1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
30 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
34 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
35 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
36 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
37 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
38 use util::transaction_utils;
39 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
40 use util::logger::Logger;
41 use util::errors::APIError;
42 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
43 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
48 use core::convert::TryFrom;
50 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget", debug_assertions))]
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
68 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
70 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
71 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
72 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
73 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
74 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
75 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
77 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
81 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
82 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
83 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
84 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
87 enum InboundHTLCState {
88 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
89 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
90 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
91 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
92 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
93 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
94 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
95 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
96 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
97 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
98 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
99 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
100 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
101 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
102 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
104 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
105 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
106 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
107 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
108 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
109 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
110 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
111 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
112 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
113 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
114 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
115 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
116 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
117 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
119 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
120 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
121 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
122 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
123 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
124 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
125 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
126 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
128 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
129 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
131 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
132 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
133 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
134 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
135 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
136 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
137 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
138 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
141 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
145 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
146 state: InboundHTLCState,
149 enum OutboundHTLCState {
150 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
151 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
152 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
153 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
154 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
155 /// money back (though we won't), and,
156 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
157 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
158 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
159 /// we'll never get out of sync).
160 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
161 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
162 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
164 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
165 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
166 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
167 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
168 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
169 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
170 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
171 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
172 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
173 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
174 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
175 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
176 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
177 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
178 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
181 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
185 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
186 state: OutboundHTLCState,
190 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
191 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
192 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
196 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
198 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
201 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
206 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
210 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
211 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
212 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
213 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
214 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
215 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
216 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
218 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
219 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
220 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
221 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
222 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
223 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
224 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
226 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
227 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
228 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
230 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
231 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
232 TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
233 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
234 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
235 OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
237 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
238 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
240 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
241 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
242 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
243 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
244 MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
245 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
246 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
247 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
248 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
250 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
251 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
252 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
253 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
254 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
255 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
256 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
257 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
258 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
259 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
260 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
261 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
263 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
264 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
266 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
268 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
269 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
270 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
271 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
272 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
273 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
274 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
275 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
277 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
279 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
281 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
285 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
291 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
294 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
295 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
296 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
299 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
300 struct HTLCCandidate {
302 origin: HTLCInitiator,
306 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
314 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
315 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
316 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
317 /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
318 pub fee_base_msat: u32,
319 /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
320 pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
321 /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
322 /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
323 /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
324 pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
327 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
329 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
331 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
332 htlc_value_msat: u64,
333 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
338 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
339 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
340 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
341 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
342 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
344 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
345 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
346 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
347 htlc_value_msat: u64,
348 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
349 /// in the holding cell).
350 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
352 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
353 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
357 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
358 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
359 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
360 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
361 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
362 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
363 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
364 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
365 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
366 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
367 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
369 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
371 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
373 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
374 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
375 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
378 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
379 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
380 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
381 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
382 pub(crate) config: ChannelConfig,
383 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
384 config: ChannelConfig,
388 channel_id: [u8; 32],
390 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
391 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
393 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
395 holder_signer: Signer,
396 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
397 destination_script: Script,
399 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
400 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
401 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
403 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
404 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
405 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
406 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
407 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
408 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
410 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
411 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
412 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
413 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
414 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
415 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
417 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
419 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
420 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
421 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
422 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
423 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
425 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
426 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
427 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
429 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
430 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
431 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
432 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
433 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
434 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
435 // commitment_signed.
436 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
437 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
438 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
439 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
440 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
441 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
442 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
443 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
444 update_time_counter: u32,
447 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
448 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
449 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
450 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
451 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
452 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
454 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
455 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
457 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
458 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
459 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
460 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
462 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
463 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
465 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
467 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
469 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
470 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
471 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
472 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
474 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
476 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
478 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
480 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
482 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
483 //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
484 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
485 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
486 // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
487 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
488 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
490 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
492 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
493 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
494 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
496 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
498 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
499 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
501 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
502 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
503 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
505 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
507 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
509 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
510 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
511 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
512 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
514 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
515 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
516 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
518 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
519 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
520 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
522 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
523 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
524 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
525 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
526 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
527 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
528 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
529 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
531 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
532 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
533 /// funding_locked *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
534 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the funding_locked
535 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
537 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
538 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::FundingLocked>,
540 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
541 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
542 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
543 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
544 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
545 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
546 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
547 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
550 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
551 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
553 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
554 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
555 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
559 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
564 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
566 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
568 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
572 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
574 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
576 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
577 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
578 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
579 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
580 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
581 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
582 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
583 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
584 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
586 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
587 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
588 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
589 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
590 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
592 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
593 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
594 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
595 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
599 CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
602 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
603 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
605 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
606 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
607 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
608 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
613 macro_rules! secp_check {
614 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
617 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
622 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
623 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
624 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
625 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
628 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
631 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
632 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
633 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
634 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
638 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
639 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
640 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
642 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
643 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
644 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
646 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
647 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
649 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
650 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
651 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
653 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
654 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
656 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
657 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
658 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
661 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
663 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
664 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
666 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
667 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
670 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
671 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
672 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
678 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
680 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
681 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
683 channel_value_satoshis,
685 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
688 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
689 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
691 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
692 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
693 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
695 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
696 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
697 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
698 pending_update_fee: None,
699 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
700 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
701 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
702 update_time_counter: 1,
704 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
706 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
707 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
708 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
709 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
710 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
712 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
713 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
714 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
715 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
717 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
718 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
719 closing_fee_limits: None,
720 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
722 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
723 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
724 short_channel_id: None,
726 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
727 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
728 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
729 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
730 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
731 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
732 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
733 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
734 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
736 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
738 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
739 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
740 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
741 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
742 counterparty_parameters: None,
743 funding_outpoint: None
745 funding_transaction: None,
747 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
748 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
749 counterparty_node_id,
751 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
753 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
755 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
756 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
758 announcement_sigs: None,
760 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
761 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
762 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
763 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
765 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
767 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
768 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
772 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
773 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
775 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
776 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
777 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
779 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
780 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
781 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
782 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
783 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
784 fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
785 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
786 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
791 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
792 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
793 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
794 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
795 F::Target: FeeEstimator
797 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
798 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
799 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
800 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
801 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
802 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
803 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
804 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
806 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
808 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
809 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
812 // Check sanity of message fields:
813 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
816 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
817 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
819 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
820 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
821 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
823 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
824 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
826 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
827 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
829 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
830 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
831 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
833 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
835 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
836 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
837 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
839 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
842 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
843 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
846 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
847 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
848 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
850 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
851 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
853 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
854 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
856 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
859 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
862 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
865 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
869 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
871 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
872 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
873 if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
874 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
877 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
878 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
880 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
882 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
883 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
884 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
886 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
887 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
889 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
890 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
893 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
894 // for full fee payment
895 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
896 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
897 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
898 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
901 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
902 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
903 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
907 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
908 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
909 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
910 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
911 if script.len() == 0 {
914 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
915 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
916 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
920 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
921 &OptionalField::Absent => {
922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
927 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_options.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
928 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
931 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
932 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
933 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
937 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
938 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
942 config: local_config,
944 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
945 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
948 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
951 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
952 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
954 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
955 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
956 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
958 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
959 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
960 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
961 pending_update_fee: None,
962 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
963 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
964 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
965 update_time_counter: 1,
967 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
969 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
970 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
971 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
972 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
973 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
975 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
976 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
977 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
978 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
980 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
981 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
982 closing_fee_limits: None,
983 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
985 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
986 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
987 short_channel_id: None,
989 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
990 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
991 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
992 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
993 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
994 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
995 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
996 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
997 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
998 minimum_depth: Some(config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth),
1000 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1002 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1003 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1004 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
1005 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1006 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1007 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1008 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1010 funding_outpoint: None
1012 funding_transaction: None,
1014 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1015 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1016 counterparty_node_id,
1018 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1020 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1022 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1023 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1025 announcement_sigs: None,
1027 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1028 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1029 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1030 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1032 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1034 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1035 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1041 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1042 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1043 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1044 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1045 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1047 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1048 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1049 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1050 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1051 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1052 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1053 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1054 /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
1055 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
1056 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the fourth return value, but not the third, and
1057 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the fourth return value.
