1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
40 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
80 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
82 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
83 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
84 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
85 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
86 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
87 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
89 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
93 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
94 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
95 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
96 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
99 enum InboundHTLCState {
100 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
101 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
102 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
103 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
104 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
105 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
106 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
107 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
108 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
109 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
110 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
111 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
112 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
113 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
114 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
116 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
117 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
120 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
121 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
124 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
125 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
126 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
127 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
128 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
129 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
131 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
132 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
133 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
134 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
135 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
136 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
141 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
143 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
144 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
145 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
146 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
147 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
148 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
149 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
150 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
153 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
157 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
158 state: InboundHTLCState,
161 enum OutboundHTLCState {
162 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
163 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
164 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
165 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
166 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
167 /// money back (though we won't), and,
168 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
169 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
170 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
171 /// we'll never get out of sync).
172 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
173 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
174 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
176 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
177 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
178 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
179 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
180 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
181 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
182 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
183 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
184 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
185 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
186 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
187 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
188 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
189 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
190 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
195 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
196 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
197 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
200 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
201 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
203 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
204 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
209 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
210 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
212 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
218 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
222 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
223 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
228 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
229 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
235 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
243 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
247 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
248 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
249 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
250 /// move on to ChannelReady.
251 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
252 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
253 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
255 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
256 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
257 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
258 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
259 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
260 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
261 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
263 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
264 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
265 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
267 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
268 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
269 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
270 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
271 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
272 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
274 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
275 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
277 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
278 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
279 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
280 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
281 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
282 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
283 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
284 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
285 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
287 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
288 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
289 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
290 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
291 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
292 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
293 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
294 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
295 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
296 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
297 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
298 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
300 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
301 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
303 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
305 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
306 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
307 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
308 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
309 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
310 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
311 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
312 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
314 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
316 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
318 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
322 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
324 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
325 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
326 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
328 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
329 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
331 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
332 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
333 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
334 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
335 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
337 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
338 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
342 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
348 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
351 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
352 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
354 holding_cell_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
358 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
359 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
360 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
361 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
362 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
363 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
364 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
365 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
366 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
367 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
370 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
371 struct HTLCCandidate {
373 origin: HTLCInitiator,
377 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
385 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
387 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
389 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
390 htlc_value_msat: u64,
391 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
396 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
397 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
398 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
399 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
400 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
402 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
403 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
404 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
405 htlc_value_msat: u64,
407 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
408 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
412 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
413 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
414 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
415 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
416 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
421 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
422 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
425 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
426 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
427 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
428 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
429 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
430 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
431 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
432 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
435 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
436 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
437 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
438 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
439 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
440 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
441 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
442 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
443 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
444 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
445 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
446 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
447 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
448 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
449 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
451 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
452 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
453 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
454 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
456 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
457 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
458 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
459 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
461 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
462 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
463 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
464 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
465 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
467 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
468 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
469 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
470 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
472 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
473 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
474 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
476 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
477 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
478 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
479 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
480 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
482 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
483 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
484 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
487 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
488 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
489 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
490 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
492 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
493 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
494 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
495 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
497 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
501 channel_id: [u8; 32],
504 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
505 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
507 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
508 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
509 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
511 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
512 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
513 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
514 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
516 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
517 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
519 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
521 holder_signer: Signer,
522 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
523 destination_script: Script,
525 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
526 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
527 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
529 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
530 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
531 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
532 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
533 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
534 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
536 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
537 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
538 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
539 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
540 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
541 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
543 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
545 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
546 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
547 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
549 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
550 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
551 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
552 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
553 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
554 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
555 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
557 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
559 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
560 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
561 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
562 // HTLCs with similar state.
563 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
564 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
565 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
566 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
567 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
568 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
569 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
570 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
571 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
574 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
575 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
576 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
578 update_time_counter: u32,
580 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
581 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
582 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
583 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
584 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
585 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
587 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
588 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
590 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
591 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
592 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
593 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
595 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
596 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
598 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
600 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
602 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
603 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
604 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
605 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
606 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
607 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
609 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
610 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
611 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
612 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
613 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
615 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
616 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
617 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
618 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
619 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
620 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
621 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
622 channel_creation_height: u32,
624 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
627 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
629 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
632 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
634 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
637 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
639 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
642 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
645 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
647 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
649 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
650 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
652 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
654 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
655 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
656 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
658 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
660 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
661 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
663 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
664 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
665 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
667 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
669 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
671 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
672 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
673 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
674 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
676 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
677 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
678 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
680 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
681 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
682 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
684 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
685 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
686 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
687 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
688 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
689 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
690 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
691 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
693 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
694 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
695 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
696 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
697 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
699 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
700 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
702 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
703 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
704 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
705 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
706 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
707 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
708 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
709 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
711 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
712 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
714 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
715 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
716 // the channel's funding UTXO.
718 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
719 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
720 // associated channel mapping.
722 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
723 // to store all of them.
724 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
726 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
727 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
728 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
729 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
730 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
732 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
733 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
735 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
736 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
737 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
739 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
740 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
741 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
742 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
743 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<ChannelMonitorUpdate>,
746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
747 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
749 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
750 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
751 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
755 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
757 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
758 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
760 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
764 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
766 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
768 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
770 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
771 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
772 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
773 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
774 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
776 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
777 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
779 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
781 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
782 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
784 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
785 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
786 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
787 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
788 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
789 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
791 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
792 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
794 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
795 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
796 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
797 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
798 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
800 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
801 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
803 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
804 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
806 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
807 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
808 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
809 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
815 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
816 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
818 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
819 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
825 macro_rules! secp_check {
826 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
829 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
834 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
835 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
836 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
837 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
839 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
841 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
842 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
843 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
845 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
848 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
850 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
853 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
854 /// required by us according to the configured or default
855 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
857 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
859 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
860 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
861 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
862 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
863 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
866 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
867 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
868 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
869 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
870 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
871 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
872 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
875 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
876 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
879 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
880 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
881 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
882 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
883 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
884 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
885 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
886 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
887 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
888 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
891 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
892 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
893 // `only_static_remotekey`.
895 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
896 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
897 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
898 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
905 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
906 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
907 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
908 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
909 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
910 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
911 // We've exhausted our options
914 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
915 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
918 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
919 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
920 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
921 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
923 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
924 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
925 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
926 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
927 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
928 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
930 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
932 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
936 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
937 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
938 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
939 outbound_scid_alias: u64
940 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
941 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
942 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
943 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
945 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
946 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
947 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
948 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
950 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
951 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
953 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
954 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
956 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
957 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
958 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
960 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
961 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
963 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
964 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
965 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
966 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
967 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
970 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
971 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
973 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
975 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
976 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
977 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
978 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
981 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
982 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
984 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
985 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
988 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
989 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
990 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
997 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
998 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
999 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1000 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1005 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1007 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1008 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1009 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1011 channel_value_satoshis,
1013 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1016 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1017 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1019 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1020 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1023 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1024 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1025 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1026 pending_update_fee: None,
1027 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1028 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1029 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1030 update_time_counter: 1,
1032 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1034 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1035 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1036 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1037 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1038 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1039 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1041 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1042 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1043 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1044 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1046 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1047 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1048 closing_fee_limits: None,
1049 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1051 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1053 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1054 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1055 short_channel_id: None,
1056 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1058 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1059 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1060 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1061 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1062 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1063 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1064 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1065 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1066 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1067 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1068 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1070 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1072 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1073 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1074 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1075 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1076 counterparty_parameters: None,
1077 funding_outpoint: None,
1078 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1079 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1081 funding_transaction: None,
1083 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1084 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1085 counterparty_node_id,
1087 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1089 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1091 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1092 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1094 announcement_sigs: None,
1096 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1097 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1098 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1099 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1101 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1103 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1104 outbound_scid_alias,
1106 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1108 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1109 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1114 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1118 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1119 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1120 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1122 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1123 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1124 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1125 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1126 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1127 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1128 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1131 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1132 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1133 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1134 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1135 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1136 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1137 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1138 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1140 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1141 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1150 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1151 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1152 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1153 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1154 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1155 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1156 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1157 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1158 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1159 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1160 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1163 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1165 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1166 // support this channel type.
