1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
61 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
62 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
63 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
65 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
69 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
72 pub struct AvailableBalances {
73 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
74 pub balance_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
76 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
78 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
81 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
85 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
90 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
91 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
92 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
93 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
94 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
100 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
101 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
102 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
103 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
106 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
108 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
109 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
110 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
112 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
113 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
115 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
117 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
118 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
119 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
121 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
125 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
127 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
130 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
134 enum InboundHTLCState {
135 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
136 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
137 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
139 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
140 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
141 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
142 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
143 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
144 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
145 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
146 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
147 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
148 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
149 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
151 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
152 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
153 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
154 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
155 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
156 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
157 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
158 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
159 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
160 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
161 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
162 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
163 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
164 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
166 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
167 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
168 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
169 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
170 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
171 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
172 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
173 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
175 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
176 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
178 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
179 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
180 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
181 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
182 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
183 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
184 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
185 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
188 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
190 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
191 /// through the following states in the state machine:
192 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
193 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
194 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
195 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
196 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
197 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
198 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
200 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
201 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
202 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
203 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
204 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
205 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
206 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
207 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
208 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
210 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
211 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
212 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
213 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
215 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
216 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
217 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
218 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
219 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
220 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
221 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
222 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
224 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
227 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
228 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
230 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
231 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
232 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
233 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
234 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
235 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
236 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
237 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
238 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
239 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
240 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
241 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
242 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
247 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
248 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
249 (2, Committed) => {},
250 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
251 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
254 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
258 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
259 state: InboundHTLCState,
262 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
263 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
264 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
266 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
267 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
268 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
270 /// The amount in msat.
271 pub amount_msat: u64,
272 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
273 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
274 /// The payment hash.
275 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
276 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
278 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
279 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
281 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
283 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
284 /// states may result in `None` here.
285 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
286 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
287 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
288 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
289 /// transactions as well.
291 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
292 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
295 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
296 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
300 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
301 (0, htlc_id, required),
302 (2, amount_msat, required),
303 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
304 (6, payment_hash, required),
305 (7, state, upgradable_option),
306 (8, is_dust, required),
309 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
310 enum OutboundHTLCState {
311 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
312 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
313 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
314 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
315 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
316 /// money back (though we won't), and,
317 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
318 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
319 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
320 /// we'll never get out of sync).
321 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
322 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
323 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
325 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
326 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
327 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
328 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
329 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
330 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
331 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
332 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
333 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
334 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
335 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
336 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
337 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
338 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
339 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
342 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
344 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
345 /// through the following states in the state machine:
346 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
347 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
348 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
349 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
350 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
351 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
352 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
354 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
355 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
356 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
357 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
358 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
359 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
360 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
361 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
363 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
364 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
366 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
367 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
368 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
369 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
370 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
371 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
372 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
373 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
374 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
375 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
378 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
379 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
381 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
382 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
383 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
384 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
385 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
387 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
388 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
390 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
391 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
392 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
393 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
394 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
395 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
396 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
401 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
402 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
403 (2, Committed) => {},
404 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
405 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
409 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
410 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
411 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
412 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
413 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
416 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
417 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
419 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
420 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
425 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
426 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
428 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
429 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
434 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
435 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
439 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
440 state: OutboundHTLCState,
442 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
443 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
447 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
448 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
450 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
451 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
452 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
454 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
455 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
456 /// The amount in msat.
457 pub amount_msat: u64,
458 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
459 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
460 /// The payment hash.
461 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
462 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
464 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
465 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
467 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
469 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
470 /// states may result in `None` here.
471 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
472 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
473 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
474 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
475 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
476 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
477 /// transactions as well.
479 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
480 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
483 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
484 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
488 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
489 (0, htlc_id, required),
490 (2, amount_msat, required),
491 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
492 (6, payment_hash, required),
493 (7, state, upgradable_option),
494 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
495 (10, is_dust, required),
498 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
499 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
500 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
501 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
505 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
507 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
508 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
509 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
510 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
513 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
518 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
523 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
527 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
528 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
529 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
530 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
531 struct $flag_type(u32);
536 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
539 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
541 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
544 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
547 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
548 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
551 Ok($flag_type(flags))
556 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
558 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
560 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
562 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
566 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
569 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
571 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
573 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
574 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
576 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
578 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
580 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
581 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
584 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
585 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
587 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
590 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
592 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
594 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
597 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
598 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
600 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
601 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
602 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
603 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
604 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
605 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
606 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
607 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
609 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
611 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
613 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
614 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
616 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
618 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
620 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
621 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
623 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
624 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
626 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
627 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
632 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
635 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
636 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
637 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
638 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
639 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
640 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
641 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
642 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
643 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
644 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
645 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
646 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
647 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
648 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
652 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
654 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
655 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
656 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
657 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
658 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
659 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
660 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
661 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
662 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
663 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
664 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
665 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
666 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
667 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
672 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
673 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
674 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
675 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
676 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
677 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
682 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
683 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
684 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
685 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
686 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
687 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
688 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
689 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
690 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
691 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
692 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
693 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
694 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
695 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
700 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
701 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
702 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
703 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
704 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
705 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
706 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
707 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
711 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
712 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
713 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
715 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
716 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
717 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
718 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
719 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
721 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
722 /// funding transaction to confirm.
723 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
724 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
726 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
727 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
728 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
732 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
733 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
735 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
738 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
747 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
749 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
753 fn $clear(&mut self) {
756 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
758 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
762 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
763 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
765 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
766 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
771 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
773 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
774 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
776 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
777 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
778 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
779 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
780 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
781 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
782 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
783 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
791 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
793 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
794 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
795 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
796 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
797 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
801 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
802 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
805 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
806 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
809 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
811 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
812 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
813 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
817 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
819 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
820 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
821 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
822 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
824 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
830 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
831 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
832 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
833 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
834 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
835 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
836 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
837 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
840 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
842 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
844 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
845 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
846 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
847 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
851 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
853 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
855 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
857 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
858 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
859 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
860 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
861 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
863 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
864 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
866 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
868 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
869 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
871 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
872 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
873 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
874 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
875 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
876 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
878 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
879 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
881 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
882 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
883 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
884 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
885 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
887 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
888 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
890 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
891 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
893 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
894 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
895 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
896 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
902 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
903 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
905 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
906 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
907 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
912 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
913 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
915 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
916 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
917 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
922 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
924 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
925 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
926 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
929 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
930 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
931 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
932 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
933 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
934 self.logger.log(record)
938 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
939 where L::Target: Logger {
940 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
941 where S::Target: SignerProvider
945 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
946 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
952 macro_rules! secp_check {
953 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
956 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
961 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
962 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
963 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
964 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
965 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
966 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
967 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
968 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
970 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
972 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
974 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
978 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
980 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
981 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
982 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
984 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
985 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
987 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
988 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
989 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
990 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
991 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
993 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
994 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
998 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
1004 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
1006 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
1007 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
1008 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1009 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1010 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1011 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1012 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
1013 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
1016 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
1017 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
1018 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
1019 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
1020 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
1021 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
1022 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
1023 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1024 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1025 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
1026 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
1029 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
1030 struct HTLCCandidate {
1032 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1035 impl HTLCCandidate {
1036 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1044 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1046 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1048 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1049 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1050 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1055 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1056 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1057 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1058 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1059 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1061 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1062 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1063 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1064 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1066 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1067 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1071 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1072 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1073 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1074 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1075 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1076 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1077 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1078 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1079 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1080 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1081 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1082 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1085 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1087 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1088 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1089 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1090 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1093 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1094 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1095 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1096 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1097 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1098 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1099 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1100 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1103 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1105 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1106 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1107 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1108 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1109 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1110 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1111 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1112 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1113 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1114 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1115 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1116 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1117 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1118 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1119 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1122 /// Tracks the transaction number, along with current and next commitment points.
1123 /// This consolidates the logic to advance our commitment number and request new
1124 /// commitment points from our signer.
1125 #[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
1126 enum HolderCommitmentPoint {
1127 // TODO: add a variant for before our first commitment point is retrieved
1128 /// We've advanced our commitment number and are waiting on the next commitment point.
1129 /// Until the `get_per_commitment_point` signer method becomes async, this variant
1130 /// will not be used.
1131 PendingNext { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey },
1132 /// Our current commitment point is ready, we've cached our next point,
1133 /// and we are not pending a new one.
1134 Available { transaction_number: u64, current: PublicKey, next: PublicKey },
1137 impl HolderCommitmentPoint {
1138 pub fn new<SP: Deref>(signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>) -> Self
1139 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
1141 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
1142 transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1143 current: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, secp_ctx),
1144 next: signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, secp_ctx),
1148 pub fn is_available(&self) -> bool {
1149 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { .. } = self { true } else { false }
1152 pub fn transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
1154 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
1155 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, .. } => *transaction_number,
1159 pub fn current_point(&self) -> PublicKey {
1161 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { current, .. } => *current,
1162 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { current, .. } => *current,
1166 pub fn next_point(&self) -> Option<PublicKey> {
1168 HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { .. } => None,
1169 HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { next, .. } => Some(*next),
1173 pub fn advance<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, signer: &ChannelSignerType<SP>, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, logger: &L)
1174 where SP::Target: SignerProvider, L::Target: Logger
1176 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number, next, .. } = self {
1177 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext {
1178 transaction_number: *transaction_number - 1,
1183 if let HolderCommitmentPoint::PendingNext { transaction_number, current } = self {
1184 let next = signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(*transaction_number - 1, secp_ctx);
1185 log_trace!(logger, "Retrieved next per-commitment point {}", *transaction_number - 1);
1186 *self = HolderCommitmentPoint::Available { transaction_number: *transaction_number, current: *current, next };
1191 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1192 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1193 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1194 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1195 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1196 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1197 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1198 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1199 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1200 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1201 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1202 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1203 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1204 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1205 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1207 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1208 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1209 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1210 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1212 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1213 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1214 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1215 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1217 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1218 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1219 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1220 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1221 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1223 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1224 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1225 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1226 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1228 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1229 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1230 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1232 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1233 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1234 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1235 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1236 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1238 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1239 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1242 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1243 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1245 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1246 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1247 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1248 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1250 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1251 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1253 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1254 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1257 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1258 (0, update, required),
1261 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1262 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1263 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1264 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1265 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1266 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1267 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1268 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1269 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1270 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1273 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1274 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1275 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1277 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1279 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1280 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1281 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1282 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1283 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1284 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1285 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1289 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1291 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1292 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1293 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1294 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1295 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1296 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1297 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1302 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1303 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1304 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1305 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1306 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1308 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1309 /// in a timely manner.
1310 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1313 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1314 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1315 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1317 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1318 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1319 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1320 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1324 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1325 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1326 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1328 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1329 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1330 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1331 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1333 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1337 /// The current channel ID.