1059 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, u32, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
1060 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1061 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1062 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1064 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1065 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1066 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1067 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1069 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1070 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1071 if match update_state {
1072 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1073 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1074 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1075 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1076 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1078 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1082 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1083 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1084 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1085 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1087 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1088 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1089 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1091 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1092 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1093 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1094 transaction_output_index: None
1099 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1100 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1101 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1102 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1103 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1104 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1105 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1107 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1108 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1111 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1112 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
1113 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1114 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1116 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1117 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1123 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1124 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1125 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1126 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1127 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1128 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1129 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1133 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1134 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1136 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1138 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1139 if generated_by_local {
1140 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1141 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1150 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1151 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1152 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1153 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1154 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1155 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1156 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1160 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1161 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1163 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1165 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
1166 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1168 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
1169 if !generated_by_local {
1170 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1178 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1179 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1180 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1181 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1182 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1183 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1184 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1185 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1187 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1189 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1190 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1191 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1192 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1194 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1196 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1197 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1198 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1199 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1202 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1203 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1204 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1206 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1209 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1210 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1211 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1212 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1214 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1217 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1218 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1223 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1224 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1229 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1231 let channel_parameters =
1232 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1233 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1234 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1242 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1245 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1246 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1247 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1248 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1250 (tx, feerate_per_kw, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1254 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1255 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1256 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1257 // outside of those situations will fail.
1258 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1262 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1267 1 + // script length (0)
1271 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1272 2 + // witness marker and flag
1273 1 + // witness element count
1274 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1275 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1276 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1277 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1278 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1279 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1281 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1282 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1283 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1289 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1291 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1293 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1294 script_sig: Script::new(),
1295 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1296 witness: Vec::new(),
1301 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1302 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1303 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1304 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1306 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1307 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1308 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1310 if value_to_self < 0 {
1311 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1312 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1313 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1314 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1315 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1318 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1319 txouts.push((TxOut {
1320 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1321 value: value_to_remote as u64
1325 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1326 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1327 txouts.push((TxOut {
1328 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1329 value: value_to_self as u64
1333 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1335 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1336 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1337 outputs.push(out.0);
1345 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1348 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1349 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1353 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1354 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1355 /// our counterparty!)
1356 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1357 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1358 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1359 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1360 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1361 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1362 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1364 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1368 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1369 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1370 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1371 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1372 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1373 //may see payments to it!
1374 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1375 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1376 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1378 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1381 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1382 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1383 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1384 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1385 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1388 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1389 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1390 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1391 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1393 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1394 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1396 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1398 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1400 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1401 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1402 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1404 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1405 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1406 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1407 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1408 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1410 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1411 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1412 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1414 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1415 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1417 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1420 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1421 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1425 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1429 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1430 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1431 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1432 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1433 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1434 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1437 // Now update local state:
1439 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1440 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1441 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1442 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1443 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1444 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1445 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1449 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1450 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1451 match pending_update {
1452 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1453 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1454 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1455 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1456 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1457 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1458 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1461 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1462 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1463 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1464 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1465 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1466 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1467 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1473 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1474 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1475 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1477 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1478 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1479 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1481 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1482 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1485 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1486 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1488 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1489 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1491 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1492 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1495 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1498 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1499 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1500 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1501 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1506 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1507 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1508 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1509 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1510 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1513 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1514 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1515 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1516 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1517 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1519 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1520 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1521 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1525 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1526 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1527 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1528 /// before we fail backwards.
