1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
483 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
485 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
486 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
488 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
492 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
493 (0, update, required),
494 (2, blocked, required),
497 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
498 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
499 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
502 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
503 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
504 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
505 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
507 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
508 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
509 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
510 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
512 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
516 channel_id: [u8; 32],
517 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
520 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
521 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
523 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
524 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
525 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
527 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
528 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
529 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
530 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
532 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
533 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
535 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
537 holder_signer: Signer,
538 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
539 destination_script: Script,
541 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
542 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
543 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
545 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
546 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
547 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
548 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
549 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
550 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
552 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
553 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
554 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
555 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
556 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
557 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
559 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
561 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
562 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
563 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
565 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
566 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
567 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
568 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
569 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
570 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
571 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
573 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
575 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
576 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
577 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
578 // HTLCs with similar state.
579 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
580 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
581 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
582 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
583 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
584 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
585 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
586 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
587 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
590 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
591 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
592 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
594 update_time_counter: u32,
596 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
597 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
598 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
599 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
600 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
601 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
603 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
604 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
606 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
607 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
608 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
609 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
611 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
612 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
614 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
616 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
618 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
619 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
620 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
621 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
622 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
623 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
625 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
626 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
627 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
628 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
629 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
631 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
632 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
633 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
634 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
635 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
636 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
637 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
638 channel_creation_height: u32,
640 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
643 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
645 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
648 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
650 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
653 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
655 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
657 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
658 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
661 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
663 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
665 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
666 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
668 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
670 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
671 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
672 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
674 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
676 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
677 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
679 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
680 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
681 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
683 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
685 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
687 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
688 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
689 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
690 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
692 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
693 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
694 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
696 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
697 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
698 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
700 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
701 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
702 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
703 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
704 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
705 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
707 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
709 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
710 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
711 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
712 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
713 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
715 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
716 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
718 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
719 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
720 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
721 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
722 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
723 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
724 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
725 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
727 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
728 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
730 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
731 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
732 // the channel's funding UTXO.
734 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
735 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
736 // associated channel mapping.
738 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
739 // to store all of them.
740 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
742 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
743 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
744 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
745 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
746 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
748 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
749 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
751 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
752 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
754 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
755 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
756 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
758 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
759 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
760 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
761 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
762 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
765 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
766 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
768 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
769 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
770 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
774 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
776 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
777 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
778 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
779 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
783 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
785 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
787 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
789 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
790 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
791 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
792 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
793 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
795 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
796 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
798 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
800 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
801 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
803 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
804 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
805 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
806 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
807 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
808 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
810 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
811 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
813 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
814 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
815 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
816 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
817 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
819 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
820 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
822 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
823 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
825 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
826 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
827 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
828 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
834 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
835 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
837 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
838 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
839 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
844 macro_rules! secp_check {
845 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
848 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
853 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
854 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
855 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
858 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
860 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
861 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
862 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
864 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
867 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
869 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
872 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
873 /// required by us according to the configured or default
874 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
876 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
878 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
879 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
880 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
881 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
882 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
885 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
886 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
887 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
888 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
889 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
890 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
891 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
894 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
895 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
898 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
899 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
900 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
901 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
902 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
903 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
904 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
905 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
906 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
907 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
910 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
911 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
912 // `only_static_remotekey`.
914 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
915 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
916 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
917 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
924 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
925 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
926 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
927 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
928 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
929 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
930 // We've exhausted our options
933 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
934 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
937 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
938 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
939 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
940 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
942 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
943 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
944 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
945 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
946 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
947 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
949 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
951 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
955 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
956 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
957 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
958 outbound_scid_alias: u64
959 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
960 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
961 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
962 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
964 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
965 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
966 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
967 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
969 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
970 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
972 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
973 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
975 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
976 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
977 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
979 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
980 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
982 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
983 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
984 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
985 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
986 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
989 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
990 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
992 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
994 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
995 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
996 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
997 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1000 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1001 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1003 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1004 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1005 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1006 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1010 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1011 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1012 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1016 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1017 Ok(script) => script,
1018 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1021 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1026 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1027 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1028 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1029 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1034 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1036 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1037 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1038 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1039 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1041 channel_value_satoshis,
1043 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1046 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1049 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1050 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1053 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1054 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1055 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1056 pending_update_fee: None,
1057 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1058 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1059 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1060 update_time_counter: 1,
1062 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1064 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1065 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1066 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1067 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1068 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1069 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1071 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1072 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1073 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1074 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1076 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1077 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1078 closing_fee_limits: None,
1079 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1081 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1083 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1084 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1085 short_channel_id: None,
1086 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1088 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1089 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1090 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1091 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1092 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1093 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1094 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1095 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1096 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1097 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1098 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1099 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1101 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1103 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1104 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1105 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1106 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1107 counterparty_parameters: None,
1108 funding_outpoint: None,
1109 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1110 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1112 funding_transaction: None,
1114 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1115 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1116 counterparty_node_id,
1118 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1120 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1122 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1123 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1125 announcement_sigs: None,
1127 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1128 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1129 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1130 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1132 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1134 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1135 outbound_scid_alias,
1137 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1138 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1140 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1141 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1146 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1150 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1151 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1152 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1154 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1155 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1156 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1157 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1158 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1159 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1160 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1163 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1164 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1165 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1166 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1167 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1168 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1169 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1170 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1172 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1173 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1182 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1183 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1184 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1185 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1186 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1187 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1188 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1189 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1190 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1191 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1192 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1195 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1197 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1198 // support this channel type.
1199 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1200 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1204 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1205 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1206 // `static_remote_key`.
1207 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1208 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1210 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1211 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1214 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1217 channel_type.clone()
1219 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1220 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1225 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1227 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1228 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1229 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1230 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1231 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1232 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1233 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1234 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1235 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1238 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1242 // Check sanity of message fields:
1243 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1246 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1249 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1252 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1253 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1256 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1259 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1262 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1264 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1265 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1268 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1271 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1275 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1276 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1279 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1282 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1285 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1288 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1291 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1292 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1294 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1298 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1300 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1301 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1306 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1307 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1308 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1309 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1312 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1315 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1316 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1317 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1319 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1323 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1324 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1325 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1326 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1327 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1331 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1332 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1333 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1334 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1338 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1339 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1340 &Some(ref script) => {
1341 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1342 if script.len() == 0 {
1345 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1348 Some(script.clone())
1351 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1358 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1359 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1360 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1361 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1365 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1366 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1367 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1371 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1372 Ok(script) => script,
1373 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1376 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1377 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1379 let chan = Channel {
1382 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1383 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1385 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1390 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1392 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1393 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1394 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1395 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1398 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1401 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1404 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1405 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1406 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1408 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1409 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1410 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1411 pending_update_fee: None,
1412 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1413 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1414 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1415 update_time_counter: 1,
1417 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1419 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1420 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1421 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1422 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1423 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1424 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1426 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1427 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1428 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1429 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1431 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1432 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1433 closing_fee_limits: None,
1434 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1436 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1438 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1439 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1440 short_channel_id: None,
1441 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1443 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1444 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1445 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1446 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1447 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1448 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1449 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1450 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1451 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1452 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1453 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1454 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1455 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1457 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1459 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1460 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1461 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1462 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1463 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1464 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1465 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1467 funding_outpoint: None,
1468 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1469 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1471 funding_transaction: None,
1473 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1474 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1475 counterparty_node_id,
1477 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1479 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1481 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1482 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1484 announcement_sigs: None,
1486 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1487 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1488 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1489 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1491 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1493 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1494 outbound_scid_alias,
1496 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1497 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1499 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1500 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1505 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1511 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1512 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1513 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1514 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1515 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1517 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1518 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1519 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1520 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1521 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1522 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1523 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1525 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1526 where L::Target: Logger
1528 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1529 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1530 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1532 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1533 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1534 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1535 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1537 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1538 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1539 if match update_state {
1540 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1541 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1542 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1543 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1544 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1546 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1550 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1551 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1552 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1553 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1555 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1556 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1557 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1559 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1560 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1561 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1562 transaction_output_index: None
1567 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1568 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1569 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1570 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1571 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1574 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1576 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1577 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1578 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1580 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1581 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1584 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1585 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1588 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1590 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1591 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1592 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1594 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1595 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1601 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1602 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1603 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1604 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1605 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1606 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1607 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1611 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1612 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1614 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1616 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1617 if generated_by_local {
1618 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1619 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1628 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1630 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1631 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1632 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1633 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1634 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1635 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1636 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1639 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1640 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1641 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1642 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1646 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1647 preimages.push(preimage);
1651 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1652 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1654 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1656 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1657 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1659 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1660 if !generated_by_local {
1661 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1669 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1670 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1671 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1672 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1673 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1674 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1675 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1676 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1678 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1680 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1681 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1682 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1683 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1685 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1687 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1688 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1689 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1690 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1693 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1694 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1695 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1696 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1698 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1701 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1702 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1703 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1704 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1706 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1709 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1710 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1715 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1721 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1723 let channel_parameters =
1724 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1725 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1726 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1729 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1734 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1737 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1738 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1739 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1740 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1742 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1743 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1744 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1752 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1753 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1759 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1760 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1761 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1762 // outside of those situations will fail.