1338 channel_id: ChannelId,
1339 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1340 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1341 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1342 channel_state: ChannelState,
1344 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1345 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1347 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1348 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1349 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1351 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1352 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1353 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1354 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1356 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1357 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1359 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1361 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1362 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1363 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1365 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1366 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1367 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1369 holder_commitment_point: HolderCommitmentPoint,
1370 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1371 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1372 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1373 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1374 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1375 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1377 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1378 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1379 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1380 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1381 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1382 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1384 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1386 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1387 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1388 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1390 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1391 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1392 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1393 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1394 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1395 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1396 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1397 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1399 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1400 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1401 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1403 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1404 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1405 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1406 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1407 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1408 /// outbound or inbound.
1409 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1411 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1413 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1414 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1415 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1416 // HTLCs with similar state.
1417 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1418 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1419 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1420 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1421 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1422 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1423 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1424 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1425 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1426 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1428 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1429 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1430 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1432 update_time_counter: u32,
1434 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1435 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1436 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1437 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1438 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1439 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1441 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1442 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1444 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1445 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1446 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1447 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1449 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1450 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1452 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1454 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1456 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1457 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1458 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1459 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1460 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1462 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1463 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1465 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1466 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1467 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1469 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1470 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1471 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1472 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1473 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1474 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1475 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1476 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1478 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1481 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1483 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1486 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1488 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1491 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1493 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1495 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1496 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1499 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1501 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1503 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1504 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1506 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1508 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1509 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1510 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1512 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1514 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1515 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1516 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1518 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1519 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1520 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1522 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1524 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1526 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1527 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1528 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1529 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1531 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1532 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1533 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1535 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1536 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1537 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1539 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1540 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1541 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1542 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1543 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1544 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1545 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1546 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1548 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1549 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1550 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1551 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1552 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1554 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1555 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1557 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1558 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1559 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1560 /// unblock the state machine.
1562 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1563 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1564 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1566 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1567 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1568 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1570 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1571 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1572 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1573 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1574 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1575 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1576 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1577 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1579 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1580 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1582 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1583 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1584 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1586 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1587 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1588 // associated channel mapping.
1590 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1591 // to store all of them.
1592 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1594 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1595 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1596 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1597 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1598 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1600 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1601 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1603 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1604 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1606 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1607 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1609 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1610 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1612 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1614 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1616 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1617 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1618 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1621 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1622 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1623 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1624 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1625 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1626 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1627 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1629 config: &'a UserConfig,
1630 current_chain_height: u32,
1633 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1634 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1635 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1636 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1637 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1639 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1640 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1642 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1643 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1645 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1647 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1648 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1650 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1652 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1653 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1654 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1656 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1657 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1660 // Check sanity of message fields:
1661 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1662 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1663 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1664 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1665 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1667 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1670 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1671 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1673 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1674 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1675 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1677 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1678 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1680 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1681 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1683 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1685 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1686 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1687 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1689 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1692 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1693 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1696 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1697 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1698 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1700 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1701 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1703 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1704 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1706 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1707 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1709 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1710 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1712 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1713 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1715 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1716 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1719 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1721 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1722 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1723 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1727 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1728 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1729 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1730 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1732 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1733 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1735 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1736 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1737 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1739 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1740 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1743 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1744 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1745 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1746 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1750 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1751 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1752 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1753 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1756 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1757 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1758 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1759 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1760 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1763 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1764 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1765 &Some(ref script) => {
1766 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1767 if script.len() == 0 {
1770 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1771 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1773 Some(script.clone())
1776 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1783 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1784 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1785 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1786 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1790 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1791 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1792 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1796 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1797 Ok(script) => script,
1798 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1801 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1802 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1804 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1807 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1810 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1812 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
1813 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
1815 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1817 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1820 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1821 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1823 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1828 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1830 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1831 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1832 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1833 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1835 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1838 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1841 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1844 holder_commitment_point,
1845 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1846 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1849 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1850 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1851 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1852 pending_update_fee: None,
1853 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1854 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1855 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1856 update_time_counter: 1,
1858 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1860 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1861 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1862 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1863 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1864 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1865 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1866 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1868 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1869 signer_pending_funding: false,
1872 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1873 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1874 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1875 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1877 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1878 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1879 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1880 closing_fee_limits: None,
1881 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1883 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1884 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1885 short_channel_id: None,
1886 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1888 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1889 channel_value_satoshis,
1890 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1891 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1892 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1893 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1894 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1895 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1896 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1897 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1898 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1899 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1902 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1904 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1905 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1906 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1907 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1908 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1909 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1910 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1912 funding_outpoint: None,
1913 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1915 funding_transaction: None,
1916 is_batch_funding: None,
1918 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1919 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1920 counterparty_node_id,
1922 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1924 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1926 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1927 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1929 announcement_sigs: None,
1931 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1932 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1933 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1934 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1936 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1937 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1939 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1940 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1942 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1943 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1945 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1946 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1951 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1953 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1959 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1960 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1961 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1962 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1963 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1964 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1965 funding_satoshis: u64,
1968 config: &'a UserConfig,
1969 current_chain_height: u32,
1970 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1971 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1972 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1973 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1974 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1975 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1976 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1978 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1979 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1980 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1982 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1983 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1985 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1987 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1988 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1990 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1991 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1993 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1994 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1995 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1997 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1998 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
2001 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
2002 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
2004 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2005 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
2007 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
2009 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
2011 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
2012 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
2013 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
2014 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
2017 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2018 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2020 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
2021 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
2022 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
2023 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
2027 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2028 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
2029 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
2033 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
2034 Ok(script) => script,
2035 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
2038 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
2040 let holder_signer = ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer);
2041 let holder_commitment_point = HolderCommitmentPoint::new(&holder_signer, &secp_ctx);
2046 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
2047 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
2048 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
2049 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
2054 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
2056 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
2057 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
2058 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
2059 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
2061 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2062 channel_value_satoshis,
2064 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
2067 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
2070 holder_commitment_point,
2071 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2072 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2075 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2076 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2077 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
2078 pending_update_fee: None,
2079 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
2080 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
2081 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
2082 update_time_counter: 1,
2084 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2086 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2087 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2088 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2089 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2090 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2091 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2092 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
2094 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
2095 signer_pending_funding: false,
2097 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
2098 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2099 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2100 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2101 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2102 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2104 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2105 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2106 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
2107 closing_fee_limits: None,
2108 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2110 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2111 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2112 short_channel_id: None,
2113 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2115 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
2116 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
2117 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2118 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
2119 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
2120 // receive `accept_channel2`.
2121 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2122 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2123 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2124 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
2125 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2126 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
2127 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2128 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2130 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2132 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2133 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2134 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2135 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2136 counterparty_parameters: None,
2137 funding_outpoint: None,
2138 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
2140 funding_transaction: None,
2141 is_batch_funding: None,
2143 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
2144 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2145 counterparty_node_id,
2147 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2149 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2151 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2152 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2154 announcement_sigs: None,
2156 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2157 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2158 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2159 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2161 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2162 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2164 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2165 outbound_scid_alias,
2167 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2168 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2170 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2171 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
2176 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2177 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
2181 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2182 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2183 self.update_time_counter
2186 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2187 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2190 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2191 self.config.announced_channel
2194 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2195 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2198 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2199 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2200 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2201 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2204 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2205 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2206 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2209 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2210 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2211 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2212 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2213 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2214 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2215 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2218 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2219 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2220 match self.channel_state {
2221 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2222 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2223 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2224 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2225 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2226 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2227 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2229 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2231 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2232 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2236 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2237 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2238 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2239 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2240 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2241 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2244 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2245 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2246 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2250 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2251 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2252 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2253 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2254 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2257 // Public utilities:
2259 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2263 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2265 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2266 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2267 self.temporary_channel_id
2270 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2274 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2275 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2276 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2280 /// Gets the channel's type
2281 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2285 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2287 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2288 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2289 self.short_channel_id
2292 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2293 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2294 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2297 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2298 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2299 self.outbound_scid_alias
2302 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2304 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2305 return &self.holder_signer
2308 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2309 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2310 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2311 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2312 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2313 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2316 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2317 /// get_funding_created.
2318 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2319 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2322 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2323 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2324 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2325 if conf_height > 0 {
2332 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2333 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2334 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2337 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2338 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2339 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2340 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2344 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2347 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2348 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2351 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2352 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2355 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2356 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2357 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2360 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2361 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2364 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2365 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2366 self.counterparty_node_id
2369 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2370 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2371 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2374 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2375 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2376 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2379 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2380 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2382 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2383 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2384 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2385 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2387 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2391 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2392 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2393 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2396 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2397 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2398 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2401 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2402 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2403 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2405 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2406 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2411 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2412 self.channel_value_satoshis
2415 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2416 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2419 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2420 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2423 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2424 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2425 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2426 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2429 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2430 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2431 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2432 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2434 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2438 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2439 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2440 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2443 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2444 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2445 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2448 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2449 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2450 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2453 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2454 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2455 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2458 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2459 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2460 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2463 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2464 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2465 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2468 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2469 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2470 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2471 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2472 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2475 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2477 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2478 self.prev_config = None;
2482 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2483 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2487 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2488 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2489 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2490 let did_channel_update =
2491 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2492 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2493 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2494 if did_channel_update {
2495 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2496 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2497 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2498 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2500 self.config.options = *config;
2504 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2505 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2506 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2507 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2508 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2511 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2512 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2513 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2514 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2515 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2517 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2518 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2519 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2520 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2521 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2522 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2523 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2525 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2526 where L::Target: Logger
2528 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2529 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2530 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2532 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2533 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2534 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2535 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2537 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2538 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2539 if match update_state {
2540 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2541 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2542 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2543 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2544 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2546 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2550 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2551 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2552 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2554 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2556 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2557 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2558 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2560 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2561 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2562 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2563 transaction_output_index: None
2568 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2569 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2570 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2571 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2572 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2575 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2577 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2578 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2579 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2581 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2582 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2585 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2586 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2589 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2591 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2592 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2593 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2595 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2596 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2602 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2604 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2605 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2606 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2607 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2608 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2609 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2610 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2614 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2615 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2617 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2619 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2620 if generated_by_local {
2621 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2622 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2623 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2633 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2635 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2636 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2637 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2638 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2639 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2640 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2641 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2644 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2645 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2646 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2647 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2651 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2652 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2656 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2657 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2659 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2661 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2662 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2664 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2665 if !generated_by_local {
2666 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2674 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2675 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2676 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2677 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2678 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2679 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2680 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2681 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2683 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2685 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2686 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2687 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2688 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2690 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2692 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2693 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2694 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2695 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2698 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2699 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2700 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2701 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2703 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2706 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2707 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2708 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2709 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2711 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2714 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2715 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2720 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2721 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2726 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2728 let channel_parameters =
2729 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2730 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2731 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2738 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2741 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2742 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2743 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2744 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2752 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2753 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2754 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2755 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2760 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2761 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2762 /// our counterparty!)
