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3214 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3215 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
3216 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
3217 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
3218 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
3219 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3222 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3224 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3231 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3232 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3234 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3235 self.send_update_fee(feerate, logger)
3240 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3241 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3242 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3243 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3244 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3246 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3247 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3248 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3250 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3252 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3254 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3257 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3259 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3263 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3264 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3265 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3266 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3267 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3268 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3269 where L::Target: Logger,
3271 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3274 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3275 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3277 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3281 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3283 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3284 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3289 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3290 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3291 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3292 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3293 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3294 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3295 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3296 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3297 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3300 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3302 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3303 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3306 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3307 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3309 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3311 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3312 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3313 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3314 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3315 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3316 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3317 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3318 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3322 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3323 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3324 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3325 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3326 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3327 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3328 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3329 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3331 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3332 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3335 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3336 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3337 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3338 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3339 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3340 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3341 let mut require_commitment = false;
3342 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3345 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3346 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3347 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3349 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3350 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3351 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3352 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3353 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3354 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3359 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3360 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3361 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3362 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3363 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3365 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3366 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3367 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3372 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3373 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3375 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3379 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3380 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3382 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3383 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3384 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3385 require_commitment = true;
3386 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3387 match forward_info {
3388 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3389 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3390 require_commitment = true;
3392 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3393 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3394 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3396 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3397 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3398 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3402 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3403 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3404 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3405 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3411 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3412 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3413 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3414 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3416 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3417 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3418 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3419 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3420 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3421 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3422 require_commitment = true;
3426 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3428 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3429 match update_state {
3430 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3431 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3432 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3433 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3434 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3436 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3437 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3438 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3439 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3440 require_commitment = true;
3441 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3442 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3447 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3448 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3449 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3450 if require_commitment {
3451 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3452 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3453 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3454 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3455 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3456 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3457 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3458 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3459 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3461 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3462 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3463 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3464 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3465 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3466 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3467 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3469 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3473 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3474 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3475 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3476 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3477 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3479 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3480 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3481 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3484 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3485 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3486 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3487 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3490 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3491 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3492 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3493 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3495 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3498 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3499 if require_commitment {
3500 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3502 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3503 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3504 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3505 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3507 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3508 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3510 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3511 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3512 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3514 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3518 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3519 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3520 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3523 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3525 commitment_update: None,
3526 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3527 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3528 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3535 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3536 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3537 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3538 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3539 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3540 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3541 if !self.is_outbound() {
3542 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3544 if !self.is_usable() {
3545 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3547 if !self.is_live() {
3548 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3551 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3552 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3553 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3554 let keys = if let Ok(keys) = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number) { keys } else { return None; };
3555 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3556 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3557 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3558 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3559 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3560 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3564 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3565 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3566 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3567 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3568 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3571 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3572 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3576 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3577 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3581 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3582 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3584 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3585 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3590 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3591 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, logger) {
3592 Some(update_fee) => {
3593 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3594 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3600 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3601 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3603 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3605 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3606 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3607 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3608 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3612 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3613 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3614 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3618 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3619 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3622 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3623 // will be retransmitted.
3624 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3625 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3626 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3628 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3629 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3631 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3632 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3633 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3634 // this HTLC accordingly
3635 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3638 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3639 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3640 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3641 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3644 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3645 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3646 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3647 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3648 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3649 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3654 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3656 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3657 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3658 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3659 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3663 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3664 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3665 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3666 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3667 // the update upon reconnection.
3668 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3672 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3673 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3676 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3677 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3678 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3679 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3680 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3681 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3683 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3684 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3685 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3686 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3687 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3688 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3690 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3691 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3692 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3693 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3694 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3695 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3696 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3699 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3700 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3701 /// to the remote side.
3702 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3703 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3704 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3706 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3707 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3708 // first received the funding_signed.