1763 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1767 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1772 1 + // script length (0)
1776 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1777 2 + // witness marker and flag
1778 1 + // witness element count
1779 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1780 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1781 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1782 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1783 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1784 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1786 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1787 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1788 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1794 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1795 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1796 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1797 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1799 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1800 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1801 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1803 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1804 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1805 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1806 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1807 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1808 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1811 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1812 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1815 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1816 value_to_holder = 0;
1819 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1820 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1821 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1822 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1824 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1825 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1828 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1829 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1833 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1834 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1835 /// our counterparty!)
1836 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1837 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1838 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1839 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1840 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1841 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1842 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1844 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1848 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1849 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1850 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1851 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1852 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1853 //may see payments to it!
1854 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1855 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1856 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1858 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1861 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1862 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1863 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1864 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1865 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1868 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1871 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1872 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1874 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1876 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1877 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1878 where L::Target: Logger {
1879 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1880 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1881 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1882 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1883 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1884 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1885 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1886 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1890 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1891 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1892 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1893 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1895 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1896 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1898 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1900 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1902 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1903 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1904 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1906 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1907 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1908 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1909 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1910 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1912 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1913 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1914 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1916 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1917 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1919 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1922 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1923 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1927 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1931 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1932 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1933 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1934 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1935 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1936 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1939 // Now update local state:
1941 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1942 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1943 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1944 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1945 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1946 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1947 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1951 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1952 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1953 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1954 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1955 // do not not get into this branch.
1956 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1957 match pending_update {
1958 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1959 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1960 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1961 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1962 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1963 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1964 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1967 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1968 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1969 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1970 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1971 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1972 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1973 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1979 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1980 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1981 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1983 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1984 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1985 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1987 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1988 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1991 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1992 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1994 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1995 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1997 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1998 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2001 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2004 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2005 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2006 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2007 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2012 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2013 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2014 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2015 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2016 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2017 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2018 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2019 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2020 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2021 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2022 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2023 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2024 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2025 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2026 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2027 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2028 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2030 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2032 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2033 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2034 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2035 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2036 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2037 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2038 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2040 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2041 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2044 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2045 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2046 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2047 update, blocked: true,
2052 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2053 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2054 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2055 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2059 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2063 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2064 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2065 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2066 /// before we fail backwards.
2068 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2069 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2070 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2071 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2072 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2073 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2074 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2077 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2078 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2079 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2080 /// before we fail backwards.
2082 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2083 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2084 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2085 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2086 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2087 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2088 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2090 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2092 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2093 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2094 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2096 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2097 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2098 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2100 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2101 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2102 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2104 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2109 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2116 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2117 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2118 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2119 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2120 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2124 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2125 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2126 force_holding_cell = true;
2129 // Now update local state:
2130 if force_holding_cell {
2131 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2132 match pending_update {
2133 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2134 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2135 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2136 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2140 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2141 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2142 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2143 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2149 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2150 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2151 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2157 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2159 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2160 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2163 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2164 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2165 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2170 // Message handlers:
2172 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2173 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2175 // Check sanity of message fields:
2176 if !self.is_outbound() {
2177 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2179 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2182 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2185 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2188 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2189 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2191 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2193 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2195 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2196 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2199 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2200 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2203 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2206 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2210 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2211 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2214 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2217 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2220 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2226 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2229 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2233 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2234 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2237 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2238 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2240 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2241 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2242 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2244 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2247 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2248 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2249 &Some(ref script) => {
2250 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2251 if script.len() == 0 {
2254 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2257 Some(script.clone())
2260 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2267 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2268 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2269 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2270 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2271 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2273 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2274 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2276 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2279 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2280 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2281 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2282 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2283 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2284 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2287 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2288 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2289 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2292 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2293 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2295 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2296 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2301 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2302 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2304 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2305 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2307 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2308 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2309 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2310 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2311 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2312 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2313 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2314 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2315 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2318 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2319 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2321 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2322 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2323 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2324 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2326 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2327 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2329 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2330 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2333 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2334 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2337 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2338 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2339 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2341 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2344 if self.is_outbound() {
2345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2347 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2348 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2349 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2353 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2356 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2357 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2358 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2359 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2362 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2363 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2364 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2365 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2366 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2368 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2370 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2371 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2372 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2375 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2376 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2377 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2381 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2382 initial_commitment_tx,
2385 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2386 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2389 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2390 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2392 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2394 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2395 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2396 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2397 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2398 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2399 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2400 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2401 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2402 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2403 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2404 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2406 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2408 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2410 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2411 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2412 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2413 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2415 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2417 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2418 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2420 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2421 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2424 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2425 }, channel_monitor))
2428 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2429 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2430 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2431 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2432 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2434 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2437 if !self.is_outbound() {
2438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2440 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2441 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2443 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2444 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2445 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2446 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2449 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2451 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2452 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2453 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2454 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2456 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2457 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2459 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2460 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2462 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2463 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2464 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2465 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2466 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2471 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2472 initial_commitment_tx,
2475 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2476 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2479 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2480 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2483 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2484 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2485 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2486 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2487 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2488 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2489 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2490 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2491 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2492 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2493 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2494 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2496 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2498 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2500 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2501 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2502 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2503 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2505 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2507 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2508 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2512 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2513 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2515 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2516 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2517 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2518 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2520 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2523 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2524 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2525 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2528 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2529 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2530 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2531 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2532 // when routing outbound payments.
2533 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2537 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2539 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2540 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2541 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2542 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2543 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2544 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2545 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2546 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2547 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2549 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2550 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2551 let expected_point =
2552 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2553 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2555 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2556 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2557 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2558 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2559 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2560 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2562 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2563 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2564 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2565 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2566 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2568 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2569 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2576 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2577 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2579 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2581 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2584 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2585 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2586 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2587 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2593 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2594 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2595 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2596 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2597 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2598 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2599 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2600 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2601 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2604 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2607 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2608 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2609 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2611 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2612 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2613 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2614 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2615 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2616 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2618 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2619 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2625 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2626 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2627 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2628 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2629 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2630 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2631 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2632 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2633 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2636 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2639 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2640 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2641 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2643 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2644 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2645 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2646 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2647 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2648 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2650 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2651 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2655 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2656 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2657 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2658 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2659 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2660 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2661 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2663 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2664 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2666 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2673 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2674 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2675 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2676 /// corner case properly.
