_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/channel.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
  12 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  13 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  15
  16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
  17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
  19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
  26 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
  27 use ln::msgs;
  28 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
  29 use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
  30 use ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor};
  31 use ln::chan_utils;
  32 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
  33 use chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER};
  34 use chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
  35 use chain::keysinterface::{Sign, KeysInterface};
  36 use util::transaction_utils;
  37 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
  38 use util::logger::Logger;
  39 use util::errors::APIError;
  40 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
  41 use util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
  42
  43 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
  44 use core::ops::Deref;
  45 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
  46 use std::sync::Mutex;
  47 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
  48 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0;
  49
  50 #[cfg(test)]
  51 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
  52         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
  53         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
  54         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
  55         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  56         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
  57         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
  58         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
  59         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
  60 }
  61
  62 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
  63         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
  64         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
  65         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
  66 }
  67
  68 enum InboundHTLCState {
  69         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
  70         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
  71         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
  72         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
  73         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
  74         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
  75         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
  76         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
  77         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
  78         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
  79         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
  80         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
  81         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
  82         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
  83         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
  84         ///
  85         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
  86         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
  87         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
  88         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
  89         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
  90         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
  91         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
  92         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
  93         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
  94         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
  95         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
  96         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
  97         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
  98         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
  99         ///
 100         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
 101         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
 102         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
 103         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
 104         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
 105         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
 106         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 107         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
 108         Committed,
 109         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 110         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 111         /// we'll drop it.
 112         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
 113         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
 114         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
 115         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
 116         /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
 117         /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
 118         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
 119         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
 120 }
 121
 122 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
 123         htlc_id: u64,
 124         amount_msat: u64,
 125         cltv_expiry: u32,
 126         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 127         state: InboundHTLCState,
 128 }
 129
 130 enum OutboundHTLCState {
 131         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
 132         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
 133         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
 134         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
 135         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
 136         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
 137         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
 138         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
 139         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
 140         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
 141         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
 142         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
 143         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
 144         Committed,
 145         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
 146         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
 147         RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 148         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 149         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 150         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 151         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
 152         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
 153         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 154         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
 155         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
 156         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 157         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
 158         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
 159         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
 160 }
 161
 162 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
 163         htlc_id: u64,
 164         amount_msat: u64,
 165         cltv_expiry: u32,
 166         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 167         state: OutboundHTLCState,
 168         source: HTLCSource,
 169 }
 170
 171 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
 172 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
 173         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
 174                 // always outbound
 175                 amount_msat: u64,
 176                 cltv_expiry: u32,
 177                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 178                 source: HTLCSource,
 179                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
 180         },
 181         ClaimHTLC {
 182                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
 183                 htlc_id: u64,
 184         },
 185         FailHTLC {
 186                 htlc_id: u64,
 187                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
 188         },
 189 }
 190
 191 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
 192 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
 193 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
 194 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
 195 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
 196 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
 197 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
 198 enum ChannelState {
 199         /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
 200         OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
 201         /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
 202         TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
 203         /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
 204         /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
 205         /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
 206         FundingCreated = 4,
 207         /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
 208         /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
 209         /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
 210         FundingSent = 8,
 211         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
 212         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 213         TheirFundingLocked = 1 << 4,
 214         /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
 215         /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
 216         OurFundingLocked = 1 << 5,
 217         ChannelFunded = 64,
 218         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
 219         /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
 220         /// dance.
 221         PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
 222         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
 223         /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
 224         /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
 225         MonitorUpdateFailed = 1 << 8,
 226         /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
 227         /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
 228         /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
 229         /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
 230         /// later.
 231         /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
 232         AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
 233         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
 234         /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
 235         /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
 236         RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
 237         /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
 238         /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
 239         /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
 240         /// us their shutdown.
 241         LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
 242         /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
 243         /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
 244         ShutdownComplete = 4096,
 245 }
 246 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
 247 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
 248
 249 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
 250
 251 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
 252 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
 253 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
 254 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
 255 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
 256 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
 257 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
 258         /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
 259         Enabled,
 260         /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
 261         DisabledStaged,
 262         /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
 263         EnabledStaged,
 264         /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
 265         Disabled,
 266 }
 267
 268 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
 269 enum HTLCInitiator {
 270         LocalOffered,
 271         RemoteOffered,
 272 }
 273
 274 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
 275 struct HTLCCandidate {
 276         amount_msat: u64,
 277         origin: HTLCInitiator,
 278 }
 279
 280 impl HTLCCandidate {
 281         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
 282                 Self {
 283                         amount_msat,
 284                         origin,
 285                 }
 286         }
 287 }
 288
 289 /// Information needed for constructing an invoice route hint for this channel.
 290 #[derive(Clone)]
 291 pub struct CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
 292         /// Base routing fee in millisatoshis.
 293         pub fee_base_msat: u32,
 294         /// Amount in millionths of a satoshi the channel will charge per transferred satoshi.
 295         pub fee_proportional_millionths: u32,
 296         /// The minimum difference in cltv_expiry between an ingoing HTLC and its outgoing counterpart,
 297         /// such that the outgoing HTLC is forwardable to this counterparty. See `msgs::ChannelUpdate`'s
 298         /// `cltv_expiry_delta` for more details.
 299         pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
 300 }
 301
 302 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
 303 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
 304 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
 305 // inbound channel.
 306 //
 307 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
 308 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
 309 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
 310         config: ChannelConfig,
 311
 312         user_id: u64,
 313
 314         channel_id: [u8; 32],
 315         channel_state: u32,
 316         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
 317         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
 318
 319         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
 320
 321         holder_signer: Signer,
 322         shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
 323         destination_script: Script,
 324
 325         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
 326         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
 327         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
 328
 329         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 330         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
 331         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
 332         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
 333         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
 334         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
 335
 336         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
 337         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
 338         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
 339         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
 340         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
 341         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
 342         /// send it first.
 343         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
 344
 345         monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
 346         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
 347         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
 348         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
 349         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
 350
 351         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
 352         // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
 353         // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
 354         //
 355         // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
 356         // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
 357         // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
 358         // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
 359         // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
 360         // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
 361         // commitment_signed.
 362         pending_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 363         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
 364         // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
 365         // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
 366         // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
 367         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
 368         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 369         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 370         update_time_counter: u32,
 371         feerate_per_kw: u32,
 372
 373         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 374         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
 375         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 376         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 377         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
 378         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
 379
 380         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u32, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, holder_sig)
 381
 382         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
 383         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
 384         funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
 385         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
 386
 387         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 388         #[cfg(test)]
 389         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 390         #[cfg(not(test))]
 391         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
 392         #[cfg(test)]
 393         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 394         #[cfg(not(test))]
 395         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
 396         //get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
 397         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
 398         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
 399         // get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_sats: u64): u64
 400         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 401         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
 402         #[cfg(test)]
 403         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 404         #[cfg(not(test))]
 405         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 406         //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
 407         minimum_depth: u32,
 408
 409         counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
 410
 411         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
 412         funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
 413
 414         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 415         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
 416         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
 417
 418         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
 419
 420         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
 421
 422         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
 423
 424         /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
 425         /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
 426         announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
 427
 428         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
 429         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
 430         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
 431         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
 432         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 433         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 434         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 435         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
 436 }
 437
 438 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 439 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
 440         fee: u64,
 441         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
 442         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
 443         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
 444         feerate: u32,
 445 }
 446
 447 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
 448 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
 449
 450 #[cfg(not(test))]
 451 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 452 #[cfg(test)]
 453 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
 454 #[cfg(not(test))]
 455 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 456 #[cfg(test)]
 457 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
 458
 459 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
 460 /// it's 2^24.
 461 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1 << 24;
 462
 463 /// Maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed. 2 * standard dust threshold on p2wsh output
 464 /// Scales up on Bitcoin Core's proceeding policy with dust outputs. A typical p2wsh output is 43
 465 /// bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal spend of 67 bytes (even if
 466 /// a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee` is set to 3000sat/kb, thus
 467 /// 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs are p2wsh, a value of
 468 /// 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions. We give a bit
 469 /// of margin to our counterparty and pick up 660 satoshis as an accepted `dust_limit_satoshis`
 470 /// upper bound to avoid negotiation conflicts with other implementations.
 471 pub const MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 2 * 330;
 472
 473 /// A typical p2wsh output is 43 bytes to which Core's `GetDustThreshold()` sums up a minimal
 474 /// spend of 67 bytes (even if a p2wsh witnessScript might be *effectively* smaller), `dustRelayFee`
 475 /// is set to 3000sat/kb, thus 110 * 3000 / 1000 = 330. Per-protocol rules, all time-sensitive outputs
 476 /// are p2wsh, a value of 330 sats is the lower bound desired to ensure good propagation of transactions.
 477 pub const MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 330;
 478
 479 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
 480 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
 481 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
 482 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
 483         Ignore(String),
 484         Close(String),
 485         CloseDelayBroadcast(String),
 486 }
 487
 488 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
 489         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
 490                 match self {
 491                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
 492                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
 493                         &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(ref e) => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", e)
 494                 }
 495         }
 496 }
 497
 498 macro_rules! secp_check {
 499         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
 500                 match $res {
 501                         Ok(thing) => thing,
 502                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
 503                 }
 504         };
 505 }
 506
 507 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
 508         // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
 509         fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 510                 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
 511         }
 512
 513         /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
 514         /// required by us.