1167 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1168 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1169 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1172 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1173 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1174 // `static_remote_key`.
1175 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1176 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1178 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1179 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1182 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1183 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1185 channel_type.clone()
1187 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1188 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1189 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1193 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1195 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1196 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1197 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1198 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1199 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1200 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1201 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1202 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1203 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1206 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1207 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1210 // Check sanity of message fields:
1211 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1212 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1214 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1217 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1218 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1220 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1221 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1224 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1227 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1230 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1232 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1233 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1236 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1239 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1243 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1244 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1245 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1247 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1250 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1253 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1256 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1259 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1262 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1266 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1268 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1269 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1274 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1275 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1276 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1277 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1280 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1283 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1284 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1285 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1287 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1291 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1292 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1293 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1294 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1295 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1299 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1300 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1301 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1302 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1303 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1306 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1307 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1308 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1309 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1310 if script.len() == 0 {
1313 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1316 Some(script.clone())
1319 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1320 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1326 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1327 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1330 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1331 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1332 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1336 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1337 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1339 let chan = Channel {
1342 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1343 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1345 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1350 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1352 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1353 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1354 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1357 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1360 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1361 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1363 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1365 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1367 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1369 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1370 pending_update_fee: None,
1371 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1372 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1373 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1374 update_time_counter: 1,
1376 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1378 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1379 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1380 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1381 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1383 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1385 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1386 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1387 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1388 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1390 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1391 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1392 closing_fee_limits: None,
1393 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1395 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1397 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1398 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1399 short_channel_id: None,
1400 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1402 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1403 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1404 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1405 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1406 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1407 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1408 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1409 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1410 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1411 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1412 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1413 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1415 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1417 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1418 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1419 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1420 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1421 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1422 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1423 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1425 funding_outpoint: None,
1426 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1427 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1429 funding_transaction: None,
1431 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1432 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1433 counterparty_node_id,
1435 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1437 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1439 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1440 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1442 announcement_sigs: None,
1444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1445 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1446 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1447 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1449 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1451 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1452 outbound_scid_alias,
1454 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1456 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1457 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1462 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1468 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1469 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1470 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1471 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1472 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1474 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1475 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1476 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1477 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1478 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1479 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1480 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1482 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1483 where L::Target: Logger
1485 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1486 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1487 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1489 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1490 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1491 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1492 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1494 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1495 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1496 if match update_state {
1497 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1498 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1499 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1500 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1501 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1503 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1507 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1508 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1509 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1510 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1512 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1513 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1514 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1516 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1517 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1518 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1519 transaction_output_index: None
1524 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1525 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1526 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1527 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1528 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1531 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1533 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1534 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1535 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1537 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1538 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1541 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1542 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1545 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1547 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1548 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1549 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1551 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1552 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1558 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1559 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1560 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1562 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1563 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1564 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1568 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1569 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1571 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1573 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1574 if generated_by_local {
1575 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1576 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1585 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1587 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1588 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1589 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1591 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1592 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1593 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1596 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1597 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1598 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1599 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1603 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1604 preimages.push(preimage);
1608 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1609 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1611 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1613 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1614 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1616 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1617 if !generated_by_local {
1618 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1626 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1627 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1628 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1629 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1630 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1631 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1632 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1633 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1635 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1637 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1638 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1639 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1640 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1642 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1644 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1645 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1646 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1647 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1650 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1651 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1652 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1653 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1655 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1658 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1659 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1660 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1661 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1663 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1666 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1667 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1672 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1673 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1678 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1680 let channel_parameters =
1681 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1682 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1683 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1686 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1691 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1694 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1695 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1696 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1697 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1699 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1700 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1701 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1709 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1710 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1716 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1717 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1718 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1719 // outside of those situations will fail.
1720 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1724 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1729 1 + // script length (0)
1733 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1734 2 + // witness marker and flag
1735 1 + // witness element count
1736 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1737 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1738 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1739 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1740 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1741 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1743 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1744 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1745 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1751 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1752 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1753 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1754 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1756 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1757 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1758 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1760 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1761 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1762 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1763 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1764 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1765 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1768 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1769 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1772 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1773 value_to_holder = 0;
1776 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1777 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1778 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1779 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1781 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1782 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1785 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1786 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1790 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1791 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1792 /// our counterparty!)
1793 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1794 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1795 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1796 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1797 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1798 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1799 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1801 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1805 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1806 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1807 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1808 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1809 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1810 //may see payments to it!
1811 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1812 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1813 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1815 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1818 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1819 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1820 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1821 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1822 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1825 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1828 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1829 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1831 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1833 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1834 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1835 where L::Target: Logger {
1836 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1837 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1838 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1839 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1840 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1841 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1842 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1843 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1847 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1848 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1849 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1850 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1852 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1853 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1855 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1857 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1859 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1860 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1861 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1863 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1864 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1865 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1866 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1867 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1869 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1870 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1871 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1873 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1874 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1876 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1879 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1880 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1884 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1888 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1889 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1890 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1891 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1892 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1893 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1896 // Now update local state:
1898 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1899 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1900 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1901 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1902 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1903 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1904 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1908 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1909 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1910 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1911 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1912 // do not not get into this branch.
1913 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1914 match pending_update {
1915 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1916 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1917 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1918 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1920 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1921 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1924 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1925 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1926 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1927 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1928 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1929 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1930 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1936 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1937 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1938 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1940 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1941 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1942 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1944 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1945 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1948 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1949 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1951 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1952 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1954 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1955 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1958 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1961 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1962 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1963 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1964 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1969 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1970 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1971 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(_) } => {
1972 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
1973 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1974 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1975 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1976 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1977 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1978 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1979 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1980 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1984 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } => {
1985 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
1986 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
1987 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
1988 monitor_update: self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap(),
1992 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
1996 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1997 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1998 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1999 /// before we fail backwards.
2001 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2002 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2003 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2004 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2005 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2006 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2007 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2010 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2011 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2012 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2013 /// before we fail backwards.