2677 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2678 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2679 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2681 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2682 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2683 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2684 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2687 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2689 let outbound_capacity_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
2690 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2692 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2694 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2696 if self.is_outbound() {
2697 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2698 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2700 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2701 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2703 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2704 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2705 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2706 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2709 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2710 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2711 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2712 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2714 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2715 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2716 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2717 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
2718 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2719 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2720 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2721 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2722 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2723 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2725 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2729 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2730 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2732 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2733 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2737 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2738 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2739 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2740 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2742 outbound_capacity_msat,
2743 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2748 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2749 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2752 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2753 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2754 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2755 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2756 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2757 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2760 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2761 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2763 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2764 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2767 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2768 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2769 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2771 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2772 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2774 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2777 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2778 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2780 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2781 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2783 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2784 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2786 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2787 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2791 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2792 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2798 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2799 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2800 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2803 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2804 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2805 included_htlcs += 1;
2808 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2809 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2813 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2814 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2815 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2816 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2817 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2818 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2823 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2825 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2826 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2831 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2832 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2836 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2837 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2838 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2841 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2842 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2844 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2845 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2846 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2848 total_pending_htlcs,
2849 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2850 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2851 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2853 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2854 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2855 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2857 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2859 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2864 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2865 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2866 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2868 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2869 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2871 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2874 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2875 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2877 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2878 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2880 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2881 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2883 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2884 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2888 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2889 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2895 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2896 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2897 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2898 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2899 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2900 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2903 included_htlcs += 1;
2906 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2907 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2910 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2911 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2913 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2914 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2915 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2920 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2921 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2922 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2925 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2926 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2928 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2929 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2931 total_pending_htlcs,
2932 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2933 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2934 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2936 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2937 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2938 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2940 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2942 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2947 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2948 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2949 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2950 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2951 if local_sent_shutdown {
2952 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2954 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2955 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2956 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2957 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2959 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2960 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2962 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2963 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2965 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2968 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2972 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2973 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2974 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2977 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2978 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2980 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2981 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2982 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2983 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2984 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2985 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2986 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2987 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2988 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2989 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2990 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2992 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2993 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2994 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2995 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2996 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2997 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3001 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
3004 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3005 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3006 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3008 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3009 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3010 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3011 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3012 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3013 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3014 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3018 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3019 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3020 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3021 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3022 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3023 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3024 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3028 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3029 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3030 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3031 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3032 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3033 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3036 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3037 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3038 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3039 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3040 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3042 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3043 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3046 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3047 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3050 if !self.is_outbound() {
3051 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3052 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3053 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3054 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3055 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3056 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3057 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3058 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3059 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3060 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3061 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3062 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3063 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3064 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3065 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3068 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3069 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3070 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3071 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3075 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3076 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3078 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3082 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3083 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3084 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3088 // Now update local state:
3089 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3090 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3091 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3092 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3093 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3094 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3095 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3100 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3102 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3103 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3104 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3105 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3106 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3107 None => fail_reason.into(),
3108 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3109 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3110 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3113 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3117 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3119 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3120 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3122 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3128 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3131 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3132 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3135 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3136 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3139 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3142 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3143 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3144 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3146 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3150 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3154 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3155 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3158 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3162 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3166 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3167 where L::Target: Logger
3169 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3172 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3173 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3175 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3179 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3181 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3183 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3184 let commitment_txid = {
3185 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3186 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3187 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3189 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3190 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3191 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3192 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3193 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3194 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3198 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3200 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3201 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3202 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3203 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3206 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3207 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3208 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3212 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3214 if self.is_outbound() {
3215 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3216 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3217 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3218 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3219 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3220 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3221 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3222 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3223 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3224 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3230 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3234 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3235 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3236 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3237 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3238 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3239 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3240 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3241 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3242 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3243 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3244 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3245 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3246 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3249 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3250 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3251 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3252 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3253 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3254 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3255 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3257 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3258 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3259 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3260 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3261 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3262 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3263 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3266 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3267 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3270 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3272 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3273 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3274 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3277 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3280 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3281 commitment_stats.tx,
3283 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3284 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3285 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3288 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3289 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3291 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3292 let mut need_commitment = false;
3293 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3294 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3295 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3296 need_commitment = true;
3300 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3301 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3302 Some(forward_info.clone())
3304 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3305 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3306 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3307 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3308 need_commitment = true;
3311 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3312 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3313 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3314 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3315 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3316 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3317 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3318 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3319 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3320 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3321 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3322 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3323 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3324 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3326 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3328 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3329 need_commitment = true;
3333 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3334 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3335 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3336 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3337 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3338 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3340 nondust_htlc_sources,
3344 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3345 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3346 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3347 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3349 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3350 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3351 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3352 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3353 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3354 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3355 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3356 // includes the right HTLCs.
3357 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3358 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3359 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3360 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3361 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3362 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3364 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3365 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3366 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3369 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3370 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3371 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3372 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3373 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3374 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3375 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3376 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3377 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3381 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3382 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3383 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3384 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3387 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3388 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3389 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3390 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3391 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3392 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3393 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3394 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3397 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3398 /// for our counterparty.
3399 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3400 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3401 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3402 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3403 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3405 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3406 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3407 updates: Vec::new(),
3410 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3411 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3412 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3413 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3414 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3415 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3416 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3417 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3418 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3419 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3420 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3421 // to rebalance channels.
3422 match &htlc_update {
3423 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3424 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3425 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3428 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3429 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3430 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3431 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3432 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3433 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3434 // into the holding cell without ever being
3435 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3436 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3437 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3440 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3446 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3447 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3448 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3449 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3450 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3451 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3452 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3453 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3454 (msg, monitor_update)
3455 } else { unreachable!() };
3456 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3457 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3459 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3460 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3461 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3462 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3463 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3464 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3465 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3466 // for a full revocation before failing.
3467 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3470 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3472 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3479 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3480 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3482 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3483 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3488 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3489 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3490 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3491 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3492 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3494 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3495 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3496 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3498 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3499 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3505 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3506 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3507 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3508 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3509 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3510 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3511 where L::Target: Logger,
3513 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3514 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3516 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3517 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3519 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3520 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3523 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3525 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3526 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3527 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3531 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3532 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3533 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3534 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3535 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3536 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3537 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3538 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3539 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3542 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3544 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3545 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3548 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3549 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3551 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3553 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3554 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3555 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3556 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3557 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3558 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3559 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3560 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3564 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3565 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3566 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3567 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3568 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3569 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3570 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3571 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3573 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3574 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3577 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3578 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3579 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3580 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3581 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3582 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3583 let mut require_commitment = false;
3584 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3587 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3588 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3589 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3591 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3592 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3593 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3594 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3595 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3596 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3601 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3602 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3603 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3604 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3605 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3607 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3608 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3609 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3614 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3615 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3617 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3621 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3622 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3624 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3625 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3626 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3627 require_commitment = true;
3628 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3629 match forward_info {
3630 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3631 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3632 require_commitment = true;
3634 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3635 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3636 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3638 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3639 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3640 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3644 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3645 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3646 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3647 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3653 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3654 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3655 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3656 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3658 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3659 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3660 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3661 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3662 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3663 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3664 require_commitment = true;
3668 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3670 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3671 match update_state {
3672 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3673 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3674 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3675 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3676 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3678 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3679 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3680 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3681 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3682 require_commitment = true;
3683 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3684 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3689 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3690 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3691 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3692 if require_commitment {
3693 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3694 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3695 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3696 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3697 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3698 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3699 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3700 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3701 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3703 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3704 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3705 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3706 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3707 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3710 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3711 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3712 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3713 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3714 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3715 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3716 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3718 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3719 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3721 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3722 if require_commitment {
3723 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3725 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3726 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3727 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3728 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3730 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3731 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3732 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3733 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3735 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3736 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3737 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3743 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3744 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3745 /// commitment update.