 515         ///
 516         /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
 517         pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
 518                 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
 519                 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
 520         }
 521
 522         // Constructors:
 523         pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
 524         where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 525               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
 526         {
 527                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay;
 528                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, channel_value_satoshis);
 529                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 530
 531                 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 532                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, channel_value_satoshis)});
 533                 }
 534                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
 535                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
 536                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
 537                 }
 538                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 539                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
 540                 }
 541                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis);
 542                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 543                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel  reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
 544                 }
 545
 546                 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
 547
 548                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 549                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 550
 551                 Ok(Channel {
 552                         user_id,
 553                         config: config.channel_options.clone(),
 554
 555                         channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
 556                         channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
 557                         secp_ctx,
 558                         channel_value_satoshis,
 559
 560                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 561
 562                         holder_signer,
 563                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 564                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 565
 566                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 567                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 568                         value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
 569
 570                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 571                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 572                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 573                         pending_update_fee: None,
 574                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 575                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 576                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 577                         update_time_counter: 1,
 578
 579                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 580
 581                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 582                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 583                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 584                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 585                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 586
 587                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 588                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 589                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 590                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
 591
 592                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 593
 594                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 595                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 596                         short_channel_id: None,
 597
 598                         feerate_per_kw: feerate,
 599                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
 600                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
 601                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
 602                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
 603                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
 604                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 605                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
 606                         minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
 607
 608                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 609
 610                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 611                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 612                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 613                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
 614                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
 615                                 funding_outpoint: None
 616                         },
 617                         funding_transaction: None,
 618
 619                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
 620                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 621                         counterparty_node_id,
 622
 623                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
 624
 625                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 626
 627                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
 628
 629                         announcement_sigs: None,
 630
 631                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 632                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 633                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 634                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 635                 })
 636         }
 637
 638         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
 639                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
 640         {
 641                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 642                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
 643                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
 644                 }
 645                 let upper_limit = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64  * 2;
 646                 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
 647                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
 648                 }
 649                 Ok(())
 650         }
 651
 652         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
 653         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
 654         pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref>(fee_estimator: &F, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
 655                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
 656           F::Target: FeeEstimator
 657         {
 658                 let holder_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
 659                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
 660                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
 661                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
 662                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
 663                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
 664                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
 665                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
 666                 };
 667                 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
 668
 669                 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
 670                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
 671                 }
 672
 673                 // Check sanity of message fields:
 674                 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
 675                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than {}. It was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 676                 }
 677                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 678                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 679                 }
 680                 let funding_value = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 681                 if msg.push_msat > funding_value {
 682                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than funding value {}", msg.push_msat, funding_value)));
 683                 }
 684                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
 685                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
 686                 }
 687                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
 688                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus; channel reserve ({}) is less than dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
 689                 }
 690                 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
 691                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
 692                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
 693                 }
 694                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
 695
 696                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
 697                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
 698                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
 699                 }
 700                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
 701                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
 702                 }
 703                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
 704                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
 705                 }
 706
 707                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
 708                 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
 709                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
 710                 }
 711                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
 712                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat,  config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
 713                 }
 714                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
 715                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
 716                 }
 717                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
 718                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 719                 }
 720                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
 721                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
 722                 }
 723                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 724                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 725                 }
 726                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis >  MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 727                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 728                 }
 729
 730                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
 731
 732                 let announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
 733                 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
 734                         if local_config.announced_channel != announce {
 735                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
 736                         }
 737                 }
 738                 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
 739                 local_config.announced_channel = announce;
 740
 741                 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
 742
 743                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
 744                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 745                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 746                 }
 747                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
 748                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
 749                 }
 750                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
 751                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
 752                 }
 753
 754                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
 755                 // for full fee payment
 756                 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
 757                 let lower_limit = background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 758                 if funders_amount_msat < lower_limit {
 759                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Insufficient funding amount ({}) for initial commitment. Must be at least {}", funders_amount_msat, lower_limit)));
 760                 }
 761
 762                 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
 763                 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
 764                 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
 765                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment".to_owned()));
 766                 }
 767
 768                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
 769                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
 770                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
 771                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
 772                                         if script.len() == 0 {
 773                                                 None
 774                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
 775                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
 776                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
 777                                         } else {
 778                                                 Some(script.clone())
 779                                         }
 780                                 },
 781                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
 782                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
 783                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
 784                                 }
 785                         }
 786                 } else { None };
 787
 788                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
 789                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
 790
 791                 let chan = Channel {
 792                         user_id,
 793                         config: local_config,
 794
 795                         channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
 796                         channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
 797                         secp_ctx,
 798
 799                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
 800
 801                         holder_signer,
 802                         shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
 803                         destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
 804
 805                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 806                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
 807                         value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
 808
 809                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 810                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
 811                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
 812                         pending_update_fee: None,
 813                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
 814                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
 815                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
 816                         update_time_counter: 1,
 817
 818                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
 819
 820                         monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
 821                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
 822                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
 823                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
 824                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
 825
 826                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 827                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 828                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 829                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
 830
 831                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
 832
 833                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
 834                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
 835                         short_channel_id: None,
 836
 837                         feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
 838                         channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
 839                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
 840                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
 841                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
 842                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
 843                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
 844                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.own_channel_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
 845                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
 846                         minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
 847
 848                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
 849
 850                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
 851                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
 852                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
 853                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
 854                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
 855                                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
 856                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
 857                                 }),
 858                                 funding_outpoint: None
 859                         },
 860                         funding_transaction: None,
 861
 862                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
 863                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
 864                         counterparty_node_id,
 865
 866                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
 867
 868                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
 869
 870                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
 871
 872                         announcement_sigs: None,
 873
 874                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 875                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 876                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
 877                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
 878                 };
 879
 880                 Ok(chan)
 881         }
 882
 883         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
 884         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
 885         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
 886         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
 887         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
 888         /// an HTLC to a).
 889         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
 890         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
 891         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
 892         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
 893         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
 894         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
 895         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
 896         /// Returns (the transaction info, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
 897         /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
 898         /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
 899         /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
 900         #[inline]
 901         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
 902                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
 903                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
 904                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
 905
 906                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
 907                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 908                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
 909                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
 910
 911                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
 912
 913                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
 914                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
 915                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 916                                         offered: $offered,
 917                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
 918                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
 919                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
 920                                         transaction_output_index: None
 921                                 }
 922                         }
 923                 }
 924
 925                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
 926                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
 927                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
 928                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
 929                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 930                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 931                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 932                                         } else {
 933                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 934                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 935                                         }
 936                                 } else {
 937                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
 938                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
 939                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 940                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 941                                         } else {
 942                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
 943                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
 944                                         }
 945                                 }
 946                         }
 947                 }
 948
 949                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
 950                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 951                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
 952                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
 953                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
 954                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 955                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
 956                         };
 957
 958                         if include {
 959                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
 960                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 961                         } else {
 962                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 963                                 match &htlc.state {
 964                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
 965                                                 if generated_by_local {
 966                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
 967                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 968                                                         }
 969                                                 }
 970                                         },
 971                                         _ => {},
 972                                 }
 973                         }
 974                 }
 975
 976                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
 977                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
 978                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
 979                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
 980                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
 981                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
 982                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
 983                         };
 984
 985                         if include {
 986                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
 987                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
 988                         } else {
 989                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
 990                                 match htlc.state {
 991                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
 992                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 993                                         },
 994                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
 995                                                 if !generated_by_local {
 996                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
 997                                                 }
 998                                         },
 999                                         _ => {},
1000                                 }
1001                         }
1002                 }
1003
1004                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1005                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1006                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1007                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1008                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1009                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1010                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1011                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1012
1013                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1014                 {
1015                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1016                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1017                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1018                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1019                         } else {
1020                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1021                         };
1022                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1023                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1024                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
1025                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1026                 }
1027
1028                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (included_non_dust_htlcs.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1029                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1030                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1031                 } else {
1032                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
1033                 };
1034
1035                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1036                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1037
1038                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1039                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1040                 } else {
1041                         value_to_a = 0;
1042                 }
1043
1044                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1045                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1046                 } else {
1047                         value_to_b = 0;
1048                 }
1049
1050                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1051
1052                 let channel_parameters =
1053                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1054                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1055                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1056                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
1057                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
1058                                                                              keys.clone(),
1059                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
1060                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1061                                                                              &channel_parameters
1062                 );
1063                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1064                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1065                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1066                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1067
1068                 (tx, num_nondust_htlcs, htlcs_included)
1069         }
1070
1071         #[inline]
1072         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1073                 let channel_close_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1074                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1075         }
1076
1077         #[inline]
1078         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1079                 let mut ret =
1080                 (4 +                                           // version
1081                  1 +                                           // input count
1082                  36 +                                          // prevout
1083                  1 +                                           // script length (0)
1084                  4 +                                           // sequence
1085                  1 +                                           // output count
1086                  4                                             // lock time
1087                  )*4 +                                         // * 4 for non-witness parts
1088                 2 +                                            // witness marker and flag
1089                 1 +                                            // witness element count
1090                 4 +                                            // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1091                 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1092                 2*(1 + 71);                                    // two signatures + sighash type flags
1093                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1094                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1095                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1096                 }
1097                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1098                         ret += ((8+1) +                            // output values and script length
1099                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                 // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1100                 }
1101                 ret
1102         }
1103
1104         #[inline]
1105         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1106                 let txins = {
1107                         let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1108                         ins.push(TxIn {
1109                                 previous_output: self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1110                                 script_sig: Script::new(),
1111                                 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1112                                 witness: Vec::new(),
1113                         });
1114                         ins
1115                 };
1116
1117                 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1118                 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1119                 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1120
1121                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1122                 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1123                 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1124
1125                 if value_to_self < 0 {
1126                         assert!(self.is_outbound());
1127                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1128                 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1129                         assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1130                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1131                 }
1132
1133                 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1134                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1135                                 script_pubkey: self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1136                                 value: value_to_remote as u64
1137                         }, ()));
1138                 }
1139
1140                 if value_to_self as u64 > self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1141                         txouts.push((TxOut {
1142                                 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1143                                 value: value_to_self as u64
1144                         }, ()));
1145                 }
1146
1147                 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1148
1149                 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1150                 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1151                         outputs.push(out.0);
1152                 }
1153
1154                 (Transaction {
1155                         version: 2,
1156                         lock_time: 0,
1157                         input: txins,
1158                         output: outputs,
1159                 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1160         }
1161
1162         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1163                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1164         }
1165
1166         #[inline]
1167         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1168         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1169         /// our counterparty!)
1170         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1171         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1172         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1173                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1174                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1175                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1176                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1177
1178                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1179         }
1180
1181         #[inline]
1182         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1183         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1184         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1185         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1186                 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1187                 //may see payments to it!
1188                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1189                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1190                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1191
1192                 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys".to_owned()))
1193         }
1194
1195         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1196         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1197         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1198         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1199                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1200         }
1201
1202         /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1203         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1204         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1205         fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Txid, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Transaction {
1206                 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay() } else { self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay() }, htlc, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1207         }
1208
1209         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1210         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1211         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1212         ///
1213         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1214         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1215         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1216                 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1217                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1218                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1219                 // either.
1220                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1221                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1222                 }
1223                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1224
1225                 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1226
1227                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1228                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1229                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1230
1231                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1232                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1233                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1234                                 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1235                                 match htlc.state {
1236                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1237                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1238                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1239                                                 } else {
1240                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1241                                                 }
1242                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1243                                                 return Ok((None, None));
1244                                         },
1245                                         _ => {
1246                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1247                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1248                                         }
1249                                 }
1250                                 pending_idx = idx;
1251                                 break;
1252                         }
1253                 }
1254                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1255                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1256                 }
1257
1258                 // Now update local state:
1259                 //
1260                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1261                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1262                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1263                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1264                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1265                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1266                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1267                         }],
1268                 };
1269
1270                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1271                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1272                                 match pending_update {
1273                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1274                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1275                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1276                                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1277                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1278                                                         return Ok((None, None));
1279                                                 }
1280                                         },
1281                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1282                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1283                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1284                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1285                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1286                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1287                                                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1288                                                 }
1289                                         },
1290                                         _ => {}
1291                                 }
1292                         }
1293                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1294                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1295                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1296                         });
1297                         return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1298                 }
1299
1300                 {
1301                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1302                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1303                         } else {
1304                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1305                                 return Ok((None, Some(monitor_update)));
1306                         }
1307                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1308                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1309                 }
1310
1311                 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1312                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1313                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1314                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1315                 }), Some(monitor_update)))
1316         }
1317
1318         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1319                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger)? {
1320                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), Some(mut monitor_update)) => {
1321                                 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1322                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1323                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1324                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1325                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1326                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1327                         },
1328                         (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), None) => {
1329                                 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
1330                                 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1331                         },
1332                         (None, Some(monitor_update)) => Ok((None, Some(monitor_update))),
1333                         (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1334                 }
1335         }
1336
1337         /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1338         /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return a ChannelError::Ignore. Thus, will always
1339         /// return Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on or preconditions are met.
1340         ///
1341         /// Note that it is still possible to hit these assertions in case we find a preimage on-chain
1342         /// but then have a reorg which settles on an HTLC-failure on chain.