1529 /// If we do fail twice, we debug_assert!(false) and return Ok(None). Thus, will always return
1530 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1531 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1532 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1533 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1535 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1537 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1538 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1539 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1541 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1542 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1543 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1545 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1546 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1547 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1549 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1554 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1555 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1561 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1562 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1563 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
1564 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
1565 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1569 // Now update local state:
1570 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1571 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1572 match pending_update {
1573 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1574 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1575 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1576 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1580 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1581 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1582 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1583 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1589 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1590 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1591 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1597 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1599 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1600 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1603 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1604 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1605 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1610 // Message handlers:
1612 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1613 // Check sanity of message fields:
1614 if !self.is_outbound() {
1615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1617 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1620 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1621 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1623 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1624 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1626 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1627 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1629 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1630 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1631 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1633 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1634 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1635 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1637 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1638 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1639 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1641 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1642 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1644 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1645 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1648 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1649 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1650 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1652 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1653 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1655 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1658 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1659 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1661 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1662 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1664 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1665 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1667 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1670 if msg.minimum_depth == 0 {
1671 // Note that if this changes we should update the serialization minimum version to
1672 // indicate to older clients that they don't understand some features of the current
1674 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum confirmation depth must be at least 1".to_owned()));
1677 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1678 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1679 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1680 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1681 if script.len() == 0 {
1684 match ShutdownScript::try_from((script.clone(), their_features)) {
1685 Ok(shutdown_script) => Some(shutdown_script.into_inner()),
1686 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script))),
1690 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1691 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1692 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1697 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1698 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1699 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
1700 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1701 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1702 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
1704 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1705 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1706 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1707 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1708 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1709 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1712 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1713 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1714 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1717 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1718 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1720 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1725 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1726 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1728 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1729 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).0;
1731 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1732 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1733 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1734 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1735 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
1736 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
1737 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
1738 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1739 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1742 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1743 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1745 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1746 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1747 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1748 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1750 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1751 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1753 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1754 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1757 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1758 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1761 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1762 if self.is_outbound() {
1763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1765 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1766 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1767 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1771 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1772 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1773 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1774 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1777 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1778 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1779 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
1780 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1781 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1783 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1785 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1786 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1787 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1790 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1791 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1792 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1796 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1797 initial_commitment_tx,
1800 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1801 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1804 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
1805 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
1807 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1809 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1810 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1811 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1812 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1813 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1814 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1815 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1816 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1817 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1819 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1821 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1823 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1824 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1825 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1826 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1828 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1830 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1831 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1833 }, channel_monitor))
1836 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1837 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1838 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1839 if !self.is_outbound() {
1840 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1842 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1843 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1845 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1846 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1847 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1848 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1851 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1853 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1854 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
1855 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1856 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1858 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
1859 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1861 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1862 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).0;
1864 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1865 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1866 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1867 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1868 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1873 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1874 initial_commitment_tx,
1877 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1878 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1881 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
1882 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
1885 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1886 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1887 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1888 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1889 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
1890 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1891 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1892 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1893 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1894 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1896 holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1898 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1900 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1901 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1902 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1903 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1905 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1907 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1910 pub fn funding_locked<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1911 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1912 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
1913 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
1916 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1918 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1919 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1920 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1921 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1922 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1923 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1924 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1925 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1926 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1927 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1928 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1929 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1930 if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1933 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1939 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1940 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1942 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_locked from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1947 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1948 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1949 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1950 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1951 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1952 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1953 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1956 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1957 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1958 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1959 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1960 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1961 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1963 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1964 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1970 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1971 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> HTLCStats {
1972 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1973 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1974 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1975 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1976 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1979 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1980 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1981 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1982 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1983 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1984 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1986 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1987 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1991 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1992 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1993 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1994 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1995 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1996 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1998 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1999 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2006 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
2007 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2008 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2009 /// corner case properly.
2010 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
2011 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2013 cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2014 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2015 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2016 - Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64 * 1000,
2018 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2019 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2020 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2025 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2026 (Self::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
2027 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2030 // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2031 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2032 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
2033 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2034 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2035 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2038 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2039 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2040 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2042 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2043 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2045 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2046 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2048 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2049 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2051 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2052 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2056 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2057 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2063 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2064 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2065 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2068 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2069 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2070 included_htlcs += 1;
2073 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2074 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2078 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2079 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2080 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2081 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2082 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2083 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2088 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2090 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2091 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2096 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2097 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2101 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2102 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2103 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2106 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2107 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2109 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2110 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2111 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2113 total_pending_htlcs,
2114 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2115 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2116 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2118 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2119 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2120 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2122 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2124 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2129 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2130 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2131 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2133 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2134 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2136 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2137 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2139 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2140 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2142 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2143 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2147 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2148 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2154 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2155 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2156 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2157 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2158 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2159 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2162 included_htlcs += 1;
2165 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2166 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2169 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2170 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2172 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2173 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2174 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2179 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2180 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
2181 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2184 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2185 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
2187 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2188 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2190 total_pending_htlcs,
2191 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2192 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2193 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2195 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2196 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2197 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2199 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2201 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2206 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2207 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2208 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2209 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2210 if local_sent_shutdown {
2211 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
2213 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2214 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
2215 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2216 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2218 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2221 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2224 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2227 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2231 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2232 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
2233 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2236 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2237 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2238 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2240 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2241 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2242 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2243 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2244 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2245 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2246 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2247 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2248 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2249 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2250 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2252 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2253 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2254 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
2255 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2256 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
2257 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2261 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2262 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2263 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2264 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2265 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2266 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2267 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2271 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2272 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2273 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2274 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2275 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2276 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2277 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2281 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2282 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2283 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2284 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2285 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2289 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2290 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2291 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2292 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2293 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2295 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2299 let chan_reserve_msat =
2300 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2301 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2305 if !self.is_outbound() {
2306 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2307 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2308 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2309 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2310 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2311 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2312 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2313 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2314 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2315 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2316 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2317 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2318 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2319 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2320 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2323 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2324 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2325 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2326 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2330 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2333 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2337 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2338 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2339 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2343 // Now update local state:
2344 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2345 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2346 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2347 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2348 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2349 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2350 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2355 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2357 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2358 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2359 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2360 match check_preimage {
2362 Some(payment_hash) =>
2363 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2364 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2368 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2369 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2370 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2371 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2373 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2379 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2382 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2383 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2386 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2390 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2391 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2394 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2395 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2398 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2402 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2406 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2407 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2410 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2414 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2418 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2419 where L::Target: Logger
2421 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2422 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2424 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2425 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2427 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2428 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2431 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2433 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2435 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw) = {
2436 let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2437 let commitment_txid = {
2438 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2439 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2440 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2442 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2443 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2444 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2445 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2446 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2447 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2451 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.3.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2452 (commitment_tx.2, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid, commitment_tx.1)
2455 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2456 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2457 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2458 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2460 if update_fee { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); }
2461 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2463 let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2464 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2465 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2468 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2470 if self.is_outbound() {
2471 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2472 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2473 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2474 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2475 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2476 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2477 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2478 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2479 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2480 assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2486 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2487 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2490 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2491 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2492 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2493 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2494 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw,
2495 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc,
2496 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2498 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2499 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2500 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2501 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2502 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2503 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2504 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2506 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2508 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2512 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2515 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2516 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2517 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2520 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2521 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx)
2522 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
2523 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2525 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2526 let mut need_commitment = false;
2527 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
2528 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2529 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2530 need_commitment = true;
2534 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2535 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2536 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2537 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2538 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2539 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2543 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2544 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2545 Some(forward_info.clone())
2547 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2548 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2549 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2550 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2551 need_commitment = true;
2554 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2555 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2556 Some(fail_reason.take())
2558 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2559 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2560 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2561 need_commitment = true;
2565 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2566 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2567 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2568 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2570 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2571 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2572 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2573 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2574 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2575 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2576 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2577 // includes the right HTLCs.
2578 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2579 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2580 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2581 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2582 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2583 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2585 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
2586 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2587 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2590 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2591 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2592 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2593 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2594 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2595 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2596 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2597 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2598 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2602 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
2603 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
2605 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2606 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2607 per_commitment_secret,
2608 next_per_commitment_point,
2609 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
2612 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
2613 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
2614 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
2615 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2616 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 &&
2617 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2618 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
2619 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
2622 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2623 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2624 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2625 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2626 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2627 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
2628 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2630 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2631 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2632 updates: Vec::new(),
2635 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2636 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2637 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2638 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2639 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2640 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2641 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2642 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2643 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2644 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2645 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2646 // to rebalance channels.