2763 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2764 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2765 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2766 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2767 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2768 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2769 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2771 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2775 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2776 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2777 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2778 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2779 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2780 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2781 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2783 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2786 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2787 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2788 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2789 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2790 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2793 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2794 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2797 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2801 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2802 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2803 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2804 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2805 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2806 // which are near the dust limit.
2807 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2808 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2809 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2810 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2811 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2813 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2814 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2816 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2817 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2820 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2821 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2822 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2825 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2826 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2828 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2830 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2831 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2834 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2835 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2838 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2839 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2841 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2842 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2844 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2847 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2848 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2849 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2850 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2851 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2852 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2854 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2857 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2862 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2863 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2864 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2865 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2867 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2868 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2869 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2870 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2871 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2872 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2874 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2876 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2877 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2881 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2882 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2883 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2884 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2885 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2886 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2887 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2889 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2891 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2892 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2894 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2900 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2901 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2902 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2903 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2904 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2905 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2906 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2907 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2908 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2909 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2910 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2911 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2912 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2913 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2914 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2915 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2916 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2921 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2922 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2923 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2924 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2925 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2926 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2927 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2928 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2932 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2933 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2934 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2935 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2936 match holding_cell_update {
2937 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2938 holding_cell_states.insert(
2940 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2943 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2944 holding_cell_states.insert(
2946 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2949 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2950 holding_cell_states.insert(
2952 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2956 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2959 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2960 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2963 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2964 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2966 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2967 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2968 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2969 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2970 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2971 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2972 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2973 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2974 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2975 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2982 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2983 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2984 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2985 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2988 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2989 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2991 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2992 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2993 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2994 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2995 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2996 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2997 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2998 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2999 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
3000 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
3003 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3004 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3010 } = *holding_cell_update {
3011 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
3013 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3014 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3015 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3016 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
3017 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
3018 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
3025 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
3026 /// Doesn't bother handling the
3027 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
3028 /// corner case properly.
3029 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3030 -> AvailableBalances
3031 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3033 let context = &self;
3034 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
3037 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
3038 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3040 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
3041 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3042 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
3043 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3046 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
3048 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
3049 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
3051 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
3053 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
3055 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3056 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3060 if context.is_outbound() {
3061 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
3062 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
3064 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
3065 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
3067 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
3068 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3069 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3070 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
3073 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3074 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
3075 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3076 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
3077 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3078 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3079 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3082 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
3083 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
3084 // match the value to right-below-dust.
3085 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
3086 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
3087 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
3088 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
3089 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
3090 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
3091 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
3092 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
3094 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
3097 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
3098 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
3099 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3100 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3101 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
3104 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
3105 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
3107 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3108 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
3109 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3111 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3112 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
3113 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
3114 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
3118 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
3120 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
3121 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
3122 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
3123 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
3124 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
3125 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
3126 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3128 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3129 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
3131 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3132 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3133 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3136 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
3137 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
3138 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
3139 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
3140 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
3141 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
3142 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3143 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
3144 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
3145 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3149 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
3150 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
3151 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
3152 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
3153 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
3154 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3157 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3158 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
3159 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
3160 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
3161 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
3164 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
3165 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
3166 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
3168 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3172 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3173 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3175 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
3176 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3180 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3181 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3182 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3183 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3185 outbound_capacity_msat,
3186 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3187 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3192 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3193 let context = &self;
3194 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3197 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3198 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3200 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3201 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3203 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3204 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3206 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3207 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3208 let context = &self;
3209 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3211 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3214 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3215 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3217 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3218 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3220 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3221 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3223 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3224 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3228 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3229 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3235 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3236 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3237 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3240 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3241 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3242 included_htlcs += 1;
3245 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3246 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3250 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3251 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3252 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3253 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3254 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3255 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3260 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3262 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3263 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3268 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3269 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3273 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3274 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3275 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3278 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3279 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3281 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3282 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3283 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3285 total_pending_htlcs,
3286 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3287 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3288 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3290 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3291 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3292 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3294 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3296 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3301 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3302 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3304 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3305 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3307 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3308 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3310 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3311 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3312 let context = &self;
3313 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3315 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3318 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3319 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3321 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3322 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3324 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3325 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3327 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3328 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3332 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3333 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3339 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3340 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3341 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3342 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3343 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3344 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3347 included_htlcs += 1;
3350 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3351 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3354 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3355 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3357 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3358 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3359 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3364 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3365 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3366 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3369 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3370 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3372 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3373 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3375 total_pending_htlcs,
3376 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3377 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3378 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3380 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3381 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3382 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3384 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3386 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3391 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3392 match self.channel_state {
3393 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3394 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3395 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3396 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3406 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3408 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3409 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3412 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3414 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3415 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3416 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3420 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3421 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3422 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3425 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3427 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3428 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3431 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3432 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3433 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3434 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3435 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3436 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3437 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3438 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3439 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3440 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3441 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3443 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3444 // return them to fail the payment.
3445 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3446 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3447 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3449 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3450 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3455 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3456 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3457 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3458 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3459 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3460 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3461 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3462 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3463 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3464 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3465 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3466 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3467 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3468 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3469 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3473 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3474 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3476 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3477 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3481 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3482 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3483 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3484 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3485 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3486 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3487 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3488 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3492 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3493 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3494 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3495 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3497 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3498 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3499 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3500 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3502 match &self.holder_signer {
3503 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3504 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3505 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3506 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3507 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3510 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3514 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3515 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3516 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3518 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3519 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3520 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3522 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3523 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3524 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3527 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3528 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3530 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3536 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3537 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3538 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3539 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3540 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3543 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3545 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3547 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3548 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3553 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3554 // We've exhausted our options
3557 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3558 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3561 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3562 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3563 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3564 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3566 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3567 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3568 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3569 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3570 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3571 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3573 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3575 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3580 // Internal utility functions for channels
3582 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3583 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3584 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3586 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3588 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3589 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3590 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3592 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3595 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3597 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3600 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3601 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3602 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3604 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3606 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3607 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3608 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3609 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3610 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3613 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3614 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3615 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3616 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3617 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3618 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3619 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3622 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3623 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3625 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3627 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3628 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3629 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3630 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3631 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3632 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3633 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3636 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3637 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3639 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3640 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3643 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3644 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3645 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3646 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3647 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3648 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3651 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3652 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3653 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3654 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3655 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3656 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3662 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3663 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3664 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3665 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3666 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3667 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3668 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3669 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3670 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3671 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3672 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3673 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3676 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3677 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3678 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3679 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3680 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3681 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3684 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3685 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3687 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3688 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3689 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3693 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3694 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3695 trait FailHTLCContents {
3696 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3697 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3698 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3699 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3701 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3702 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3703 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3704 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3706 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3707 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3709 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3710 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3713 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3714 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3715 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3716 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3719 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3720 failure_code: self.1
3723 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3724 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3726 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3727 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3729 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3730 failure_code: self.1
3735 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3736 fn name() -> &'static str;
3738 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3739 fn name() -> &'static str {
3743 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3744 fn name() -> &'static str {
3745 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3749 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3750 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3751 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3753 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3754 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3755 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3756 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3758 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3759 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3761 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3763 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3764 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3765 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3766 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3768 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3769 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3773 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3779 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3780 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3781 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3782 // outside of those situations will fail.
3783 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3787 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3792 1 + // script length (0)
3796 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3797 2 + // witness marker and flag
3798 1 + // witness element count
3799 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3800 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3801 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3802 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3803 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3804 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3806 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3807 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3808 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3814 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3815 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3816 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3817 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3819 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3820 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3821 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3823 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3824 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3825 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3826 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3827 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3828 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3831 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3832 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3835 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3836 value_to_holder = 0;
3839 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3840 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3841 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3842 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3844 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3845 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3848 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3849 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3852 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3855 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3856 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3858 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3860 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3861 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3862 where L::Target: Logger {
3863 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3864 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3865 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3866 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3867 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3868 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3869 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3870 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3874 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3875 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3876 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3877 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3879 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3880 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3883 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3884 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3885 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3887 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3888 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3889 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3890 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3891 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3892 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3893 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3895 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3896 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3897 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3899 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3900 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3902 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3905 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3906 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3910 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3914 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3915 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3916 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3917 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3918 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3919 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3922 // Now update local state:
3924 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3925 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3926 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3927 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3928 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3929 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3930 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3931 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3933 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3936 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3937 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3938 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3939 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3940 // do not not get into this branch.
3941 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3942 match pending_update {
3943 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3944 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3945 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3946 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3947 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3948 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3949 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3952 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3953 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3955 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3956 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3957 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3958 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3959 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3960 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3966 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3967 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3968 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3970 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3971 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3972 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3974 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3975 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3978 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3979 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3981 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3982 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3984 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3985 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3988 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3991 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3992 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3993 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3994 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3999 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
4000 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4001 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
4002 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
4003 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
4004 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
4005 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
4006 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
4007 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
4008 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
4009 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4010 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
4011 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4012 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4013 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4015 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
4016 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
4017 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
4018 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
4019 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
4022 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
4023 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4024 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4030 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4031 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
4033 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
4037 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
4038 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
4039 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
4040 /// before we fail backwards.
4042 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
4043 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
4044 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4045 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
4046 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4047 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
4048 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
4051 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
4052 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
4054 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
4055 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
4056 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
4057 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4058 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
4059 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
4062 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
4063 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
4064 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
4065 /// before we fail backwards.
4067 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
4068 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
4069 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
4070 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
4071 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4073 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
4074 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4075 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
4078 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
4079 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
4080 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
4082 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
4083 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
4084 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
4086 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
4087 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
4088 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4090 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4095 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
4096 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
4102 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
4103 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4104 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
4105 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
4106 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4110 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4111 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
4112 force_holding_cell = true;
4115 // Now update local state:
4116 if force_holding_cell {
4117 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4118 match pending_update {
4119 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
4120 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4121 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4122 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
4126 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
4127 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
4129 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
4130 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
4131 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
4137 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
4138 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
4142 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
4143 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
4145 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
4146 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
4149 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
4152 // Message handlers:
4153 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
4154 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
4155 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
4156 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
4157 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
4158 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
4159 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
4162 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
4164 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
4166 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
4167 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
4168 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
4169 debug_assert!(matches!(
4170 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
4172 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4173 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
4176 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
4177 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4179 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4180 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4181 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4182 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4184 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4187 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4188 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4189 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4192 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4193 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4194 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4195 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4196 // when routing outbound payments.