3746 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3747 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3748 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3751 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3752 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3753 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3754 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3756 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3757 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3758 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3759 if !self.is_outbound() {
3760 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3762 if !self.is_usable() {
3763 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3765 if !self.is_live() {
3766 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3769 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3770 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3771 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3772 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3773 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3774 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3775 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3776 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3777 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3778 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3782 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3783 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3784 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3785 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3786 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3789 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3790 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3794 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3795 force_holding_cell = true;
3798 if force_holding_cell {
3799 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3803 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3804 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3806 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3807 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3812 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3813 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3815 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3817 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3818 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3819 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3820 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3824 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3825 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3826 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3830 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3831 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3834 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3835 // will be retransmitted.
3836 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3837 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3838 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3840 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3841 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3843 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3844 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3845 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3846 // this HTLC accordingly
3847 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3850 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3851 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3852 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3853 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3856 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3857 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3858 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3859 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3860 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3861 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3866 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3868 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3869 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3870 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3871 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3875 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3876 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3877 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3878 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3879 // the update upon reconnection.
3880 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3884 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3885 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3888 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3889 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3890 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3891 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3892 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3893 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3894 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3896 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3897 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3898 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3899 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3900 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3901 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3902 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3904 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3905 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3906 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3907 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3908 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3909 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3910 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3913 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3914 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3915 /// to the remote side.
3916 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3917 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3918 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3919 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3922 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3924 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3925 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3926 let mut found_blocked = false;
3927 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3928 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3929 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3933 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3934 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3935 // first received the funding_signed.
3936 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3937 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3938 self.funding_transaction.take()
3940 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3941 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3942 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3943 funding_broadcastable = None;
3946 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3947 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3948 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3949 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3950 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3951 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3952 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3953 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3954 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3955 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3956 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3957 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3958 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3959 next_per_commitment_point,
3960 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3964 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3966 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3967 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3968 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3969 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3970 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3971 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3973 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3974 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3975 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3976 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3977 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3978 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3982 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3983 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3985 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3986 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3989 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3990 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3991 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3992 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3993 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3994 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3995 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3996 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3997 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4001 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4002 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4004 if self.is_outbound() {
4005 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4007 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4008 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4010 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4011 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4013 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4014 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4015 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4016 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4017 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4018 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4019 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4020 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4021 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4022 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4023 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4025 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4027 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4029 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4035 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4036 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4037 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4038 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4039 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4040 per_commitment_secret,
4041 next_per_commitment_point,
4043 next_local_nonce: None,
4047 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4048 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4049 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4050 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4051 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4053 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4054 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4055 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4056 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4057 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4058 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4059 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4060 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4061 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4066 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4067 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4069 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4070 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4071 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4072 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4073 reason: err_packet.clone()
4076 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4077 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4078 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4079 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4080 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4081 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4084 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4085 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4086 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4087 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4088 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4095 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4096 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4097 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4098 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4102 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4103 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4104 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4105 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4106 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4107 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4111 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4112 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4114 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4115 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4116 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4117 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4118 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4119 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4120 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4121 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4124 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4126 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4127 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4128 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4129 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4133 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4134 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4135 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4138 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4139 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4140 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4141 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4142 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4143 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4145 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4146 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4147 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4148 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4149 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4152 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4153 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4154 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4155 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4156 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4157 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4158 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4159 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4163 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4164 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4165 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4166 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4168 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4172 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4173 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4174 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4176 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4177 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4178 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4179 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4180 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4184 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4186 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4187 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4188 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4189 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4190 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4193 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4194 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4195 channel_ready: None,
4196 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4197 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4198 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4202 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4203 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4204 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4205 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4206 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4207 next_per_commitment_point,
4208 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4210 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4211 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4212 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4216 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4217 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4218 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4220 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4221 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4222 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4225 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4228 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4231 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4232 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4233 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4234 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4235 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4237 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4238 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4239 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4240 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4241 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4242 next_per_commitment_point,
4243 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4247 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4248 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4249 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4251 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4254 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4255 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4256 raa: required_revoke,
4257 commitment_update: None,
4258 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4260 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4261 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4262 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4264 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4267 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4268 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4269 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4270 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4271 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4272 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4275 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4276 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4277 raa: required_revoke,
4278 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4279 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4283 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4287 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4288 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4289 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4290 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4292 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4294 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4296 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4297 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4298 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4299 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4300 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4301 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4303 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4304 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4305 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4306 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4307 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4309 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4310 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4311 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4312 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4315 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4316 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4317 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4318 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4319 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4320 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4321 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4322 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4323 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4324 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4325 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4326 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4327 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4328 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4329 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4331 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4334 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4335 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4338 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4339 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4340 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4341 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4342 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4343 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4344 self.channel_state &
4345 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4346 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4347 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4348 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4351 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4352 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4353 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4354 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4355 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4356 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4357 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4359 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4365 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4366 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4367 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4368 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4370 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4371 return Ok((None, None));
4374 if !self.is_outbound() {
4375 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4376 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4378 return Ok((None, None));
4381 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4383 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4384 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4385 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4386 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4388 let sig = self.holder_signer
4389 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4390 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4392 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4393 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4394 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4395 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4397 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4398 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4399 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4404 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4405 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4406 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4407 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4409 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4412 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4413 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4414 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4415 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4416 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4418 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4419 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4423 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4425 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4426 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4429 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4430 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4431 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4434 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4437 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4438 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4439 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4440 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4442 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4445 assert!(send_shutdown);
4446 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4447 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4448 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4450 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4451 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4453 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4458 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4460 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4461 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4463 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4464 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4465 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4466 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4467 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4468 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4471 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4472 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4473 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4476 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4477 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4478 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4479 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4483 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4484 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4485 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4486 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4487 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4488 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4490 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4491 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4498 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4499 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4501 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4504 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4505 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4507 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4509 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4510 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4511 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4512 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4513 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4514 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4515 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4516 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4517 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4519 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4520 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4523 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4527 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4528 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4529 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4530 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4532 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4533 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4535 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4536 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4538 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4539 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4541 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4542 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4545 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4549 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4550 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4551 return Ok((None, None));
4554 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4555 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4556 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4557 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4559 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4561 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4564 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4565 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4566 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4567 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4568 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4572 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4573 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4574 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4578 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4579 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4580 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4581 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4582 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4583 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4584 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4588 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4590 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4591 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4592 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4593 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4595 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4598 let sig = self.holder_signer
4599 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4600 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4602 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4603 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4604 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4605 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4609 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4610 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4611 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4612 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4614 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4615 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4616 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4622 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4623 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4624 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4626 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4627 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4629 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4630 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4633 if !self.is_outbound() {
4634 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4635 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4636 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4637 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4639 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4640 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4641 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4643 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4644 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4647 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4648 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4649 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4650 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4651 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4652 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4653 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4654 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4659 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4660 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4661 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4662 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4664 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4668 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4669 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4670 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4671 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4673 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4679 // Public utilities:
4681 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4685 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4687 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4688 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4689 self.temporary_channel_id
4692 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4696 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4697 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4698 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4702 /// Gets the channel's type
4703 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4707 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4708 /// is_usable() returns true).