2015 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2016 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2017 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2018 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2019 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2020 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2021 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2023 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2025 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2026 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2027 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2029 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2030 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2031 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2033 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2034 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2035 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2037 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2042 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2043 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2049 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2050 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2051 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2052 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2053 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2057 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2058 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2059 force_holding_cell = true;
2062 // Now update local state:
2063 if force_holding_cell {
2064 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2065 match pending_update {
2066 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2067 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2068 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2069 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2073 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2074 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2075 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2076 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2082 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2083 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2084 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2090 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2092 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2093 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2096 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2097 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2098 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2103 // Message handlers:
2105 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2106 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2108 // Check sanity of message fields:
2109 if !self.is_outbound() {
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2112 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2115 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2118 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2121 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2124 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2126 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2128 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2129 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2130 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2132 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2133 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2136 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2137 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2139 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2143 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2144 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2147 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2150 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2153 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2156 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2157 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2159 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2162 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2166 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2167 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2170 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2171 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2173 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2174 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2177 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2180 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2181 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2182 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2183 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2184 if script.len() == 0 {
2187 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2190 Some(script.clone())
2193 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2194 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2200 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2201 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2202 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2203 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2204 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2206 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2207 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2209 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2212 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2213 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2214 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2215 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2216 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2217 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2220 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2221 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2222 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2225 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2226 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2228 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2229 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2234 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2235 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2237 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2238 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2240 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2241 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2242 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2243 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2244 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2245 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2246 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2247 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2248 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2251 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2252 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2254 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2255 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2256 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2257 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2259 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2260 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2262 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2263 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2266 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2267 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2270 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2271 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2272 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2274 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2277 if self.is_outbound() {
2278 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2280 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2281 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2282 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2286 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2289 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2290 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2291 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2292 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2295 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2296 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2297 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2298 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2299 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2301 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2303 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2304 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2308 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2309 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2310 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2314 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2315 initial_commitment_tx,
2318 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2319 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2322 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2323 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2325 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2327 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2328 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2329 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2330 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2331 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2332 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2333 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2334 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2335 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2336 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2337 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2339 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2341 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2343 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2344 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2345 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2346 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2348 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2350 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2351 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2353 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2354 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2356 }, channel_monitor))
2359 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2360 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2361 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2362 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2363 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2365 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2368 if !self.is_outbound() {
2369 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2371 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2372 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2374 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2375 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2376 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2377 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2380 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2382 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2383 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2384 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2385 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2387 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2388 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2390 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2391 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2393 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2394 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2395 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2396 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2397 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2398 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2402 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2403 initial_commitment_tx,
2406 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2407 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2410 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2411 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2414 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2415 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2416 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2417 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2418 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2419 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2420 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2421 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2422 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2423 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2424 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2425 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2427 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2429 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2431 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2432 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2433 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2434 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2436 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2438 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2439 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2443 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2444 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2446 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2447 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2448 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2449 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2451 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2454 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2455 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2456 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2459 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2460 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2461 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2462 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2463 // when routing outbound payments.
2464 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2468 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2470 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2471 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2472 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2473 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2474 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2475 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2476 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2477 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2478 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2480 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2481 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2482 let expected_point =
2483 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2484 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2486 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2487 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2488 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2489 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2490 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2491 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2493 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2494 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2495 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2496 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2497 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2499 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2500 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2504 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2507 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2508 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2510 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2512 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2515 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2516 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2517 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2518 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2524 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2525 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2526 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2527 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2528 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2529 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2530 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2531 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2532 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2535 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2538 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2539 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2540 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2542 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2543 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2544 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2545 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2546 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2547 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2549 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2550 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2556 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2557 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2558 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2559 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2560 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2561 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2562 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2563 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2564 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2567 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2570 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2571 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2572 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2574 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2575 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2576 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2577 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2578 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2579 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2581 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2582 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2586 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2587 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2588 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2589 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2590 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2591 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2592 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2594 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2595 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2597 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2604 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2605 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2606 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2607 /// corner case properly.
2608 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2609 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2610 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2612 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2613 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2614 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2615 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2618 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2620 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2621 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2622 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2625 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2626 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2627 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2628 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2630 outbound_capacity_msat,
2631 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2632 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2633 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2639 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2640 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2643 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2644 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2645 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2646 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2647 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2648 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2651 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2652 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2654 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2655 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2658 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2659 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2660 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2662 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2663 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2665 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2668 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2669 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2671 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2672 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2674 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2675 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2677 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2678 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2682 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2683 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2689 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2690 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2691 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2694 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2695 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2696 included_htlcs += 1;
2699 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2700 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2704 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2705 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2706 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2707 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2708 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2709 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2714 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2716 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2717 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2722 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2723 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2727 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2728 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2729 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2732 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2733 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2735 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2736 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2737 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2739 total_pending_htlcs,
2740 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2741 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2742 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2744 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2745 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2746 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2748 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2750 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2755 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2756 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2757 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2759 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2760 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2762 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2765 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2766 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2768 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2769 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2771 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2772 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2774 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2775 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2779 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2780 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2786 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2787 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2788 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2789 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2790 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2791 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2794 included_htlcs += 1;
2797 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2798 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2801 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2802 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2804 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2805 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2806 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2811 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2812 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2813 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2816 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2817 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2819 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2820 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2822 total_pending_htlcs,
2823 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2824 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2825 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2827 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2828 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2829 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2831 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2833 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2838 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2839 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2840 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2841 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2842 if local_sent_shutdown {
2843 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2845 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2846 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2847 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2850 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2853 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2856 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2859 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2863 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2864 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2865 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2868 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2871 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2872 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2873 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2874 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2875 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2876 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2877 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2878 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2879 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2880 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2881 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2883 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2884 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2885 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2886 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2887 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2888 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2892 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2895 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2896 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2897 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2899 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2900 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2901 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2902 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2903 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2904 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2905 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2909 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2910 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2911 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2912 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2913 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2914 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2915 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2919 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2920 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2921 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2922 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2923 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2927 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2928 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2929 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2930 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2931 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2933 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2934 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2937 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2938 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2941 if !self.is_outbound() {
2942 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2943 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2944 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2945 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2946 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2947 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2948 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2949 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2950 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2951 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2952 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2953 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2954 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2955 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2956 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2959 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2960 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2961 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2962 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2963 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2966 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2967 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2969 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2973 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2974 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2975 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2979 // Now update local state:
2980 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2981 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2982 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2983 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2984 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2985 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2986 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2991 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2993 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2994 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2995 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2996 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2997 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2998 None => fail_reason.into(),
2999 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3000 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3001 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3004 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3008 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3010 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3011 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3013 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3019 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3022 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3023 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3024 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3026 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3027 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3030 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3033 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3034 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3037 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3041 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3045 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3046 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3047 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3049 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3053 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3057 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<&ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelError>
3058 where L::Target: Logger
3060 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3061 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3063 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3066 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3070 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3072 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3074 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3075 let commitment_txid = {
3076 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3077 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3078 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3080 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3081 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3082 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3083 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3084 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3085 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3089 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3091 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3092 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3093 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3094 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3097 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3098 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3099 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3103 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3105 if self.is_outbound() {
3106 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3107 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3108 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3109 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3110 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3111 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3112 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3113 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3114 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3115 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3121 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3125 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3126 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3127 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3128 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3129 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3130 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3131 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3132 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3133 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3134 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3135 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3136 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3137 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3140 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3141 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3142 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3143 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3144 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3145 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3146 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3148 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3149 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3150 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3151 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3152 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3153 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3154 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3157 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3158 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3161 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3163 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3164 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3165 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3168 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3171 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3172 commitment_stats.tx,
3174 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3175 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3176 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3179 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3180 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3182 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3183 let mut need_commitment = false;
3184 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3185 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3186 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3187 need_commitment = true;
3191 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3192 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3193 Some(forward_info.clone())
3195 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3196 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3197 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3198 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3199 need_commitment = true;
3202 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3203 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3204 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3205 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3206 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3207 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3208 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3209 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3210 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3211 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3212 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3213 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3214 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3215 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3217 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3219 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3220 need_commitment = true;
3224 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3225 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3226 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3227 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3228 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3229 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3231 nondust_htlc_sources,
3235 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3236 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3237 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3238 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3240 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3241 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3242 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3243 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3244 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3245 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3246 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3247 // includes the right HTLCs.
3248 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3249 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3250 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3251 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3252 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3253 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3255 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3256 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3257 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3258 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3261 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3262 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3263 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3264 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3265 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3266 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3267 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3268 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3269 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3273 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3274 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3275 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3276 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3277 return Ok(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap());
3280 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3281 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3282 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3283 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3284 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3285 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3286 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3287 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3290 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3291 /// for our counterparty.
3292 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3293 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3294 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3295 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3296 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3298 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3299 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3300 updates: Vec::new(),
3303 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3304 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3305 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3306 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3307 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3308 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3309 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3310 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3311 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3312 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3313 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3314 // to rebalance channels.