4197 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4201 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4202 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4203 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4204 match &self.context.channel_state {
4205 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4206 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4207 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4208 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4209 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4210 check_reconnection = true;
4211 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4212 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4213 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4214 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4215 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4217 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4218 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4221 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4222 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4223 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4225 if check_reconnection {
4226 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4227 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4228 let expected_point =
4229 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4230 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4232 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4233 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4234 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4235 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4236 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4237 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4239 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4240 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4241 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4242 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4243 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4245 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4251 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4252 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4254 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4256 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4259 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4260 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4261 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4262 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4263 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4266 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4267 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4270 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4273 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4276 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4279 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4283 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4284 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4285 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4288 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4292 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4293 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4294 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4295 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4296 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4297 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4298 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4299 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4300 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4301 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4302 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4304 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4305 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4306 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4307 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4308 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4309 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4313 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4314 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4315 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4316 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4317 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4318 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4321 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4322 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4324 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4325 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4326 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4328 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4329 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4333 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4336 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4341 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4342 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4346 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4347 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4348 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4349 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4350 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4354 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4357 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4361 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4362 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4363 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4367 // Now update local state:
4368 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4369 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4370 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4371 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4372 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4373 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4374 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4375 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4381 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4383 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4384 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4385 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4386 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4387 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4388 None => fail_reason.into(),
4389 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4390 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4391 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4394 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4398 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4399 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4400 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4401 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4403 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4404 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4409 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4412 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4413 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4416 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4420 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4423 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4424 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4427 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4428 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4431 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4435 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4436 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4439 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4443 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4447 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4448 where L::Target: Logger
4450 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4453 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4454 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4456 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4457 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4460 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4462 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4464 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4465 let commitment_txid = {
4466 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4467 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4468 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4470 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4471 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4472 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4473 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4474 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4475 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4479 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4481 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4482 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4483 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4484 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4487 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4488 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4489 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4490 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4493 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4495 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4496 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4497 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4498 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4499 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4500 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4501 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4502 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4503 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4504 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4505 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4511 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4512 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4515 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4516 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4517 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4518 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4519 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4520 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4521 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4522 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4523 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4524 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4525 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4526 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4527 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4530 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4531 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4532 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4533 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4534 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4535 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4536 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4538 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4539 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4540 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4541 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4542 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4543 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4544 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4545 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4547 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4548 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4551 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4553 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4554 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4555 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4558 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4561 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4562 commitment_stats.tx,
4564 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4565 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4566 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4569 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4570 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4572 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4573 let mut need_commitment = false;
4574 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4575 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4576 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4577 need_commitment = true;
4581 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4582 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4583 Some(resolution.clone())
4585 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4586 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4587 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4588 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4589 need_commitment = true;
4592 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4593 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4594 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4595 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4596 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4597 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4598 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4599 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4600 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4601 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4602 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4603 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4604 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4605 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4607 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4609 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4610 need_commitment = true;
4614 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4615 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4616 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4617 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4618 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4619 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4620 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4622 nondust_htlc_sources,
4624 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4627 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4628 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4629 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4630 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4631 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4633 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4634 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4635 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4636 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4637 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4638 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4639 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4640 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4641 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4642 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4643 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4644 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4645 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4646 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4648 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4649 &self.context.channel_id);
4650 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4653 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4654 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4655 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4656 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4657 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4658 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4659 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4660 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4661 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4665 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4666 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4667 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4668 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4671 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4672 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4673 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4674 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4675 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4676 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4677 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4679 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4680 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4681 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4684 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4685 /// for our counterparty.
4686 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4687 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4688 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4689 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4691 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4692 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4693 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4694 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4696 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4697 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4698 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4699 updates: Vec::new(),
4700 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4703 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4704 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4705 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4706 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4707 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4708 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4709 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4710 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4711 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4712 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4713 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4714 // to rebalance channels.
4715 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4716 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4717 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4718 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4720 match self.send_htlc(
4721 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4722 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4724 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4727 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4728 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4729 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4730 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4731 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4732 // into the holding cell without ever being
4733 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4734 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4735 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4738 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4745 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4746 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4747 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4748 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4749 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4750 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4751 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4752 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4753 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4754 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4755 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4756 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4759 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4760 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4761 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4763 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4764 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4765 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4768 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4770 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4771 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4772 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4773 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4774 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4775 // for a full revocation before failing.
4776 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4777 update_fail_count += 1;
4779 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4781 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4786 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4787 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4789 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4790 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4795 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4796 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4797 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4798 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4799 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4801 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4802 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4803 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4805 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4806 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4812 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4813 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4814 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4815 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4816 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4817 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4818 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4819 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4820 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4822 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4825 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4828 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4832 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4834 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4835 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4836 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4840 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4841 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4842 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4843 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4844 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4845 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4846 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4847 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4848 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4851 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4853 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4854 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4857 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4858 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4859 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4860 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4862 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4864 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4869 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4870 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4871 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4872 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4873 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4874 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4875 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4876 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4877 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4879 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4882 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4883 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4884 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4885 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4886 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4887 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4888 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4889 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4890 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4892 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4893 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4896 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4897 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4898 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4899 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4900 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4901 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4902 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4903 let mut require_commitment = false;
4904 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4907 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4908 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4909 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4910 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4912 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4913 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4914 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4915 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4916 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4917 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4919 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4923 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4924 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4925 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4926 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4927 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4929 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4930 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4931 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4936 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4937 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4939 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4943 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4944 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4946 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4947 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4948 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4949 require_commitment = true;
4950 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4952 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4953 match pending_htlc_status {
4954 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4955 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4956 require_commitment = true;
4958 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4959 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4960 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4962 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4963 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4964 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4968 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4969 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4970 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4971 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4974 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4975 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4976 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4977 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4983 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4984 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4985 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4986 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4987 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4989 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4990 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4991 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4992 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4993 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4994 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4995 require_commitment = true;
4999 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
5001 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5002 match update_state {
5003 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
5004 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
5005 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5006 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5007 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5008 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
5010 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
5011 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
5012 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5013 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5014 require_commitment = true;
5015 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5016 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5021 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
5022 let release_state_str =
5023 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
5024 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
5025 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
5026 if !release_monitor {
5027 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5028 update: monitor_update,
5030 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
5032 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
5037 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
5039 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5040 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
5041 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
5042 if require_commitment {
5043 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5044 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
5045 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
5046 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
5048 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5049 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
5050 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5051 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5052 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5054 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
5055 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
5056 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5057 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
5058 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
5061 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
5062 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
5063 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
5064 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5065 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5066 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5068 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
5069 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5071 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5072 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5074 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
5075 if require_commitment {
5076 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5078 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
5079 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
5080 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
5081 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
5083 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
5084 &self.context.channel_id(),
5085 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
5088 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5089 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5091 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
5092 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
5094 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5095 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
5101 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5102 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5103 /// commitment update.
5104 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
5105 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5106 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5108 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
5109 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
5112 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
5113 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
5114 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
5115 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
5117 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
5118 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5119 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5120 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5121 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5122 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
5123 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5125 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5126 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
5128 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5129 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
5131 if !self.context.is_live() {
5132 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
5135 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
5136 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5137 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5138 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5139 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5140 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
5141 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
5142 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
5143 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
5144 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
5148 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
5149 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5150 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5151 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5154 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5155 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5159 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5160 force_holding_cell = true;
5163 if force_holding_cell {
5164 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
5168 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
5169 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
5171 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5172 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5177 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5178 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5180 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5182 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5183 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5184 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5185 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5189 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5190 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5191 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5195 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5196 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5199 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5200 // will be retransmitted.
5201 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5202 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5203 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5205 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5206 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5208 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5209 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5210 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5211 // this HTLC accordingly
5212 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5215 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5216 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5217 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5218 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5221 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5222 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5223 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5224 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5225 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5226 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5231 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5233 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5234 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5235 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5236 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5240 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5241 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5242 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5243 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5244 // the update upon reconnection.
5245 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5249 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5251 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5252 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5256 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5257 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5258 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5259 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5260 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5261 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5262 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5264 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5265 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5266 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5267 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5268 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5269 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5270 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5272 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5273 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5274 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5275 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5276 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5277 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5278 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5281 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5282 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5283 /// to the remote side.
5284 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5285 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5286 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5287 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5290 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5292 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5293 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5295 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5296 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5297 // first received the funding_signed.
5298 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5299 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5300 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5301 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5303 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5305 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5306 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5307 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5308 funding_broadcastable = None;
5311 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5312 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5313 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5314 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5315 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5316 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5317 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5318 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5319 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5320 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5321 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5322 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5323 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5324 next_per_commitment_point,
5325 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5329 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5331 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5332 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5333 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5334 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5335 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5336 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5337 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5338 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5340 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5341 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5342 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5343 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5344 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5345 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5346 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5350 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5351 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5353 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5354 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5356 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5357 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5360 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5361 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5362 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5363 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5364 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5365 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5366 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5367 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5368 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5369 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5373 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5374 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5376 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5377 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5379 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5380 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5382 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5384 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5385 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5386 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5387 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5388 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5389 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5390 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5391 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5392 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5394 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5395 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5396 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5401 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5403 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5404 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5405 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5406 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5408 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5409 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5411 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5412 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5415 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5416 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5417 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5418 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5420 SignerResumeUpdates {
5427 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5428 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5429 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5430 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5431 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5432 per_commitment_secret,
5433 next_per_commitment_point,
5435 next_local_nonce: None,
5439 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5440 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5441 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5442 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5443 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5444 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5446 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5447 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5448 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5449 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5450 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5451 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5452 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5453 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5454 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5455 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5456 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5461 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5462 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5464 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5465 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5466 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5467 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5468 reason: err_packet.clone()
5471 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5472 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5473 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5474 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5475 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5476 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5479 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5480 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5481 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5482 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5483 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5490 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5491 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5492 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5493 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5497 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5498 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5499 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5500 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5501 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5502 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5503 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5507 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5508 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5510 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5511 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5512 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5513 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5518 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5519 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5524 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5525 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5526 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5527 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5528 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5529 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5530 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5535 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5536 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5538 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5539 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5540 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5541 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5542 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5543 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5544 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5545 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5548 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5550 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5551 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5552 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5553 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5557 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5558 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5562 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5563 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5564 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5565 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5566 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5567 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5570 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5571 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5572 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5573 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5574 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5577 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5578 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5579 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5580 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5581 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5582 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5583 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5584 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5588 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5589 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5590 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5591 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5592 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5593 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5594 our_commitment_transaction
5598 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5599 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5600 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5601 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5603 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5605 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5607 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5608 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5609 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5610 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5611 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5614 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5615 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5616 channel_ready: None,
5617 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5618 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5619 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5623 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5624 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5625 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5626 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5627 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5628 next_per_commitment_point,
5629 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5631 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5632 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5633 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5637 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5638 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5639 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5641 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5642 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5643 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5646 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5649 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5650 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5651 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5652 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5653 our_commitment_transaction
5657 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5658 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5659 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5660 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5661 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5662 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5663 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5665 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5667 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5668 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5669 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5670 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5671 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5672 next_per_commitment_point,
5673 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5677 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5678 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5679 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5681 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5684 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5685 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5686 raa: required_revoke,
5687 commitment_update: None,
5688 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5690 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5691 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5692 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5694 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5697 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5698 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5699 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5700 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5701 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5702 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5705 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5706 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5707 raa: required_revoke,
5708 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5709 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5712 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5713 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5714 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5715 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5716 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5719 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5720 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5721 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5722 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5727 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5728 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5729 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5730 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5732 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5734 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5736 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5737 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5738 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5739 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5740 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5741 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5742 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5743 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5745 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5746 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5747 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5748 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5749 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5751 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5752 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5753 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5754 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5757 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5758 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5759 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5760 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5761 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5762 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5763 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5764 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5765 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5766 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5767 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5768 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5769 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5770 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5771 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5773 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5776 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5777 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5780 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5781 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5782 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5783 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5784 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5785 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5788 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5789 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5790 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5791 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5792 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5793 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5796 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5802 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5803 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5804 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5805 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5807 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5808 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5809 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5810 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5811 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5812 return Ok((None, None, None));
5815 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5816 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5817 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5819 return Ok((None, None, None));
5822 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5823 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5824 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5825 return Ok((None, None, None));
5828 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5830 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5831 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5832 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5833 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5835 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5836 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5838 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5839 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5841 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5842 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5843 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5844 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5846 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5847 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5848 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5852 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5858 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5859 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5861 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5862 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5865 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5866 /// within our expected timeframe.