1343         pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1344                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1345                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1346                 }
1347                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1348
1349                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1350                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1351                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1352
1353                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1354                 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1355                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1356                                 match htlc.state {
1357                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1358                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1359                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fail/fulfilled");
1360                                                 return Ok(None);
1361                                         },
1362                                         _ => {
1363                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1364                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
1365                                         }
1366                                 }
1367                                 pending_idx = idx;
1368                         }
1369                 }
1370                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1371                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1372                 }
1373
1374                 // Now update local state:
1375                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1376                         for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1377                                 match pending_update {
1378                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1379                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1380                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already fulfilled");
1381                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1382                                                 }
1383                                         },
1384                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1385                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1386                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
1387                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
1388                                                 }
1389                                         },
1390                                         _ => {}
1391                                 }
1392                         }
1393                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1394                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1395                                 err_packet,
1396                         });
1397                         return Ok(None);
1398                 }
1399
1400                 {
1401                         let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1402                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1403                 }
1404
1405                 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1406                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1407                         htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1408                         reason: err_packet
1409                 }))
1410         }
1411
1412         // Message handlers:
1413
1414         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1415                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1416                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1417                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
1418                 }
1419                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1420                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
1421                 }
1422                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1423                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1424                 }
1425                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1426                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
1427                 }
1428                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1429                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve ({}) and dust_limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
1430                 }
1431                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1432                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? channel_reserve_satoshis was ({}). dust_limit is ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)));
1433                 }
1434                 let remote_reserve = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1435                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > remote_reserve {
1436                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, remote_reserve)));
1437                 }
1438                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1439                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1440                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1441                 }
1442                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1443                 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
1444                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
1445                 }
1446                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1447                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1448                 }
1449                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1450                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1451                 }
1452
1453                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1454                 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1455                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1456                 }
1457                 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1458                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1459                 }
1460                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1461                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1462                 }
1463                 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1464                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1465                 }
1466                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1467                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1468                 }
1469                 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1470                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1471                 }
1472                 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1473                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
1474                 }
1475
1476                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1477                         match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1478                                 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1479                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1480                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1481                                                 None
1482                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1483                                         } else if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, script) {
1484                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. script: ({})", script.to_bytes().to_hex())));
1485                                         } else {
1486                                                 Some(script.clone())
1487                                         }
1488                                 },
1489                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1490                                 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1491                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1492                                 }
1493                         }
1494                 } else { None };
1495
1496                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1497                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1498                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1499                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1500                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1501                 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1502
1503                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1504                         funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1505                         revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1506                         payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1507                         delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1508                         htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1509                 };
1510
1511                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1512                         selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1513                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1514                 });
1515
1516                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1517                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1518
1519                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1520
1521                 Ok(())
1522         }
1523
1524         fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1525                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1526
1527                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1528                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1529                 {
1530                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1531                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1532                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1533                         // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
1534                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1535                         secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
1536                 }
1537
1538                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1539                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1540
1541                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1542                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1543                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1544
1545                 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
1546                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
1547
1548                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1549                 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
1550         }
1551
1552         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1553                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1554         }
1555
1556         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1557                 if self.is_outbound() {
1558                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
1559                 }
1560                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1561                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1562                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1563                         // channel.
1564                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
1565                 }
1566                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1567                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1568                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1569                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1570                 }
1571
1572                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
1573                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
1574                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
1575                 // funding_created_signature may fail.
1576                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
1577
1578                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
1579                         Ok(res) => res,
1580                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
1581                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
1582                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
1583                         },
1584                         Err(e) => {
1585                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
1586                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
1587                                 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
1588                         }
1589                 };
1590
1591                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1592                         initial_commitment_tx,
1593                         msg.signature,
1594                         Vec::new(),
1595                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1596                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1597                 );
1598
1599                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1600
1601                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1602                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1603                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1604                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1605                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1606                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
1607                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1608                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1609                                                           obscure_factor,
1610                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1611
1612                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1613
1614                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1615                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1616                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1617                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1618
1619                 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1620                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
1621                         signature
1622                 }, channel_monitor))
1623         }
1624
1625         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1626         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1627         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<Signer>, Transaction), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1628                 if !self.is_outbound() {
1629                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
1630                 }
1631                 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1632                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
1633                 }
1634                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1635                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1636                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1637                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1638                 }
1639
1640                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1641
1642                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1643                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1644                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1645                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1646
1647                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty ID {} tx {}", counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
1648
1649                 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1650                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
1651                 {
1652                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
1653                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
1654                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
1655                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1656                         if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
1657                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
1658                         }
1659                 }
1660
1661                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
1662                         initial_commitment_tx,
1663                         msg.signature,
1664                         Vec::new(),
1665                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
1666                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
1667                 );
1668
1669
1670                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1671                 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
1672                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
1673                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
1674                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), self.holder_signer.clone(),
1675                                                           &self.shutdown_pubkey, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
1676                                                           &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
1677                                                           &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
1678                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
1679                                                           obscure_factor,
1680                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block);
1681
1682                 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
1683
1684                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
1685                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1686                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1687                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1688
1689                 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap()))
1690         }
1691
1692         pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1693                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1694                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1695                 }
1696
1697                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1698
1699                 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1700                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1701                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1702                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1703                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
1704                 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1705                                  // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1706                                  self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1707                                  self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1708                                 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1709                                 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1710                                                       (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1711                         if self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1712                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point".to_owned()));
1713                         }
1714                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1715                         return Ok(());
1716                 } else {
1717                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time".to_owned()));
1718                 }
1719
1720                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
1721                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1722                 Ok(())
1723         }
1724
1725         /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1726         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1727                 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1728                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1729                         htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1730                 }
1731                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1732         }
1733
1734         /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1735         /// holding cell.
1736         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1737                 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1738                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1739                         htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1740                 }
1741
1742                 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1743                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1744                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1745                                 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1746                                 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1747                         }
1748                 }
1749
1750                 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1751         }
1752
1753         /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1754         /// Doesn't bother handling the
1755         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1756         /// corner case properly.
1757         pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1758                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1759                 (cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1760                 cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1761         }
1762
1763         // Get the fee cost of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1764         // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1765         fn commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, num_htlcs: usize) -> u64 {
1766                 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1767                 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1768                 (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * self.feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1769         }
1770
1771         // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1772         // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
1773         // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
1774         // are excluded.
1775         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1776                 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1777
1778                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1779                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1780
1781                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1782                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1783                 match htlc.origin {
1784                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1785                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1786                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1787                                 }
1788                         },
1789                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1790                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1791                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1792                                 }
1793                         }
1794                 }
1795
1796                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1797                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1798                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1799                                 continue
1800                         }
1801                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1802                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1803                         included_htlcs += 1;
1804                 }
1805
1806                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1807                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1808                                 continue
1809                         }
1810                         match htlc.state {
1811                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1812                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1813                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1814                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1815                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1816                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1817                                 _ => {},
1818                         }
1819                 }
1820
1821                 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1822                         match htlc {
1823                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1824                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1825                                                 continue
1826                                         }
1827                                         included_htlcs += 1
1828                                 },
1829                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1830                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1831                         }
1832                 }
1833
1834                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1835                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1836                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1837                 {
1838                         let mut fee = res;
1839                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1840                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1841                         }
1842                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1843                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1844                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1845                                 fee,
1846                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1847                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1848                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1849                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1850                                 },
1851                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1852                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1853                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1854                                 },
1855                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1856                         };
1857                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1858                 }
1859                 res
1860         }
1861
1862         // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1863         // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
1864         // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
1865         // excluded.
1866         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1867                 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1868
1869                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1870                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1871
1872                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1873                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1874                 match htlc.origin {
1875                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1876                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1877                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1878                                 }
1879                         },
1880                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1881                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1882                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
1883                                 }
1884                         }
1885                 }
1886
1887                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1888                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1889                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1890                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1891                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1892                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1893                                 continue
1894                         }
1895                         included_htlcs += 1;
1896                 }
1897
1898                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1899                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1900                                 continue
1901                         }
1902                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1903                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1904                         match htlc.state {
1905                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1906                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1907                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1908                                 _ => {},
1909                         }
1910                 }
1911
1912                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1913                 let res = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs);
1914                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
1915                 {
1916                         let mut fee = res;
1917                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1918                                 fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(num_htlcs - 1);
1919                         }
1920                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1921                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1922                                 fee,
1923                                 total_pending_htlcs,
1924                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1925                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1926                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
1927                                 },
1928                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1929                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1930                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1931                                 },
1932                                 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
1933                         };
1934                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1935                 }
1936                 res
1937         }
1938
1939         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
1940         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
1941                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
1942                 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1943                 if local_sent_shutdown {
1944                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|20);
1945                 }
1946                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
1947                 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32);
1948                 if remote_sent_shutdown {
1949                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
1950                 }
1951                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1952                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
1953                 }
1954                 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1955                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
1956                 }
1957                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
1958                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
1959                 }
1960                 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
1961                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
1962                 }
1963
1964                 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1965                 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1966                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
1967                 }
1968                 let holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis);
1969                 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1970                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1971                 }
1972                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1973                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1974                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1975                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1976                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1977                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1978                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1979                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1980                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1981                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1982                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1983                 // transaction).
1984                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1985                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1986                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1987                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1988                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1989                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1990                         }
1991                 }
1992
1993                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
1994                         self.value_to_self_msat + htlc_inbound_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
1995                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
1996                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
1997                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
1998                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
1999                 }
2000
2001                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2002                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2003                 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2004                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2005                         self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2006                 };
2007                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2008                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2009                 };
2010
2011                 let chan_reserve_msat =
2012                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) * 1000;
2013                 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
2014                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2015                 }
2016
2017                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2018                         // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2019                         // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2020                         // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2021                         // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2022                         // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2023                         // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2024                         // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2025                         // sensitive to fee spikes.
2026                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2027                         let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2028                         if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - chan_reserve_msat < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2029                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2030                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2031                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation");
2032                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2033                         }
2034                 } else {
2035                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2036                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2037                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2038                         if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2039                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2040                         }
2041                 }
2042                 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2043                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2044                 }
2045                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2046                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2047                 }
2048
2049                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2050                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2051                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2052                         }
2053                 }
2054
2055                 // Now update local state:
2056                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2057                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2058                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2059                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2060                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2061                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2062                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2063                 });
2064                 Ok(())
2065         }
2066
2067         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2068         #[inline]
2069         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2070                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2071                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2072                                 match check_preimage {
2073                                         None => {},
2074                                         Some(payment_hash) =>
2075                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2076                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2077                                                 }
2078                                 };
2079                                 match htlc.state {
2080                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2081                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2082                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2083                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
2084                                         },
2085                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2086                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2087                                 }
2088                                 return Ok(&htlc.source);
2089                         }
2090                 }
2091                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2092         }
2093
2094         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
2095                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2096                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2097                 }
2098                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2099                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2100                 }
2101
2102                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2103                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
2104         }
2105
2106         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2107                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2108                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2109                 }
2110                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2111                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2112                 }
2113
2114                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2115                 Ok(())
2116         }
2117
2118         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2119                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2120                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2121                 }
2122                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2123                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2124                 }
2125
2126                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2127                 Ok(())
2128         }
2129
2130         pub fn commitment_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
2131         where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2132                                 L::Target: Logger
2133         {
2134                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2135                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
2136                 }
2137                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2138                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
2139                 }
2140                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2141                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
2142                 }
2143
2144                 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2145
2146                 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2147
2148                 let mut update_fee = false;
2149                 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2150                         update_fee = true;
2151                         self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
2152                 } else {
2153                         self.feerate_per_kw
2154                 };
2155
2156                 let (num_htlcs, mut htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx, commitment_txid) = {
2157                         let commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw, logger);
2158                         let commitment_txid = {
2159                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.0.trust();
2160                                 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2161                                 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2162
2163                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
2164                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2165                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2166                                 }
2167                                 bitcoin_tx.txid
2168                         };
2169                         let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2170                         (commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned, commitment_tx.0, commitment_txid)
2171                 };
2172
2173                 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
2174                 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
2175                 if update_fee {
2176                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
2177                         if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + counterparty_reserve_we_require {
2178                                 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
2179                         }
2180                 }
2181                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2182                 {
2183                         if self.is_outbound() {
2184                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2185                                 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2186                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2187                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2188                                                 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2189                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2190                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
2191                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2192                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2193                                                         assert_eq!(total_fee, info.fee / 1000);
2194                                                 }
2195                                 }
2196                         }
2197                 }
2198
2199                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != num_htlcs {
2200                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), num_htlcs))));
2201                 }
2202
2203                 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
2204                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2205                 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2206                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2207                                 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &keys, feerate_per_kw);
2208                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
2209                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
2210                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
2211                                 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2212                                         return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
2213                                 }
2214                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
2215                         } else {
2216                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
2217                         }
2218                 }
2219
2220                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2221                         commitment_tx,
2222                         msg.signature,
2223                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2224                         &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2225                         self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2226                 );
2227
2228                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2229                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
2230
2231                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2232                 let mut need_commitment = false;
2233                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2234                         if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
2235                                 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
2236                                 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
2237                                 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
2238                                 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
2239                                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
2240                                         need_commitment = true;
2241                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2242                                 }
2243                         }
2244                 }
2245
2246                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2247                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2248                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2249                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2250                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2251                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
2252                         }]
2253                 };
2254
2255                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2256                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2257                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
2258                         } else { None };
2259                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2260                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2261                                 need_commitment = true;
2262                         }
2263                 }
2264                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2265                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2266                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
2267                         } else { None } {
2268                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
2269                                 need_commitment = true;
2270                         }
2271                 }
2272
2273                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2274                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
2275                 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
2276                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
2277
2278                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2279                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
2280                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
2281                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2282                         if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2283                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
2284                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
2285                                 // includes the right HTLCs.