3709 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3710 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3711 self.funding_transaction.take()
3713 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3714 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3715 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3716 funding_broadcastable = None;
3719 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3720 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3721 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3722 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3723 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3724 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3725 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3726 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3727 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3728 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3729 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3730 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3731 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3732 next_per_commitment_point,
3733 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3737 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3739 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3740 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3741 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3742 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3743 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3744 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3746 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3747 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3748 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3749 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3750 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3751 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3755 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3756 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3758 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3759 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3762 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3763 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3764 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3765 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3766 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3767 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3768 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3769 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3770 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3774 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3775 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3777 if self.is_outbound() {
3778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3780 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3781 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3783 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3784 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3786 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3787 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3788 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3789 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3790 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3791 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3792 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3793 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3794 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3795 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3796 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3797 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3798 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3800 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3801 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3802 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3808 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3809 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3810 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3811 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3812 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3813 per_commitment_secret,
3814 next_per_commitment_point,
3818 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3819 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3820 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3821 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3822 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3824 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3825 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3826 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3827 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3828 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3829 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3830 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3831 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3832 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3837 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3838 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3840 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3841 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3842 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3843 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3844 reason: err_packet.clone()
3847 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3848 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3849 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3850 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3851 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3852 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3855 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3856 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3857 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3858 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3859 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3866 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3867 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3868 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3869 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3873 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3874 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3875 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3876 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3877 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3878 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3882 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3883 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3885 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3886 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3887 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3888 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3889 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3890 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3891 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3892 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3893 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3894 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3895 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3899 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3900 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3904 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3905 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3906 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3907 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3908 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3909 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3910 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3911 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3913 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3914 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3915 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3916 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3917 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3920 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3921 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3922 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3923 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3924 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3925 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3926 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3927 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3930 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3934 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3935 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3936 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3937 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3939 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3943 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3944 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3945 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3947 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3948 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3949 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3950 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3951 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3955 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
3957 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3958 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3959 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3960 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3961 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3964 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3965 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3966 channel_ready: None,
3967 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3968 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3969 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3970 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3974 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3975 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3976 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3977 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3978 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3979 next_per_commitment_point,
3980 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3982 raa: None, commitment_update: None, mon_update: None,
3983 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3984 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3985 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3989 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3990 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3991 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3993 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3994 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3995 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3998 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4004 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4005 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4006 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4007 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4008 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4010 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4011 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4012 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4013 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4014 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4015 next_per_commitment_point,
4016 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4020 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4021 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4022 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4024 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4027 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
4028 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
4029 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
4030 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
4032 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
4033 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
4034 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) =>
4035 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
4036 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4037 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4038 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4039 raa: required_revoke,
4040 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
4041 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4042 mon_update: Some(monitor_update),
4043 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4046 Ok((None, holding_cell_failed_htlcs)) => {
4047 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4048 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4049 raa: required_revoke,
4050 commitment_update: None,
4051 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4053 holding_cell_failed_htlcs,
4058 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4059 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4060 raa: required_revoke,
4061 commitment_update: None,
4062 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4064 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4067 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4068 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4069 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4071 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4074 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4075 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4076 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4077 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4078 commitment_update: None, raa: None, mon_update: None,
4079 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4080 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4083 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4084 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4085 raa: required_revoke,
4086 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4087 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4089 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4093 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4097 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4098 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4099 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4100 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4102 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4104 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4106 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4107 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4108 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4109 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4110 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4111 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4113 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4114 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4115 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4116 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4117 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4119 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4120 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4121 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4122 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4125 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4126 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4127 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4128 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4129 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4130 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4131 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4132 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4133 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4134 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4135 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4136 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4137 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4138 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4139 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4141 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4144 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4145 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4148 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4149 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4150 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4151 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4152 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4153 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4154 self.channel_state &
4155 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4156 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4157 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4158 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4161 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4162 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4163 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4164 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4165 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4166 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4169 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4175 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4176 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4177 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4178 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4180 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4181 return Ok((None, None));
4184 if !self.is_outbound() {
4185 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4186 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4188 return Ok((None, None));
4191 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4193 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4194 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4195 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4196 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4198 let sig = self.holder_signer
4199 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4200 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4202 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4203 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4204 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4205 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4207 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4208 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4209 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4214 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4215 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4216 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4217 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4219 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4220 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4222 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4223 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4224 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4225 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4226 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4228 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4229 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4233 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4235 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4236 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4239 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4240 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4241 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4244 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4247 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4248 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4249 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4250 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4252 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4255 assert!(send_shutdown);
4256 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4257 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4260 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4265 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4267 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4268 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4270 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4271 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4272 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4273 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4274 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4275 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4279 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4280 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4281 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4282 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4286 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4287 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4288 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4289 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4290 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4291 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4293 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4294 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4301 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4302 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4304 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4307 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4308 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4310 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4312 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4313 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4314 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4315 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4316 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4317 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4318 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4319 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4320 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4322 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4323 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4326 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4330 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4331 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4332 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4333 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4335 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4338 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4341 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4342 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4344 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4348 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4352 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4353 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4354 return Ok((None, None));
4357 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4358 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4359 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4360 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4362 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4364 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4367 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4368 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4369 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4370 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4371 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4375 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4376 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4381 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4382 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4383 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4384 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4385 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4386 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4387 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4391 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4393 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4394 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4395 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4396 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4398 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4401 let sig = self.holder_signer
4402 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4403 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4405 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4406 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4407 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4408 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4412 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4413 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4414 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4415 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4417 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4418 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4419 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4425 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4426 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4427 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4429 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4430 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4432 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4433 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4436 if !self.is_outbound() {
4437 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4438 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4439 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4440 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4442 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4444 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4446 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4447 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4450 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4451 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4452 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4453 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4454 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4455 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4456 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4457 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4459 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4462 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4463 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4464 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4465 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4467 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4471 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4472 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4473 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4474 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4476 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4482 // Public utilities:
4484 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4488 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4492 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4493 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4494 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
4498 /// Gets the channel's type
4499 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4503 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4504 /// is_usable() returns true).