3315 match &htlc_update {
3316 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3317 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3318 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3321 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3322 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3323 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3324 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3325 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3326 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3327 // into the holding cell without ever being
3328 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3329 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3330 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3333 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3339 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3340 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3341 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3342 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3343 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3344 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3345 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3346 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3347 (msg, monitor_update)
3348 } else { unreachable!() };
3349 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3350 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3352 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3353 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3354 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3355 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3356 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3357 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3358 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3359 // for a full revocation before failing.
3360 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3363 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3365 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3372 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3373 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3375 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3376 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3381 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3382 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3383 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3384 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3385 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3387 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3388 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3389 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3391 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3392 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3393 (Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()), htlcs_to_fail)
3399 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3400 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3401 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3402 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3403 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3404 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, &ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError>
3405 where L::Target: Logger,
3407 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3410 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3411 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3413 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3417 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3419 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3420 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3421 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3425 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3426 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3427 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3428 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3429 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3430 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3431 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3432 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3433 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3436 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3438 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3439 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3442 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3443 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3445 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3447 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3448 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3449 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3450 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3451 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3452 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3453 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3454 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3458 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3459 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3460 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3461 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3462 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3463 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3464 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3465 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3467 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3468 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3471 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3472 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3473 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3474 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3475 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3476 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3477 let mut require_commitment = false;
3478 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3481 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3482 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3483 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3485 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3486 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3487 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3488 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3489 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3490 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3495 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3496 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3497 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3498 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3499 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3501 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3502 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3503 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3508 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3509 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3511 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3515 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3516 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3518 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3519 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3520 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3521 require_commitment = true;
3522 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3523 match forward_info {
3524 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3525 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3526 require_commitment = true;
3528 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3529 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3530 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3532 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3533 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3534 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3538 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3539 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3540 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3541 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3547 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3548 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3549 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3550 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3552 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3553 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3554 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3555 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3556 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3557 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3558 require_commitment = true;
3562 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3564 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3565 match update_state {
3566 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3567 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3568 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3569 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3570 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3572 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3573 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3574 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3575 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3576 require_commitment = true;
3577 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3578 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3583 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3584 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3585 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3586 if require_commitment {
3587 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3588 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3589 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3590 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3591 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3592 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3593 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3594 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3595 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3597 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3598 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3599 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3600 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3601 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3602 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()));
3605 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3606 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3607 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap();
3608 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3609 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3610 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3611 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3613 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3614 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3615 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3617 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3618 if require_commitment {
3619 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3621 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3622 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3623 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3624 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3626 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3627 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3628 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3629 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3630 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3632 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3633 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3634 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
3635 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
3641 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3642 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3643 /// commitment update.
3644 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3645 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3646 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3649 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3650 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3651 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3652 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3654 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3655 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3656 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3657 if !self.is_outbound() {
3658 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3660 if !self.is_usable() {
3661 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3663 if !self.is_live() {
3664 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3667 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3668 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3669 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3670 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3671 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3672 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3673 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3674 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3675 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3676 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3680 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3681 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3682 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3683 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3684 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3687 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3688 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3692 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3693 force_holding_cell = true;
3696 if force_holding_cell {
3697 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3701 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3702 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3704 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3705 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3710 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3711 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3713 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3715 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3716 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3717 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3718 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3722 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3723 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3724 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3728 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3729 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3732 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3733 // will be retransmitted.
3734 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3735 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3736 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3738 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3739 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3741 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3742 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3743 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3744 // this HTLC accordingly
3745 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3748 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3749 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3750 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3751 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3754 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3755 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3756 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3757 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3758 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3759 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3764 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3766 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3767 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3768 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3769 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3773 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3774 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3775 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3776 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3777 // the update upon reconnection.
3778 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3782 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3783 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3786 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3787 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3788 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3789 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3790 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3791 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3792 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3794 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3795 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3796 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3797 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3798 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3799 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3800 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3802 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3803 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3804 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3805 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3806 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3807 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3808 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3811 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3812 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3813 /// to the remote side.
3814 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3815 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3816 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3817 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3820 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3822 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3823 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3824 self.pending_monitor_updates.clear();
3826 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3827 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3828 // first received the funding_signed.
3829 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3830 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3831 self.funding_transaction.take()
3833 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3834 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3835 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3836 funding_broadcastable = None;
3839 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3840 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3841 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3842 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3843 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3844 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3845 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3846 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3847 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3848 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3849 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3850 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3851 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3852 next_per_commitment_point,
3853 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3857 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3859 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3860 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3861 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3862 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3863 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3864 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3866 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3867 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3868 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3869 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3870 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3871 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3875 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3876 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3878 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3879 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3882 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3883 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3884 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3885 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3886 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3887 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3888 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3889 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3890 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3894 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3895 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3897 if self.is_outbound() {
3898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3900 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3903 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3904 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3906 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3907 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3908 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3909 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3910 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3911 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3912 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3913 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3914 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3915 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3916 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3917 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3918 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3920 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3921 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3922 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3928 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3929 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3930 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3931 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3932 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3933 per_commitment_secret,
3934 next_per_commitment_point,
3938 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3939 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3940 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3941 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3942 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3944 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3945 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3946 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3947 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3948 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3949 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3950 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3951 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3952 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3957 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3958 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3960 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3961 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3962 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3963 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3964 reason: err_packet.clone()
3967 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3968 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3969 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3970 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3971 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3972 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3975 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3976 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3977 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3978 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3979 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3986 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3987 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3988 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3989 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3993 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3994 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3995 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3996 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3997 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3998 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4002 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4003 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4005 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4006 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4007 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4008 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4009 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4010 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4011 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4012 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4015 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4017 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4018 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4019 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4020 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4021 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4024 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4025 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4029 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4030 match msg.data_loss_protect {
4031 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
4032 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4033 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4034 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4035 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4036 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4038 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4039 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4040 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4041 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4042 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4045 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4046 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4047 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4048 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4049 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4050 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4051 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4052 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4055 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4059 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4060 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4061 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4062 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4064 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4068 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4069 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4070 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4072 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4073 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4074 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4075 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4076 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4080 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4082 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4083 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4084 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4085 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4086 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4087 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4089 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4090 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4091 channel_ready: None,
4092 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4093 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4094 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4098 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4099 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4100 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4101 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4102 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4103 next_per_commitment_point,
4104 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4106 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4107 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4108 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4112 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4113 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4114 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4116 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4117 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4118 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4121 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4124 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4127 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4128 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4129 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4130 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4131 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4133 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4134 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4135 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4136 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4137 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4138 next_per_commitment_point,
4139 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4143 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4144 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4145 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4147 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4150 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4151 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4152 raa: required_revoke,
4153 commitment_update: None,
4154 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4156 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4157 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4158 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4160 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4163 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4164 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4165 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4166 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4167 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4168 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4171 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4172 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4173 raa: required_revoke,
4174 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4175 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4179 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4183 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4184 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4185 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4186 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4188 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4190 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4192 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4193 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4194 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4195 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4196 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4197 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4199 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4200 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4201 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4202 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4203 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4205 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4206 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4207 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4208 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4211 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4212 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4213 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4214 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4215 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4216 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4217 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4218 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4219 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4220 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4221 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4222 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4223 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4224 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4225 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4227 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4230 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4231 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4234 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4235 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4236 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4237 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4238 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4239 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4240 self.channel_state &
4241 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4242 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4243 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4244 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4247 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4248 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4249 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4250 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4251 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4252 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4253 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4255 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4261 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4262 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4263 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4264 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4266 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4267 return Ok((None, None));
4270 if !self.is_outbound() {
4271 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4272 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4274 return Ok((None, None));
4277 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4279 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4280 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4281 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4282 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4284 let sig = self.holder_signer
4285 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4286 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4288 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4289 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4290 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4291 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4293 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4294 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4295 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4300 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4301 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4302 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4303 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4305 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4308 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4309 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4310 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4311 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4314 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4315 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4319 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4321 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4322 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4325 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4326 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4327 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4330 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4333 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4334 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4335 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4336 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4338 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4341 assert!(send_shutdown);
4342 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4343 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4344 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4346 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4351 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4353 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4354 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4356 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4357 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4358 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4359 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4360 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4361 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4364 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4365 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
4366 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
4368 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4369 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4370 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4371 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4375 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4376 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4377 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4378 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4379 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4380 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4382 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4383 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4390 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4391 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4393 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4396 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4397 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4399 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4401 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4402 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4403 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4404 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4405 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4406 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4407 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4408 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4409 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4411 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4412 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4415 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4419 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4420 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4421 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4422 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4424 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4427 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4428 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4430 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4431 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4433 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4437 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4441 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4442 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4443 return Ok((None, None));
4446 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4447 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4448 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4449 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4451 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4453 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4456 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4457 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4458 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4459 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4460 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4464 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4465 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4466 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4470 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4471 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4472 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4473 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4474 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4475 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4476 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4480 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4482 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4483 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4484 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4485 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4487 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4490 let sig = self.holder_signer
4491 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4492 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4494 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4495 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4496 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4497 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4501 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4502 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4503 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4504 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4506 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4507 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4508 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4514 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4515 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4516 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4518 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4519 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4521 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4522 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4525 if !self.is_outbound() {
4526 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4527 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4528 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4529 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4531 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4532 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4533 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4535 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4536 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4539 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4540 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4541 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4542 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4543 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4544 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4545 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4546 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4548 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4551 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4552 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4553 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4554 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4556 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4560 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4561 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4562 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4563 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4565 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4571 // Public utilities:
4573 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4577 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4581 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4582 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4583 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4587 /// Gets the channel's type
4588 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4592 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4593 /// is_usable() returns true).