2286                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2287                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2288                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2289                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2290                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2291                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2292                         }
2293                         // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
2294                         // re-send the message on restoration)
2295                         return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
2296                 }
2297
2298                 let (commitment_signed, closing_signed) = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
2299                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
2300                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
2301                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
2302                         let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
2303                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2304                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2305                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2306                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2307                         (Some(msg), None)
2308                 } else if !need_commitment {
2309                         (None, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
2310                 } else { (None, None) };
2311
2312                 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2313                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2314                         per_commitment_secret,
2315                         next_per_commitment_point,
2316                 }, commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
2317         }
2318
2319         /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
2320         /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
2321         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2322                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2323                 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
2324                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
2325
2326                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2327                                 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
2328                                 updates: Vec::new(),
2329                         };
2330
2331                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
2332                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
2333                         let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2334                         let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2335                         let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
2336                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
2337                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2338                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
2339                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
2340                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
2341                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
2342                                 // to rebalance channels.
2343                                 match &htlc_update {
2344                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
2345                                                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
2346                                                         Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
2347                                                         Err(e) => {
2348                                                                 match e {
2349                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
2350                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
2351                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
2352                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
2353                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
2354                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
2355                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
2356                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
2357                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
2358                                                                         },
2359                                                                         _ => {
2360                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
2361                                                                         },
2362                                                                 }
2363                                                         }
2364                                                 }
2365                                         },
2366                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
2367                                                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
2368                                                         Ok((update_fulfill_msg_option, additional_monitor_update_opt)) => {
2369                                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
2370                                                                 if let Some(mut additional_monitor_update) = additional_monitor_update_opt {
2371                                                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
2372                                                                 }
2373                                                         },
2374                                                         Err(e) => {
2375                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2376                                                                 else {
2377                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
2378                                                                 }
2379                                                         }
2380                                                 }
2381                                         },
2382                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
2383                                                 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
2384                                                         Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
2385                                                         Err(e) => {
2386                                                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
2387                                                                 else {
2388                                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
2389                                                                 }
2390                                                         }
2391                                                 }
2392                                         },
2393                                 }
2394                         }
2395                         if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
2396                                 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
2397                         }
2398                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
2399                                 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
2400                                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2401                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2402                                         feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
2403                                 })
2404                         } else {
2405                                 None
2406                         };
2407
2408                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2409                         // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
2410                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
2411                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2412                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2413
2414                         Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2415                                 update_add_htlcs,
2416                                 update_fulfill_htlcs,
2417                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2418                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2419                                 update_fee,
2420                                 commitment_signed,
2421                         }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
2422                 } else {
2423                         Ok((None, Vec::new()))
2424                 }
2425         }
2426
2427         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
2428         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
2429         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
2430         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
2431         /// revoke_and_ack message.
2432         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &F, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
2433                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2434                                         L::Target: Logger,
2435         {
2436                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
2437                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2438                 }
2439                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2440                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2441                 }
2442                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2443                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2444                 }
2445
2446                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2447                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned())) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
2448                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
2449                         }
2450                 }
2451
2452                 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
2453                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
2454                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
2455                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
2456                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
2457                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
2458                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
2459                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
2460                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
2461                 }
2462
2463                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
2464                 {
2465                         *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2466                         *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2467                 }
2468
2469                 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
2470                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
2471                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2472                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2473                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2474                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
2475                                 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
2476                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
2477                         }],
2478                 };
2479
2480                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2481                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
2482                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
2483                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2484                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2485                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2486                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2487                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2488
2489                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2490                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2491                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2492                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2493                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2494                 let mut require_commitment = false;
2495                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2496
2497                 {
2498                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2499                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2500                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2501
2502                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2503                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2504                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2505                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2506                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2507                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2508                                         }
2509                                         false
2510                                 } else { true }
2511                         });
2512                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2513                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2514                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2515                                         if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2516                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2517                                         } else {
2518                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2519                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2520                                         }
2521                                         false
2522                                 } else { true }
2523                         });
2524                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2525                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2526                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2527                                         true
2528                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2529                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2530                                         true
2531                                 } else { false };
2532                                 if swap {
2533                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2534                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2535
2536                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2537                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2538                                                 require_commitment = true;
2539                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2540                                                 match forward_info {
2541                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2542                                                                 require_commitment = true;
2543                                                                 match fail_msg {
2544                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2545                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2546                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2547                                                                         },
2548                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2549                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2550                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2551                                                                         },
2552                                                                 }
2553                                                         },
2554                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2555                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2556                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2557                                                         }
2558                                                 }
2559                                         }
2560                                 }
2561                         }
2562                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2563                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2564                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2565                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2566                                 }
2567                                 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2568                                         Some(fail_reason.take())
2569                                 } else { None } {
2570                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2571                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2572                                         require_commitment = true;
2573                                 }
2574                         }
2575                 }
2576                 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2577
2578                 if self.is_outbound() {
2579                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2580                                 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2581                         }
2582                 } else {
2583                         if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2584                                 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2585                                 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2586                                 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2587                                 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2588                                 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2589                                 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2590                                         require_commitment = true;
2591                                         self.pending_update_fee = None;
2592                                 }
2593                         }
2594                 }
2595
2596                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2597                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2598                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2599                         if require_commitment {
2600                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2601                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2602                                 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2603                                 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2604                                 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2605                                 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2606                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2607                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2608                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2609                         }
2610                         self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2611                         self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2612                         return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, monitor_update, Vec::new()))
2613                 }
2614
2615                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
2616                         (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
2617                                 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2618                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2619                                         commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2620                                 }
2621                                 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2622                                 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2623                                         commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2624                                 }
2625
2626                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
2627                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2628                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2629                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2630
2631                                 Ok((Some(commitment_update), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2632                         },
2633                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
2634                                 if require_commitment {
2635                                         let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2636
2637                                         // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
2638                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2639                                         self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2640                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2641
2642                                         Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2643                                                 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2644                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2645                                                 update_fail_htlcs,
2646                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2647                                                 update_fee: None,
2648                                                 commitment_signed
2649                                         }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2650                                 } else {
2651                                         Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), monitor_update, htlcs_to_fail))
2652                                 }
2653                         }
2654                 }
2655
2656         }
2657
2658         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2659         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2660         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2661         fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2662                 if !self.is_outbound() {
2663                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2664                 }
2665                 if !self.is_usable() {
2666                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2667                 }
2668                 if !self.is_live() {
2669                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2670                 }
2671
2672                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2673                         self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2674                         return None;
2675                 }
2676
2677                 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2678                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2679
2680                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2681                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2682                         feerate_per_kw,
2683                 })
2684         }
2685
2686         pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2687                 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2688                         Some(update_fee) => {
2689                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
2690                                 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2691                         },
2692                         None => Ok(None)
2693                 }
2694         }
2695
2696         /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2697         /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2698         /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2699         /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2700         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2701         /// completed.
2702         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> where L::Target: Logger {
2703                 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2704
2705                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2706                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2707                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2708                         return outbound_drops;
2709                 }
2710                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2711                 // will be retransmitted.
2712                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2713
2714                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2715                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2716                         match htlc.state {
2717                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2718                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2719                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2720                                         // this HTLC accordingly
2721                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
2722                                         false
2723                                 },
2724                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2725                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2726                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2727                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2728                                         true
2729                                 },
2730                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2731                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2732                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2733                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2734                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2735                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2736                                         true
2737                                 },
2738                         }
2739                 });
2740                 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2741
2742                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2743                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2744                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2745                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2746                                 // the update upon reconnection.
2747                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2748                         }
2749                 }
2750
2751                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2752                         match htlc_update {
2753                                 // Note that currently on channel reestablish we assert that there are
2754                                 // no holding cell HTLC update_adds, so if in the future we stop
2755                                 // dropping added HTLCs here and failing them backwards, then there will
2756                                 // need to be corresponding changes made in the Channel's re-establish
2757                                 // logic.
2758                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2759                                         outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2760                                         false
2761                                 },
2762                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2763                         }
2764                 });
2765                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2766                 log_debug!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2767                 outbound_drops
2768         }
2769
2770         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2771         /// updates are partially paused.
2772         /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2773         /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2774         /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2775         /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2776         pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2777                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2778                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2779                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2780                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2781                 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2782                 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2783                 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2784                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2785         }
2786
2787         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2788         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2789         /// to the remote side.
2790         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<Transaction>, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) where L::Target: Logger {
2791                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2792                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2793
2794                 let funding_broadcastable = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.is_outbound() {
2795                         self.funding_transaction.take()
2796                 } else { None };
2797
2798                 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateFailed (and
2799                 // we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for us to
2800                 // do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound
2801                 // channel which failed to persist the monitor on funding_created, and we got the funding
2802                 // transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted.
2803                 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2804                         assert!(!self.is_outbound(), "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
2805                         self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2806                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2807                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2808                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2809                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2810                         })
2811                 } else { None };
2812
2813                 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2814                 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2815                 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2816                 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2817
2818                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2819                         self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2820                         self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2821                         return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked);
2822                 }
2823
2824                 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2825                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2826                 } else { None };
2827                 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2828                         Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
2829                 } else { None };
2830
2831                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2832                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2833                 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2834                 log_trace!(logger, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2835                         if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
2836                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2837                         if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2838                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2839                 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, funding_broadcastable, funding_locked)
2840         }
2841
2842         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2843                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2844         {
2845                 if self.is_outbound() {
2846                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
2847                 }
2848                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2849                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2850                 }
2851                 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2852                 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw);
2853                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2854                 Ok(())
2855         }
2856
2857         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2858                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2859                 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2860                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2861                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
2862                         per_commitment_secret,
2863                         next_per_commitment_point,
2864                 }
2865         }
2866
2867         fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
2868                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2869                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2870                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2871                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2872
2873                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2874                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2875                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2876                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2877                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2878                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2879                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2880                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2881                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2882                                 });
2883                         }
2884                 }
2885
2886                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2887                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2888                                 match reason {
2889                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2890                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2891                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2892                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2893                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
2894                                                 });
2895                                         },
2896                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2897                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2898                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2899                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2900                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2901                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2902                                                 });
2903                                         },
2904                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2905                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2906                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2907                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2908                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2909                                                 });
2910                                         },
2911                                 }
2912                         }
2913                 }
2914
2915                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2916                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2917                 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2918                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2919                         update_fee: None,
2920                         commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2921                 }
2922         }
2923
2924         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2925         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2926         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2927                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2928                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2929                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2930                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2931                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
2932                 }
2933
2934                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2935                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2936                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2937                 }
2938
2939                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2940                         match msg.data_loss_protect {
2941                                 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2942                                         let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
2943                                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
2944                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
2945                                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
2946                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
2947                                         }
2948                                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2949                                                 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(
2950                                                         "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting".to_owned()
2951                                                 ));
2952                                         }
2953                                 },
2954                                 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2955                         }
2956                 }
2957
2958                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2959                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2960                 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2961
2962                 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2963                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2964                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2965                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2966                         })
2967                 } else { None };
2968
2969                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2970                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2971                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2972                                         self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2973                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2974                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet".to_owned()));
2975                                 }
2976                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2977                                 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2978                         }
2979
2980                         // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2981                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2982                         return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2983                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2984                                 next_per_commitment_point,
2985                         }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2986                 }
2987
2988                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2989                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2990                         // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2991                         None
2992                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
2993                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2994                                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2995                                 None
2996                         } else {
2997                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2998                         }
2999                 } else {
3000                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3001                 };
3002
3003                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3004                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3005                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3006                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3007                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
3008
3009                 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3010                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
3011                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3012                         Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3013                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3014                                 next_per_commitment_point,
3015                         })
3016                 } else { None };
3017
3018                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3019                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3020                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3021                         } else {
3022                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3023                         }
3024
3025                         if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
3026                                 // Note that if in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3027                                 // disconnect, this logic will need to be updated.