4505 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4506 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4507 self.short_channel_id
4510 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4511 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4512 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4515 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4516 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4517 self.outbound_scid_alias
4519 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4520 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4521 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4522 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4523 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4526 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4527 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4528 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4529 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4532 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4533 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4534 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4537 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4538 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4541 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4542 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4545 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4546 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4547 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4550 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4551 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4554 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4555 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4556 self.counterparty_node_id
4559 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4560 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4561 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4564 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4565 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4566 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4569 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4570 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4572 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4573 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4574 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4575 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4577 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4581 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4582 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4583 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4586 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4587 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4588 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4591 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4592 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4593 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4595 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4596 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4601 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4602 self.channel_value_satoshis
4605 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4606 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4609 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4610 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4613 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4614 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4617 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4618 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4619 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4622 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4623 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4624 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4627 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4628 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4629 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4632 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4633 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4634 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4635 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4636 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4639 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4641 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4642 self.prev_config = None;
4646 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4647 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4651 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4652 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4653 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4654 let did_channel_update =
4655 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4656 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4657 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4658 if did_channel_update {
4659 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4660 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4661 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4662 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4664 self.config.options = *config;
4668 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4669 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4670 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4671 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4672 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4673 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4674 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4676 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4677 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4680 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4682 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4683 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4689 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4690 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4691 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4692 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4693 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4694 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4695 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4697 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4698 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4705 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4709 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4710 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4711 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4712 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4713 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4714 // which are near the dust limit.
4715 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4716 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4717 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4718 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4719 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4721 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4722 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4724 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4727 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4728 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4731 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4732 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4735 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4736 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4740 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4745 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4747 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4748 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4749 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4750 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4751 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4752 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4754 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4756 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4764 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4765 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4769 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4770 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4771 self.update_time_counter
4774 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4775 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4778 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4779 self.config.announced_channel
4782 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4783 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4786 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4787 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4788 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4789 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4792 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4793 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4794 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4797 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4798 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4799 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4800 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4801 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4804 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4805 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4806 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4807 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4808 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4811 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4812 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4813 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4814 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4817 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4818 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4819 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4822 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4823 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4824 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4826 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4827 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4828 if self.channel_state &
4829 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4830 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4831 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4832 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4833 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4836 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4837 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4838 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4839 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4840 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4841 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4843 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4844 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4845 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4847 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4848 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4849 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4850 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4851 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4852 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4858 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4859 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4860 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4863 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4864 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4865 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4868 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4869 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4870 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4873 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4874 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4875 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4876 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4877 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4878 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4883 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4884 self.channel_update_status
4887 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4888 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4889 self.channel_update_status = status;
4892 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4894 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4895 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4896 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4900 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4901 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4902 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4905 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4909 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4910 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4911 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4913 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4914 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4915 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4917 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4918 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4921 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4922 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4923 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4924 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4925 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4926 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4927 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4928 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4929 self.channel_state);
4931 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4935 if need_commitment_update {
4936 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4937 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4938 let next_per_commitment_point =
4939 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4940 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4941 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4942 next_per_commitment_point,
4943 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4947 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4953 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4954 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4955 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4956 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
4957 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
4958 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4959 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4960 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4961 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4962 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4963 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4964 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4965 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4966 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4967 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4968 if self.is_outbound() {
4969 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4970 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4971 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4972 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4973 // channel and move on.
4974 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4975 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4977 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4978 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4979 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4981 if self.is_outbound() {
4982 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4983 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4984 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4985 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4986 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4987 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4991 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4992 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4993 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4994 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4995 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4999 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5000 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5001 // may have already happened for this block).