5868 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5869 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5870 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5873 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5876 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5877 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5881 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5882 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5884 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5887 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5888 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5889 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5890 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5891 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5893 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5894 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5895 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5898 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5900 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5901 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5904 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5905 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5906 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5909 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5912 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5913 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5914 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5915 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5917 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5920 assert!(send_shutdown);
5921 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5922 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5923 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5925 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5926 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5928 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5933 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5935 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5936 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5938 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5939 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5940 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5941 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5942 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5943 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5944 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5946 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5948 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5949 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5951 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5952 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5953 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5954 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5958 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5959 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5960 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5961 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5962 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5963 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5965 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5966 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5973 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5974 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5976 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5979 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5980 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5982 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5984 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5985 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5986 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5987 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5988 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5989 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5990 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5991 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5992 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5994 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5995 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5998 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
6002 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
6003 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
6004 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
6005 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
6007 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
6008 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
6010 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
6013 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
6014 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
6016 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
6017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
6020 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
6021 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
6024 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6025 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
6026 return Ok((None, None, None));
6029 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6030 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
6031 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
6032 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
6034 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6036 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6039 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
6040 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
6041 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
6042 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6043 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
6047 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
6048 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6049 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
6053 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
6054 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
6056 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
6059 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
6060 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6061 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6062 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6064 monitor_update: None,
6065 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6066 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6067 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6068 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6069 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6070 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6071 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6072 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6074 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6075 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6076 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6077 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
6081 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
6083 macro_rules! propose_fee {
6084 ($new_fee: expr) => {
6085 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6086 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
6088 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
6091 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
6092 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6094 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6095 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
6096 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
6097 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
6099 monitor_update: None,
6100 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6101 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
6102 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6103 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
6104 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6105 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
6106 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
6107 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
6109 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
6110 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6111 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
6112 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
6117 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
6118 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
6119 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6120 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
6122 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
6123 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
6124 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
6126 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
6128 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6135 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
6136 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
6137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
6139 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6140 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6142 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6143 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6146 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6147 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
6148 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
6149 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
6150 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
6152 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6153 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
6154 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
6156 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
6157 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6160 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
6161 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
6162 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6163 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6164 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6165 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6166 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6167 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6172 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6173 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6174 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6175 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6181 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6182 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6183 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6184 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6186 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6192 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6193 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6194 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6195 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6196 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6197 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6198 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6200 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6201 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6204 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6206 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6207 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6213 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6214 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6215 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6216 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6217 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6218 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6219 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6221 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6222 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6229 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6230 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6231 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6233 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6236 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6237 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6240 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
6241 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6242 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
6243 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6246 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6247 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6248 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6250 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6251 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6252 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6253 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6254 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6255 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6256 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6259 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6260 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6261 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6262 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6263 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6264 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6265 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6266 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6270 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6271 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6272 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6273 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6274 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6275 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6276 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6280 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6281 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6286 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6287 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6288 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6289 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6290 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6291 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6295 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6296 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6297 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6298 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6300 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6301 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6302 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6303 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6304 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6305 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6306 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6307 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6308 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6310 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6311 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6312 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6319 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6320 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6323 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6324 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6327 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6328 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6332 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6333 &self.context.holder_signer
6337 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6339 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6340 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6341 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6342 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6343 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6344 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6346 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6348 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6356 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6357 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6361 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6362 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6363 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6364 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6367 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6368 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6369 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6370 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6373 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6374 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6375 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6376 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6377 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6378 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6381 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6382 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6383 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6384 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6385 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6386 if !release_monitor {
6387 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6396 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6397 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6398 /// here after logging them.
6399 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6400 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6401 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6402 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6405 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6406 update.update.update_id,
6416 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6417 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6420 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6421 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6422 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6424 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6425 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6427 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6428 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6430 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6431 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6432 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6435 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6436 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6437 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6438 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6439 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6440 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6442 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6443 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6444 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6446 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6447 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6448 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6449 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6450 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6451 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6457 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6458 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6459 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6460 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6463 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6464 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6465 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6468 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6469 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6470 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6473 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6474 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6475 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6478 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6479 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6480 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6481 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6482 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6485 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6486 self.context.channel_update_status
6489 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6490 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6491 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6494 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6496 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6497 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6498 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6502 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6503 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6504 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6507 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6511 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6512 // channel_ready yet.
6513 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6517 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6518 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6519 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6520 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6522 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6523 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6524 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6526 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6527 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6530 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6531 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6533 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6534 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6535 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6536 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6537 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6538 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6539 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6540 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6542 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6546 if need_commitment_update {
6547 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6548 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6549 let next_per_commitment_point =
6550 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6551 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6552 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6553 next_per_commitment_point,
6554 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6558 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6564 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6565 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6566 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6567 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6568 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6569 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6570 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6572 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6575 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6576 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6577 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6578 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6579 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6580 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6581 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6582 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6583 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6584 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6585 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6586 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6587 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6588 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6589 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6590 // channel and move on.
6591 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6592 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6594 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6595 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6596 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6598 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6599 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6600 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6601 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6602 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6603 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6604 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6605 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6610 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6611 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6612 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6613 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6614 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6617 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6618 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6619 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6620 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6621 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6622 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6625 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6626 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6627 // may have already happened for this block).
6628 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6629 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6630 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6631 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6634 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6635 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6636 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6637 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6645 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6646 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6647 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6648 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6650 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6651 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6654 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6656 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6657 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6658 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6659 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6661 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6664 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6667 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6668 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6669 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6670 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6672 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6675 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6676 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6677 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6679 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6680 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6682 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6683 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6684 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6692 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6694 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6695 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6696 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6698 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6699 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6702 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6703 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6704 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6705 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6706 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6707 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6708 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6709 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6712 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6713 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6714 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6715 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6717 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6718 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6719 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6721 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6722 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6723 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6724 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6726 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6727 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6728 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6729 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6730 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6731 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6732 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6735 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6736 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6738 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6741 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6742 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6743 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6744 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6745 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6746 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6747 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6748 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6749 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6750 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6751 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6752 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6753 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6754 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6755 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6756 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6757 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6763 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6768 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6769 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6771 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6772 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6773 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6774 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6776 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6779 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6781 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6782 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6783 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6784 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6785 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6786 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6788 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6789 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6792 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6793 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6794 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6795 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6796 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6797 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6799 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6800 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6803 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6804 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6805 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6806 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6807 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6813 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6814 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6815 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6816 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6818 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6821 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6825 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6829 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6830 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6834 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6838 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6839 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6842 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6846 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6848 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6853 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6854 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6855 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6857 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6862 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6864 None => return None,
6867 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6869 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6870 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6872 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6873 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6876 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6882 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6884 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6885 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6886 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6887 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6888 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6889 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6890 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6892 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6893 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6894 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6895 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6896 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6897 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6898 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6899 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6900 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6901 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6902 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6903 contents: announcement,
6906 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6911 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6915 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6916 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6917 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6918 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6919 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6920 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6921 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6922 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6924 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6926 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6927 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6928 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6929 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6931 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6932 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6933 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6934 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6937 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6938 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6939 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6940 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6943 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6946 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6947 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6948 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6949 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6950 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6951 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6954 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6956 Err(_) => return None,
6958 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6959 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6964 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6965 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6966 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6967 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6968 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6969 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6970 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6971 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6972 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6973 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6974 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6975 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6976 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6977 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6978 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6979 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6982 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6985 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6986 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6987 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6988 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6989 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6990 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6991 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6992 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6993 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6995 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6996 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6997 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6998 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6999 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
7000 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
7001 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
7002 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
7003 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
7005 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
7006 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
7007 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
7008 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
7009 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
7010 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
7011 next_funding_txid: None,
7016 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
7018 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
7019 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
7020 /// commitment update.
7022 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
7023 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7024 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
7025 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7026 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7027 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
7028 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7031 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
7032 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
7033 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
7035 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
7036 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
7041 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
7042 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
7044 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
7046 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
7047 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
7049 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
7050 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
7051 /// regenerate them.