3028                                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3029                                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } = htlc_update {
3030                                                 debug_assert!(false, "There shouldn't be any add-HTLCs in the holding cell now because they should have been dropped on peer disconnect. Panic here because said HTLCs won't be handled correctly.");
3031                                         }
3032                                 }
3033
3034                                 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
3035                                 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
3036                                 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
3037                                 // now!
3038                                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3039                                         Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
3040                                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast(_)) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
3041                                         Ok((Some((commitment_update, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3042                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3043                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3044                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3045                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(monitor_update), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3046                                         },
3047                                         Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail)) => {
3048                                                 // If in the future we no longer drop holding cell update_adds on peer
3049                                                 // disconnect, we may be handed some HTLCs to fail backwards here.
3050                                                 assert!(htlcs_to_fail.is_empty());
3051                                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3052                                         },
3053                                 }
3054                         } else {
3055                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3056                         }
3057                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3058                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
3059                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3060                         } else {
3061                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3062                         }
3063
3064                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3065                                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3066                                 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3067                         }
3068
3069                         return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
3070                 } else {
3071                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3072                 }
3073         }
3074
3075         fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>
3076                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3077         {
3078                 if !self.is_outbound() || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
3079                                 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
3080                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3081                         return None;
3082                 }
3083
3084                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3085                 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
3086                         proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
3087                 }
3088                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3089                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
3090
3091                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
3092                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3093                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3094                         .ok();
3095                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3096                 if sig.is_none() { return None; }
3097
3098                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone().unwrap()));
3099                 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3100                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3101                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
3102                         signature: sig.unwrap(),
3103                 })
3104         }
3105
3106         pub fn shutdown<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
3107                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3108         {
3109                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3110                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3111                 }
3112                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3113                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
3114                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
3115                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
3116                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
3117                 }
3118                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3119                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3120                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3121                         }
3122                 }
3123                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3124
3125                 if is_unsupported_shutdown_script(&their_features, &msg.scriptpubkey) {
3126                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3127                 }
3128
3129                 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
3130                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
3131                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
3132                         }
3133                 } else {
3134                         self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
3135                 }
3136
3137                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3138
3139                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
3140                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3141
3142                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
3143                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
3144                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
3145                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3146                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3147                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3148                         match htlc_update {
3149                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3150                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3151                                         false
3152                                 },
3153                                 _ => true
3154                         }
3155                 });
3156                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
3157                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
3158                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
3159
3160                 let shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3161                         None
3162                 } else {
3163                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3164                                 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3165                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3166                         })
3167                 };
3168
3169                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3170                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3171
3172                 Ok((shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3173         }
3174
3175         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) {
3176                 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
3177                 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
3178                 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
3179
3180                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
3181
3182                 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
3183                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
3184                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
3185                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3186                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3187                 } else {
3188                         tx.input[0].witness.push(counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3189                         tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
3190                 }
3191                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3192                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
3193
3194                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
3195         }
3196
3197         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &F, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
3198                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3199         {
3200                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
3201                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
3202                 }
3203                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3204                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3205                 }
3206                 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
3207                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
3208                 }
3209                 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
3210                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
3211                 }
3212
3213                 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3214                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
3215                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
3216                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}", msg.fee_satoshis)));
3217                 }
3218                 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3219
3220                 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3221                         Ok(_) => {},
3222                         Err(_e) => {
3223                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
3224                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
3225                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
3226                                 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&closing_tx).signature_hash(0, &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
3227                                 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
3228                         },
3229                 };
3230
3231                 let closing_tx_max_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(
3232                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(0) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None },
3233                         if let Some(oup) = closing_tx.output.get(1) { Some(&oup.script_pubkey) } else { None });
3234                 if let Some((_, last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3235                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
3236                                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3237                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3238                                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3239                                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3240                                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3241                                 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
3242                         }
3243                 }
3244
3245                 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
3246                         ($new_feerate: expr) => {
3247                                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
3248                                 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000, false);
3249                                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3250                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3251                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3252                                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= tx_weight);
3253                                 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, sig.clone()));
3254                                 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3255                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3256                                         fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
3257                                         signature: sig,
3258                                 }), None))
3259                         }
3260                 }
3261
3262                 let mut min_feerate = 253;
3263                 if self.is_outbound() {
3264                         let max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3265                         if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) > max_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3266                                 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3267                                         if max_feerate <= last_feerate {
3268                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher ({}) than our Normal feerate ({})", last_feerate, max_feerate)));
3269                                         }
3270                                 }
3271                                 propose_new_feerate!(max_feerate);
3272                         }
3273                 } else {
3274                         min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3275                 }
3276                 if (msg.fee_satoshis as u64) < min_feerate as u64 * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000 {
3277                         if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3278                                 if min_feerate >= last_feerate {
3279                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower ({}) than our Background feerate ({}).", last_feerate, min_feerate)));
3280                                 }
3281                         }
3282                         propose_new_feerate!(min_feerate);
3283                 }
3284
3285                 let sig = self.holder_signer
3286                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3287                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
3288                 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
3289                 assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 <= closing_tx_max_weight);
3290                 debug_assert!(closing_tx.get_weight() as u64 >= closing_tx_max_weight - 2);
3291
3292                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3293                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3294
3295                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
3296                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3297                         fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
3298                         signature: sig,
3299                 }), Some(closing_tx)))
3300         }
3301
3302         // Public utilities:
3303
3304         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
3305                 self.channel_id
3306         }
3307
3308         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
3309         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
3310         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
3311                 self.user_id
3312         }
3313
3314         /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
3315         /// is_usable() returns true).
3316         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3317         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
3318                 self.short_channel_id
3319         }
3320
3321         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
3322         /// get_outbound_funding_created.
3323         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
3324                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
3325         }
3326
3327         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3328                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
3329         }
3330
3331         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3332                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
3333         }
3334
3335         fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
3336                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().selected_contest_delay
3337         }
3338
3339         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
3340                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
3341         }
3342
3343         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3344         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
3345                 self.counterparty_node_id
3346         }
3347
3348         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3349         #[cfg(test)]
3350         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3351                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
3352         }
3353
3354         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3355         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3356                 return cmp::min(
3357                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
3358                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
3359                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
3360                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
3361
3362                         Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis)
3363                 );
3364         }
3365
3366         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3367         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
3368                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
3369         }
3370
3371         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
3372                 self.channel_value_satoshis
3373         }
3374
3375         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
3376                 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
3377         }
3378
3379         pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
3380                 cmp::max(self.config.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
3381         }
3382
3383         #[cfg(test)]
3384         pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
3385                 self.feerate_per_kw
3386         }
3387
3388         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3389                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
3390         }
3391
3392         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3393                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
3394         }
3395
3396         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
3397                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
3398         }
3399
3400         #[cfg(test)]
3401         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
3402                 &self.holder_signer
3403         }
3404
3405         #[cfg(test)]
3406         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
3407                 ChannelValueStat {
3408                         value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
3409                         channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
3410                         channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
3411                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3412                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
3413                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
3414                                 let mut res = 0;
3415                                 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3416                                         match h {
3417                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
3418                                                         res += amount_msat;
3419                                                 }
3420                                                 _ => {}
3421                                         }
3422                                 }
3423                                 res
3424                         },
3425                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
3426                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
3427                 }
3428         }
3429
3430         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3431         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
3432                 self.update_time_counter
3433         }
3434
3435         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
3436                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
3437         }
3438
3439         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
3440                 self.config.announced_channel
3441         }
3442
3443         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
3444                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
3445         }
3446
3447         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
3448         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3449         pub fn get_holder_fee_base_msat<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &F) -> u32
3450                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3451         {
3452                 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
3453                 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
3454
3455                 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
3456                 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
3457
3458                 if self.is_outbound() {
3459                         // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
3460                         res += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
3461                 }
3462
3463                 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
3464                 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) as u64 * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
3465
3466                 res as u32
3467         }
3468
3469         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
3470         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
3471                 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
3472         }
3473
3474         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
3475         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3476         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
3477                 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
3478                 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
3479         }
3480
3481         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
3482         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
3483         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3484         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
3485                 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
3486         }
3487
3488         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
3489         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
3490         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
3491                 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
3492         }
3493
3494         /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
3495         pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
3496                 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
3497         }
3498
3499         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
3500         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
3501         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
3502         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
3503                 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32  {
3504                         assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3505                         true
3506                 } else { false }
3507         }
3508
3509         pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
3510                 self.channel_update_status
3511         }
3512
3513         pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
3514                 self.channel_update_status = status;
3515         }
3516
3517         fn check_get_funding_locked(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::FundingLocked> {
3518                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3519                         return None;
3520                 }
3521
3522                 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3523                 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
3524                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
3525                 }
3526
3527                 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 {
3528                         return None;
3529                 }
3530
3531                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3532                 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3533                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
3534                         true
3535                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
3536                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3537                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3538                         true
3539                 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
3540                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3541                         false
3542                 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
3543                         panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
3544                 } else {
3545                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
3546                         false
3547                 };
3548
3549                 if need_commitment_update {
3550                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3551                                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3552                                 return Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3553                                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3554                                         next_per_commitment_point,
3555                                 });
3556                         } else {
3557                                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3558                         }
3559                 }
3560                 None
3561         }
3562
3563         /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
3564         /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
3565         /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
3566         pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData, logger: &L)
3567                         -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> where L::Target: Logger {
3568                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3569                 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
3570                         if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3571                                 // If we haven't yet sent a funding_locked, but are in FundingSent (ignoring
3572                                 // whether they've sent a funding_locked or not), check if we should send one.
3573                                 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3574                                         if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
3575                                                 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
3576                                                 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3577                                                                 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3578                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3579                                                                 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3580                                                                 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3581                                                                 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3582                                                                 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3583                                                                 // channel and move on.
3584                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3585                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3586                                                         }
3587                                                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
3588                                                         return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3589                                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3590                                                                 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index".to_owned()
3591                                                         });
3592                                                 } else {
3593                                                         if self.is_outbound() {
3594                                                                 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3595                                                                         if input.witness.is_empty() {
3596                                                                                 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3597                                                                                 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3598                                                                                 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3599                                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3600                                                                         }
3601                                                                 }
3602                                                         }
3603                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
3604                                                         self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
3605                                                         self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
3606                                                                 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
3607                                                                 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
3608                                                         }
3609                                                 }
3610                                         }
3611                                         // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for funding_locked here and
3612                                         // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
3613                                         // may have already happened for this block).
3614                                         if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3615                                                 return Ok(Some(funding_locked));
3616                                         }
3617                                 }
3618                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
3619                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
3620                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3621                                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3622                                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3623                                                         data: "Commitment or closing transaction was confirmed on chain.".to_owned()
3624                                                 });
3625                                         }
3626                                 }
3627                         }
3628                 }
3629                 Ok(None)
3630         }
3631
3632         /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
3633         /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
3634         /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
3635         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
3636         ///
3637         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
3638         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
3639         /// post-shutdown.