5002 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5003 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5004 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
5005 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5008 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5009 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5010 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5011 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5019 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5020 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5021 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5022 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5024 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5025 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5028 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5030 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5031 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5032 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5035 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5036 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5037 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5038 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5039 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5041 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5042 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5044 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5045 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5046 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5054 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5056 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5057 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5058 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5060 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5061 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5064 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5065 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5066 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5067 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5068 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5069 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5070 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5071 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5072 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5075 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5076 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5077 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5078 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5080 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5081 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5082 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5084 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5085 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5086 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5087 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5089 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5090 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5091 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5092 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5093 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5094 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5095 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5098 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5099 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5101 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5104 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5105 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5106 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5107 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5108 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5109 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5110 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5111 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5112 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5113 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5114 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5115 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5116 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5117 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5118 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5119 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5120 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5126 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5131 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5132 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5134 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5135 if !self.is_outbound() {
5136 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5138 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5139 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5142 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5143 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5146 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5147 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5151 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5152 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5153 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5154 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5155 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5156 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5157 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5158 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5159 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5160 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5161 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5162 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5163 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5164 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5165 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5166 first_per_commitment_point,
5167 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5168 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5169 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5170 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5172 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5176 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5177 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5180 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5181 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5182 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5183 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5186 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5187 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5189 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5190 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u64) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5191 if self.is_outbound() {
5192 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5194 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5195 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5197 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5198 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5200 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5201 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5204 self.user_id = user_id;
5205 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5207 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5210 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5211 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5212 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5214 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5215 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5216 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5217 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5219 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5220 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5221 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5222 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5223 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5224 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5225 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5226 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5227 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5228 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5229 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5230 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5231 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5232 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5233 first_per_commitment_point,
5234 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5235 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5236 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5238 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5242 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5243 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5245 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5247 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5248 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5251 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5252 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5253 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5254 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5255 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5256 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5259 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5260 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5261 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5262 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5263 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5264 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5265 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5266 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5267 if !self.is_outbound() {
5268 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5270 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5271 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5273 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5274 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5275 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5276 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5279 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5280 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5282 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5285 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5286 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5291 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5293 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5295 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5296 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5297 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5299 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5300 temporary_channel_id,
5301 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5302 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5307 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5308 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5309 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5310 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5312 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5315 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5316 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5317 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5318 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5320 if !self.is_usable() {
5321 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5324 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5326 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5327 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5329 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5330 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5331 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5332 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5333 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5334 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5340 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5341 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5342 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5346 if !self.is_usable() {
5350 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5351 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5355 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5359 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5360 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5363 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5367 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5369 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5374 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5376 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5377 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5378 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5379 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5380 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5384 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5386 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5387 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5388 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5390 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5391 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5392 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5393 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5394 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5395 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5396 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5397 contents: announcement,
5400 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5404 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5405 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5406 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5407 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5408 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5410 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5412 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5413 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5414 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5415 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5417 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5418 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5419 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5420 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5423 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5424 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5425 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5426 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5429 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5432 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5433 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5434 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5435 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5438 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5440 Err(_) => return None,
5442 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5443 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5448 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5449 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5450 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5451 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5452 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5453 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5454 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5455 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5456 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5457 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5458 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5459 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5460 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5461 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5462 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5463 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5464 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5465 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5466 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5469 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5470 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5471 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5472 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5475 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5476 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5477 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5478 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5479 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5480 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5481 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5482 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5484 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5485 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5486 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5487 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5488 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5489 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5490 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5491 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5492 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5494 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5500 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5502 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5503 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5505 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5507 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5508 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5510 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5511 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5512 /// regenerate them.
5514 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
5516 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
5517 pub fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5518 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5519 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5521 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5522 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5523 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5526 if amount_msat == 0 {
5527 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5530 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5531 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5534 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5535 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5536 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5537 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5538 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5539 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5540 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5541 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5544 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5545 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5546 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5547 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5549 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5550 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5551 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5554 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
5555 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5556 if !self.is_outbound() {
5557 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5558 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5559 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5560 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5561 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5562 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5566 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5569 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5570 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5571 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5573 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5574 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5575 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5576 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5577 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5578 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5582 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5583 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5584 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5585 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5586 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5587 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5591 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5592 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5593 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5596 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5597 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5598 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5599 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5601 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5602 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5605 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5606 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5607 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5608 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5609 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5612 // Now update local state:
5613 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5614 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5619 onion_routing_packet,
5624 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5625 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5627 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5629 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5633 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5634 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5635 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5639 onion_routing_packet,
5641 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5646 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
5647 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
5648 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
5649 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
5650 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5651 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5652 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
5654 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
5655 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
5657 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
5658 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5660 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) {
5661 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
5663 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
5664 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5665 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5666 have_updates = true;
5668 if have_updates { break; }
5670 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5671 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5672 have_updates = true;
5674 if have_updates { break; }
5677 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
5679 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
5681 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5682 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5683 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5684 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5685 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5687 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5688 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5689 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5691 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5692 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5696 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5697 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5698 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5699 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5700 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5701 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5702 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5705 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5706 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5707 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5708 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5709 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5710 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5713 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5715 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5716 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5717 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5718 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5719 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5720 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5722 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5725 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5726 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5729 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5730 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5731 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5732 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5733 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5734 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5735 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5736 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5739 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5740 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5743 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5744 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5745 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5746 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