2647 match &htlc_update {
2648 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2649 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2650 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2653 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2654 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
2655 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2656 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2657 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2658 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2659 // into the holding cell without ever being
2660 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2661 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2662 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2665 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2671 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2672 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
2673 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
2674 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
2675 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
2676 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
2677 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
2678 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2679 (msg, monitor_update)
2680 } else { unreachable!() };
2681 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2682 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2684 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2685 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), logger) {
2686 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
2687 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
2688 // `get_update_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself
2689 // must not fail - we should never end up in a state where we
2690 // double-fail an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates
2691 // we didn't wait for a full revocation before failing.
2692 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
2695 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2697 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2704 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2705 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2707 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
2708 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2709 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
2710 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2711 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2712 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2718 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2719 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2720 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2721 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2722 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2724 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
2725 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
2726 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
2728 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2730 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2732 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2735 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2737 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2741 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2742 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2743 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2744 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2745 /// revoke_and_ack message.
2746 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2747 where L::Target: Logger,
2749 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2750 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2752 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2755 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2756 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2759 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
2761 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2762 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2767 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2768 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2769 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2770 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2771 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2772 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2773 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2774 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2778 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2780 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2781 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2784 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
2785 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2787 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
2789 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2790 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2791 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2792 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2793 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2794 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2795 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2796 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2800 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2801 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2802 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2803 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2804 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2805 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2806 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2807 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2809 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2810 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2811 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2812 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2813 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2814 let mut require_commitment = false;
2815 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2818 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2819 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2820 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2822 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2823 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2824 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2825 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2826 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2827 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2832 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2833 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2834 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2835 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2836 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2838 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2839 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2844 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2845 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2847 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2851 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2852 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2854 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2855 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2856 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2857 require_commitment = true;
2858 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2859 match forward_info {
2860 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2861 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2862 require_commitment = true;
2864 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2865 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2866 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2868 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2869 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2870 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2874 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2875 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2876 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2877 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2883 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2884 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2885 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2886 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2888 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2889 Some(fail_reason.take())
2891 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2892 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2893 require_commitment = true;
2897 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2899 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2900 match update_state {
2901 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
2902 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
2903 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2904 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2905 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2907 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
2908 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
2909 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2910 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
2911 require_commitment = true;
2912 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2913 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2918 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2919 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2920 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2921 if require_commitment {
2922 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2923 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2924 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2925 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2926 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2927 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2928 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2929 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2930 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2932 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2933 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2934 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2935 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2938 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2939 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2940 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2941 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2942 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2944 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2945 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2946 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2949 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2950 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2951 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2952 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2954 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2956 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2957 if require_commitment {
2958 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2960 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2961 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2962 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2963 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2965 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
2966 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2967 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2968 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2969 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2971 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2974 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2976 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2977 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2983 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2984 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2985 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2986 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2987 if !self.is_outbound() {
2988 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2990 if !self.is_usable() {
2991 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2993 if !self.is_live() {
2994 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2997 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
2998 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3002 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3003 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3005 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3006 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3011 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3012 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
3013 Some(update_fee) => {
3014 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3015 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3021 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3022 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3024 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3026 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3027 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3028 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3029 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3032 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3033 // will be retransmitted.
3034 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3035 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3036 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3038 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3039 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3041 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3042 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3043 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3044 // this HTLC accordingly
3045 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3048 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3049 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3050 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3051 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3054 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3055 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3056 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3057 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3058 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3059 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3064 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3066 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3067 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3068 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3069 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3073 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3074 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3075 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3076 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3077 // the update upon reconnection.
3078 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3082 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3083 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3086 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
3087 /// updates are partially paused.
3088 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
3089 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
3090 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
3091 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
3092 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
3093 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
3094 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
3095 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
3096 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
3097 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3098 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
3099 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3100 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
3103 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3104 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3105 /// to the remote side.
3106 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
3107 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3108 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
3110 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
3111 self.funding_transaction.take()
3114 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
3115 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
3116 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
3117 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
3118 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
3119 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
3120 assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3121 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
3122 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3123 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3124 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3125 next_per_commitment_point,
3129 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
3130 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3131 let mut failures = Vec::new();
3132 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3134 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3135 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3136 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3137 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
3140 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3141 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3143 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3144 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3147 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3148 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3149 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3150 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3151 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3152 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3153 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3154 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
3157 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3158 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3160 if self.is_outbound() {
3161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3163 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3166 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
3167 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate();
3169 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3170 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3171 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3172 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3173 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3174 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3175 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3176 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3177 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3178 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3179 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3181 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3183 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3185 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3191 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3192 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3193 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3194 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3195 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3196 per_commitment_secret,
3197 next_per_commitment_point,
3201 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3202 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3203 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3204 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3205 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3207 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3208 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3209 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3210 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3211 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3212 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3213 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3214 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3215 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3220 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3221 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3223 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3224 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3225 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3226 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3227 reason: err_packet.clone()
3230 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3231 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3232 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3233 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3234 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3235 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3238 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3239 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3240 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3241 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3242 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3249 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3250 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3251 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3252 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3256 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3257 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3258 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3259 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3260 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3261 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3265 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3266 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3267 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3268 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3269 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3270 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3271 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3275 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3276 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3280 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3281 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3282 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3283 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3284 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3285 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3286 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3289 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3290 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
3291 "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
3295 OptionalField::Absent => {}
3299 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3300 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3301 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3303 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3304 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3305 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3306 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3307 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3311 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3312 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
3313 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
3314 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3315 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
3318 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3319 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3322 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
3323 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3324 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3325 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3326 next_per_commitment_point,
3327 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3330 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3331 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3332 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
3334 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3335 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3336 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3339 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3342 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3345 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3346 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3347 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3348 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3349 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3351 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3352 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3353 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3354 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3355 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3356 next_per_commitment_point,
3360 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3361 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3362 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3364 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3367 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3368 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3369 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3370 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3372 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3373 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3374 Err(ChannelError::Warn(_)) | Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) =>
3375 panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3376 Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3377 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3379 Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3380 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), htlcs_to_fail, shutdown_msg));
3384 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3386 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3387 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3388 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3390 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3393 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3394 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3395 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3398 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), Vec::new(), shutdown_msg));
3400 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3404 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3405 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3406 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3407 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> (u64, u64)
3408 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3410 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3412 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3413 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3414 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3415 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3416 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3417 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3419 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3420 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3421 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3422 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3423 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3425 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3426 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3427 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3428 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3431 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
3432 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
3433 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
3434 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
3435 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
3436 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
3437 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
3438 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3439 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3440 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
3441 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
3442 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
3443 // target feerate-calculated fee.
