Add maybe_handle_error_without_close for OutboundV2Channel
[rust-lightning] / lightning / src / ln / channel.rs
1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
2 // history.
3 //
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
8 // licenses.
9
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
13 use bitcoin::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs;
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49
50 use crate::io;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
54 use core::ops::Deref;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
60
61 #[cfg(test)]
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63         pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64         pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65         pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66         pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67         pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68         pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69         pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70         pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
71 }
72
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74         /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75         pub balance_msat: u64,
76         /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77         pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78         /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79         pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80         /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81         pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82         /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83         pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
84 }
85
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 enum FeeUpdateState {
88         // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89         RemoteAnnounced,
90         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91         // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92         // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93         // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94         // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95         // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96
97         // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
98         Outbound,
99 }
100
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102         FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103         FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104         Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
105 }
106
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108         /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109         /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110         RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112         /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113         /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114         /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115         /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116         /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117         /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118         /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119         /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120         /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121         /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122         /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
123         ///
124         /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc)   --> local
126         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127         /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack               <-- local
128         /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129         /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130         /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc)   --> local
131         /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132         /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133         /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134         /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135         /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136         /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138         ///
139         /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141         /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142         /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143         /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144         /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145         /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146         AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
147         Committed,
148         /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
150         /// we'll drop it.
151         /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152         /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153         /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154         /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155         /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156         /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157         /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158         LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
159 }
160
161 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
162 ///
163 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
164 /// through the following states in the state machine:
165 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
166 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
167 ///   through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
168 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
169 ///   the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
170 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
171 ///   through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
172 ///
173 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
174 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
175 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
176         /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
177         /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
178         /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
179         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
180         /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
181         /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
182         ///
183         /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
184         /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
185         /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
186         /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
187         Committed,
188         /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
189         /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
190         /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
191         /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
192         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
193         /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
194         /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
195         /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
196         /// transaction.
197         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
198 }
199
200 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
201         fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
202                 match state {
203                         InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
204                         InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
205                                 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
206                         InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
207                                 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
208                         InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
209                                 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
210                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
211                                 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
212                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
213                                 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
214                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
215                                 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
216                 }
217         }
218 }
219
220 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
221         (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
222         (2, Committed) => {},
223         (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
224         (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
225 );
226
227 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
228         htlc_id: u64,
229         amount_msat: u64,
230         cltv_expiry: u32,
231         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
232         state: InboundHTLCState,
233 }
234
235 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
236 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
237 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
238         /// The HTLC ID.
239         /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
240         /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
241         /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
242         pub htlc_id: u64,
243         /// The amount in msat.
244         pub amount_msat: u64,
245         /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
246         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
247         /// The payment hash.
248         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249         /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
250         ///
251         /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
252         /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
253         ///
254         /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
255         ///
256         /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
257         /// states may result in `None` here.
258         pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
259         /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
260         /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
261         /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
262         /// transactions as well.
263         ///
264         /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
265         /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
266         /// fee.
267         ///
268         /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
269         /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
270         pub is_dust: bool,
271 }
272
273 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
274         (0, htlc_id, required),
275         (2, amount_msat, required),
276         (4, cltv_expiry, required),
277         (6, payment_hash, required),
278         (7, state, upgradable_option),
279         (8, is_dust, required),
280 });
281
282 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
283 enum OutboundHTLCState {
284         /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
285         /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
286         /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
287         /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
288         ///  * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
289         ///    money back (though we won't), and,
290         ///  * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
291         ///    allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
292         ///    doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
293         ///    we'll never get out of sync).
294         /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
295         /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
296         LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
297         Committed,
298         /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
299         /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
300         RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
301         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
302         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
303         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
304         /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
305         /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
306         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
307         /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
308         /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
309         /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
310         /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
311         /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
312         AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
313 }
314
315 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
316 ///
317 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
318 /// through the following states in the state machine:
319 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
320 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
321 ///   through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
322 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
323 ///   the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
324 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
325 ///   through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
326 ///
327 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
328 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
329 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
330         /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
331         /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
332         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
333         /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
334         /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
335         ///
336         /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
337         /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
338         Committed,
339         /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
340         /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
341         /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
342         /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
343         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
344         /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
345         /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
346         /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
347         /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
348         AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
349 }
350
351 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
352         fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
353                 match state {
354                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
355                                 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
356                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
357                                 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
358                         // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
359                         // the state yet.
360                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
361                                 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
362                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
363                                 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
364                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
365                                 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
366                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
367                                 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
368                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
369                                 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
370                 }
371         }
372 }
373
374 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
375         (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
376         (2, Committed) => {},
377         (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
378         (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
379 );
380
381 #[derive(Clone)]
382 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
383 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
384         /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
385         Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
386         Failure(HTLCFailReason),
387 }
388
389 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
390         fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
391                 match o {
392                         None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
393                         Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
394                 }
395         }
396 }
397
398 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
399         fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
400                 match self {
401                         OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
402                         OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
403                 }
404         }
405 }
406
407 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
408 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
409         htlc_id: u64,
410         amount_msat: u64,
411         cltv_expiry: u32,
412         payment_hash: PaymentHash,
413         state: OutboundHTLCState,
414         source: HTLCSource,
415         blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
416         skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
417 }
418
419 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
420 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
421 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
422         /// The HTLC ID.