3640         ///
3641         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
3642         /// back.
3643         pub fn best_block_updated(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3644                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
3645                 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + HTLC_FAIL_BACK_BUFFER;
3646                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3647                         match htlc_update {
3648                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
3649                                         if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
3650                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3651                                                 false
3652                                         } else { true }
3653                                 },
3654                                 _ => true
3655                         }
3656                 });
3657
3658                 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
3659
3660                 if let Some(funding_locked) = self.check_get_funding_locked(height) {
3661                         return Ok((Some(funding_locked), timed_out_htlcs));
3662                 }
3663
3664                 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3665                 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 ||
3666                    (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32 {
3667                         let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
3668                         if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
3669                                 // Note that check_get_funding_locked may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
3670                                 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
3671                                 // indicate we've already sent a funding_locked
3672                                 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
3673                         }
3674
3675                         // If we've sent funding_locked (or have both sent and received funding_locked), and
3676                         // the funding transaction's confirmation count has dipped below minimum_depth / 2,
3677                         // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
3678                         // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
3679                         if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth as i64 / 2 {
3680                                 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3681                                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3682                                         data: format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.", self.minimum_depth, funding_tx_confirmations),
3683                                 });
3684                         }
3685                 }
3686
3687                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs))
3688         }
3689
3690         /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
3691         /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
3692         /// before the channel has reached funding_locked and we can just wait for more blocks.
3693         pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed(&mut self) -> Result<(), msgs::ErrorMessage> {
3694                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
3695                         // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
3696                         // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
3697                         let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
3698                         // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
3699                         // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
3700                         // time we saw and it will be ignored.
3701                         let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
3702                         match self.best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time) {
3703                                 Ok((funding_locked, timed_out_htlcs)) => {
3704                                         assert!(funding_locked.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
3705                                         assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
3706                                         Ok(())
3707                                 },
3708                                 Err(e) => Err(e)
3709                         }
3710                 } else {
3711                         // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
3712                         Ok(())
3713                 }
3714         }
3715
3716         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3717         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3718
3719         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3720                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3721                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3722                 }
3723                 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3724                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3725                 }
3726
3727                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3728                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3729                 }
3730
3731                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3732                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3733
3734                 msgs::OpenChannel {
3735                         chain_hash,
3736                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3737                         funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3738                         push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3739                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3740                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3741                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3742                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3743                         feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
3744                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3745                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3746                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3747                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3748                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3749                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3750                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3751                         first_per_commitment_point,
3752                         channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3753                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3754                 }
3755         }
3756
3757         pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3758                 if self.is_outbound() {
3759                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3760                 }
3761                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3762                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3763                 }
3764                 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3765                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3766                 }
3767
3768                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3769                 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
3770
3771                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3772                         temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3773                         dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
3774                         max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3775                         channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3776                         htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
3777                         minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3778                         to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3779                         max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3780                         funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
3781                         revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
3782                         payment_point: keys.payment_point,
3783                         delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
3784                         htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
3785                         first_per_commitment_point,
3786                         shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3787                 }
3788         }
3789
3790         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3791         fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3792                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3793                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw, logger).0;
3794                 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
3795                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
3796         }
3797
3798         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3799         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3800         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3801         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3802         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3803         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3804         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3805         pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3806                 if !self.is_outbound() {
3807                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3808                 }
3809                 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3810                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3811                 }
3812                 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3813                                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3814                                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3815                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3816                 }
3817
3818                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
3819                 self.holder_signer.ready_channel(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
3820
3821                 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
3822                         Ok(res) => res,
3823                         Err(e) => {
3824                                 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3825                                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3826                                 return Err(e);
3827                         }
3828                 };
3829
3830                 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3831
3832                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3833
3834                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3835                 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3836                 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
3837
3838                 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
3839                         temporary_channel_id,
3840                         funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3841                         funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3842                         signature
3843                 })
3844         }
3845
3846         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3847         /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3848         /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3849         /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3850         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3851         /// closing).
3852         /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3853         /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3854         pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3855                 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3856                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
3857                 }
3858                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3859                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked".to_owned()));
3860                 }
3861                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3862                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing".to_owned()));
3863                 }
3864
3865                 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
3866
3867                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3868                         features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
3869                         chain_hash,
3870                         short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3871                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
3872                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
3873                         bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3874                         bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
3875                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
3876                 };
3877
3878                 let sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3879                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
3880
3881                 Ok((msg, sig))
3882         }
3883
3884         fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, msghash: secp256k1::Message, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, our_bitcoin_sig: Signature) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
3885                 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
3886                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
3887
3888                         let our_node_sig = self.secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, our_node_secret);
3889                         Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
3890                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
3891                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
3892                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
3893                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
3894                                 contents: announcement,
3895                         })
3896                 } else {
3897                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to get channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
3898                 }
3899         }
3900
3901         /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
3902         /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
3903         /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
3904         pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_secret: &SecretKey, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
3905                 let (announcement, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
3906
3907                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
3908
3909                 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
3910                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
3911                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
3912                                  &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
3913                 }
3914                 if self.secp_ctx.verify(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
3915                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
3916                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
3917                                 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
3918                 }
3919
3920                 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
3921
3922                 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_secret, our_node_id, msghash, announcement, our_bitcoin_sig)
3923         }
3924
3925         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3926         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3927         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
3928                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3929                 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3930                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
3931                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
3932                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
3933                 // fuzztarget mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
3934                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
3935                 // valid, and valid in fuzztarget mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
3936                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
3937                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
3938                 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3939                         let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3940                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3941                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3942                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3943                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
3944                         })
3945                 } else {
3946                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret");
3947                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3948                                 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3949                                 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
3950                         })
3951                 };
3952                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3953                         channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3954                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3955                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3956                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3957                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3958                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3959                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3960
3961                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3962                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3963                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
3964                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3965                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3966                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3967                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3968                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3969                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3970                         // overflow here.
3971                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3972                         data_loss_protect,
3973                 }
3974         }
3975
3976
3977         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3978
3979         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3980         /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3981         /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3982         /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3983         /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3984         /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3985         /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3986         pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3987                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3988                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
3989                 }
3990                 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
3991                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
3992                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
3993                 }
3994
3995                 if amount_msat == 0 {
3996                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3997                 }
3998
3999                 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
4000                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
4001                 }
4002
4003                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
4004                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
4005                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
4006                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
4007                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
4008                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
4009                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
4010                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update".to_owned()));
4011                 }
4012
4013                 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
4014                 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4015                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4016                 }
4017                 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4018                 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4019                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4020                 }
4021
4022                 if !self.is_outbound() {
4023                         // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4024                         let counterparty_balance_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat;
4025                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis);
4026                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4027                         let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4028                         if counterparty_balance_msat < holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4029                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4030                         }
4031                 }
4032
4033                 let pending_value_to_self_msat = self.value_to_self_msat - htlc_outbound_value_msat;
4034                 if pending_value_to_self_msat < amount_msat {
4035                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, pending_value_to_self_msat)));
4036                 }
4037
4038                 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
4039                 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
4040                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
4041                         2 * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
4042                 } else { 0 };
4043                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
4044                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", pending_value_to_self_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
4045                 }
4046
4047                 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
4048                 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
4049                 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4050                 if pending_value_to_self_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
4051                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
4052                 }
4053
4054                 // Now update local state:
4055                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4056                         self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4057                                 amount_msat,
4058                                 payment_hash,
4059                                 cltv_expiry,
4060                                 source,
4061                                 onion_routing_packet,
4062                         });
4063                         return Ok(None);
4064                 }
4065
4066                 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4067                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4068                         amount_msat,
4069                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
4070                         cltv_expiry,
4071                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
4072                         source,
4073                 });
4074
4075                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4076                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4077                         htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
4078                         amount_msat,
4079                         payment_hash,
4080                         cltv_expiry,
4081                         onion_routing_packet,
4082                 };
4083                 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
4084
4085                 Ok(Some(res))
4086         }
4087
4088         /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
4089         /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
4090         /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
4091         /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
4092         pub fn send_commitment<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4093                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
4094                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
4095                 }
4096                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
4097                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
4098                 }
4099                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4100                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4101                 }
4102                 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
4103                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
4104                 }
4105                 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
4106                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4107                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4108                                 have_updates = true;
4109                         }
4110                         if have_updates { break; }
4111                 }
4112                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4113                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4114                                 have_updates = true;
4115                         }
4116                         if have_updates { break; }
4117                 }
4118                 if !have_updates {
4119                         panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
4120                 }
4121                 self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)
4122         }
4123         /// Only fails in case of bad keys
4124         fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4125                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
4126                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
4127                 // is acceptable.
4128                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4129                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4130                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
4131                         } else { None };
4132                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
4133                                 htlc.state = state;
4134                         }
4135                 }
4136                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4137                         if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
4138                                 Some(fail_reason.take())
4139                         } else { None } {
4140                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
4141                         }
4142                 }
4143                 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
4144
4145                 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
4146                         Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
4147                                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4148                                 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
4149                                         htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
4150                                 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
4151                         },
4152                         Err(e) => return Err(e),
4153                 };
4154
4155                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4156                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4157                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4158                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
4159                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
4160                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
4161                                 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4162                                 their_revocation_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
4163                         }]
4164                 };
4165                 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
4166                 Ok((res, monitor_update))
4167         }
4168
4169         /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
4170         /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
4171         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4172                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4173                 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
4174                         if self.is_outbound() {
4175                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4176                         }
4177                 }
4178
4179                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
4180                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw, logger);
4181                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().txid();
4182                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
4183
4184                 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4185                 {
4186                         if !self.is_outbound() {
4187                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4188                                 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4189                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4190                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
4191                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4192                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
4193                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4194                                                 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
4195                                                         let actual_fee = self.commit_tx_fee_msat(counterparty_commitment_tx.1);
4196                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
4197                                                 }
4198                                 }
4199                         }
4200                 }
4201
4202                 {
4203                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(counterparty_commitment_tx.2.len());
4204                         for &(ref htlc, _) in counterparty_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
4205                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
4206                         }
4207
4208                         let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0, &self.secp_ctx)
4209                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
4210                         signature = res.0;
4211                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
4212
4213                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {}",
4214                                 encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_commitment_tx.0.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
4215                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid,
4216                                 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
4217                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
4218
4219                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
4220                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
4221                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
4222                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &counterparty_keys)),
4223                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
4224                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
4225                         }
4226                 }
4227
4228                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
4229                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4230                         signature,
4231                         htlc_signatures,
4232                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, counterparty_commitment_tx.2)))
4233         }
4234
4235         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
4236         /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
4237         /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
4238         /// more info.
4239         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4240                 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
4241                         Some(update_add_htlc) => {
4242                                 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
4243                                 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
4244                         },
4245                         None => Ok(None)
4246                 }
4247         }
4248
4249         /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
4250         pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
4251                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
4252         }
4253
4254         pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4255                 let usable_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
4256                 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= usable_channel_value_msat {
4257                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
4258                 }
4259                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4260                         fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
4261                         fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
4262                         cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
4263                 });
4264
4265                 Ok(())
4266         }
4267
4268         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
4269         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
4270         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
4271                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4272                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4273                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
4274                         }
4275                 }
4276                 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
4277                         if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
4278                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
4279                         }
4280                         else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
4281                                 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
4282                         }
4283                 }
4284                 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4285                 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
4286                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
4287                 }
4288
4289                 let closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
4290
4291                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4292                 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4293                         self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4294                 } else {
4295                         self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4296                 }
4297                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4298
4299                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
4300                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
4301                 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4302                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4303                 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4304                         match htlc_update {
4305                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4306                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4307                                         false
4308                                 },
4309                                 _ => true
4310                         }
4311                 });
4312
4313                 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
4314                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
4315                         scriptpubkey: closing_script,
4316                 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4317         }
4318
4319         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
4320         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
4321         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
4322         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
4323         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
4324         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
4325                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
4326                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
4327                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
4328                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
4329                 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4330
4331                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
4332                 // return them to fail the payment.