3444 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
3445 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
3447 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
3450 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
3451 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
3454 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
3455 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
3456 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
3457 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
3458 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
3459 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
3460 self.channel_state &
3461 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
3462 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)
3463 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
3464 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
3467 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
3468 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
3469 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
3470 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3471 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3472 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
3473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
3475 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
3481 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L)
3482 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3483 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3485 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
3486 return Ok((None, None));
3489 if !self.is_outbound() {
3490 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
3491 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
3493 return Ok((None, None));
3496 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3498 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3499 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
3500 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
3501 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
3503 let sig = self.holder_signer
3504 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3505 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
3507 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
3508 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3509 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3510 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3512 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3513 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
3514 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
3519 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
3520 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
3521 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3522 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>
3524 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3525 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3527 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3528 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3529 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3530 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3531 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3533 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3534 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3535 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3538 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3540 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match ShutdownScript::try_from((msg.scriptpubkey.clone(), their_features)) {
3541 Ok(script) => script.into_inner(),
3542 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex()))),
3545 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3546 if Some(&shutdown_scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3547 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", shutdown_scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3550 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3553 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
3554 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
3555 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3556 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3558 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
3561 assert!(send_shutdown);
3562 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
3563 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
3564 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
3566 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3571 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3573 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3574 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3576 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
3577 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3578 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3579 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3580 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
3581 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3585 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
3586 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3587 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3588 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3592 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3593 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3594 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3595 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3596 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3597 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3599 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3600 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3607 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3608 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3610 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3613 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3614 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3615 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3616 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3618 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3620 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3621 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3622 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3623 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3624 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3626 tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3627 tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3629 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3630 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3632 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3635 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3636 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3638 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3639 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3641 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3642 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3644 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3645 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3647 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3651 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
3652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
3655 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 != 0 {
3656 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
3657 return Ok((None, None));
3660 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3661 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3662 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
3665 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3667 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3670 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3671 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3672 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3673 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3674 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3678 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3679 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3680 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3681 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3682 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3683 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3684 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3688 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
3690 macro_rules! propose_fee {
3691 ($new_fee: expr) => {
3692 let (mut tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3693 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
3695 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
3698 let sig = self.holder_signer
3699 .sign_closing_transaction(&tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3700 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3702 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3703 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3704 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3705 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3709 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
3710 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3711 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3712 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
3714 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
3715 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
3716 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
3722 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
3723 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
3724 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
3726 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
3727 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
3729 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3730 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
3733 if !self.is_outbound() {
3734 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
3735 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
3736 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
3737 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
3739 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3740 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
3741 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
3743 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
3744 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3747 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
3748 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
3749 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3750 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
3751 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
3752 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3753 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
3754 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
3756 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
3759 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
3760 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3761 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
3762 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
3764 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
3768 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
3769 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
3770 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
3771 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
3773 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
3779 // Public utilities:
3781 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3785 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
3789 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3790 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3791 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3795 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3796 /// is_usable() returns true).
3797 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3798 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3799 self.short_channel_id
3802 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3803 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3804 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3805 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3808 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3809 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3812 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3813 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3816 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
3817 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
3818 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
3821 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3822 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3825 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3826 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3827 self.counterparty_node_id
3830 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3832 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3833 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3836 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3837 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3839 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3840 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3841 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3842 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3844 Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3848 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3849 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3850 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3853 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3854 self.channel_value_satoshis
3857 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3858 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
3861 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3862 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3865 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3866 self.config.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
3869 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3873 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3874 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
3875 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
3876 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
3877 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
3878 // which are near the dust limit.
3879 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3880 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3881 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
3883 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
3886 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3887 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3890 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3891 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3894 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3895 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3899 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3904 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3906 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3907 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3908 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
3909 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3910 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3911 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3913 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3915 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3923 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3924 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3928 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3929 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3930 self.update_time_counter
3933 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3934 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3937 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3938 self.config.announced_channel
3941 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3942 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3945 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3946 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3947 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
3948 self.config.forwarding_fee_base_msat
3951 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3952 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3953 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3956 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3957 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3958 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3959 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3960 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3963 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3964 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3965 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3966 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3967 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
3970 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3971 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3972 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3973 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3976 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3977 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3978 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3981 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
3982 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3983 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
3986 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
3987 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3988 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
3991 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3992 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3993 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3994 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3995 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
3996 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4001 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4002 self.channel_update_status
4005 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4006 self.channel_update_status = status;
4009 fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
4010 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4014 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4015 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4016 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4019 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4023 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4024 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4025 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
4027 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
4028 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4029 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4031 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
4032 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4034 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
4035 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
4037 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4041 if need_commitment_update {
4042 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
4043 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4044 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
4045 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4046 next_per_commitment_point,
4049 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
4055 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4056 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4057 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4058 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
4059 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4060 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4061 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4062 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4063 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
4064 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
4065 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4066 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4067 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4068 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4069 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
4070 if self.is_outbound() {
4071 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4072 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4073 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4074 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4075 // channel and move on.
4076 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4077 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4079 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4080 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
4081 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4082 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
4085 if self.is_outbound() {
4086 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4087 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4088 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4089 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4090 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4091 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4095 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4096 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4097 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4098 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4099 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4103 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
4104 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4105 // may have already happened for this block).