4594 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4595 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4596 self.short_channel_id
4599 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4600 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4601 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4604 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4605 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4606 self.outbound_scid_alias
4608 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4609 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4610 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4611 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4612 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4615 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4616 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4617 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4618 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4621 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4622 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4623 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4626 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4627 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4628 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4629 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4633 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4636 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4637 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4640 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4641 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4644 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4645 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4646 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4649 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4650 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4653 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4654 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4655 self.counterparty_node_id
4658 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4659 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4660 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4663 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4664 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4665 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4668 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4669 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4671 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4672 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4673 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4674 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4676 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4680 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4681 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4682 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4685 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4686 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4687 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4690 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4691 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4692 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4694 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4695 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4700 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4701 self.channel_value_satoshis
4704 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4705 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4708 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4709 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4712 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4713 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4716 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4717 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4718 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4721 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4722 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4723 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4726 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4727 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4728 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4731 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4732 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4733 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4734 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4735 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4738 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4740 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4741 self.prev_config = None;
4745 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4746 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4750 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4751 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4752 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4753 let did_channel_update =
4754 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4755 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4756 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4757 if did_channel_update {
4758 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4759 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4760 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4761 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4763 self.config.options = *config;
4767 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4768 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4769 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4770 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4771 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4772 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4773 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4775 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4776 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4779 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4781 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4782 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4788 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4789 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4790 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4791 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4792 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4793 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4794 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4796 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4797 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4804 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4808 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4809 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4810 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4811 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4812 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4813 // which are near the dust limit.
4814 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4815 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4816 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4817 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4818 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4820 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4821 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4823 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4826 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4827 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4830 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4831 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4834 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4835 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4839 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4844 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4846 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4847 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4848 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4849 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4850 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4851 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4853 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4855 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4863 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4864 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4868 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4869 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4870 self.update_time_counter
4873 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4874 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4877 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4878 self.config.announced_channel
4881 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4882 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4885 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4886 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4887 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4888 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4891 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4892 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4893 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4896 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4897 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4898 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4899 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4900 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4903 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4904 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4905 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4906 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4907 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4910 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4911 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4912 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4913 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4916 pub fn get_next_monitor_update(&self) -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4917 self.pending_monitor_updates.first()
4920 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4921 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4922 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4925 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4926 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4927 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4929 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4930 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4931 if self.channel_state &
4932 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4933 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4934 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4935 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4936 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4939 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4940 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4941 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4942 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4943 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4944 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4946 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4947 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4948 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4950 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4951 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4952 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4953 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4954 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4955 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4961 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4962 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4963 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4966 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4967 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4968 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4971 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4972 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4973 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4976 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4977 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4978 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4979 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4980 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4981 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4986 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4987 self.channel_update_status
4990 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4991 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4992 self.channel_update_status = status;
4995 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4997 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4998 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4999 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5003 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5004 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5005 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5008 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5012 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5013 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5014 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5016 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5017 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5018 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5020 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5021 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5024 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5025 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5026 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5027 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5028 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5029 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5030 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5031 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5032 self.channel_state);
5034 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5038 if need_commitment_update {
5039 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5040 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5041 let next_per_commitment_point =
5042 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5043 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5044 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5045 next_per_commitment_point,
5046 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5050 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5056 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5057 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5058 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5059 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5060 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5061 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5062 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5064 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5067 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5068 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5069 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5070 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5071 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5072 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5073 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5074 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5075 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5076 if self.is_outbound() {
5077 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5078 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5079 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5080 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5081 // channel and move on.
5082 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5083 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5085 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5086 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5087 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5089 if self.is_outbound() {
5090 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5091 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5092 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5093 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5094 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5095 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5099 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5100 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5101 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5102 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5103 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5107 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5108 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5109 // may have already happened for this block).
5110 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5111 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5112 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5113 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5116 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5117 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5118 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5119 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5127 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5128 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5129 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5130 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5132 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5133 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5136 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5138 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5139 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5140 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5141 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5143 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5146 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5149 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5150 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5151 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5152 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5154 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5157 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5158 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5159 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5161 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5162 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5164 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5165 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5166 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5174 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5176 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5177 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5178 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5180 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5181 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5184 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5185 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5186 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5187 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5188 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5189 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5190 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5191 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5192 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5195 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5196 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5197 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5198 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5200 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5201 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5202 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5204 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5205 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5206 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5207 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5209 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5210 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5211 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5212 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5213 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5214 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5215 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5218 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5219 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5221 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5224 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5225 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5226 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5227 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5228 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5229 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5230 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5231 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5232 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5233 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5234 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5235 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5236 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5237 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5238 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5239 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5240 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5246 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5251 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5252 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5254 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5255 if !self.is_outbound() {
5256 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5258 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5259 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5262 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5263 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5266 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5267 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5271 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5272 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5273 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5274 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5275 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5276 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5277 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5278 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5279 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5280 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5281 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5282 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5283 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5284 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5285 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5286 first_per_commitment_point,
5287 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5288 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5289 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5290 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5292 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5296 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5297 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5300 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5301 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5302 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5303 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5306 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5307 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5309 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5310 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5311 if self.is_outbound() {
5312 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5314 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5315 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5317 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5318 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5320 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5321 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5324 self.user_id = user_id;
5325 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5327 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5330 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5331 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5332 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5334 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5335 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5336 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5337 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5339 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5340 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5341 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5342 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5343 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5344 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5345 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5346 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5347 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5348 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5349 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5350 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5351 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5352 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5353 first_per_commitment_point,
5354 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5355 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5356 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5358 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5362 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5363 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5365 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5367 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5368 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5371 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5372 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5373 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5374 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5375 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5376 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5379 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5380 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5381 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5382 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5383 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5384 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5385 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5386 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5387 if !self.is_outbound() {
5388 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5390 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5391 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5393 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5394 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5395 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5396 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5399 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5400 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5402 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5405 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5406 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5411 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5413 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5415 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5416 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5417 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5419 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5420 temporary_channel_id,
5421 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5422 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5427 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5428 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5429 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5430 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5432 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5435 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5436 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5437 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5438 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5439 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5440 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5442 if !self.is_usable() {
5443 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5446 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5447 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5448 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5449 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5451 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5452 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5454 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5455 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5456 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5457 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5458 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5459 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5465 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5466 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5467 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5468 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5470 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5473 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5477 if !self.is_usable() {
5481 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5482 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5486 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5490 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5491 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5494 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5498 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5500 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5505 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5507 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5512 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5514 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5515 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5516 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5517 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5518 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5522 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5524 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5525 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5526 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5527 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5528 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5529 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5530 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5532 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5533 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5534 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5535 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5536 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5537 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5538 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5539 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5540 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5541 contents: announcement,
5544 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5548 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5549 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5550 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5551 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5552 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5553 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5554 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5555 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5557 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5559 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5560 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5561 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5562 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5564 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5565 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5566 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5567 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5570 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5571 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5572 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5573 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5576 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5579 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5580 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5581 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5582 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5583 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5584 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5587 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5589 Err(_) => return None,
5591 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5592 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5597 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5598 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5599 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5600 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5601 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5602 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5603 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5604 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5605 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5606 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5607 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5608 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5609 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5610 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5611 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5612 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5613 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5614 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5615 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5618 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5619 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5620 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5621 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5624 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5625 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5626 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5627 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5628 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5629 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5630 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5631 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5633 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5634 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5635 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5636 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5637 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5638 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5639 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5640 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5641 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5643 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5649 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5651 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5652 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5653 /// commitment update.