4333                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4334                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4335                         match htlc_update {
4336                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
4337                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
4338                                 },
4339                                 _ => {}
4340                         }
4341                 }
4342                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
4343                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
4344                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
4345                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
4346                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
4347                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
4348                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
4349                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
4350                         if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
4351                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4352                                 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4353                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4354                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
4355                                 }))
4356                         } else { None }
4357                 } else { None };
4358
4359                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4360                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4361                 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
4362         }
4363 }
4364
4365 fn is_unsupported_shutdown_script(their_features: &InitFeatures, script: &Script) -> bool {
4366         // We restrain shutdown scripts to standards forms to avoid transactions not propagating on the p2p tx-relay network
4367
4368         // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms,
4369         // which for a a BIP-141-compliant witness program is at max 42 bytes in length.
4370         // So don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
4371         let is_script_too_long = script.len() > 42;
4372         if is_script_too_long {
4373                 return true;
4374         }
4375
4376         if their_features.supports_shutdown_anysegwit() && script.is_witness_program() && script.as_bytes()[0] != OP_PUSHBYTES_0.into_u8() {
4377                 return false;
4378         }
4379
4380         return !script.is_p2pkh() && !script.is_p2sh() && !script.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !script.is_v0_p2wsh()
4381 }
4382
4383 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4384 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
4385
4386 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4387         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4388                 match self {
4389                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
4390                                 0u8.write(writer)?;
4391                                 error_packet.write(writer)?;
4392                         },
4393                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
4394                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4395                                 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
4396                                 err_code.write(writer)?;
4397                         },
4398                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4399                                 2u8.write(writer)?;
4400                                 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4401                         },
4402                 }
4403                 Ok(())
4404         }
4405 }
4406
4407 impl Readable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
4408         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4409                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4410                         0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
4411                         1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4412                         2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
4413                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4414                 })
4415         }
4416 }
4417
4418 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4419         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4420                 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
4421                 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
4422                 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
4423                 match self {
4424                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4425                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4426                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4427                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4428                 }
4429                 Ok(())
4430         }
4431 }
4432
4433 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
4434         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4435                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4436                         0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
4437                         1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
4438                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4439                 })
4440         }
4441 }
4442
4443 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
4444         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
4445                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
4446                 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
4447
4448                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4449
4450                 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
4451                 self.config.write(writer)?;
4452
4453                 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
4454                 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
4455                 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4456
4457                 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
4458
4459                 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
4460                 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
4461                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
4462                 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
4463                 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
4464                 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
4465
4466                 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
4467                 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
4468
4469                 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4470                 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
4471                 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
4472
4473                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
4474                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4475                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4476                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
4477                         }
4478                 }
4479                 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4480                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4481                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
4482                                 continue; // Drop
4483                         }
4484                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4485                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4486                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4487                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4488                         match &htlc.state {
4489                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
4490                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
4491                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4492                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4493                                 },
4494                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
4495                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4496                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
4497                                 },
4498                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4499                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4500                                 },
4501                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
4502                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4503                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
4504                                 },
4505                         }
4506                 }
4507
4508                 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4509                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4510                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4511                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4512                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4513                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4514                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
4515                         match &htlc.state {
4516                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
4517                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4518                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
4519                                 },
4520                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4521                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4522                                 },
4523                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
4524                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4525                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4526                                 },
4527                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
4528                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
4529                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4530                                 },
4531                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
4532                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
4533                                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4534                                 },
4535                         }
4536                 }
4537
4538                 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4539                 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4540                         match update {
4541                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
4542                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
4543                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
4544                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
4545                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4546                                         source.write(writer)?;
4547                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
4548                                 },
4549                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
4550                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
4551                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
4552                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4553                                 },
4554                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4555                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
4556                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4557                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
4558                                 }
4559                         }
4560                 }
4561
4562                 match self.resend_order {
4563                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4564                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
4565                 }
4566
4567                 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
4568                 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
4569                 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
4570
4571                 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4572                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
4573                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
4574                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4575                 }
4576
4577                 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
4578                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
4579                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
4580                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
4581                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
4582                 }
4583
4584                 self.pending_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4585                 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
4586
4587                 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
4588                 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
4589                 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
4590                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
4591
4592                 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4593                         Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
4594                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4595                                 feerate.write(writer)?;
4596                                 fee.write(writer)?;
4597                                 sig.write(writer)?;
4598                         },
4599                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
4600                 }
4601
4602                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
4603                 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
4604                 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
4605
4606                 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4607                 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4608                 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
4609                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
4610                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4611                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
4612                 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
4613                 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
4614
4615                 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
4616                         Some(info) => {
4617                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
4618                                 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
4619                                 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
4620                                 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
4621                         },
4622                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?
4623                 }
4624
4625                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
4626                 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
4627
4628                 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4629                 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
4630                 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
4631
4632                 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
4633
4634                 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
4635
4636                 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
4637
4638                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {}, {(0, self.announcement_sigs)});
4639
4640                 Ok(())
4641         }
4642 }
4643
4644 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
4645 impl<'a, Signer: Sign, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<&'a K> for Channel<Signer>
4646                 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer> {
4647         fn read<R : ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R, keys_source: &'a K) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
4648                 let _ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
4649
4650                 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4651                 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
4652
4653                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4654                 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
4655                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4656
4657                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4658
4659                 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4660                 let mut keys_data = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE));
4661                 while keys_data.len() != keys_len as usize {
4662                         // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
4663                         let mut data = [0; 1024];
4664                         let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.len())];
4665                         reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
4666                         keys_data.extend_from_slice(read_slice);
4667                 }
4668                 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
4669
4670                 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4671                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
4672
4673                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4674                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
4675                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4676
4677                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4678                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4679                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
4680                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4681                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4682                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4683                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4684                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4685                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4686                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
4687                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4688                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4689                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4690                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4691                                 },
4692                         });
4693                 }
4694
4695                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4696                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4697                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
4698                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
4699                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4700                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4701                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4702                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4703                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4704                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4705                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
4706                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4707                                         2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
4708                                         3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
4709                                         4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
4710                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4711                                 },
4712                         });
4713                 }
4714
4715                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4716                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
4717                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
4718                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4719                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4720                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4721                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
4722                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
4723                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
4724                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4725                                 },
4726                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
4727                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
4728                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4729                                 },
4730                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
4731                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
4732                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
4733                                 },
4734                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4735                         });
4736                 }
4737
4738                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4739                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4740                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4741                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4742                 };
4743
4744                 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
4745                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
4746                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
4747
4748                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4749                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4750                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
4751                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4752                 }
4753
4754                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
4755                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
4756                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
4757                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
4758                 }
4759
4760                 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4761                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
4762
4763                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4764                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4765                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
4766                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
4767
4768                 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4769                         0 => None,
4770                         1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
4771                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4772                 };
4773
4774                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
4775                 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
4776                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4777
4778                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4779                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4780                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4781                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
4782                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4783                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
4784                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
4785                 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
4786
4787                 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
4788                         0 => None,
4789                         1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
4790                                 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
4791                                 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
4792                                 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
4793                         }),
4794                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
4795                 };
4796
4797                 let channel_parameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
4798                 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
4799
4800                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4801
4802                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
4803                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
4804
4805                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
4806                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
4807
4808                 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
4809
4810                 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
4811                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {}, {(0, announcement_sigs)});
4812
4813                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4814                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
4815
4816                 Ok(Channel {
4817                         user_id,
4818
4819                         config,
4820                         channel_id,
4821                         channel_state,
4822                         secp_ctx,
4823                         channel_value_satoshis,
4824
4825                         latest_monitor_update_id,
4826
4827                         holder_signer,
4828                         shutdown_pubkey,
4829                         destination_script,
4830
4831                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
4832                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
4833                         value_to_self_msat,
4834
4835                         pending_inbound_htlcs,
4836                         pending_outbound_htlcs,
4837                         holding_cell_htlc_updates,
4838
4839                         resend_order,
4840
4841                         monitor_pending_funding_locked,
4842                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
4843                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
4844                         monitor_pending_forwards,
4845                         monitor_pending_failures,
4846
4847                         pending_update_fee,
4848                         holding_cell_update_fee,
4849                         next_holder_htlc_id,
4850                         next_counterparty_htlc_id,
4851                         update_time_counter,
4852                         feerate_per_kw,
4853
4854                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4855                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4856                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4857                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4858
4859                         last_sent_closing_fee,
4860
4861                         funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4862                         funding_tx_confirmation_height,
4863                         short_channel_id,
4864
4865                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
4866                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
4867                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4868                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4869                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
4870                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
4871                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
4872                         minimum_depth,
4873
4874                         counterparty_forwarding_info,
4875
4876                         channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
4877                         funding_transaction,
4878
4879                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
4880                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
4881                         counterparty_node_id,
4882
4883                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4884
4885                         commitment_secrets,
4886
4887                         channel_update_status,
4888
4889                         announcement_sigs,
4890
4891                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4892                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4893                         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
4894                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
4895                 })
4896         }
4897 }
4898
4899 #[cfg(test)]
4900 mod tests {
4901         use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4902         use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4903         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4904         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, SigHashType};
4905         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
4906         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4907         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
4908         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
4909         use hex;
4910         use ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4911         use ln::channelmanager::{BestBlock, HTLCSource};
4912         use ln::channel::{Channel,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,HTLCCandidate,HTLCInitiator,TxCreationKeys};
4913         use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4914         use ln::features::InitFeatures;
4915         use ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate};
4916         use ln::chan_utils;
4917         use ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT};
4918         use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4919         use chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, KeysInterface, BaseSign};
4920         use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4921         use util::config::UserConfig;
4922         use util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
4923         use util::test_utils;
4924         use util::logger::Logger;
4925         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4926         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
4927         use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4928         use bitcoin::secp256k1::recovery::RecoverableSignature;
4929         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4930         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
4931         use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, WPubkeyHash};
4932         use std::sync::Arc;
4933
4934         struct TestFeeEstimator {
4935                 fee_est: u32
4936         }
4937         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4938                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
4939                         self.fee_est
4940                 }
4941         }
4942
4943         #[test]
4944         fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4945                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4946                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4947         }
4948
4949         struct Keys {
4950                 signer: InMemorySigner,
4951         }
4952         impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4953                 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
4954
4955                 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4956                 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4957                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4958                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4959                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4960                         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4961                 }
4962
4963                 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4964                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4965                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4966                         PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4967                 }
4968
4969                 fn get_channel_signer(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemorySigner {
4970                         self.signer.clone()
4971                 }
4972                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4973                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
4974                 fn sign_invoice(&self, _invoice_preimage: Vec<u8>) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
4975         }
4976
4977         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4978                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4979         }
4980
4981         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
4982         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
4983         #[test]
4984         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
4985                 let original_fee = 253;
4986                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
4987                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4988                 let seed = [42; 32];
4989                 let network = Network::Testnet;
4990                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
4991
4992                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4993                 let config = UserConfig::default();
4994                 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
4995
4996                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
4997                 // same as the old fee.
4998                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
4999                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5000                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
5001         }
5002
5003         #[test]
5004         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
5005                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
5006                 // dust limits are used.
5007                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5008                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5009                 let seed = [42; 32];
5010                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5011                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5012
5013                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
5014                 // they have different dust limits.