4106 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
4107 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4108 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
4111 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4112 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4113 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4114 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
4115 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4116 data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
4125 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4126 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4127 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4128 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4130 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4131 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4134 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4136 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, logger: &L)
4137 -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4138 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4139 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
4140 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4142 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4143 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4144 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4152 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4154 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
4155 log_info!(logger, "Sending a funding_locked to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
4156 return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
4159 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4160 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
4161 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
4162 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4163 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4164 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4165 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4166 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
4167 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4170 // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
4171 // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
4172 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4173 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4174 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap() as i64 / 2 {
4175 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
4176 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4177 data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations),
4182 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
4185 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4186 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4187 /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
4188 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
4189 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4190 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4191 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4192 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4193 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4194 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4195 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4196 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
4197 match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, logger) {
4198 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
4199 assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4200 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4206 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4211 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4212 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4214 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
4215 if !self.is_outbound() {
4216 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
4218 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
4219 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
4222 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4223 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4226 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4227 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4231 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4232 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
4233 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
4234 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4235 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4236 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4237 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4238 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
4239 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4240 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4241 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4242 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4243 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4244 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4245 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4246 first_per_commitment_point,
4247 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
4248 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4249 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4250 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4255 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
4256 if self.is_outbound() {
4257 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
4259 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4260 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
4262 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4263 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
4266 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4267 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
4269 msgs::AcceptChannel {
4270 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
4271 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4272 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4273 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
4274 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4275 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
4276 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
4277 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
4278 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
4279 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
4280 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
4281 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
4282 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
4283 first_per_commitment_point,
4284 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4285 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
4286 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
4291 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
4292 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4293 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4294 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).0;
4295 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4296 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
4299 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
4300 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
4301 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
4302 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
4303 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
4304 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
4305 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
4306 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4307 if !self.is_outbound() {
4308 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
4310 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
4311 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
4313 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
4314 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4315 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4316 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
4319 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
4320 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
4322 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
4325 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
4326 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4331 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
4333 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
4335 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
4336 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
4337 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
4339 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
4340 temporary_channel_id,
4341 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
4342 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
4347 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
4348 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
4349 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
4350 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4351 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4353 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
4354 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
4356 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4357 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
4358 if !self.config.announced_channel {
4359 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4361 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
4362 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
4364 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
4365 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
4368 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
4370 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4371 features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
4373 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4374 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
4375 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
4376 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
4377 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
4378 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4381 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
4382 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4387 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4389 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4390 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
4391 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
4393 let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
4394 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4395 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4396 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4397 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4398 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4399 contents: announcement,
4402 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4406 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4407 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4408 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4409 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
4410 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
4412 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4414 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4415 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4416 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4417 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4419 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4420 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4421 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4422 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4425 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4427 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
4430 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4431 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4432 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
4433 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
4435 Err(_) => return None,
4437 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4438 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) {
4439 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4444 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4445 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4446 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4447 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4448 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
4449 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
4450 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
4451 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
4452 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
4453 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
4454 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
4455 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
4456 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
4457 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
4458 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
4459 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4460 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4461 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
4462 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
4465 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4466 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
4467 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
4468 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
4471 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
4472 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4473 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
4474 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
4475 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
4476 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
4477 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
4478 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
4480 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
4481 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
4482 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4483 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
4484 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
4485 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
4486 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
4487 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
4488 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
4490 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
4496 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
4498 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
4499 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
4501 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
4503 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
4504 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
4506 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateFailed, we cannot commit to a new state as we
4507 /// may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to regenerate
4510 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to calling any other methods on this Channel!
4512 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
4513 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
4514 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4515 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
4517 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
4518 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
4519 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
4522 if amount_msat == 0 {
4523 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4526 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4527 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4530 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
4531 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4532 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4533 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4534 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4535 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4536 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4537 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
4540 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4541 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4542 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4543 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4545 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4546 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4547 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4550 if !self.is_outbound() {
4551 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4552 let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4553 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
4554 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4555 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4556 if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4557 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4561 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4562 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4563 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4564 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4565 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4566 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4570 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = (self.get_dust_buffer_feerate() as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4571 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4572 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
4573 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4574 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4575 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
4579 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
4580 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4581 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4584 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4585 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4586 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4587 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4589 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4590 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4593 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4594 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4595 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
4596 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4597 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4600 // Now update local state:
4601 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4602 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4607 onion_routing_packet,
4612 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4613 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4615 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4617 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4621 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4622 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4623 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4627 onion_routing_packet,
4629 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4634 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4635 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4636 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4637 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4638 pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4639 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4640 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4642 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4643 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4645 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4646 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4648 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4649 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4651 let mut have_updates = self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4652 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4653 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4654 have_updates = true;
4656 if have_updates { break; }
4658 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4659 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4660 have_updates = true;
4662 if have_updates { break; }
4665 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4667 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4669 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4670 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4671 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
4672 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4673 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4675 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4676 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4677 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4679 if let Some(state) = new_state {
4680 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4684 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4685 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4686 Some(fail_reason.take())
4688 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
4689 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4692 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4693 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
4694 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
4695 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4696 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4697 self.pending_update_fee = None;
4700 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4702 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4703 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4704 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4705 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4706 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4707 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4709 Err(e) => return Err(e),
4712 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4713 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4714 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4715 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4716 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4717 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4718 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4719 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4722 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4723 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4726 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4727 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4728 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4729 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4730 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
4731 let feerate_per_kw = counterparty_commitment_tx.1;
4732 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4733 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4735 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4737 if !self.is_outbound() {
4738 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4739 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4740 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4741 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4742 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4743 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4744 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4745 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4746 let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.2);
4747 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4754 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.3.len());
4755 for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.3.iter() {
4759 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4760 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4762 htlc_signatures = res.1;
4764 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
4765 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4766 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4767 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4769 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4770 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
4771 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4772 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4773 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4774 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4778 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4779 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4782 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.3)))
4785 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4786 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4787 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4789 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4790 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4791 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4792 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4793 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4799 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4800 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4801 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4804 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4805 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4806 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4808 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4809 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4810 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4811 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4817 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4818 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4819 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
4820 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
4821 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4822 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4823 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4824 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4827 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4828 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4829 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4831 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4832 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4835 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4836 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4837 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4840 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4843 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4844 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4845 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
4847 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4852 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4853 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
4854 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4855 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4857 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4859 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4861 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4862 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4863 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4864 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4865 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4866 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4870 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
4871 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4872 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4875 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4876 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4877 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4878 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4879 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4881 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4882 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4889 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4892 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4893 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4894 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4895 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4896 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4897 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4898 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4899 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4900 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4901 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4902 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4904 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4905 // return them to fail the payment.
4906 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4907 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4909 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4910 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4915 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4916 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4917 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4918 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4919 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4920 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4921 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4922 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4923 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4924 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4925 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4926 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4927 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4932 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4933 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4934 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4938 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
4939 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4941 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
4947 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4948 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4949 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4950 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4951 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4953 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4954 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4955 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4956 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4962 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4963 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4964 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4965 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4966 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4967 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4972 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4973 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
4974 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4977 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4979 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4981 // Write out the old serialization for the config object. This is read by version-1
4982 // deserializers, but we will read the version in the TLV at the end instead.
4983 self.config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4984 self.config.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4985 self.config.announced_channel.write(writer)?;
4986 self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4988 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4989 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4990 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4992 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4994 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4995 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4996 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4997 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4998 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4999 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
5001 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
5002 // deserialized from that format.
5003 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
5004 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
5005 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
5007 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
5009 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5010 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
5011 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
5013 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
5014 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5015 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5016 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
5019 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5020 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5021 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
5024 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5025 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5026 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5027 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5029 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
5030 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
5032 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5034 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
5036 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
5038 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5041 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
5043 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
5048 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5049 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5050 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5051 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5052 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5053 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5054 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
5056 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
5058 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
5060 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
5063 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
5064 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
5065 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
5068 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
5070 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5072 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
5074 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5079 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5080 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5082 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
5084 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
5085 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
5086 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5087 source.write(writer)?;
5088 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
5090 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
5092 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
5093 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5095 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
5097 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5098 err_packet.write(writer)?;
5103 match self.resend_order {
5104 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
5105 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
5108 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
5109 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
5110 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
5112 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5113 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
5114 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
5115 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5118 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5119 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
5120 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
5121 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
5122 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
5125 if self.is_outbound() {
5126 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
5127 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5128 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed, drop it.