7053 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
7054 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
7056 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
7057 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7058 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
7059 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
7060 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
7061 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7062 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
7063 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7065 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
7066 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
7067 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
7069 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
7071 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7072 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
7073 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
7076 if amount_msat == 0 {
7077 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
7080 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
7081 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
7082 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
7083 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7086 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
7087 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
7088 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
7091 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
7092 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
7093 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
7094 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
7095 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
7096 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
7097 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
7098 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
7101 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
7102 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
7103 payment_hash, amount_msat,
7104 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
7105 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
7106 else { "to peer" });
7108 if need_holding_cell {
7109 force_holding_cell = true;
7112 // Now update local state:
7113 if force_holding_cell {
7114 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7119 onion_routing_packet,
7126 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7127 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7129 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
7131 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
7137 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
7138 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7139 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
7143 onion_routing_packet,
7147 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
7152 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
7153 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
7154 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
7155 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
7157 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7158 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
7159 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
7161 if let Some(state) = new_state {
7162 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7166 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7167 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
7168 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7169 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
7170 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
7171 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
7172 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
7175 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7176 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
7177 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
7178 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
7179 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
7180 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
7183 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7185 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7186 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7187 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7188 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7189 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7191 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7192 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7195 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7196 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7197 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7198 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7199 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7200 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7201 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7202 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7203 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7204 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7205 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7206 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7208 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7210 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7214 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7215 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7216 where L::Target: Logger
7218 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7219 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7220 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7222 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7224 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7225 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7226 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7227 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7228 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7229 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7230 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7231 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7232 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7233 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7234 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7240 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7243 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7244 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7245 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7246 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7247 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7248 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7250 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7251 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7252 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7254 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7255 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7256 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7259 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7260 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7264 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7265 &commitment_stats.tx,
7266 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7267 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7268 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7269 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7271 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7273 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7274 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7275 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7276 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7278 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7279 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7280 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7281 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7282 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7283 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7287 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7288 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7292 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7293 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7295 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7301 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7302 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7304 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7305 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7306 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7307 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7308 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7309 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7310 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7311 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7313 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7314 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7315 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7318 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7319 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7320 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7326 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7328 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7329 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7330 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7331 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7332 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7334 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7336 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7342 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7343 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7344 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7345 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7346 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7348 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7349 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7350 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7353 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7354 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7356 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7357 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7359 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7360 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7362 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7363 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7364 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7367 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7370 // use override shutdown script if provided
7371 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7372 Some(script) => script,
7374 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7375 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7376 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7377 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7381 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7382 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7384 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7389 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7390 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7391 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7392 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7393 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7395 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7396 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7397 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7398 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7399 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7400 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7401 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7403 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7405 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7406 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7408 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7409 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7410 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7413 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7414 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7415 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7416 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7417 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7419 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7420 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7427 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7428 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7430 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7433 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7434 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7435 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7437 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7438 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7442 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7446 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7447 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7448 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7449 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7452 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7453 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7454 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7455 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7456 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7457 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7458 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7459 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7461 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7462 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7463 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7464 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7465 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7466 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7469 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7470 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7471 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7474 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7478 counterparty_node_id,
7480 channel_value_satoshis,
7484 current_chain_height,
7485 outbound_scid_alias,
7486 temporary_channel_id,
7487 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7492 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7497 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7498 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7499 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7500 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7501 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7502 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7503 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7504 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7505 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7507 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7512 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7513 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7514 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7517 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7518 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7519 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7520 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7523 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7525 next_local_nonce: None,
7529 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7530 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7531 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7532 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7533 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7534 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7535 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7536 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7537 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7538 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7539 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7542 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7543 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7545 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7547 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7548 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7549 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7550 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7553 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7554 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7556 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7558 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7559 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7561 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7562 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7563 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7564 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7565 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7566 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7569 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7570 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7572 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7573 if funding_created.is_none() {
7574 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7575 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7577 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7578 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7579 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7580 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7588 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7589 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7590 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7591 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7592 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7593 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7595 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7597 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7598 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7601 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7602 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7603 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7604 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7607 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7608 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7609 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7611 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7612 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7615 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7616 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7619 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7620 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7623 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7625 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7626 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7627 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7628 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7629 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7630 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7631 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7632 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7633 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7634 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7635 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7636 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7637 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7638 first_per_commitment_point,
7639 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7640 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7641 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7642 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7644 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7646 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7647 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7652 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7653 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7655 // Check sanity of message fields:
7656 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7657 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7659 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7660 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7662 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7665 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7666 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7668 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7669 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7671 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7672 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7673 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7675 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7676 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7677 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7679 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7680 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7681 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7683 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7684 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7686 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7687 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7690 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7691 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7694 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7695 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7697 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7698 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7700 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7701 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7703 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7704 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7706 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7707 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7709 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7710 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7713 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7714 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7715 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7717 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7718 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7720 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7721 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7724 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7725 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7728 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7729 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7730 &Some(ref script) => {
7731 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7732 if script.len() == 0 {
7735 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7736 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7738 Some(script.clone())
7741 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7743 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7748 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7749 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7750 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7751 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7752 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7754 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7755 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7757 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7760 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7761 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7762 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7763 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7764 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7765 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7768 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7769 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7770 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7773 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7774 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7776 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7777 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7779 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7784 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7785 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7786 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7787 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7788 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7792 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7793 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7795 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7796 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7798 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7799 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7800 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7801 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7804 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7806 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7807 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7808 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7809 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7811 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7812 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7814 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7815 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7817 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7818 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7819 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7820 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7821 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7822 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7826 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7827 initial_commitment_tx,
7830 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7831 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7835 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7836 if validated.is_err() {
7837 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7840 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7841 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7842 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7843 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7844 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7845 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7846 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7847 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7848 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7849 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7850 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7851 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7853 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7854 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7855 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7856 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7857 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7858 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7859 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7860 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7862 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7863 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7864 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7866 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7868 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7869 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7871 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7873 let mut channel = Channel {
7874 context: self.context,
7875 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7876 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7879 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7880 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7881 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7884 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7886 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7887 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7888 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7889 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7890 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7895 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7896 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7897 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7898 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7901 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7902 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7903 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7904 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7905 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7906 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7907 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7908 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7912 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7913 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7914 // `static_remote_key`.
7915 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7916 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7918 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7919 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7920 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7922 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7923 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7926 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7928 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7929 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7936 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7937 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7938 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7939 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7940 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7941 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7942 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7943 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7944 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7945 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7946 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7949 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7951 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7952 // support this channel type.
7953 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7955 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7956 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7957 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7958 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7959 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7960 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7961 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7965 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7969 counterparty_node_id,
7973 current_chain_height,
7978 counterparty_pubkeys,
7980 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7981 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7983 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7985 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7990 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7991 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7993 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7994 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7995 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7996 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7999 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8000 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8002 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
8004 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8005 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
8008 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
8011 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8012 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8013 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8015 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
8016 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
8017 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8018 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8020 msgs::AcceptChannel {
8021 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8022 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
8023 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8024 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8025 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8026 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8027 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8028 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8029 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8030 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8031 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8032 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8033 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8034 first_per_commitment_point,
8035 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8036 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8037 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8039 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8041 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8043 next_local_nonce: None,
8047 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8048 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8050 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
8052 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
8053 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
8056 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
8057 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8059 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
8060 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
8061 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
8062 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8063 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8064 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
8065 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
8066 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
8067 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
8068 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
8069 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
8071 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
8074 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
8075 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
8076 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
8080 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8081 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
8084 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8085 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8087 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
8088 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
8090 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
8092 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
8093 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
8094 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8095 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
8098 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
8099 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
8100 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
8101 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
8102 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8104 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
8106 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
8107 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
8108 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
8111 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
8112 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
8113 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
8117 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8118 initial_commitment_tx,
8121 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8122 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8125 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
8126 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
8129 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
8131 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
8132 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
8133 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
8134 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
8136 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
8138 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8139 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
8140 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
8141 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
8142 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
8143 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8144 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
8145 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8146 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
8147 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
8148 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8150 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
8151 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
8152 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
8153 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
8154 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8155 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
8156 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
8158 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
8159 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
8161 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
8162 // `ChannelMonitor`.
8163 let mut channel = Channel {
8164 context: self.context,
8165 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8166 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8168 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
8169 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
8171 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
8175 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8176 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8177 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8178 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8179 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8180 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8181 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8184 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8185 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8186 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8187 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8188 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8189 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8190 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8191 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8192 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8193 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8195 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8196 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8197 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8199 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8201 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8202 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8204 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8205 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8208 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8212 counterparty_node_id,
8218 current_chain_height,
8219 outbound_scid_alias,
8220 temporary_channel_id,
8221 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8226 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8227 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8228 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8229 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8230 funding_tx_locktime,
8231 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8237 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8238 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8239 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8240 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8241 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8242 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8244 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8246 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8247 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8250 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8251 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8252 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8255 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8256 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8259 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8260 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8261 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8262 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8263 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8264 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8265 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8267 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8268 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8270 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8271 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8272 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8273 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8274 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8275 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8276 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8277 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8278 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8279 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8280 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8281 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8282 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8283 first_per_commitment_point,
8284 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8285 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8286 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8287 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8289 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8291 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8292 second_per_commitment_point,
8293 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8294 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8299 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8300 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8301 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8302 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8303 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8304 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8307 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8308 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8309 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8310 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8311 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8312 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8313 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8314 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8315 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8316 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8317 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8318 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8321 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8322 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8323 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8324 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8325 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8327 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8328 // support this channel type.
8329 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8331 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8333 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8335 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8336 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8337 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8338 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8339 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8340 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8343 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8347 counterparty_node_id,
8351 current_chain_height,
8357 counterparty_pubkeys,
8359 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8360 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8361 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8362 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8364 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8365 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8366 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8367 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8371 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8372 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8373 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8374 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8375 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8376 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8383 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8384 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8386 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8387 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8388 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8389 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8392 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8393 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8395 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8397 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8398 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8401 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8404 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8405 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8406 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8408 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8409 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8410 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8411 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8412 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8413 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8414 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8416 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8417 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8418 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8419 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8420 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8421 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8422 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8423 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8424 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8425 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8426 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8427 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8428 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8429 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8430 first_per_commitment_point,
8431 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8432 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8433 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8435 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8437 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8438 second_per_commitment_point,
8439 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8443 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8444 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8446 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8448 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8449 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8453 // Unfunded channel utilities
8455 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8456 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8457 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8458 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8459 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8460 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8461 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8462 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8463 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8464 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8467 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8468 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8469 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8470 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8471 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8472 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8478 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8479 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8481 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8487 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8488 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8489 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8490 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8491 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8493 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8494 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8495 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8496 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8502 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8503 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8504 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8505 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8506 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8507 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8512 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8514 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8515 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8517 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8518 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8519 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8520 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8525 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8526 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8527 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8528 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8529 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8530 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8535 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8536 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8537 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8540 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8541 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8542 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8543 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8547 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8549 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8551 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8553 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8554 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8555 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8556 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8557 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8559 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8560 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8561 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8562 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8564 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8566 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8567 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8568 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8570 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8572 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8574 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8576 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8578 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8579 // deserialized from that format.
8580 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8581 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8582 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8584 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8586 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8587 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8588 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8590 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8591 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8592 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8593 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8596 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8597 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8598 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8601 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8602 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8603 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8604 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8606 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8607 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8609 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8610 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8611 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8616 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8619 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8621 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8622 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8623 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8628 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8631 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8634 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8636 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8641 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8642 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8643 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8645 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8646 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8647 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8648 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8649 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8650 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8651 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8653 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8655 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8657 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8660 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8661 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8662 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8665 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8667 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8668 preimages.push(preimage);
8670 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8671 reason.write(writer)?;
8673 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8675 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8676 preimages.push(preimage);
8678 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8679 reason.write(writer)?;
8682 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8683 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8686 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8687 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8688 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8689 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8690 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8691 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8693 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8694 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8695 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8698 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8699 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8700 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8701 source.write(writer)?;
8702 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8704 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8705 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8707 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8709 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8710 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8712 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8714 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8715 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8717 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8718 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8720 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8721 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8722 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8724 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8726 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8727 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8732 match self.context.resend_order {
8733 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8734 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8737 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8738 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8739 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8741 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8742 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8743 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8744 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8747 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8748 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8749 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8750 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8751 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8754 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8755 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8756 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8757 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8759 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8760 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8761 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8763 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8765 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8766 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8767 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8768 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8770 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8771 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8772 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8773 // consider the stale state on reload.