4709 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4710 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4711 self.short_channel_id
4714 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4715 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4716 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4719 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4720 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4721 self.outbound_scid_alias
4723 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4724 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4725 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4726 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4727 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4730 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4731 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4732 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4733 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4736 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4737 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4738 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4741 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4742 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4743 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4744 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4748 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4751 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4752 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4755 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4756 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4759 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4760 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4761 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4764 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4765 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4768 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4769 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4770 self.counterparty_node_id
4773 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4774 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4775 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4778 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4779 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4780 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4783 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4784 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4786 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4787 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4788 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4789 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4791 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4795 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4796 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4797 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4800 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4801 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4802 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4805 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4806 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4807 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4809 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4810 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4815 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4816 self.channel_value_satoshis
4819 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4820 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4823 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4824 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4827 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4828 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4831 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4832 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4833 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4836 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4837 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4838 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4841 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4842 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4843 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4846 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4847 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4848 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4851 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4852 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4853 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4856 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4857 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4858 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4861 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4862 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4863 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4864 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4865 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4868 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4870 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4871 self.prev_config = None;
4875 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4876 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4880 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4881 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4882 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4883 let did_channel_update =
4884 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4885 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4886 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4887 if did_channel_update {
4888 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4889 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4890 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4891 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4893 self.config.options = *config;
4897 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4898 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4899 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4900 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4901 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4902 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4903 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4905 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4906 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4909 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4911 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4912 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4918 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4919 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4920 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4921 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4922 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4923 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4924 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4926 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4927 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4934 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
4938 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4939 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4940 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4941 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4942 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4943 // which are near the dust limit.
4944 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4945 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4946 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4947 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4948 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4950 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4951 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4953 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4956 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4957 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4960 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4961 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4964 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4965 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4969 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4974 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4976 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4977 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4978 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4979 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4980 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4981 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4983 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4985 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4993 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4994 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4998 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4999 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
5000 self.update_time_counter
5003 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5004 self.latest_monitor_update_id
5007 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
5008 self.config.announced_channel
5011 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
5012 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
5015 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
5016 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5017 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
5018 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
5021 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
5022 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
5023 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
5026 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
5027 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5028 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
5029 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
5030 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
5033 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5034 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5035 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5036 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5037 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5040 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5041 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5042 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5043 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5046 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5047 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5048 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5051 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5052 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5053 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5054 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5055 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5056 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5057 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5058 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5064 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5065 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5066 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5067 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5068 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5069 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5074 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5075 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5077 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5078 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5079 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5080 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5083 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5084 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5087 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5088 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5091 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5092 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5093 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5096 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5097 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5098 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5100 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5101 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5102 if self.channel_state &
5103 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5104 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5105 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5106 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5107 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5110 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5111 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5112 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5113 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5114 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5115 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5117 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5118 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5119 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5121 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5122 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5123 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5124 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5125 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5126 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5132 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5133 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5134 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5137 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5138 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5139 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5142 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5143 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5144 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5147 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5148 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5149 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5150 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5151 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5152 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5157 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5158 self.channel_update_status
5161 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5162 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5163 self.channel_update_status = status;
5166 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5168 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5169 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5170 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5174 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5175 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5176 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5179 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5183 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5184 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5185 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5187 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5188 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5189 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5191 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5192 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5195 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5196 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5197 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5198 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5199 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5200 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5201 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5202 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5203 self.channel_state);
5205 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5209 if need_commitment_update {
5210 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5211 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5212 let next_per_commitment_point =
5213 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5214 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5215 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5216 next_per_commitment_point,
5217 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5221 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5227 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5228 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5229 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5230 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5231 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5232 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5233 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5235 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5238 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5239 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5240 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5241 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5242 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5243 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5244 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5245 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5246 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5247 if self.is_outbound() {
5248 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5249 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5250 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5251 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5252 // channel and move on.
5253 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5254 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5256 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5257 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5258 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5260 if self.is_outbound() {
5261 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5262 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5263 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5264 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5265 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5266 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5270 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5271 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5272 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5273 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5274 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5278 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5279 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5280 // may have already happened for this block).
5281 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5282 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5283 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5284 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5287 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5288 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5289 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5290 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5298 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5299 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5300 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5301 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5303 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5304 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5307 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5309 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5310 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5311 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5312 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5314 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5317 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5320 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5321 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5322 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5323 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5325 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5328 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5329 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5330 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5332 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5333 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5335 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5336 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5337 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5345 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5347 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5348 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5349 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5351 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5352 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5355 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5356 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5357 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5358 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5359 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5360 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5361 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5362 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5363 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5366 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5367 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5368 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5369 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5371 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5372 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5373 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5375 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5376 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5377 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5378 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5380 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5381 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5382 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5383 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5384 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5385 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5386 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5389 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5390 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5392 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5395 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5396 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5397 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5398 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5399 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5400 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5401 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5402 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5403 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5404 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5405 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5406 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5407 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5408 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5409 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5410 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5411 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5417 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5422 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5423 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5425 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5426 if !self.is_outbound() {
5427 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5429 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5430 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5433 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5434 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5437 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5438 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5442 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5443 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5444 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5445 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5446 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5447 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5448 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5449 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5450 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5451 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5452 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5453 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5454 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5455 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5456 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5457 first_per_commitment_point,
5458 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5459 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5460 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5461 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5463 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5467 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5468 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5471 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5472 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5473 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5474 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5477 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5478 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5480 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5481 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5482 if self.is_outbound() {
5483 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5485 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5486 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5488 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5489 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5491 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5492 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5495 self.user_id = user_id;
5496 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5498 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5501 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5502 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5503 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5505 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5506 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5507 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5508 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5510 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5511 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5512 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5513 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5514 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5515 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5516 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5517 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5518 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5519 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5520 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5521 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5522 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5523 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5524 first_per_commitment_point,
5525 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5526 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5527 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5529 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5531 next_local_nonce: None,
5535 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5536 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5538 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5540 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5541 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5544 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5545 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5546 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5547 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5548 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5549 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5552 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5553 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5554 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5555 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5556 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5557 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5558 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5559 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5560 if !self.is_outbound() {
5561 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5563 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5564 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5566 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5567 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5568 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5569 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5572 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5573 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5575 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5578 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5579 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5584 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5586 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5588 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5589 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5590 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5592 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5593 temporary_channel_id,
5594 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5595 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5598 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5600 next_local_nonce: None,
5604 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5605 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5606 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5607 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5609 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5612 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5613 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5614 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5615 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5616 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5617 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5619 if !self.is_usable() {
5620 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5623 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5624 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5625 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5626 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5628 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5629 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5631 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5632 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5633 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5634 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5635 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5636 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5642 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5643 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5644 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5645 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5647 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5650 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5654 if !self.is_usable() {
5658 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5659 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5663 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5667 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5668 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5671 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5675 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5677 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5682 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5684 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5689 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5691 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5692 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5693 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5694 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5695 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5699 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5701 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5702 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5703 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5704 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5705 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5706 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5707 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5709 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5710 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5711 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5712 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5713 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5714 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5715 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5716 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5717 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5718 contents: announcement,
5721 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5725 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5726 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5727 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5728 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5729 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5730 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5731 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5732 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5734 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5736 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5737 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5738 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5739 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5741 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5742 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5743 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5744 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5747 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5748 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5749 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5750 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5753 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5756 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5757 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5758 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5759 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5760 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5761 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5764 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5766 Err(_) => return None,
5768 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5769 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5774 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5775 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5776 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5777 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5778 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5779 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5780 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5781 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5782 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5783 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5784 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5785 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5786 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5787 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5788 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5789 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5792 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5795 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5796 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5797 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5798 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5799 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5800 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5801 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5802 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5804 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5805 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5806 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5807 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5808 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5809 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5810 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5811 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5812 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5814 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5815 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5816 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5817 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5818 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5819 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5820 next_funding_txid: None,
5825 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5827 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5828 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5829 /// commitment update.