5747 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5748 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5749 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5751 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5753 if !self.is_outbound() {
5754 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5755 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5756 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5757 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5758 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5759 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5760 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5761 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5762 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5763 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5770 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5771 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5775 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5776 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5778 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5780 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5781 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5782 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5783 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5785 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5786 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5787 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5788 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5789 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5790 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5794 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5795 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5798 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5801 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5802 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5803 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
5805 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5806 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, logger)? {
5807 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5808 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5809 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5815 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5816 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5817 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5820 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5821 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5824 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5825 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5826 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5827 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5833 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5834 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5835 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5836 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5837 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5838 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5839 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5840 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5843 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5844 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5845 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5847 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5848 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5851 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5852 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5853 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5856 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5859 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5860 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5861 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5863 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5868 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5869 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5870 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5871 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5873 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5875 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5877 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5878 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5879 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5880 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5881 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5882 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5886 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5887 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5888 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5891 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5892 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5893 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5894 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5895 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5897 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5898 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5905 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5908 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5909 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5910 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5911 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5912 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5913 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5914 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5915 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5916 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5917 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5918 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5920 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5921 // return them to fail the payment.
5922 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5923 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5924 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5926 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5927 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5932 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5933 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5934 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5935 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5936 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5937 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5938 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5939 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5940 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5941 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5942 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5943 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5944 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5949 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5950 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5951 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
5955 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5956 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
5958 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
5964 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5965 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5966 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
5967 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
5968 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
5970 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5971 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5972 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5973 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5979 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
5980 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5981 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5982 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5983 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
5984 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5989 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
5990 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
5991 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
5992 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
5994 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5995 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
5996 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
5997 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6002 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6003 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6004 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6005 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6006 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6007 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6012 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6013 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6014 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6017 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6019 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
6021 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6022 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6023 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6024 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6026 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6027 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6028 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6030 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6032 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6033 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6034 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6035 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6036 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6037 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6039 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6040 // deserialized from that format.
6041 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6042 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6043 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6045 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6047 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6048 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6049 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6051 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6052 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6053 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6054 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6057 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6058 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6059 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6062 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6063 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6064 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6065 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6067 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6068 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6070 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6072 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6074 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6076 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6079 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6081 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6086 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6088 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6089 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6090 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6091 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6092 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6093 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6094 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6096 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6098 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6100 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6103 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6104 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6105 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6108 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6110 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6111 preimages.push(preimage);
6113 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6114 reason.write(writer)?;
6116 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6118 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6119 preimages.push(preimage);
6121 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6122 reason.write(writer)?;
6127 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6128 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6130 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6132 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6133 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6134 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6135 source.write(writer)?;
6136 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6138 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6140 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6141 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6143 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6145 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6146 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6151 match self.resend_order {
6152 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6153 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6156 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6157 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6158 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6160 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6161 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6162 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6163 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6166 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6167 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6168 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6169 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6170 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6173 if self.is_outbound() {
6174 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6175 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6176 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6178 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6179 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6180 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6182 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6184 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6185 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6186 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6187 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6189 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6190 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6191 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6192 // consider the stale state on reload.
6195 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6196 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6197 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6199 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6200 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6201 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6203 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6204 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6206 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6207 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6208 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6210 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6211 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6213 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6216 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6217 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6218 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6220 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6223 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6224 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6226 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6227 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6228 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6230 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6232 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6234 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6236 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6237 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6238 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6239 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6240 htlc.write(writer)?;
6243 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6244 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6245 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6247 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6248 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6250 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6251 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6252 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6253 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6254 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6255 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6256 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6258 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6259 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6260 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6261 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6262 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6264 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6266 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6267 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6268 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6269 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6270 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6271 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6272 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6274 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6275 (2, chan_type, option),
6276 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6277 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6278 (5, self.config, required),
6279 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6280 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6281 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6282 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6283 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6284 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6285 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6286 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6287 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6288 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6295 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6296 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as KeysInterface>::Signer>
6297 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6298 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6299 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6300 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6302 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6304 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6306 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6307 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6308 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6309 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6310 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6312 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6313 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6316 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6317 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6318 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6320 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6322 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6323 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
6324 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
6325 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6326 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6327 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
6328 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6329 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6331 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6333 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6334 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6335 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6338 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6340 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6341 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6342 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6344 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6345 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6346 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6347 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6348 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6349 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6350 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6351 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6352 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6353 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6354 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6355 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6356 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6357 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6362 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6363 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6364 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6365 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6366 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6367 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6368 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6369 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6370 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6371 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6372 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6373 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6375 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6376 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6379 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6380 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6383 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6384 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6386 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6391 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6392 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6393 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6394 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6395 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6396 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6397 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6398 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6399 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6400 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6402 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6403 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6404 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6406 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6407 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6408 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6410 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6414 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6415 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6416 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6417 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6420 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6421 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6422 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6424 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6425 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6426 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6427 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6430 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6431 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6432 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6433 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6436 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6438 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6440 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6441 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6442 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6443 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6445 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6446 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6447 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6448 // consider the stale state on reload.