5129 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
5131 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
5133 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
5135 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
5136 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
5137 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
5138 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
5140 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
5141 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
5142 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
5143 // consider the stale state on reload.
5146 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
5147 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
5148 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
5150 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5151 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
5152 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
5154 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
5155 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
5157 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
5158 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
5159 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
5161 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
5162 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
5164 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
5167 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
5168 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
5169 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
5171 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
5174 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
5175 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
5177 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5178 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
5179 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
5181 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
5183 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
5185 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
5187 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5188 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
5189 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5190 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
5191 htlc.write(writer)?;
5194 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
5195 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
5196 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
5197 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
5198 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
5199 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
5200 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
5202 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
5203 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5204 (5, self.config, required),
5205 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5206 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
5213 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
5214 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
5215 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
5216 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
5217 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
5219 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5221 let mut config = Some(ChannelConfig::default());
5223 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
5224 config.as_mut().unwrap().forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
5225 config.as_mut().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
5226 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
5227 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5229 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
5230 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5233 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5234 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
5235 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5237 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5239 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5240 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
5241 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
5242 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
5243 let mut data = [0; 1024];
5244 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
5245 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
5246 keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
5248 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
5250 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
5251 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
5252 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
5255 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
5257 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5258 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
5259 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5261 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5262 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5263 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
5264 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5265 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5266 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5267 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5268 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5269 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5270 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
5271 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5272 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5273 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5274 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5279 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5280 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5281 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
5282 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5283 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5284 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5285 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5286 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5287 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5288 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5289 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
5290 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5291 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
5292 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
5293 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
5294 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5299 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5300 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
5301 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
5302 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5303 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5304 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5305 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
5306 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
5307 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
5308 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5310 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
5311 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
5312 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5314 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
5315 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
5316 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
5318 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5322 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5323 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5324 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5325 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5328 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
5329 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
5330 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
5332 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5333 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5334 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
5335 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5338 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5339 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
5340 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
5341 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
5344 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
5346 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
5348 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5349 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5350 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
5351 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
5353 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
5354 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
5355 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
5356 // consider the stale state on reload.
5357 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5360 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5361 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5362 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
5364 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5367 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
5368 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
5369 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5371 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5372 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
5373 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5374 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
5376 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5377 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5379 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5380 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5382 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5383 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
5384 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
5386 let mut minimum_depth = None;
5388 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
5389 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
5391 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
5392 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5395 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
5397 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5398 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
5399 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
5400 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
5402 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
5405 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
5406 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
5408 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5410 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
5411 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
5413 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
5414 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
5416 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
5418 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5419 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
5420 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5422 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
5423 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
5424 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
5428 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
5429 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
5430 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
5432 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
5438 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
5439 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
5440 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
5441 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
5442 (1, minimum_depth, option),
5443 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
5444 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
5445 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
5446 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
5449 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5450 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5455 config: config.unwrap(),
5459 channel_value_satoshis,
5461 latest_monitor_update_id,
5464 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5467 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5468 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5471 pending_inbound_htlcs,
5472 pending_outbound_htlcs,
5473 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
5477 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
5478 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
5479 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
5480 monitor_pending_forwards,
5481 monitor_pending_failures,
5484 holding_cell_update_fee,
5485 next_holder_htlc_id,
5486 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
5487 update_time_counter,
5490 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5491 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5492 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5493 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
5495 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5496 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5497 closing_fee_limits: None,
5498 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
5500 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
5501 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
5504 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
5505 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5506 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5507 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5508 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
5509 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5510 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
5513 counterparty_forwarding_info,
5515 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
5516 funding_transaction,
5518 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
5519 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
5520 counterparty_node_id,
5522 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5526 channel_update_status,
5527 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5531 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5532 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5533 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5534 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5536 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5538 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
5539 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
5546 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
5547 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
5548 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
5549 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
5550 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
5551 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5552 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
5553 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
5555 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
5556 use ln::channelmanager::HTLCSource;
5557 use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
5558 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
5559 use ln::features::InitFeatures;
5560 use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
5561 use ln::script::ShutdownScript;
5563 use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
5564 use chain::BestBlock;
5565 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
5566 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
5567 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
5568 use util::config::UserConfig;
5569 use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
5570 use util::errors::APIError;
5571 use util::test_utils;
5572 use util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
5573 use util::logger::Logger;
5574 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
5575 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
5576 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
5577 use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
5578 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
5579 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
5580 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
5581 use core::num::NonZeroU8;
5585 struct TestFeeEstimator {
5588 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
5589 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
5595 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
5596 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
5597 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
5601 signer: InMemorySigner,
5603 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
5604 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
5606 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
5607 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
5608 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5609 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5610 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
5611 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
5614 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
5615 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
5616 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5617 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
5620 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
5623 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
5624 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
5625 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
5628 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
5629 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
5633 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
5634 let features = InitFeatures::known().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
5635 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
5636 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(NonZeroU8::new(16).unwrap(), &[0, 40]).unwrap();
5638 let seed = [42; 32];
5639 let network = Network::Testnet;
5640 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5641 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
5642 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
5645 let fee_estimator = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 };
5646 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5647 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5648 let config = UserConfig::default();
5649 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config) {
5650 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
5651 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
5653 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
5654 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
5658 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
5659 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
5661 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
5662 let original_fee = 253;
5663 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
5664 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5665 let seed = [42; 32];
5666 let network = Network::Testnet;
5667 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5669 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5670 let config = UserConfig::default();
5671 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5673 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
5674 // same as the old fee.
5675 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
5676 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5677 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5681 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5682 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5683 // dust limits are used.
5684 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5685 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5686 let seed = [42; 32];
5687 let network = Network::Testnet;
5688 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5690 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5691 // they have different dust limits.
5693 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5694 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5695 let config = UserConfig::default();
5696 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5698 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5699 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5700 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5701 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5702 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5704 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5705 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5706 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5707 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5708 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5710 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5711 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5712 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5714 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5715 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5716 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5717 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5720 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5722 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5723 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5724 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5725 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5726 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5728 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5729 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5733 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5734 // the dust limit check.