8776 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8777 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8778 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8780 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8781 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8782 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8784 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8785 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8787 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8788 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8789 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8791 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8792 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8794 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8797 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8798 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8799 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8801 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8804 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8805 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8807 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8808 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8809 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8811 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8813 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8815 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8817 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8818 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8819 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8820 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8821 htlc.write(writer)?;
8824 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8825 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8826 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8828 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8829 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8831 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8832 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8833 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8834 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8835 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8836 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8837 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8839 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8840 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8841 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8842 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8843 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8845 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8846 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8848 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8849 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8850 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8851 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8853 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8855 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8856 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8857 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8860 // `current_point` will become optional when async signing is implemented.
8861 let cur_holder_commitment_point = Some(self.context.holder_commitment_point.current_point());
8862 let next_holder_commitment_point = self.context.holder_commitment_point.next_point();
8864 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8865 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8866 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8867 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8868 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8869 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8870 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8872 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8873 (2, chan_type, option),
8874 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8875 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8876 (5, self.context.config, required),
8877 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8878 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8879 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8880 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8881 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8882 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8883 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8884 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8885 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8886 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8887 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8888 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8889 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8890 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8891 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8892 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8893 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8894 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8895 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8896 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8897 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8898 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8899 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8900 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point, option),
8901 (47, next_holder_commitment_point, option),
8902 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8909 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8910 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8912 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8913 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8915 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8916 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8917 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8919 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8920 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8921 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8922 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8924 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8926 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8927 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8928 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8929 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8930 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8932 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8933 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8936 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8937 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8938 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8940 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8942 let mut keys_data = None;
8944 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8945 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8946 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8947 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8948 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8949 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8950 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8951 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8952 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8953 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8957 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8958 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8959 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8962 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8964 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8965 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8966 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8968 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8970 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8971 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8972 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8973 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8974 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8975 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8976 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8977 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8979 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8980 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8982 Readable::read(reader)?
8984 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8987 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8988 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8990 Readable::read(reader)?
8992 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8994 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8995 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8996 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9001 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9002 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
9003 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
9004 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9005 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9006 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9007 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
9008 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
9009 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
9010 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9011 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
9012 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9014 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9015 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
9018 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9019 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
9022 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9023 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
9025 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9027 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9028 blinding_point: None,
9032 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9033 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
9034 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
9035 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9036 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9037 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9038 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
9039 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
9040 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
9041 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
9042 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9043 blinding_point: None,
9045 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9046 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
9047 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9049 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9050 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
9051 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
9053 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9057 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9058 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
9059 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
9060 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9063 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
9064 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
9065 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
9067 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9068 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
9069 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
9070 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
9073 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9074 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
9075 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
9076 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
9079 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9081 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
9083 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9084 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9085 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
9086 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
9088 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
9089 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
9090 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
9091 // consider the stale state on reload.
9092 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9095 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9096 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9097 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
9099 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9102 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
9103 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
9104 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9106 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
9107 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
9108 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9109 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
9111 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
9112 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
9114 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
9115 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9117 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9118 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
9119 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
9121 let mut minimum_depth = None;
9123 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
9124 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
9126 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
9127 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9130 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
9132 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
9133 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
9134 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
9135 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
9137 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
9140 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
9141 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
9143 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9145 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
9146 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
9148 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
9149 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
9151 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
9153 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9154 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
9155 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9157 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
9158 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
9159 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
9163 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
9164 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
9165 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
9167 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
9173 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
9174 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
9175 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
9176 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
9177 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
9178 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
9179 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
9180 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
9181 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9182 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9184 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9185 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9186 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9187 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9188 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9189 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9190 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9192 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9193 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9194 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9195 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9197 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9199 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9200 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9202 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9204 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9206 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9207 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9209 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9210 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9212 let mut cur_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9213 let mut next_holder_commitment_point_opt: Option<PublicKey> = None;
9215 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9216 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9217 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9218 (2, channel_type, option),
9219 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9220 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9221 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9222 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9223 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9224 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9225 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9226 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9227 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9228 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9229 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9230 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9231 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9232 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9233 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9234 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9235 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9236 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9237 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9238 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9239 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9240 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9241 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9242 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9243 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9244 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9245 (45, cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9246 (47, next_holder_commitment_point_opt, option),
9247 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9250 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9251 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9252 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9253 // required channel parameters.
9254 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9255 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9257 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9259 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9260 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9261 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9262 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9265 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9266 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9267 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9269 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9270 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9272 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9273 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9278 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9279 if iter.next().is_some() {
9280 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9284 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9285 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9286 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9287 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9288 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9291 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9292 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9293 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9295 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9296 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9298 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9299 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9300 // separate u64 values.
9301 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9303 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9305 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9306 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9307 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9308 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9310 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9311 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9313 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9314 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9315 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9316 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9317 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9320 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9321 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9323 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9324 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9325 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9326 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9328 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9329 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9331 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9332 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9333 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9334 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9335 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9338 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9339 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9342 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9343 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9344 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9345 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9346 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9347 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9350 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9351 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9352 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9354 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9358 // If we're restoring this channel for the first time after an upgrade, then we require that the
9359 // signer be available so that we can immediately populate the current commitment point. Channel
9360 // restoration will fail if this is not possible.
9361 let holder_commitment_point = match (cur_holder_commitment_point_opt, next_holder_commitment_point_opt) {
9362 (Some(current), Some(next)) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9363 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current, next
9365 (Some(current), _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9366 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, current,
9367 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9369 (_, _) => HolderCommitmentPoint::Available {
9370 transaction_number: cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9371 current: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &secp_ctx),
9372 next: holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &secp_ctx),
9377 context: ChannelContext {
9380 config: config.unwrap(),
9384 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9385 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9386 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9389 temporary_channel_id,
9391 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9393 channel_value_satoshis,
9395 latest_monitor_update_id,
9397 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9398 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9401 holder_commitment_point,
9402 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9403 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9406 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9407 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9408 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9409 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9413 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9414 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9415 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9416 monitor_pending_forwards,
9417 monitor_pending_failures,
9418 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9419 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9421 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9422 signer_pending_funding: false,
9425 holding_cell_update_fee,
9426 next_holder_htlc_id,
9427 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9428 update_time_counter,
9431 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9432 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9433 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9434 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9436 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9437 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9438 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9439 closing_fee_limits: None,
9440 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9442 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9443 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9445 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9447 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9448 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9449 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9450 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9451 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9452 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9453 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9454 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9455 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9458 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9460 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9461 funding_transaction,
9464 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9465 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9466 counterparty_node_id,
9468 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9472 channel_update_status,
9473 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9477 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9478 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9479 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9480 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9482 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9483 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9485 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9486 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9487 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9489 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9490 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9492 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9493 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9495 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9498 local_initiated_shutdown,
9500 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9502 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9503 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9511 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9512 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9513 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
9514 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9515 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
9516 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9517 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9518 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9519 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9520 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9521 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9522 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9523 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9524 use crate::ln::msgs;
9525 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9526 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9527 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9528 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9529 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9530 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9531 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9532 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9533 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9534 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9535 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9536 use crate::util::test_utils;
9537 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9538 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9539 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9540 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9541 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9542 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9543 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9544 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
9545 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9546 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
9547 use crate::prelude::*;
9550 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9551 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9552 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9553 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9555 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9556 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9557 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9558 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9561 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9564 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9565 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9571 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9572 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9573 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9574 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9578 signer: InMemorySigner,
9581 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9582 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9585 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9586 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9588 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9590 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9591 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9594 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9598 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9600 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9601 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9602 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9603 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9604 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9607 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9608 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9609 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9610 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9614 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9615 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9616 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9620 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9621 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9622 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9623 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9626 let seed = [42; 32];
9627 let network = Network::Testnet;
9628 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9629 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9630 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9633 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9634 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9635 let config = UserConfig::default();
9636 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9637 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9638 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9640 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9641 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9645 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9646 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9648 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9649 let original_fee = 253;
9650 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9651 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9652 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9653 let seed = [42; 32];
9654 let network = Network::Testnet;
9655 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9657 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9658 let config = UserConfig::default();
9659 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9661 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9662 // same as the old fee.
9663 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9664 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9665 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9669 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9670 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9671 // dust limits are used.
9672 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9673 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9674 let seed = [42; 32];
9675 let network = Network::Testnet;
9676 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9677 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9678 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9680 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9681 // they have different dust limits.
9683 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9684 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9685 let config = UserConfig::default();
9686 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9688 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9689 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9690 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9691 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9692 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9694 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9695 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9696 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9697 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9698 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9700 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9701 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9702 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9703 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9705 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9706 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9707 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9709 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9710 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9711 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9713 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9714 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9715 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9717 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9718 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9719 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9720 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9723 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9725 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9726 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9727 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9728 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9729 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9730 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9731 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9732 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9733 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9735 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9736 blinding_point: None,
9739 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9740 // the dust limit check.