6449 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6452 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6453 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6454 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6456 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6459 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6460 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6463 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6464 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6465 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6466 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6468 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6469 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6471 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6472 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6474 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6475 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6476 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6478 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6480 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6481 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6483 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6484 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6487 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6489 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6490 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6491 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6492 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6494 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6497 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6498 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6503 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6505 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6506 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6508 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6510 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6511 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6512 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6514 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6515 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6516 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6520 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6521 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6522 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6524 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6530 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6531 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6532 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6533 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6534 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6535 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6536 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6537 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6538 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6539 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6541 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6542 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6543 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6544 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6545 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6546 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6548 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6549 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6550 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6551 (2, channel_type, option),
6552 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6553 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6554 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6555 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6556 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6557 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6558 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6559 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6560 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6561 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6562 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6563 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6564 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6567 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6568 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6569 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6571 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6572 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6574 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6575 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6580 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6581 if iter.next().is_some() {
6582 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6586 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6587 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6588 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6589 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6590 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6593 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6594 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6595 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6598 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6599 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6604 config: config.unwrap(),
6608 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6609 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6610 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6614 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6616 channel_value_satoshis,
6618 latest_monitor_update_id,
6621 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6624 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6625 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6628 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6629 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6630 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6634 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6635 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6636 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6637 monitor_pending_forwards,
6638 monitor_pending_failures,
6639 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6642 holding_cell_update_fee,
6643 next_holder_htlc_id,
6644 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6645 update_time_counter,
6648 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6649 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6650 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6651 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6653 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6654 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6655 closing_fee_limits: None,
6656 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6658 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6660 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6661 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6663 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6665 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6666 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6667 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6668 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6669 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6670 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6671 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6672 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6673 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6676 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6678 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6679 funding_transaction,
6681 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6682 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6683 counterparty_node_id,
6685 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6689 channel_update_status,
6690 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6695 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6697 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6699 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6701 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6702 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6703 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6705 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6707 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6708 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6710 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6718 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6719 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6720 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6721 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6722 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6724 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6725 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6726 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6727 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6728 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6729 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6730 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6731 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6732 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6733 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6734 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6735 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface};
6736 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6737 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6738 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6739 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6740 use crate::util::test_utils;
6741 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6742 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6743 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6744 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6745 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6746 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6747 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6748 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6749 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6750 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6751 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6752 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6753 use crate::prelude::*;
6755 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6758 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6759 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6765 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6766 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6767 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6768 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6772 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6773 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6774 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6775 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6776 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6777 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6778 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6782 signer: InMemorySigner,
6784 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
6785 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6787 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6788 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6789 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6790 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6791 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6792 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6793 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6794 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6797 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6798 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6799 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6800 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6803 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
6806 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6807 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6808 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6811 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6812 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6813 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6817 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6818 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6819 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6820 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6822 let seed = [42; 32];
6823 let network = Network::Testnet;
6824 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6825 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6826 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6829 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6830 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6831 let config = UserConfig::default();
6832 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6833 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6834 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6836 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6837 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6841 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6842 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6844 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6845 let original_fee = 253;
6846 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6847 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6848 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6849 let seed = [42; 32];
6850 let network = Network::Testnet;
6851 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6853 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6854 let config = UserConfig::default();
6855 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6857 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6858 // same as the old fee.
6859 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6860 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6861 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6865 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6866 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6867 // dust limits are used.
6868 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6869 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6870 let seed = [42; 32];
6871 let network = Network::Testnet;
6872 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6873 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6875 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
6876 // they have different dust limits.
6878 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6879 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6880 let config = UserConfig::default();
6881 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6883 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
6884 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
6885 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6886 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
6887 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
6889 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
6890 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
6891 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
6892 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
6893 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
6895 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
6896 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
6897 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6899 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
6900 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
6901 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
6902 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6905 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6907 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
6908 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
6909 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
6910 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6911 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
6913 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
6914 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
6915 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
6916 payment_secret: None,
6917 payment_params: None,
6921 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
6922 // the dust limit check.