5655 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5656 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5657 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5658 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5660 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5661 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5663 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5664 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5669 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5670 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5672 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5674 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5675 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5677 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5678 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5679 /// regenerate them.
5681 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5682 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5684 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5685 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5686 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5687 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5688 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5689 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5691 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5692 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5693 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5696 if amount_msat == 0 {
5697 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5700 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5701 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5704 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5705 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5706 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5707 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5708 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5709 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5710 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5711 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5714 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5715 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5716 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5717 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5719 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5720 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5721 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5724 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5725 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5726 if !self.is_outbound() {
5727 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5728 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5729 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5730 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5731 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5732 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5736 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5739 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5740 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5741 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5743 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5744 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5745 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5746 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5747 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5748 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5752 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5753 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5754 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5755 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5756 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5757 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5761 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5762 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5763 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5766 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5767 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5768 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5769 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5771 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5772 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5775 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5776 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5777 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5778 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5779 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5782 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5783 force_holding_cell = true;
5786 // Now update local state:
5787 if force_holding_cell {
5788 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5793 onion_routing_packet,
5798 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5799 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5801 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5803 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5807 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5808 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5809 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5813 onion_routing_packet,
5815 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5820 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5821 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5822 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5823 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5825 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5826 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5827 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5829 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5830 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5834 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5835 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5836 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5837 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5838 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5839 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5840 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5843 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5844 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5845 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5846 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5847 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5848 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5851 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5853 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5854 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5855 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5857 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5858 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5861 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5862 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5863 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5864 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5865 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5866 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5867 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5868 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5871 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5875 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5876 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5877 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5878 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5880 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5882 if !self.is_outbound() {
5883 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5884 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5885 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5886 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5887 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5888 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5889 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5890 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5891 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5892 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5898 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5901 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5902 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5903 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5904 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5905 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5906 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5908 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5909 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5910 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5911 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5914 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5915 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5919 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5920 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5922 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5924 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5925 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5926 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5927 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5929 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5930 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5931 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5932 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5933 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5934 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5938 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5939 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5942 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5945 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5946 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5948 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5949 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5950 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5951 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
5952 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5955 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5956 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5957 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
5958 Ok(Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap()))
5964 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5965 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5966 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5969 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5970 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5971 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5973 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5974 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5975 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5976 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5982 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5983 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5985 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5986 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5987 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5988 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5989 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5990 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5991 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5992 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5993 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5996 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5997 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5998 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6000 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6001 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6004 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6005 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6006 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6009 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6010 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6011 let mut chan_closed = false;
6012 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6016 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6018 None if !chan_closed => {
6019 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
6020 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6021 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6023 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6029 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6030 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6031 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6032 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6034 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6036 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6038 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6039 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6040 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6041 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6042 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6043 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6046 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6047 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(monitor_update);
6048 Some(self.pending_monitor_updates.last().unwrap())
6050 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6051 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6052 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6055 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6056 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6057 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6058 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6059 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6061 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6062 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6069 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6070 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6072 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6075 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6076 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6077 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6078 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6079 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6080 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6081 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6082 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6083 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6084 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6085 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6087 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6088 // return them to fail the payment.
6089 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6090 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6091 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6093 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6094 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6099 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6100 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6101 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6102 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6103 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6104 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6105 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6106 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6107 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6108 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6109 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6110 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6111 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6116 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6117 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6118 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6121 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6122 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6123 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6125 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6126 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6130 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6134 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6135 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6137 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6143 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6144 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6145 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6146 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6147 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6149 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6150 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6151 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6152 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6158 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6159 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6160 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6161 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6162 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6163 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6168 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6169 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6170 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6171 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6173 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6174 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6175 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6176 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6181 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6182 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6183 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6184 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6185 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6186 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6191 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6192 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6193 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6196 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6198 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6199 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6200 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6201 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6202 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6204 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6205 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6206 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6207 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6209 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6210 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6211 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6213 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6215 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6216 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6217 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6218 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6219 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6220 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6222 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6223 // deserialized from that format.
6224 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6225 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6226 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6228 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6230 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6231 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6232 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6234 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6235 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6236 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6237 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6240 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6241 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6242 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6245 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6246 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6247 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6248 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6250 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6251 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6253 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6255 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6257 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6259 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6262 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6264 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6269 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6271 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6272 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6273 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6274 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6275 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6276 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6277 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6279 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6281 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6283 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6286 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6287 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6288 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6291 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6293 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6294 preimages.push(preimage);
6296 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6297 reason.write(writer)?;
6299 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6301 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6302 preimages.push(preimage);
6304 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6305 reason.write(writer)?;
6310 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6311 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6313 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6315 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6316 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6317 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6318 source.write(writer)?;
6319 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6321 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6323 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6324 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6326 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6328 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6329 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6334 match self.resend_order {
6335 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6336 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6339 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6340 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6341 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6343 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6344 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6345 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6346 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6349 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6350 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6351 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6352 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6353 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6356 if self.is_outbound() {
6357 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6358 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6359 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6361 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6362 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6363 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6365 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6367 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6368 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6369 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6370 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6372 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6373 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6374 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6375 // consider the stale state on reload.