5831 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5832 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5833 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5834 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5836 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5837 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5839 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5840 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5845 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5846 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5848 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5850 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5851 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5853 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5854 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5855 /// regenerate them.
5857 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5858 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5860 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5861 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5862 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5863 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5864 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5865 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5867 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5868 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5869 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5872 if amount_msat == 0 {
5873 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5876 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5877 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5880 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5881 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5882 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5883 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5884 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5885 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5886 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5887 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5890 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5891 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5892 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5893 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5894 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5896 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5897 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5898 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5899 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5902 if !self.is_outbound() {
5903 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5904 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5905 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5906 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5907 let remote_balance_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat).saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
5908 if remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5909 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5913 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5916 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5917 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5918 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5920 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5921 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5922 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5923 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5924 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5925 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5929 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5930 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5931 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5932 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5933 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5934 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5938 let holder_balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
5939 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
5940 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5941 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5942 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5945 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5946 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5947 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5948 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5950 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5951 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5952 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5955 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5956 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5957 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5958 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5959 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5960 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5963 let need_holding_cell = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5964 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5965 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5966 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5967 else { "to peer" });
5969 if need_holding_cell {
5970 force_holding_cell = true;
5973 // Now update local state:
5974 if force_holding_cell {
5975 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5980 onion_routing_packet,
5985 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5986 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5988 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5990 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5994 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5995 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5996 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6000 onion_routing_packet,
6002 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6007 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6008 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6009 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6010 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6012 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6013 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6014 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6016 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6017 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6021 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6022 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6023 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6024 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6025 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6026 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6027 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6030 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6031 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6032 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6033 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6034 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6035 self.pending_update_fee = None;
6038 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6040 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6041 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6042 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6044 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6045 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6048 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6049 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6050 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6051 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6052 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6053 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6054 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6055 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6058 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6062 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6063 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6064 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6065 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6067 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6069 if !self.is_outbound() {
6070 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6071 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6072 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6073 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6074 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6075 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6076 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6077 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6078 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6079 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6085 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6088 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6089 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6090 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6091 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6092 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6093 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6095 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6096 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6097 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6098 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6101 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6102 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6106 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6107 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6109 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6111 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6112 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6113 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6114 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6116 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6117 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6118 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6119 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6120 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6121 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6125 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6126 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6130 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6131 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6134 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6135 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6137 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6138 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6139 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6140 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6141 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6144 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6145 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6146 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6152 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6153 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6154 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6157 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6158 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6161 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6162 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6163 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6164 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6170 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6171 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6173 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6174 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6175 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6176 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6177 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6178 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6179 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6180 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6181 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6184 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6185 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6186 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6188 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6189 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6192 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6193 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6195 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6196 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6197 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6200 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6201 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6202 let mut chan_closed = false;
6203 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6207 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6209 None if !chan_closed => {
6210 // use override shutdown script if provided
6211 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6212 Some(script) => script,
6214 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6215 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6216 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6217 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6221 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6222 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6224 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6230 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6231 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6232 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6233 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6235 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6237 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6239 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6240 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6241 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6242 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6243 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6244 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6247 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6248 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6249 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6252 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6253 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6254 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6257 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6258 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6259 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6260 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6261 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6263 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6264 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6271 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6272 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6274 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6277 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6278 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6279 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6280 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6281 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6282 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6283 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6284 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6285 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6286 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6287 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6289 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6290 // return them to fail the payment.
6291 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6292 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6293 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6295 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6296 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6301 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6302 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6303 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6304 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6305 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6306 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6307 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6308 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6309 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6310 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6311 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6312 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6313 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6318 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6319 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6320 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6323 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6324 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6325 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6327 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6328 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6332 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6336 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6337 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6339 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6345 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6346 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6347 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6348 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6349 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6351 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6352 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6353 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6354 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6360 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6361 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6362 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6363 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6364 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6365 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6370 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6371 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6372 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6373 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6375 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6376 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6377 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6378 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6383 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6384 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6385 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6386 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6387 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6388 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6393 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6394 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6395 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6398 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6400 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6401 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6402 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6403 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6404 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6406 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6407 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6408 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6409 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6411 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6412 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6413 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6415 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6417 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6418 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6419 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6420 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6421 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6422 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6424 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6425 // deserialized from that format.
6426 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6427 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6428 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6430 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6432 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6433 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6434 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6436 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6437 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6438 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6439 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6442 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6443 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6444 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6447 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6448 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6449 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6450 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6452 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6453 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6455 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6457 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6459 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6461 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6464 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6466 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6471 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6473 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6474 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6475 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6476 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6477 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6478 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6479 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6481 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6483 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6485 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6488 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6489 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6490 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6493 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6495 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6496 preimages.push(preimage);
6498 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6499 reason.write(writer)?;
6501 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6503 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6504 preimages.push(preimage);
6506 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6507 reason.write(writer)?;
6512 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6513 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6515 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6517 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6518 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6519 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6520 source.write(writer)?;
6521 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6523 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6525 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6526 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6528 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6530 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6531 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6536 match self.resend_order {
6537 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6538 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6541 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6542 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6543 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6545 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6546 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6547 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6548 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6551 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6552 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6553 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6554 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6555 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6558 if self.is_outbound() {
6559 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6560 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6561 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6563 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6564 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6565 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6567 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6569 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6570 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6571 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6572 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6574 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6575 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6576 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6577 // consider the stale state on reload.
6580 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6581 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6582 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6584 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6585 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6586 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6588 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6589 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6591 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6592 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6593 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6595 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6596 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6598 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6601 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6602 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6603 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6605 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6608 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6609 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6611 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6612 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6613 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6615 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6617 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6619 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6621 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6622 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6623 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6624 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6625 htlc.write(writer)?;
6628 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6629 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6630 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6632 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6633 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6635 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6636 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6637 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6638 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6639 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6640 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6641 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6643 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6644 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6645 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6646 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6647 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6649 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6650 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6652 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6653 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6654 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6655 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6657 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6659 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6660 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6661 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6662 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6663 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6664 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6665 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6667 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6668 (2, chan_type, option),
6669 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6670 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6671 (5, self.config, required),
6672 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6673 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6674 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6675 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6676 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6677 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6678 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6679 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6680 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6681 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6682 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6683 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6684 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6685 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6686 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6687 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6694 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6695 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6697 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6698 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6700 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6701 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6702 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6704 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6705 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6706 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6707 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6709 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6711 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6712 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6713 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6714 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6715 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6717 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6718 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6721 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6722 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6723 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6725 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6727 let mut keys_data = None;
6729 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6730 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6731 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6732 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6733 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6734 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6735 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6736 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6737 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6738 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6742 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6743 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6744 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6747 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6749 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6750 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6751 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6753 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6755 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6756 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6757 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6758 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6759 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6760 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6761 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6762 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6763 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6764 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6765 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6766 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6767 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6772 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6773 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6774 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6775 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6776 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6777 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6778 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6779 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6780 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6781 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6782 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6783 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6785 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6786 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6789 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6790 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6793 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6794 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6796 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6801 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6802 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6803 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6804 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6805 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6806 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6807 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6808 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6809 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6810 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6812 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6813 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6814 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6816 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6817 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6818 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6820 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6824 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6825 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6826 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6827 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6830 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6831 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6832 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6834 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6835 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6836 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6837 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6840 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6841 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6842 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6843 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6846 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6850 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6851 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6852 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6853 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6855 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6856 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6857 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6858 // consider the stale state on reload.