423         /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
424         /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
425         /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
426         ///
427         /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
428         pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
429         /// The amount in msat.
430         pub amount_msat: u64,
431         /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
432         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
433         /// The payment hash.
434         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
435         /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
436         ///
437         /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
438         /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
439         ///
440         /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
441         ///
442         /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
443         /// states may result in `None` here.
444         pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
445         /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
446         pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
447         /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
448         /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
449         /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
450         /// transactions as well.
451         ///
452         /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
453         /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
454         /// fee.
455         ///
456         /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
457         /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
458         pub is_dust: bool,
459 }
460
461 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
462         (0, htlc_id, required),
463         (2, amount_msat, required),
464         (4, cltv_expiry, required),
465         (6, payment_hash, required),
466         (7, state, upgradable_option),
467         (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
468         (10, is_dust, required),
469 });
470
471 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
472 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
473 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
474         AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
475                 // always outbound
476                 amount_msat: u64,
477                 cltv_expiry: u32,
478                 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
479                 source: HTLCSource,
480                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
481                 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
482                 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
483                 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
484         },
485         ClaimHTLC {
486                 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
487                 htlc_id: u64,
488         },
489         FailHTLC {
490                 htlc_id: u64,
491                 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
492         },
493         FailMalformedHTLC {
494                 htlc_id: u64,
495                 failure_code: u16,
496                 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
497         },
498 }
499
500 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
501         ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
502                 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
503                 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
504                 struct $flag_type(u32);
505
506                 impl $flag_type {
507                         $(
508                                 #[doc = $flag_doc]
509                                 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
510                         )*
511
512                         /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
513                         #[allow(unused)]
514                         const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
515
516                         #[allow(unused)]
517                         fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
518
519                         #[allow(unused)]
520                         fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
521                                 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
522                                         Err(())
523                                 } else {
524                                         Ok($flag_type(flags))
525                                 }
526                         }
527
528                         #[allow(unused)]
529                         fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
530                         #[allow(unused)]
531                         fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
532                         #[allow(unused)]
533                         fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
534                         #[allow(unused)]
535                         fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
536                 }
537
538                 $(
539                         define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
540                 )*
541
542                 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
543                         type Output = Self;
544                         fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
545                 }
546                 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
547                         fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
548                 }
549                 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
550                         type Output = Self;
551                         fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
552                 }
553                 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
554                         fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
555                 }
556         };
557         ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
558                 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
559         };
560         ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
561                 impl $flag_type {
562                         #[allow(unused)]
563                         fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
564                         #[allow(unused)]
565                         fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
566                         #[allow(unused)]
567                         fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
568                 }
569         };
570         ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
571                 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
572
573                 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
574                         is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
575                 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
576                         is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
577                 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
578                         is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
579                 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
580                         is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
581
582                 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
583                         type Output = Self;
584                         fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
585                 }
586                 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
587                         fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
588                 }
589                 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
590                         type Output = Self;
591                         fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
592                 }
593                 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
594                         fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
595                 }
596                 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
597                         fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
598                 }
599                 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
600                         fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
601                 }
602         };
603 }
604
605 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
606 /// to choose.
607 mod state_flags {
608         pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
609         pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
610         pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
611         pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
612         pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
613         pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
614         pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
615         pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
616         pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
617         pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
618         pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
619         pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
620         pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
621         pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
622 }
623
624 define_state_flags!(
625         "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
626         FundedStateFlags, [
627                 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
628                         until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
629                         is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
630                 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
631                         somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
632                         complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
633                         is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
634                 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
635                         any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
636                         message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
637                         is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
638                 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
639                         the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
640                         is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
641         ]
642 );
643
644 define_state_flags!(
645         "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
646         NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
647                 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
648                         OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
649                 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
650                         THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
651         ]
652 );
653
654 define_state_flags!(
655         "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
656         FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
657                 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
658                         `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
659                         THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
660                         is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
661                 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
662                         `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
663                         OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
664                         is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
665                 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
666                         is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
667                         their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
668                         is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
669         ]
670 );
671
672 define_state_flags!(
673         "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
674         FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
675                 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
676                         `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
677                         messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
678                         implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
679                         AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
680                         is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
681         ]
682 );
683
684 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
685 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
686 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
687 enum ChannelState {
688         /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
689         NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
690         /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
691         /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
692         /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
693         FundingNegotiated,
694         /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
695         /// funding transaction to confirm.
696         AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
697         /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
698         /// now operational.