6378 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6379 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6380 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6382 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6383 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6384 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6386 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6387 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6389 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6390 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6391 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6393 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6394 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6396 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6399 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6400 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6401 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6403 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6406 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6407 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6409 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6410 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6411 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6413 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6415 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6417 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6419 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6420 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6421 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6422 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6423 htlc.write(writer)?;
6426 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6427 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6428 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6430 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6431 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6433 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6434 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6435 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6436 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6437 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6438 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6439 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6441 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6442 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6443 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6444 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6445 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6447 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6449 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6450 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6451 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6452 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6454 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6455 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6456 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6457 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6458 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6459 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6460 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6462 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6463 (2, chan_type, option),
6464 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6465 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6466 (5, self.config, required),
6467 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6468 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6469 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6470 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6471 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6472 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6473 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6474 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6475 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6476 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6477 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6478 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6485 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6486 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6488 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6489 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6491 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6492 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6493 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6495 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6496 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6497 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6498 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6500 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6502 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6503 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6504 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6505 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6506 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6508 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6509 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6512 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6513 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6514 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6518 let mut keys_data = None;
6520 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6521 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6522 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6524 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6525 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6526 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6527 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6528 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6529 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6533 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6534 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6535 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6538 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6540 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6541 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6542 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6544 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6545 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6546 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6547 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6548 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6549 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6550 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6551 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6552 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6553 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6554 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6555 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6556 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6557 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6562 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6563 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6564 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6565 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6566 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6567 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6568 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6569 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6570 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6571 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6572 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6573 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6575 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6576 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6579 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6580 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6583 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6584 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6586 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6591 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6592 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6593 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6594 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6595 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6596 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6597 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6598 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6599 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6600 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6602 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6603 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6604 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6606 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6607 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6608 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6610 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6614 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6615 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6616 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6617 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6620 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6621 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6622 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6624 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6625 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6626 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6627 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6630 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6631 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6632 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6633 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6636 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6638 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6640 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6641 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6642 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6643 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6645 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6646 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6647 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6648 // consider the stale state on reload.
6649 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6652 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6653 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6654 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6656 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6659 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6660 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6661 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6663 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6664 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6665 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6666 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6668 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6669 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6671 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6672 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6674 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6675 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6676 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6678 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6680 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6681 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6683 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6684 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6687 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6689 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6690 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6691 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6692 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6694 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6697 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6698 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6700 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6702 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6703 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6705 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6706 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6708 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6710 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6711 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6712 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6714 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6715 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6716 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6720 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6721 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6722 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6724 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6730 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6731 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6732 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6733 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6734 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6735 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6736 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6737 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6738 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6739 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6741 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6742 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6743 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6744 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6745 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6746 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6748 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6749 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6751 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6752 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6753 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6754 (2, channel_type, option),
6755 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6756 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6757 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6758 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6759 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6760 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6761 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6762 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6763 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6764 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6765 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6766 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6767 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6768 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6769 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6772 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6773 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6774 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6775 // required channel parameters.
6776 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6777 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6778 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6780 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6782 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6783 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6784 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6785 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6788 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6789 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6790 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6792 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6793 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6795 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6796 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6801 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6802 if iter.next().is_some() {
6803 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6807 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6808 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6809 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6810 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6811 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6814 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6815 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6817 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6818 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6819 // separate u64 values.
6820 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6825 config: config.unwrap(),
6829 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6830 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6831 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6835 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6837 channel_value_satoshis,
6839 latest_monitor_update_id,
6842 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6845 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6846 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6849 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6850 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6851 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6855 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6856 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6857 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6858 monitor_pending_forwards,
6859 monitor_pending_failures,
6860 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6863 holding_cell_update_fee,
6864 next_holder_htlc_id,
6865 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6866 update_time_counter,
6869 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6870 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6871 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6872 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6874 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6875 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6876 closing_fee_limits: None,
6877 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6879 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6881 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6882 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6884 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6886 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6887 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6888 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6889 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6890 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6891 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6892 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6893 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6894 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6897 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6899 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6900 funding_transaction,
6902 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6903 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6904 counterparty_node_id,
6906 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6910 channel_update_status,
6911 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6915 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6916 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6917 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6918 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6920 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6922 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6923 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6924 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6926 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6928 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6929 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6931 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6934 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6942 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6943 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6944 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6945 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6946 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6948 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6949 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6951 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6952 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6953 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6954 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6955 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6956 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6957 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6958 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6959 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6960 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6961 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
6962 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6963 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6964 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6965 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6966 use crate::util::test_utils;
6967 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6968 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
6969 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6970 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6971 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6972 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6973 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6974 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6975 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6976 use crate::prelude::*;
6978 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6981 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6982 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6988 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6989 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6990 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6991 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6995 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6996 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6997 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6998 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6999 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7000 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7001 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7005 signer: InMemorySigner,
7008 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7009 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7012 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7013 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7015 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7016 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7019 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7023 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7025 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
7026 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7027 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7028 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7029 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
7032 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
7033 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7034 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7035 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
7039 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7040 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7041 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7045 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7046 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7047 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7048 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7050 let seed = [42; 32];
7051 let network = Network::Testnet;
7052 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7053 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7054 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7057 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7058 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7059 let config = UserConfig::default();
7060 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7061 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7062 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7064 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7065 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7069 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7070 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7072 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7073 let original_fee = 253;
7074 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7075 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7076 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7077 let seed = [42; 32];
7078 let network = Network::Testnet;
7079 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7081 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7082 let config = UserConfig::default();
7083 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7085 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7086 // same as the old fee.
7087 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7088 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7089 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7093 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7094 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7095 // dust limits are used.
7096 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7097 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7098 let seed = [42; 32];
7099 let network = Network::Testnet;
7100 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7101 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7103 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7104 // they have different dust limits.
7106 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7107 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7108 let config = UserConfig::default();
7109 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7111 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7112 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7113 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7114 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7115 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7117 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7118 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7119 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7120 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7121 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7123 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7124 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7125 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7127 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7128 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7129 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7130 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7133 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7135 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7136 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7137 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7138 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7139 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7141 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7142 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7143 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7144 payment_secret: None,
7145 payment_params: None,
7149 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7150 // the dust limit check.
7151 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7152 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7153 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7154 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7156 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7157 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7158 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7159 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7160 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7161 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7162 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7166 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7167 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7168 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7169 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7170 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7171 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7172 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7173 let seed = [42; 32];
7174 let network = Network::Testnet;
7175 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7177 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7178 let config = UserConfig::default();
7179 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7181 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7182 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7184 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7185 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7186 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7187 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7188 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7189 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7191 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7192 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7193 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7194 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7195 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7197 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7199 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7200 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7201 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7202 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7203 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7205 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7206 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7207 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7208 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7209 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7213 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7214 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7215 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7216 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7217 let seed = [42; 32];
7218 let network = Network::Testnet;
7219 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7220 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7221 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7223 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7225 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7226 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7227 let config = UserConfig::default();
7228 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7230 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7231 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7232 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7233 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7235 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7236 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7237 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7239 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7240 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7241 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7242 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7244 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7245 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7246 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7248 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7249 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7251 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7252 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7253 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7254 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7255 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7256 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7257 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7258 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7259 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7264 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7266 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7267 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7268 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7269 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7270 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7271 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7272 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7279 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7280 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7281 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7282 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7283 let seed = [42; 32];
7284 let network = Network::Testnet;
7285 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7286 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7287 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7289 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7290 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7291 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7292 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7293 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7294 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7295 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7296 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7298 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7299 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7300 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7301 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7302 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7303 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7305 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7306 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7307 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7308 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7310 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7312 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7313 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7314 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7315 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7316 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7317 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7319 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7320 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7321 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7322 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7324 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7325 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7326 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7327 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7328 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7330 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7331 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7333 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7334 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7335 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7337 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7338 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7339 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7340 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7341 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7343 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7344 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7346 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7347 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7348 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7352 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7354 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7355 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7356 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7358 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7359 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7360 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7361 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7363 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7364 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7365 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7367 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7369 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7370 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7373 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7374 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7375 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7376 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7377 let seed = [42; 32];
7378 let network = Network::Testnet;
7379 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7380 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7381 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7384 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7385 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7386 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7388 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7389 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7391 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7392 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7393 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7395 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7396 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7398 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7400 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7401 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7403 // Channel Negotiations failed
7404 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7405 assert!(result.is_err());
7410 fn channel_update() {
7411 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7412 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7413 let seed = [42; 32];
7414 let network = Network::Testnet;
7415 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7416 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7418 // Create a channel.