6859 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6862 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6863 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6864 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6866 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6869 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6870 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6871 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6875 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6876 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6878 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6879 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6881 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6882 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6884 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6885 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6886 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6888 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6890 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6891 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6893 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6894 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6899 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6900 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6901 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6902 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6904 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6907 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6908 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6912 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6913 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6915 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6916 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6918 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6920 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6921 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6922 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6924 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6925 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6926 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6930 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6931 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6932 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6934 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6940 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6941 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6942 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6943 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6944 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6945 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6946 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6947 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6948 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6949 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6951 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6952 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6953 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6954 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6955 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6956 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
6957 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6959 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6960 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6961 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6962 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
6964 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
6966 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6967 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6968 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6969 (2, channel_type, option),
6970 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6971 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6972 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6973 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6974 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6975 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6976 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6977 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6978 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6979 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6980 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6981 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6982 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6983 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6984 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6985 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6986 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
6987 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6988 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6991 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6992 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6993 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6994 // required channel parameters.
6995 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6996 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6997 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6999 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7001 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7002 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7003 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7004 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7007 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7008 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7009 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7011 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7012 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7014 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7015 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7020 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7021 if iter.next().is_some() {
7022 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7026 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7027 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7028 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7029 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7030 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7033 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7034 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7036 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7037 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7038 // separate u64 values.
7039 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7041 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7046 config: config.unwrap(),
7050 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7051 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7052 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7055 temporary_channel_id,
7057 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7059 channel_value_satoshis,
7061 latest_monitor_update_id,
7064 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7067 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7068 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7071 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7072 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7073 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7074 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7078 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7079 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7080 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7081 monitor_pending_forwards,
7082 monitor_pending_failures,
7083 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7086 holding_cell_update_fee,
7087 next_holder_htlc_id,
7088 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7089 update_time_counter,
7092 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7093 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7094 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7095 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7097 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7098 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7099 closing_fee_limits: None,
7100 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7102 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7104 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7105 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7107 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7109 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7110 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7111 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7112 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7113 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7114 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7115 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7116 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7117 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7120 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7122 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7123 funding_transaction,
7125 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7126 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7127 counterparty_node_id,
7129 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7133 channel_update_status,
7134 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7138 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7139 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7140 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7141 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7143 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7145 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7146 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7147 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7149 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7150 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7152 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7153 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7155 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7158 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7166 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7167 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7168 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7169 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7170 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7172 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7173 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7175 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7176 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7177 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7178 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7179 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7180 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7181 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7182 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7183 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7184 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7185 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7186 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7187 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7188 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7189 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7190 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7191 use crate::util::test_utils;
7192 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7193 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7194 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7195 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7196 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7197 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7198 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7199 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7200 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7201 use crate::prelude::*;
7203 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7206 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7207 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7213 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7214 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7215 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7216 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7220 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7221 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7222 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7223 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7224 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7225 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7226 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7230 signer: InMemorySigner,
7233 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7234 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7237 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7238 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7240 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7241 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7244 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7248 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7250 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7251 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7252 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7253 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7254 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7257 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7258 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7259 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7260 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7264 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7265 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7266 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7270 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7271 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7272 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7273 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7275 let seed = [42; 32];
7276 let network = Network::Testnet;
7277 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7278 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7279 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7282 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7283 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7284 let config = UserConfig::default();
7285 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7286 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7287 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7289 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7290 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7294 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7295 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7297 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7298 let original_fee = 253;
7299 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7300 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7301 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7302 let seed = [42; 32];
7303 let network = Network::Testnet;
7304 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7306 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7307 let config = UserConfig::default();
7308 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7310 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7311 // same as the old fee.
7312 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7313 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7314 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7318 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7319 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7320 // dust limits are used.
7321 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7322 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7323 let seed = [42; 32];
7324 let network = Network::Testnet;
7325 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7326 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7328 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7329 // they have different dust limits.
7331 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7332 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7333 let config = UserConfig::default();
7334 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7336 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7337 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7338 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7339 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7340 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7342 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7343 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7344 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7345 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7346 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7348 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7349 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7350 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7352 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7353 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7354 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7355 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7358 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7360 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7361 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7362 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7363 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7364 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7365 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7366 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7367 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7368 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7372 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7373 // the dust limit check.
7374 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7375 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7376 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7377 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7379 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7380 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7381 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7382 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7383 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7384 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7385 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7389 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7390 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7391 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7392 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7393 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7394 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7395 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7396 let seed = [42; 32];
7397 let network = Network::Testnet;
7398 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7400 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7401 let config = UserConfig::default();
7402 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7404 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7405 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7407 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7408 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7409 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7410 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7411 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7412 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7414 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7415 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7416 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7417 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7418 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7420 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7422 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7423 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7424 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7425 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7426 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7428 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7429 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7430 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7431 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7432 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7436 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7437 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7438 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7439 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7440 let seed = [42; 32];
7441 let network = Network::Testnet;
7442 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7443 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7444 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7446 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7448 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7449 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7450 let config = UserConfig::default();
7451 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7453 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7454 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7455 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7456 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7458 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7459 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7460 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7462 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7463 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7464 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7465 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7467 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7468 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7469 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7471 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7472 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7474 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7475 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7476 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7477 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7478 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7479 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7480 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7482 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7484 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7485 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7486 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7487 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7488 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7492 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7493 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7494 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7496 let seed = [42; 32];
7497 let network = Network::Testnet;
7498 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7499 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7500 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7502 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7503 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7504 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7505 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7506 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7507 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7508 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7509 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7511 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7512 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7513 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7514 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7515 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7516 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7518 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7519 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7520 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7521 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7523 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7525 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7526 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7527 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7528 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7529 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7530 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7532 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7533 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7534 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7535 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7537 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7538 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7539 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7540 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7541 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7543 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7544 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7546 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7547 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7548 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7550 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7551 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7552 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7553 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7554 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7556 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7557 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7559 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7560 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7561 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7565 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7567 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7568 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7569 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7571 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7572 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7573 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7574 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7576 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7577 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7578 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7580 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7582 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7583 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7586 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7587 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7588 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7589 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7590 let seed = [42; 32];
7591 let network = Network::Testnet;
7592 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7593 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7594 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7597 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7598 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7599 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7601 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7602 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7604 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7605 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7606 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7608 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7609 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7611 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7613 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7614 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7616 // Channel Negotiations failed
7617 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7618 assert!(result.is_err());
7623 fn channel_update() {
7624 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7625 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7626 let seed = [42; 32];
7627 let network = Network::Testnet;
7628 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7629 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7631 // Create a channel.