9741 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9742 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9743 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9744 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9746 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9747 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9748 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9749 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9750 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9751 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9752 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9756 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9757 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9758 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9759 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9760 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9761 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9762 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9763 let seed = [42; 32];
9764 let network = Network::Testnet;
9765 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9767 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9768 let config = UserConfig::default();
9769 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9771 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9772 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9774 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9775 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9776 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9777 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9778 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9779 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9781 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9782 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9783 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9784 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9785 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9787 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9789 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9790 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9791 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9792 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9793 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9795 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9796 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9797 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9798 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9799 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9803 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9804 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9805 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9806 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9807 let seed = [42; 32];
9808 let network = Network::Testnet;
9809 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9810 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9811 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9813 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9815 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9816 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9817 let config = UserConfig::default();
9818 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9820 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9821 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9822 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9823 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9825 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9826 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9827 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9829 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9830 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9831 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9832 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9834 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9835 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9836 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9838 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9839 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9840 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9842 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9843 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9844 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9845 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9846 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9847 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9848 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9850 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9852 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9853 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9854 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9855 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9856 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9860 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9861 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9862 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9863 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9864 let seed = [42; 32];
9865 let network = Network::Testnet;
9866 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9867 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9868 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9870 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9871 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9872 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9873 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9874 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9875 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9876 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9877 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9879 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9880 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9881 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9882 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9883 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9884 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9886 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9887 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9888 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9889 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9891 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9893 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9894 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9895 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9896 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9897 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9898 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9900 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9901 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9902 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9903 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9905 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9906 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9907 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9908 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9909 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9911 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9912 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9914 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9915 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9916 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9918 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9919 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9920 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9921 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9922 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9924 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9925 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9927 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9928 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9929 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9933 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9935 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9936 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9937 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9939 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9940 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9941 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9942 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9944 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9945 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9946 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9948 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9950 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9951 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9954 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9955 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9956 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9957 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9958 let seed = [42; 32];
9959 let network = Network::Testnet;
9960 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9961 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9962 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9965 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9966 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9967 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9969 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9970 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9972 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9973 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9974 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9976 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9977 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9979 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9981 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9982 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9984 // Channel Negotiations failed
9985 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9986 assert!(result.is_err());
9991 fn channel_update() {
9992 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9993 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9994 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9995 let seed = [42; 32];
9996 let network = Network::Testnet;
9997 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9998 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9999 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10001 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
10002 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10003 let config = UserConfig::default();
10004 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10006 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
10007 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
10008 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10009 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10010 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
10012 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
10013 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10014 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10015 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
10016 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
10018 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
10019 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10020 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10021 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10023 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10024 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10025 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10027 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
10028 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
10029 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10031 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
10032 let update = ChannelUpdate {
10033 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
10035 short_channel_id: 0,
10038 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
10039 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
10040 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
10041 fee_base_msat: 110,
10042 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
10043 excess_data: Vec::new(),
10045 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
10047 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
10049 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
10050 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
10051 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
10052 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
10054 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
10055 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
10056 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
10058 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
10061 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
10065 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
10066 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
10068 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10069 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10070 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10071 let seed = [42; 32];
10072 let network = Network::Testnet;
10073 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10074 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10076 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10077 let config = UserConfig::default();
10078 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
10079 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10080 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10082 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10083 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10084 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
10086 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
10087 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
10088 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
10090 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10091 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
10092 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
10093 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
10094 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
10097 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
10099 hops: vec![RouteHop {
10100 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
10101 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
10102 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
10106 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
10107 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
10108 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
10110 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
10113 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
10115 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10116 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
10117 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10118 blinding_point: None,
10120 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
10121 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
10123 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
10126 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
10129 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
10131 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10134 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
10135 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
10136 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
10138 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
10139 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
10142 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10143 blinding_point: None,
10145 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
10146 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
10149 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
10150 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
10152 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
10153 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
10155 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
10158 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
10159 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
10160 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
10161 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
10162 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
10163 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
10164 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
10165 } = &mut dummy_add {
10166 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
10167 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
10168 } else { panic!() }
10169 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
10170 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
10171 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
10173 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
10176 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
10178 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
10179 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
10180 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
10181 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
10182 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
10183 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
10184 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
10185 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
10188 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10190 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10191 use bitcoin::sighash;
10192 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10193 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10194 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10195 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10196 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10197 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10198 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10199 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10200 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10201 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10202 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10203 use crate::sync::Arc;
10204 use core::str::FromStr;
10205 use hex::DisplayHex;
10207 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10208 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10209 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10210 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10212 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10214 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10215 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10216 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10217 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10218 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10220 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10221 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10227 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10228 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10229 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10231 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10232 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10233 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10234 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10235 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10236 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10238 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10240 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10241 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10242 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10243 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10244 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10245 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10247 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10248 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10249 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10250 selected_contest_delay: 144
10252 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10253 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10255 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10256 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10258 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10259 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10261 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10262 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10264 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10265 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10266 // build_commitment_transaction.
10267 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10268 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10269 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10270 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10271 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10273 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10274 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10275 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10276 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10280 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10281 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10282 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10283 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10287 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10288 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10289 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10291 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10292 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10294 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10295 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10297 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10299 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10300 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10301 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10302 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10303 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10304 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10305 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10307 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10308 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10309 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10310 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10312 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10313 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10314 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10316 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10318 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10319 commitment_tx.clone(),
10320 counterparty_signature,
10321 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10322 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10323 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10325 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10326 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10328 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10329 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10330 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10332 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10333 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10336 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10337 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10339 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10340 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10341 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10342 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10343 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10344 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10345 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10346 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10348 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10351 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10352 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10353 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10357 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10360 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10361 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10362 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10363 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10364 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10365 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10367 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10368 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10369 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10370 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10371 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10372 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10373 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10374 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10375 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10376 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10378 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10379 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10380 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10381 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10382 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10383 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10385 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10389 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10390 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10391 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10392 "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", {});
10394 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10395 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10397 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10398 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10399 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10401 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10402 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10403 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10404 "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", {});
10406 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10407 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10409 amount_msat: 1000000,
10411 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10412 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10414 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10417 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10418 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10420 amount_msat: 2000000,
10422 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10423 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10425 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10428 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10429 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10431 amount_msat: 2000000,
10433 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10434 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10435 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10436 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10437 blinding_point: None,
10439 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10442 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10443 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10445 amount_msat: 3000000,
10447 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10448 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10449 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10450 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10451 blinding_point: None,
10453 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10456 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10457 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10459 amount_msat: 4000000,
10461 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10462 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10464 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10468 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10469 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10470 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10472 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10473 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10474 "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", {
10477 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10478 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10479 "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" },
10482 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10483 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10484 "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" },
10487 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10488 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10489 "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" },
10492 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10493 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10494 "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" },
10497 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10498 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10499 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10502 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10503 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10504 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10506 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10507 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10508 "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", {
10511 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10512 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10513 "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" },
10516 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10517 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10518 "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" },
10521 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10522 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10523 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
10526 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10527 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10528 "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" },
10531 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10532 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10533 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10536 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10537 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10538 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10540 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10541 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10542 "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", {
10545 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10546 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10547 "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" },
10550 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10551 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10552 "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" },
10555 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10556 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10557 "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" },
10560 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10561 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10562 "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" }
10565 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10566 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10567 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10568 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10570 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10571 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10572 "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", {
10575 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10576 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10577 "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" },
10580 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10581 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10582 "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" },
10585 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10586 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10587 "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" },
10590 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10591 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10592 "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" }
10595 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10596 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10597 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10598 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10600 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10601 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10602 "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", {
10605 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10606 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10607 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10610 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10611 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10612 "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" },
10615 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10616 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10617 "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" },
10620 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10621 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10622 "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" }
10625 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10626 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10627 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10629 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10630 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10631 "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", {
10634 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10635 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10636 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10639 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10640 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10641 "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" },
10644 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10645 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10646 "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" }
10649 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10650 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10651 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10653 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10654 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10655 "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", {
10658 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10659 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10660 "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" },
10663 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10664 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10665 "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" },
10668 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10669 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10670 "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" }
10673 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10674 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10675 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10677 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10678 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10679 "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", {
10682 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10683 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10684 "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" },
10687 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10688 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10689 "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" }
10692 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10693 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10694 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10695 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10696 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10697 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10699 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10700 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10701 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10704 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10705 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10706 "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" },
10709 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10710 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10711 "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" }
10714 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10715 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10716 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10717 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10718 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10720 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10721 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10722 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10725 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10726 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10727 "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" },
10730 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10731 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10732 "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" }
10735 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10736 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10737 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10739 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10740 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10741 "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", {
10744 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10745 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10746 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10749 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10750 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10751 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10752 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10753 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10755 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10756 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10757 "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", {
10760 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10761 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10762 "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" }
10765 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10766 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10767 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10768 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10769 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10771 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10772 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10773 "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", {
10776 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10777 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10778 "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" }
10781 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10782 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10783 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10784 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10786 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10787 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10788 "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", {});
10790 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10791 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10792 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10793 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10794 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10796 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10797 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10798 "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", {});
10800 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10801 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10802 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10803 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10804 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10806 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10807 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10808 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
10810 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10811 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10812 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10814 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10815 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10816 "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", {});
10818 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10819 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10820 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10821 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10822 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10824 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10825 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10826 "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", {});
10828 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10829 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10830 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10831 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10832 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10834 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10835 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10836 "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", {});
10838 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10839 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10840 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10841 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10842 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10843 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10845 amount_msat: 2000000,
10847 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10848 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10850 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10853 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10854 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10855 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10857 amount_msat: 5000001,
10859 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10860 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10861 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10862 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10863 blinding_point: None,
10865 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10868 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10869 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10871 amount_msat: 5000000,
10873 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10874 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10875 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10876 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10877 blinding_point: None,
10879 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10883 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10884 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10885 "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", {
10888 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10889 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10890 "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" },
10892 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10893 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10894 "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" },
10896 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10897 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10898 "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" }
10901 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10902 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10903 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10904 "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", {
10907 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10908 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10909 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
10911 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10912 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10913 "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" },
10915 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10916 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10917 "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" }
10922 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10923 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10925 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10926 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10927 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10928 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10930 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10931 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10932 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10934 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10935 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10937 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10938 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10940 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10941 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10942 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10946 fn test_key_derivation() {
10947 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10948 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10950 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10951 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10953 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10954 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10956 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10957 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10959 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10960 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10962 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10963 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10965 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10966 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10970 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10971 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10972 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10973 let seed = [42; 32];
10974 let network = Network::Testnet;
10975 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10976 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10978 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10979 let config = UserConfig::default();
10980 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10981 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10983 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10984 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10986 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10987 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10988 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10989 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10990 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10991 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10992 assert!(res.is_ok());
10996 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10997 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10998 // resulting `channel_type`.
10999 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11000 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11001 let network = Network::Testnet;
11002 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
11003 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11005 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
11006 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
11008 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11009 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
11011 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
11012 // need to signal it.
11013 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11014 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11015 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
11016 &config, 0, 42, None
11018 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
11020 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
11021 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
11022 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
11024 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11025 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11026 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11030 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11031 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11032 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11033 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11034 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11037 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
11038 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
11042 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
11043 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
11044 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
11045 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11046 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11047 let network = Network::Testnet;
11048 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
11049 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11051 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
11052 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
11054 let config = UserConfig::default();
11056 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
11057 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
11058 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
11059 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
11060 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
11062 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11063 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11064 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11068 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
11069 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11070 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
11072 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
11073 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
11074 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11075 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11076 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
11077 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11079 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
11083 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
11084 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
11086 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11087 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11088 let network = Network::Testnet;
11089 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
11090 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11092 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
11093 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
11095 let config = UserConfig::default();
11097 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
11098 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
11099 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
11100 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
11101 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
11102 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
11103 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
11104 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
11106 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
11107 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
11108 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
11109 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11110 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
11111 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
11115 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11116 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11118 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11119 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11120 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
11121 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11123 assert!(res.is_err());
11125 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
11126 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
11127 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
11129 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11130 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
11131 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
11134 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11136 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11137 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
11138 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11139 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
11142 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
11143 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
11145 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
11146 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
11148 assert!(res.is_err());
11152 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
11153 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
11154 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
11155 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
11156 let seed = [42; 32];
11157 let network = Network::Testnet;
11158 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
11159 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
11160 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
11162 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
11163 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
11164 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
11165 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
11167 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
11168 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
11169 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11174 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11184 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
11185 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
11186 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11191 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11192 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11198 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11201 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11202 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11203 &accept_channel_msg,
11204 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11205 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11208 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11209 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11210 let tx = Transaction {
11212 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11216 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11219 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11222 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11223 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11224 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11225 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11226 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11227 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11231 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11232 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11240 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11241 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11242 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11243 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11245 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11246 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11253 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11254 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11255 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11256 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11257 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11259 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11260 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11261 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11269 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11270 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11273 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11274 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11275 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11276 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());