5015
5016                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5017                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5018                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5019                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5020
5021                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5022                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
5023                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
5024                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5025                 let node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5026
5027                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
5028                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5029                 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5030                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5031                 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
5032
5033                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
5034                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
5035                 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
5036                         htlc_id: 0,
5037                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
5038                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
5039                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
5040                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5041                 });
5042
5043                 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5044                         htlc_id: 1,
5045                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
5046                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
5047                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
5048                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5049                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
5050                                 path: Vec::new(),
5051                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5052                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
5053                         }
5054                 });
5055
5056                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
5057                 // the dust limit check.
5058                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5059                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5060                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5061                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
5062
5063                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
5064                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
5065                 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5066                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = node_a_chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(3);
5067                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5068                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5069                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
5070         }
5071
5072         #[test]
5073         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
5074                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
5075                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
5076                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
5077                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
5078                 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 };
5079                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5080                 let seed = [42; 32];
5081                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5082                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5083
5084                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5085                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5086                 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5087
5088                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(0);
5089                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = chan.commit_tx_fee_msat(1);
5090
5091                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
5092                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5093                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5094                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5095                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5096                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5097
5098                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5099                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5100                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5101                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5102                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5103
5104                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
5105
5106                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
5107                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
5108                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5109                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5110                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
5111
5112                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
5113                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
5114                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
5115                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5116                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
5117         }
5118
5119         #[test]
5120         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
5121                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5122                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
5123                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5124                 let seed = [42; 32];
5125                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5126                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
5127                 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
5128                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5129
5130                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
5131
5132                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
5133                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5134                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5135                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5136
5137                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
5138                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
5139                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
5140                 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, InitFeatures::known(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config).unwrap();
5141
5142                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
5143                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.get_accept_channel();
5144                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config, InitFeatures::known()).unwrap();
5145
5146                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
5147                 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5148                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
5149                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
5150                 }]};
5151                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
5152                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
5153                 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&logger).unwrap();
5154
5155                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
5156                 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&logger);
5157
5158                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
5159                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
5160                 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5161                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5162                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5163                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5164                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5165                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5166                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5167                         },
5168                         _ => panic!()
5169                 }
5170
5171                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
5172                 // is sane.
5173                 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
5174                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
5175                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
5176                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
5177                 match msg.data_loss_protect {
5178                         OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
5179                                 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
5180                         },
5181                         _ => panic!()
5182                 }
5183         }
5184
5185         #[test]
5186         fn channel_update() {
5187                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5188                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5189                 let seed = [42; 32];
5190                 let network = Network::Testnet;
5191                 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
5192                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
5193
5194                 // Create a channel.
5195                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5196                 let config = UserConfig::default();
5197                 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap();
5198                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
5199                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
5200                 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
5201
5202                 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
5203                 let update = ChannelUpdate {
5204                         contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
5205                                 chain_hash,
5206                                 short_channel_id: 0,
5207                                 timestamp: 0,
5208                                 flags: 0,
5209                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
5210                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
5211                                 htlc_maximum_msat: OptionalField::Absent,
5212                                 fee_base_msat: 110,
5213                                 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
5214                                 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5215                         },
5216                         signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
5217                 };
5218                 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
5219
5220                 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
5221                 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
5222                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
5223                 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
5224                         Some(info) => {
5225                                 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
5226                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
5227                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
5228                         },
5229                         None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
5230                 }
5231         }
5232
5233         #[test]
5234         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
5235                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
5236                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
5237                 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
5238                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5239
5240                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
5241                         &secp_ctx,
5242                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5243                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5244                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5245                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5246                         SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5247
5248                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
5249                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
5250                         10_000_000,
5251                         [0; 32]
5252                 );
5253
5254                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5255                                 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
5256                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
5257
5258                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
5259                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
5260                 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
5261                 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&&feeest, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
5262                 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
5263
5264                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
5265
5266                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5267                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5268                         revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
5269                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
5270                         delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
5271                         htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
5272                 };
5273                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
5274                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5275                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
5276                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
5277                         });
5278                 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
5279                 signer.ready_channel(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
5280
5281                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
5282                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5283
5284                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
5285                            hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
5286
5287                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
5288                            hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
5289
5290                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
5291                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
5292                 // build_commitment_transaction.
5293                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
5294                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5295                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5296                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
5297                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
5298
5299                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
5300                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, {
5301                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
5302                         } ) => { {
5303                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
5304                                         let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw, &logger);
5305
5306                                         let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
5307                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
5308                                                 .collect();
5309                                         (res.0, htlcs)
5310                                 };
5311                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
5312                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
5313                                 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5314                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5315                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
5316                                 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
5317
5318                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
5319                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5320                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
5321                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
5322                                 $({
5323                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5324                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
5325                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
5326                                 })*
5327                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
5328
5329                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
5330                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
5331                                         counterparty_signature,
5332                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
5333                                         &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
5334                                         chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
5335                                 );
5336                                 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
5337                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
5338
5339                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
5340                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
5341                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
5342
5343                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
5344                                 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
5345
5346                                 $({
5347                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5348
5349                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
5350                                         let htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
5351                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
5352                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]).unwrap();
5353                                         secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).unwrap();
5354
5355                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
5356                                         if !htlc.offered {
5357                                                 for i in 0..5 {
5358                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
5359                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
5360                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
5361                                                         }
5362                                                 }
5363
5364                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
5365                                         }
5366
5367                                         let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
5368                                         assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx), "output index");
5369
5370                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5371                                         assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
5372                                         let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
5373                                         let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
5374                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
5375                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
5376                                                         hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
5377                                 })*
5378                                 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
5379                         } }
5380                 }
5381
5382                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
5383                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
5384
5385                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
5386                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
5387                                                  "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", {});
5388
5389                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5390                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5391                                 htlc_id: 0,
5392                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
5393                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
5394                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5395                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5396                         };
5397                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
5398                         out
5399                 });
5400                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5401                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5402                                 htlc_id: 1,
5403                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5404                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5405                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5406                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5407                         };
5408                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5409                         out
5410                 });
5411                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5412                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5413                                 htlc_id: 2,
5414                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5415                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
5416                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5417                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5418                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5419                         };
5420                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
5421                         out
5422                 });
5423                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5424                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5425                                 htlc_id: 3,
5426                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
5427                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
5428                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5429                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5430                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5431                         };
5432                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
5433                         out
5434                 });
5435                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5436                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5437                                 htlc_id: 4,
5438                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
5439                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
5440                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5441                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5442                         };
5443                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
5444                         out
5445                 });
5446
5447                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5448                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5449                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
5450
5451                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
5452                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
5453                                  "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", {
5454
5455                                   { 0,
5456                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
5457                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
5458                                   "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" },
5459
5460                                   { 1,
5461                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
5462                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
5463                                   "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" },
5464
5465                                   { 2,
5466                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
5467                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
5468                                   "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" },
5469
5470                                   { 3,
5471                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
5472                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
5473                                   "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" },
5474
5475                                   { 4,
5476                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
5477                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
5478                                   "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" }
5479                 } );
5480
5481                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5482                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5483                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
5484
5485                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
5486                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
5487                                  "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", {
5488
5489                                   { 0,
5490                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
5491                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
5492                                   "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" },
5493
5494                                   { 1,
5495                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
5496                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
5497                                   "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" },
5498
5499                                   { 2,
5500                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
5501                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
5502                                   "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" },
5503
5504                                   { 3,
5505                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
5506                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
5507                                   "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" },
5508
5509                                   { 4,
5510                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
5511                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
5512                                   "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" }
5513                 } );
5514
5515                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5516                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5517                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
5518
5519                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
5520                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
5521                                  "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", {
5522
5523                                   { 0,
5524                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
5525                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
5526                                   "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" },
5527
5528                                   { 1,
5529                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
5530                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
5531                                   "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" },
5532
5533                                   { 2,
5534                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
5535                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
5536                                   "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" },
5537
5538                                   { 3,
5539                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
5540                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
5541                                   "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" }
5542                 } );
5543
5544                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5545                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5546                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
5547
5548                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
5549                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
5550                                  "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", {
5551
5552                                   { 0,
5553                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
5554                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
5555                                   "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" },
5556
5557                                   { 1,
5558                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
5559                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
5560                                   "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" },
5561
5562                                   { 2,
5563                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
5564                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
5565                                   "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" },
5566
5567                                   { 3,
5568                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
5569                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
5570                                   "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" }
5571                 } );
5572
5573                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5574                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5575                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
5576
5577                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
5578                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
5579                                  "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", {
5580
5581                                   { 0,
5582                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
5583                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
5584                                   "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" },
5585
5586                                   { 1,
5587                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
5588                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
5589                                   "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff010000000000000000015c060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546014830450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
5590
5591                                   { 2,
5592                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
5593                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
5594                                   "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" }
5595                 } );
5596
5597                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5598                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5599                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
5600
5601                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
5602                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
5603                                  "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", {
5604
5605                                   { 0,
5606                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
5607                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
5608                                   "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" },
5609
5610                                   { 1,
5611                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
5612                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
5613                                   "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" },
5614
5615                                   { 2,
5616                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
5617                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
5618                                   "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" }
5619                 } );
5620
5621                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5622                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5623                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
5624
5625                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
5626                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
5627                                  "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", {
5628
5629                                   { 0,
5630                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
5631                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
5632                                   "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" },
5633
5634                                   { 1,
5635                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
5636                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
5637                                   "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" }
5638                 } );
5639
5640                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5641                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5642                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
5643
5644                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
5645                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
5646                                  "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", {
5647
5648                                   { 0,
5649                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
5650                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
5651                                   "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" },
5652
5653                                   { 1,
5654                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
5655                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
5656                                   "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
5657                 } );
5658
5659                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5660                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5661                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
5662
5663                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
5664                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
5665                                  "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", {
5666
5667                                   { 0,
5668                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
5669                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
5670                                   "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" }
5671                 } );
5672
5673                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5674                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5675                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
5676
5677                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
5678                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
5679                                  "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", {
5680
5681                                   { 0,
5682                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
5683                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
5684                                   "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" }
5685                 } );
5686
5687                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5688                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5689                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
5690
5691                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
5692                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
5693                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5694
5695                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
5696                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5697                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
5698
5699                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
5700                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
5701                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5702
5703                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
5704                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5705                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
5706
5707                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5708                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5709                                  "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", {});
5710
5711                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
5712                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
5713                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
5714
5715                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
5716                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
5717                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
5718
5719                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
5720                 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
5721                 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
5722                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
5723                 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
5724                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
5725                                 htlc_id: 1,
5726                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
5727                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
5728                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5729                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
5730                         };
5731                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
5732                         out
5733                 });
5734                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
5735                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5736                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5737                                 htlc_id: 6,
5738                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5739                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
5740                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5741                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5742                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5743                         };
5744                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5745                         out
5746                 });
5747                 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
5748                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
5749                                 htlc_id: 5,
5750                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
5751                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
5752                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
5753                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
5754                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
5755                         };
5756                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
5757                         out
5758                 });
5759
5760                 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
5761                                  "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
5762                                  "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", {
5763
5764                                   { 0,
5765                                   "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
5766                                   "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
5767                                   "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" },
5768                                   { 1,
5769                                   "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
5770                                   "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
5771                                   "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" },
5772                                   { 2,
5773                                   "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
5774                                   "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
5775                                   "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" }
5776                 } );
5777         }
5778
5779         #[test]
5780         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
5781                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
5782
5783                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
5784                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
5785                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5786                            hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
5787
5788                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
5789                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
5790                            hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
5791
5792                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
5793                            hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
5794
5795                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
5796                            hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
5797
5798                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
5799                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
5800                            hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
5801         }
5802
5803         #[test]
5804         fn test_key_derivation() {
5805                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
5806                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5807
5808                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5809                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
5810
5811                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
5812                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
5813
5814                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
5815                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
5816
5817                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5818                                 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
5819
5820                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5821                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5822
5823                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
5824                                 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
5825
5826                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
5827                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
5828         }
5829 }