6923 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6924 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6925 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6926 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
6928 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
6929 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
6930 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6931 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
6932 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6933 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6934 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
6938 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
6939 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
6940 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
6941 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
6942 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
6943 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
6944 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6945 let seed = [42; 32];
6946 let network = Network::Testnet;
6947 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6949 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6950 let config = UserConfig::default();
6951 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6953 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
6954 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
6956 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
6957 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6958 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6959 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6960 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6961 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6963 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6964 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6965 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6966 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6967 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6969 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
6971 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
6972 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
6973 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6974 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6975 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
6977 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
6978 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
6979 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6980 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
6981 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
6985 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
6986 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6987 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
6988 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6989 let seed = [42; 32];
6990 let network = Network::Testnet;
6991 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
6992 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
6993 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6995 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
6997 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
6998 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6999 let config = UserConfig::default();
7000 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7002 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7003 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7004 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7005 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7007 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7008 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7009 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7011 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7012 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7013 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7014 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7016 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7017 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7018 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
7020 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7021 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
7023 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7024 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7025 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7026 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7027 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7028 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7029 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7030 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7031 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7036 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7038 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7039 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7040 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7041 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7042 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7043 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7044 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7051 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7052 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7053 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7054 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7055 let seed = [42; 32];
7056 let network = Network::Testnet;
7057 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7058 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7059 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7061 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7062 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7063 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7064 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7065 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7066 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7067 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7068 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7070 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7071 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7072 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7073 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7074 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7075 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7077 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7078 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7079 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7080 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7082 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7084 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7085 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7086 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7087 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7088 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7089 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7091 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7092 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7093 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7094 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7096 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7097 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7098 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7099 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7100 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7102 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7103 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7105 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7106 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7107 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7109 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7110 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7111 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7112 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7113 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7115 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7116 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7118 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7119 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7120 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7124 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7126 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7127 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7128 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7130 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7131 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7132 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7133 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7135 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7136 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7137 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7139 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7141 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7142 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7145 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7146 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7147 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7148 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7149 let seed = [42; 32];
7150 let network = Network::Testnet;
7151 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7152 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7153 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7156 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7157 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7158 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7160 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7161 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7163 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7164 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7165 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7167 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7168 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7170 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7172 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7173 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7175 // Channel Negotiations failed
7176 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7177 assert!(result.is_err());
7182 fn channel_update() {
7183 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7184 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7185 let seed = [42; 32];
7186 let network = Network::Testnet;
7187 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7188 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7190 // Create a channel.
7191 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7192 let config = UserConfig::default();
7193 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7194 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7195 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7196 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7198 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7199 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7200 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7202 short_channel_id: 0,
7205 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7206 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7207 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7209 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7210 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7212 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7214 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7216 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7217 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7218 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7219 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7221 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7222 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7223 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7225 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7229 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7231 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7232 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7233 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7234 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7235 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7236 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7237 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7238 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7239 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7240 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7241 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7242 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7243 use crate::sync::Arc;
7245 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7246 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7247 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7248 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7250 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7252 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7253 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7254 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7255 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7256 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7257 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7259 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7260 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7265 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7266 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7267 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7269 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7270 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7271 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7272 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7273 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7274 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7276 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7278 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7279 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7280 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7281 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7282 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7283 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7285 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7286 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7287 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7288 selected_contest_delay: 144
7290 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7291 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7293 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7294 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7296 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7297 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7299 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7300 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7302 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7303 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7304 // build_commitment_transaction.