7632 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7633 let config = UserConfig::default();
7634 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7635 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7636 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7637 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7639 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7640 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7641 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7643 short_channel_id: 0,
7646 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7647 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7648 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7650 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7651 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7653 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7655 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7657 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7658 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7659 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7660 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7662 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7663 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7664 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7666 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7670 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7672 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7673 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7674 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7675 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7676 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7677 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7678 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7679 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7680 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7681 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7682 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7683 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7684 use crate::sync::Arc;
7686 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7687 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7688 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7689 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7691 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7693 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7694 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7695 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7696 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7697 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7699 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7700 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7706 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7707 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7708 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7710 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7711 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7712 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7713 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7714 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7715 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7717 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7719 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7720 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7721 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7722 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7723 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7724 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7726 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7727 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7728 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7729 selected_contest_delay: 144
7731 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7732 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7734 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7735 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7737 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7738 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7740 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7741 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7743 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7744 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7745 // build_commitment_transaction.
7746 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7747 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7748 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7749 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7750 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7752 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7753 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7754 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7755 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7759 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7760 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7761 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7762 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7766 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7767 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7768 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7770 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7771 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7773 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7774 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7776 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7778 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7779 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7780 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7781 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7782 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7783 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7784 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7786 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7787 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7788 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7789 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7791 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7792 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7793 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7795 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7797 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7798 commitment_tx.clone(),
7799 counterparty_signature,
7800 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7801 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7802 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7804 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7805 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7807 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7808 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7809 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7811 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7812 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7815 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7816 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7818 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7819 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7820 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7821 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7822 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7823 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7824 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7825 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7827 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7830 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7831 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7832 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7836 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7839 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7840 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7841 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7843 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7844 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7845 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7846 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7847 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7848 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7849 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7850 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7852 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7856 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7857 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7858 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7859 "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", {});
7861 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7862 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7864 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7865 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7866 "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", {});
7868 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7869 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7870 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7871 "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", {});
7873 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7874 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7876 amount_msat: 1000000,
7878 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7879 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7881 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7884 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7885 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7887 amount_msat: 2000000,
7889 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7890 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7892 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7895 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7896 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7898 amount_msat: 2000000,
7900 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7901 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7902 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7904 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7907 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7908 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7910 amount_msat: 3000000,
7912 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7913 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7914 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7916 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7919 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7920 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7922 amount_msat: 4000000,
7924 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7925 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7927 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7931 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7932 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7933 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7935 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7936 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7937 "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", {
7940 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7941 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7942 "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" },
7945 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7946 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7947 "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" },
7950 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7951 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7952 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7955 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7956 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7957 "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" },
7960 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7961 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7962 "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" }
7965 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7966 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7967 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7969 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7970 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7971 "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", {
7974 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7975 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7976 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
7979 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7980 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7981 "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" },
7984 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7985 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7986 "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" },
7989 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7990 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7991 "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" },
7994 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7995 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7996 "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" }
7999 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8000 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8001 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8003 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8004 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8005 "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", {
8008 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8009 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8010 "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" },
8013 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8014 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8015 "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" },
8018 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8019 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8020 "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" },
8023 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8024 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8025 "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" }
8028 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8029 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8030 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8031 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8033 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8034 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8035 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8038 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8039 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8040 "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" },
8043 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8044 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8045 "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" },
8048 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8049 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8050 "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" },
8053 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8054 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8055 "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" }
8058 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8059 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8060 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8061 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8063 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8064 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8065 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8068 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8069 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8070 "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" },
8073 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8074 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8075 "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" },
8078 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8079 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8080 "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" },
8083 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8084 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8085 "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" }
8088 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8089 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8090 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8092 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8093 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8094 "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", {
8097 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8098 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8099 "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" },
8102 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8103 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8104 "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" },
8107 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8108 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8109 "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" }
8112 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8113 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8114 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8116 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8117 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8118 "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", {
8121 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8122 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8123 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de84500148304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e015430101008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8126 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8127 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8128 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd010000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a001483045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b7701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8131 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8132 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8133 "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" }
8136 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8137 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8138 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8140 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8141 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8142 "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", {
8145 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8146 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8147 "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" },
8150 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8151 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8152 "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" }
8155 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8156 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8157 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8158 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8160 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8161 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8162 "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", {
8165 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8166 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8167 "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" },
8170 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8171 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8172 "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" }
8175 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8176 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8177 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8178 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8180 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8181 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8182 "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", {
8185 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8186 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8187 "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" },
8190 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8191 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8192 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8195 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8196 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8197 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8199 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8200 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8201 "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", {
8204 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8205 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8206 "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" }
8209 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8210 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8211 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8212 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8214 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8215 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8216 "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", {
8219 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8220 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8221 "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" }
8224 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8225 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8226 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8227 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8229 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8230 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8231 "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", {
8234 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8235 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8236 "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" }
8239 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8240 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8241 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8242 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8244 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8245 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8246 "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", {});
8248 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8249 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8250 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8251 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8253 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8254 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8255 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ad0886a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd01483045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b9501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8257 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8258 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8259 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8260 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8262 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8263 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8264 "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", {});
8266 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8267 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8268 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8270 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8271 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8272 "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", {});
8274 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8275 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8276 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8277 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8279 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8280 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8281 "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", {});
8283 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8284 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8285 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8286 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8288 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8289 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8290 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8292 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8293 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8294 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8295 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8296 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8297 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8299 amount_msat: 2000000,
8301 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8302 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8304 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8307 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8308 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8309 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8311 amount_msat: 5000001,
8313 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8314 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8315 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8317 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8320 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8321 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8323 amount_msat: 5000000,
8325 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8326 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8327 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8329 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8333 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8334 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8335 "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", {
8338 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8339 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8340 "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" },
8342 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8343 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8344 "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" },
8346 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8347 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8348 "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" }
8351 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8352 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8353 "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", {
8356 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8357 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8358 "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" },
8360 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8361 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8362 "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" },
8364 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8365 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8366 "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" }
8371 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8372 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8374 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8375 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8376 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8377 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8379 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8380 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8381 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8383 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8384 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8386 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8387 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8389 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8390 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8391 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8395 fn test_key_derivation() {
8396 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8397 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8399 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8400 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8402 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8403 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8405 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8406 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8408 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8409 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8411 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8412 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8414 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8415 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8417 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8418 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8422 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8423 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8424 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8425 let seed = [42; 32];
8426 let network = Network::Testnet;
8427 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8428 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8430 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8431 let config = UserConfig::default();
8432 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8433 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8435 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8436 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8438 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8439 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8440 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8441 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8442 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8443 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8444 assert!(res.is_ok());
8449 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8450 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8451 // resulting `channel_type`.
8452 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8453 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8454 let network = Network::Testnet;
8455 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8456 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8458 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8459 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8461 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8462 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8464 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8465 // need to signal it.
8466 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8467 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8468 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8471 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8473 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8474 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8475 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8477 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8478 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8479 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8482 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8483 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8484 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8485 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8486 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8489 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8490 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8495 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8496 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8497 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8498 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8499 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8500 let network = Network::Testnet;
8501 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8502 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8504 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8505 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8507 let config = UserConfig::default();
8509 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8510 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8511 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8512 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8513 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8515 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8516 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8517 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8520 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8521 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8522 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8524 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8525 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8526 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8527 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8528 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8529 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8531 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8536 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8537 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8539 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8540 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8541 let network = Network::Testnet;
8542 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8543 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8545 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8546 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8548 let config = UserConfig::default();
8550 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8551 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8552 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8553 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8554 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8555 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8556 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8557 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8559 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8560 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8561 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8562 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8563 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8564 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8567 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8568 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8570 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8571 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8572 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8573 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8575 assert!(res.is_err());
8577 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8578 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8579 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8581 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8582 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8583 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8586 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8588 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8589 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8590 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8591 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8594 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8595 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8597 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8598 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8600 assert!(res.is_err());