5735 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5736 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5737 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5738 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5740 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5741 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5742 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5743 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5744 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5745 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5746 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5750 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5751 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5752 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5753 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5754 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5755 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5756 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5757 let seed = [42; 32];
5758 let network = Network::Testnet;
5759 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5761 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5762 let config = UserConfig::default();
5763 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5765 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5766 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5768 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5769 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5770 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5771 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5772 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5773 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5775 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5776 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5777 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5778 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5779 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5781 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5783 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5784 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5785 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5786 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5787 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5789 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5790 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5791 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5792 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5793 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5797 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5798 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5799 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5800 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5801 let seed = [42; 32];
5802 let network = Network::Testnet;
5803 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5804 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5805 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5807 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5809 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5810 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5811 let config = UserConfig::default();
5812 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5814 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5815 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5816 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5817 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5819 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5820 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5821 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, &InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5823 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5824 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5825 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5826 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5828 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5829 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5830 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5832 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5833 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5835 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5836 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5837 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5838 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5839 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5840 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5841 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5842 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5843 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5848 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5850 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5851 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5852 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5853 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5854 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5855 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5856 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5863 fn channel_update() {
5864 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5865 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5866 let seed = [42; 32];
5867 let network = Network::Testnet;
5868 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5869 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5871 // Create a channel.
5872 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5873 let config = UserConfig::default();
5874 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5875 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5876 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5877 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5879 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5880 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5881 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5883 short_channel_id: 0,
5886 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5887 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5888 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5890 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5891 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5893 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5895 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5897 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5898 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5899 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5900 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5902 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5903 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5904 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5906 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5911 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5912 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5913 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5914 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5915 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5917 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5919 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5920 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5921 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5922 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5923 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5925 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5926 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5931 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5932 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5933 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5935 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5936 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5937 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5938 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &InitFeatures::known(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5939 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5940 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
5942 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5944 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5945 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5946 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5947 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5948 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5949 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5951 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5952 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5953 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5954 selected_contest_delay: 144
5956 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5957 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5959 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5960 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5962 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5963 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5965 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5966 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5968 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5969 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5970 // build_commitment_transaction.
5971 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5972 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5973 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5974 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5975 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5977 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5978 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5979 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5981 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5982 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
5984 let htlcs = res.3.drain(..)
5985 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5989 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5990 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5991 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5992 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5993 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5994 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5996 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5997 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5998 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5999 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
6001 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6002 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
6003 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
6005 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
6007 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6008 commitment_tx.clone(),
6009 counterparty_signature,
6010 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
6011 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6012 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6014 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
6015 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
6017 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
6018 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
6019 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
6021 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
6022 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
6025 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6027 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
6028 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
6029 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
6030 &htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
6031 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
6032 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
6033 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
6035 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
6038 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
6039 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
6040 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
6044 assert!(preimage.is_some());
6047 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
6048 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
6050 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6051 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
6052 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
6053 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
6054 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
6055 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
6056 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
6058 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
6062 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
6063 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
6065 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
6066 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
6067 "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", {});
6069 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6070 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6072 amount_msat: 1000000,
6074 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6075 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6077 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
6080 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6081 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6083 amount_msat: 2000000,
6085 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6086 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6088 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6091 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6092 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6094 amount_msat: 2000000,
6096 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6097 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6098 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6100 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
6103 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6104 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6106 amount_msat: 3000000,
6108 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6109 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6110 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6112 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
6115 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6116 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6118 amount_msat: 4000000,
6120 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6121 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6123 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
6127 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6128 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6129 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
6131 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
6132 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
6133 "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", {
6136 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
6137 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
6138 "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" },
6141 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
6142 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
6143 "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" },
6146 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
6147 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
6148 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b02000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d4335201483045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
6151 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
6152 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
6153 "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" },
6156 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
6157 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
6158 "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" }
6161 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6162 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6163 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
6165 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
6166 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
6167 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
6170 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
6171 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
6172 "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" },
6175 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
6176 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
6177 "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" },
6180 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
6181 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
6182 "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" },
6185 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
6186 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
6187 "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" },
6190 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
6191 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
6192 "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" }
6195 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6196 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6197 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
6199 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
6200 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
6201 "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", {
6204 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
6205 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
6206 "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" },
6209 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
6210 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
6211 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
6214 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
6215 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
6216 "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" },
6219 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
6220 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
6221 "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" }
6224 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6225 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6226 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
6228 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
6229 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
6230 "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", {
6233 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
6234 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
6235 "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" },
6238 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
6239 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
6240 "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" },
6243 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
6244 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
6245 "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" },
6248 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
6249 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
6250 "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" }
6253 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6254 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6255 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
6257 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
6258 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
6259 "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", {
6262 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
6263 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
6264 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
6267 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
6268 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
6269 "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" },
6272 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
6273 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
6274 "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" }
6277 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6278 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6279 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
6281 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
6282 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
6283 "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", {
6286 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
6287 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
6288 "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" },
6291 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
6292 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
6293 "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" },
6296 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
6297 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
6298 "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" }
6301 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6302 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6303 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
6305 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
6306 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
6307 "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", {
6310 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
6311 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
6312 "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" },
6315 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
6316 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
6317 "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" }
6320 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6321 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6322 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
6324 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
6325 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
6326 "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", {
6329 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
6330 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
6331 "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" },
6334 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
6335 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
6336 "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" }
6339 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6340 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6341 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
6343 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
6344 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
6345 "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", {
6348 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
6349 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
6350 "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" }
6353 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6354 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6355 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
6357 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
6358 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
6359 "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", {
6362 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
6363 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
6364 "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" }
6367 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6368 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6369 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
6371 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
6372 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
6373 "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", {});
6375 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
6376 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6377 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
6379 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
6380 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
6381 "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", {});
6383 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
6384 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6385 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
6387 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6388 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6389 "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", {});
6391 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
6392 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
6393 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
6395 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
6396 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
6397 "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", {});
6399 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
6400 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
6401 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
6402 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
6403 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
6404 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
6406 amount_msat: 2000000,
6408 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6409 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6411 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
6414 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
6415 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6416 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6418 amount_msat: 5000000,
6420 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6421 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6422 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6424 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6427 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
6428 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
6430 amount_msat: 5000000,
6432 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
6433 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6434 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
6436 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
6440 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
6441 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
6442 "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", {
6445 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
6446 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
6447 "0200000000010189a326e23addc28323dbadcb4e71c2c17088b6e8fa184103e552f44075dddc34000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050048304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c60148304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
6449 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
6450 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
6451 "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" },
6453 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
6454 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
6455 "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" }
6460 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
6461 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
6463 let mut seed = [0; 32];
6464 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
6465 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6466 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
6468 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
6469 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
6470 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
6472 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
6473 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
6475 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
6476 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
6478 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
6479 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
6480 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
6484 fn test_key_derivation() {
6485 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
6486 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6488 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6489 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6491 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
6492 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
6494 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
6495 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
6497 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6498 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
6500 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6501 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
6503 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
6504 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
6506 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
6507 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());