7305 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7306 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7307 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7308 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7309 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
7311 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7312 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7313 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7314 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7318 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7319 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7320 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7321 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7325 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7326 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7327 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7329 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7330 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7332 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7333 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7335 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7337 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7338 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7339 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7340 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7341 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7342 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7343 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7345 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7346 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7347 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7348 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7350 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7351 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7352 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7354 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7356 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7357 commitment_tx.clone(),
7358 counterparty_signature,
7359 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7360 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7361 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7363 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7364 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7366 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7367 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7368 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7370 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7371 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7374 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7375 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7377 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7378 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7379 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7380 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7381 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7382 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7383 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7384 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7386 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7389 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7390 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7391 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7395 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7398 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7399 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7400 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7402 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7403 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7404 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7405 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7406 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7407 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7408 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7409 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7411 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7415 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7416 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7418 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7419 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7420 "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", {});
7422 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7423 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7424 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7425 "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", {});
7427 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7428 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7430 amount_msat: 1000000,
7432 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7433 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7435 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7438 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7439 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7441 amount_msat: 2000000,
7443 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7444 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7446 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7449 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7450 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7452 amount_msat: 2000000,
7454 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7455 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7456 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7458 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7461 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7462 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7464 amount_msat: 3000000,
7466 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7467 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7468 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7470 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7473 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7474 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7476 amount_msat: 4000000,
7478 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7479 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7481 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7485 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7486 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7487 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7489 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7490 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7491 "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", {
7494 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7495 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7496 "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" },
7499 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7500 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7501 "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" },
7504 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7505 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7506 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7509 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7510 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7511 "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" },
7514 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7515 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7516 "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" }
7519 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7520 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7521 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7523 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7524 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7525 "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", {
7528 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7529 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7530 "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" },
7533 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7534 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7535 "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" },
7538 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7539 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7540 "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" },
7543 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7544 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7545 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7548 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7549 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7550 "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" }
7553 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7554 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7555 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7557 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7558 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7559 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7562 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7563 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7564 "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" },
7567 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7568 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7569 "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" },
7572 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7573 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7574 "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" },
7577 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7578 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7579 "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" }
7582 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7583 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7584 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7585 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7587 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7588 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7589 "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", {
7592 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7593 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7594 "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" },
7597 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7598 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7599 "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" },
7602 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7603 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7604 "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" },
7607 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7608 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7609 "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" }
7612 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7613 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7614 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7615 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7617 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7618 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7619 "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", {
7622 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7623 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7624 "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" },
7627 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7628 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7629 "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" },
7632 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7633 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7634 "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" },
7637 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7638 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7639 "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" }
7642 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7643 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7644 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7646 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7647 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7648 "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", {
7651 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7652 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7653 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7656 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7657 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7658 "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" },
7661 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7662 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7663 "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" }
7666 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7667 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7668 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7670 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7671 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7672 "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", {
7675 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7676 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7677 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
7680 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7681 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7682 "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" },
7685 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7686 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7687 "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" }
7690 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7691 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7692 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7694 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7695 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7696 "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", {
7699 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7700 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7701 "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" },
7704 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7705 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7706 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7709 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7710 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7711 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7712 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7714 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7715 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7716 "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", {
7719 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7720 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7721 "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" },
7724 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7725 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7726 "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" }
7729 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7730 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7731 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7732 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7734 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7735 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7736 "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", {
7739 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7740 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7741 "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" },
7744 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7745 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7746 "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" }
7749 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7750 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7751 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7753 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7754 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7755 "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", {
7758 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7759 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7760 "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" }
7763 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7764 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7765 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7766 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7768 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7769 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7770 "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", {
7773 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7774 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7775 "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" }
7778 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7779 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7780 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7781 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7783 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7784 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7785 "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", {
7788 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7789 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7790 "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" }
7793 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7794 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7795 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7796 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7798 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7799 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7800 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7802 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7803 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7804 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7805 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7807 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7808 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7809 "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", {});
7811 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7812 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7813 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7814 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7816 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7817 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7818 "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", {});
7820 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7821 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7822 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7824 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7825 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7826 "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", {});
7828 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7829 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7830 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7831 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7833 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7834 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7835 "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", {});
7837 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7838 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7839 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7840 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7842 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7843 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7844 "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", {});
7846 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7847 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7848 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7849 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7850 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7851 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7853 amount_msat: 2000000,
7855 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7856 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7858 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7861 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7862 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7863 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7865 amount_msat: 5000000,
7867 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7868 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7869 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7871 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7874 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7875 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7877 amount_msat: 5000000,
7879 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7880 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7881 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7883 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7887 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
7888 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
7889 "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", {
7892 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
7893 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
7894 "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" },
7896 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
7897 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
7898 "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" },
7900 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
7901 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
7902 "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" }
7905 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
7906 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
7907 "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", {
7910 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
7911 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
7912 "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" },
7914 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
7915 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
7916 "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" },
7918 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
7919 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
7920 "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" }
7925 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
7926 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
7928 let mut seed = [0; 32];
7929 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
7930 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7931 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
7933 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
7934 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
7935 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
7937 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
7938 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
7940 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
7941 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
7943 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
7944 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
7945 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
7949 fn test_key_derivation() {
7950 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
7951 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7953 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7954 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7956 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
7957 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
7959 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7960 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
7962 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7963 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
7965 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7966 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7968 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
7969 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
7971 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
7972 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
7976 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
7977 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7978 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7979 let seed = [42; 32];
7980 let network = Network::Testnet;
7981 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7982 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7984 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7985 let config = UserConfig::default();
7986 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7987 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7989 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
7990 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
7992 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7993 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
7994 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7995 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
7996 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7997 assert!(res.is_ok());