7419 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7420 let config = UserConfig::default();
7421 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7422 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7423 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7424 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7426 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7427 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7428 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7430 short_channel_id: 0,
7433 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7434 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7435 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7437 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7438 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7440 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7442 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7444 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7445 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7446 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7447 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7449 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7450 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7451 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7453 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7457 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7459 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7460 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7461 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7462 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7463 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7464 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7465 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7466 use crate::chain::keysinterface::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7467 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7468 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7469 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7470 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7471 use crate::sync::Arc;
7473 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7474 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7475 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7476 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7478 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7480 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7481 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7482 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7483 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7484 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7486 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7487 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7492 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7493 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7494 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7496 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7497 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7498 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7499 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7500 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7501 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7503 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7505 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7506 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7507 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7508 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7509 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7510 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7512 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7513 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7514 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7515 selected_contest_delay: 144
7517 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7518 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7520 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7521 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7523 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7524 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7526 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7527 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7529 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7530 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7531 // build_commitment_transaction.
7532 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7533 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7534 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7535 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7536 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7538 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7539 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7540 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7541 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7545 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7546 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7547 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7548 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7552 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7553 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7554 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7556 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7557 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7559 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7560 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7562 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7564 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7565 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7566 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7567 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7568 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7569 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7570 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7572 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7573 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7574 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7575 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7577 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7578 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7579 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7581 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7583 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7584 commitment_tx.clone(),
7585 counterparty_signature,
7586 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7587 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7588 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7590 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7591 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7593 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7594 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7595 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7597 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7598 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7601 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7602 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7604 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7605 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7606 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7607 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7608 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7609 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7610 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7611 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7613 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7616 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7617 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7618 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7622 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7625 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7626 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7627 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7629 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7630 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7631 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7632 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7633 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7634 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7635 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7636 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7638 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7642 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7643 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7645 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7646 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7647 "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", {});
7649 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7650 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7651 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7652 "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", {});
7654 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7655 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7657 amount_msat: 1000000,
7659 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7660 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7662 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7665 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7666 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7668 amount_msat: 2000000,
7670 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7671 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7673 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7676 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7677 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7679 amount_msat: 2000000,
7681 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7682 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7683 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7685 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7688 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7689 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7691 amount_msat: 3000000,
7693 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7694 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7695 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7697 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7700 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7701 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7703 amount_msat: 4000000,
7705 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7706 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7708 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7712 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7713 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7714 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7716 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7717 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7718 "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", {
7721 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7722 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7723 "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" },
7726 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7727 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7728 "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" },
7731 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7732 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7733 "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" },
7736 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7737 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7738 "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" },
7741 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7742 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7743 "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" }
7746 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7747 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7748 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7750 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7751 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7752 "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", {
7755 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7756 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7757 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f014730440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
7760 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7761 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7762 "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" },
7765 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7766 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7767 "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" },
7770 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7771 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7772 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c6401483045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7775 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7776 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7777 "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" }
7780 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7781 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7782 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7784 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7785 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7786 "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", {
7789 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7790 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7791 "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" },
7794 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7795 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7796 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
7799 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7800 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7801 "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" },
7804 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7805 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7806 "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" }
7809 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7810 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7811 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7812 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7814 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7815 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7816 "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", {
7819 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7820 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7821 "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" },
7824 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7825 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7826 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
7829 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7830 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7831 "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" },
7834 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7835 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7836 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7839 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7840 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7841 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7842 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7844 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7845 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7846 "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", {
7849 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7850 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7851 "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" },
7854 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7855 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7856 "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" },
7859 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7860 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7861 "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" },
7864 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7865 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7866 "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" }
7869 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7870 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7871 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7873 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7874 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7875 "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", {
7878 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7879 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7880 "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" },
7883 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7884 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7885 "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" },
7888 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7889 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7890 "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" }
7893 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7894 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7895 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7897 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7898 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7899 "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", {
7902 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7903 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7904 "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" },
7907 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7908 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7909 "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" },
7912 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7913 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7914 "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" }
7917 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7918 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7919 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7921 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7922 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7923 "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", {
7926 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7927 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7928 "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" },
7931 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7932 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7933 "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" }
7936 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7937 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7938 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7939 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7941 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7942 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7943 "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", {
7946 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7947 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7948 "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" },
7951 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7952 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7953 "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" }
7956 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7957 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7958 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7959 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7961 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7962 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7963 "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", {
7966 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7967 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7968 "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" },
7971 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7972 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7973 "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" }
7976 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7977 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7978 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7980 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7981 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7982 "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", {
7985 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7986 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7987 "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" }
7990 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7991 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7992 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7993 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7995 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7996 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7997 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80054a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aa28b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d01483045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c22837701475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8000 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8001 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8002 "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" }
8005 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8006 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8007 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8008 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8010 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8011 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8012 "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", {
8015 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8016 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8017 "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" }
8020 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8021 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8022 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8023 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8025 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8026 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8027 "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", {});
8029 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8030 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8031 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8032 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8034 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8035 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8036 "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", {});
8038 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8039 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8040 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8041 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8043 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8044 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8045 "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", {});
8047 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8048 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8049 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8051 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8052 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8053 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8055 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8056 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8057 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8058 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8060 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8061 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8062 "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", {});
8064 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8065 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8066 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8067 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8069 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8070 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8071 "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", {});
8073 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8074 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8075 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8076 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8077 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8078 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8080 amount_msat: 2000000,
8082 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8083 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8085 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8088 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8089 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8090 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8092 amount_msat: 5000000,
8094 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8095 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8096 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8098 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8101 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8102 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8104 amount_msat: 5000000,
8106 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8107 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8108 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8110 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8114 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8115 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8116 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a79f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f014730440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8119 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8120 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8121 "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" },
8123 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8124 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8125 "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" },
8127 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8128 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8129 "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" }
8132 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8133 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8134 "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", {
8137 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8138 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8139 "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" },
8141 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8142 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8143 "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" },
8145 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8146 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8147 "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" }
8152 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8153 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8155 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8156 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8157 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8158 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8160 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8161 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8162 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8164 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8165 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8167 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8168 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8170 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8171 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8172 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8176 fn test_key_derivation() {
8177 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8178 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8180 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8181 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8183 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8184 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8186 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8187 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8189 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8190 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8192 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8193 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8195 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8196 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8198 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8199 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8203 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8204 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8205 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8206 let seed = [42; 32];
8207 let network = Network::Testnet;
8208 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8209 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8211 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8212 let config = UserConfig::default();
8213 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8214 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8216 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8217 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8219 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8220 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8221 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8222 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8223 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8224 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8225 assert!(res.is_ok());
8230 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8231 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8232 // resulting `channel_type`.
8233 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8234 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8235 let network = Network::Testnet;
8236 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8237 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8239 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8240 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8242 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8243 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8245 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8246 // need to signal it.
8247 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8248 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8249 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8252 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8254 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8255 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8256 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8258 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8259 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8260 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8263 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8264 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8265 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8266 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8267 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8270 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8271 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8276 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8277 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8278 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8279 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8280 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8281 let network = Network::Testnet;
8282 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8283 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8285 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8286 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8288 let config = UserConfig::default();
8290 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8291 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8292 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8293 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8294 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8296 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8297 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8298 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8301 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8302 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8303 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8305 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8306 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8307 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8308 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8309 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8310 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8312 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8317 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8318 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8320 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8321 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8322 let network = Network::Testnet;
8323 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8324 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8326 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8327 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8329 let config = UserConfig::default();
8331 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8332 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8333 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8334 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8335 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8336 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8337 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8338 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8340 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8341 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8342 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8343 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8344 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8345 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8348 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8349 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8351 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8352 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8353 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8354 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8356 assert!(res.is_err());
8358 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8359 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8360 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8362 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8363 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8364 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8367 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8369 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8370 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8371 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8372 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8375 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8376 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8378 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8379 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8381 assert!(res.is_err());