699         ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
700         /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
701         /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
702         ShutdownComplete,
703 }
704
705 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
706         ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
707                 #[allow(unused)]
708                 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
709                         match self {
710                                 $(
711                                         ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
712                                 )*
713                                 _ => false,
714                         }
715                 }
716                 #[allow(unused)]
717                 fn $set(&mut self) {
718                         match self {
719                                 $(
720                                         ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
721                                 )*
722                                 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
723                         }
724                 }
725                 #[allow(unused)]
726                 fn $clear(&mut self) {
727                         match self {
728                                 $(
729                                         ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
730                                 )*
731                                 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
732                         }
733                 }
734         };
735         ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
736                 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
737         };
738         ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
739                 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
740         };
741 }
742
743 impl ChannelState {
744         fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
745                 match state {
746                         state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
747                         state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
748                         val => {
749                                 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
750                                         AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
751                                                 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
752                                 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
753                                         ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
754                                                 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
755                                 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
756                                         Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
757                                 } else {
758                                         Err(())
759                                 }
760                         },
761                 }
762         }
763
764         fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
765                 match self {
766                         ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
767                         ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
768                         ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
769                         ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
770                         ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
771                 }
772         }
773
774         fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
775                 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
776         }
777
778         fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
779                 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
780         }
781
782         fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
783                 match self {
784                         ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
785                         ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
786                         _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
787                 }
788         }
789
790         fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
791                 match self {
792                         ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
793                                 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
794                                         !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
795                                         !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
796                         _ => {
797                                 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
798                                 false
799                         },
800                 }
801         }
802
803         impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
804         impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
805         impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
806         impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
807         impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
808         impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
809         impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
810         impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
811 }
812
813 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
814
815 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
816
817 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
818         const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
819         const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
820         if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
821 }
822
823 #[cfg(not(test))]
824 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
825 #[cfg(test)]
826 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
827
828 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
829
830 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
831 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
832 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
833 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
834 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
835
836 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
837 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
838 /// It's 2^24 - 1.
839 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
840
841 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
842 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
843
844 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
845 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
846 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
847 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
848 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
849 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
850
851 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
852 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
853
854 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
855 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
856 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
857 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
858 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
859 /// standard.
860 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
861 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
862
863 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
864 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
865
866 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
867 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
868 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
869 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
870         Ignore(String),
871         Warn(String),
872         Close(String),
873 }
874
875 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
876         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
877                 match self {
878                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
879                         &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
880                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
881                 }
882         }
883 }
884
885 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
886         fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
887                 match self {
888                         &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
889                         &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
890                         &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
891                 }
892         }
893 }
894
895 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
896         pub logger: &'a L,
897         pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
898         pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
899 }
900
901 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
902         fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
903                 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
904                 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
905                 self.logger.log(record)
906         }
907 }
908
909 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
910 where L::Target: Logger {
911         pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
912         where S::Target: SignerProvider
913         {
914                 WithChannelContext {
915                         logger,
916                         peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
917                         channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
918                 }
919         }
920 }
921
922 macro_rules! secp_check {
923         ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
924                 match $res {
925                         Ok(thing) => thing,
926                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
927                 }
928         };
929 }
930
931 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
932 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
933 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
934 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
935 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
936 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
937 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
938         /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
939         Enabled,
940         /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
941         DisabledStaged(u8),
942         /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
943         EnabledStaged(u8),
944         /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
945         Disabled,
946 }
947
948 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
949 #[derive(PartialEq)]
950 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
951         /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
952         /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
953         NotSent,
954         /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
955         /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
956         MessageSent,
957         /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
958         /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
959         /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
960         /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
961         /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
962         Committed,
963         /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
964         /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
965         PeerReceived,
966 }
967
968 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
969 enum HTLCInitiator {
970         LocalOffered,
971         RemoteOffered,
972 }
973
974 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
975 struct HTLCStats {
976         pending_htlcs: u32,
977         pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
978         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
979         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
980         holding_cell_msat: u64,
981         on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
982 }
983
984 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
985 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
986         tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
987         feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
988         total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
989         num_nondust_htlcs: usize,  // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
990         htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
991         local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
992         remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
993         outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
994         inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
995 }
996
997 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
998 struct HTLCCandidate {
999         amount_msat: u64,
1000         origin: HTLCInitiator,
1001 }
1002
1003 impl HTLCCandidate {
1004         fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1005                 Self {
1006                         amount_msat,
1007                         origin,
1008                 }
1009         }
1010 }
1011
1012 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1013 /// description
1014 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1015         NewClaim {
1016                 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1017                 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1018                 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1019         },
1020         DuplicateClaim {},
1021 }
1022
1023 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1024 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1025         /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1026         /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1027         /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1028         NewClaim {
1029                 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1030                 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1031                 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1032                 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1033         },
1034         /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1035         /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1036         DuplicateClaim {},
1037 }
1038
1039 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1040 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1041         pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1042         pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1043         pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1044         pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1045         pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1046         pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1047         pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1048         pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1049         pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1050 }
1051
1052 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1053 #[allow(unused)]
1054 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1055         pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1056         pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1057         pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1058 }
1059
1060 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1061 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1062         pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1063         pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1064         pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1065         pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1066         pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1067         pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1068 }
1069
1070 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1071 #[must_use]
1072 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1073         pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1074         /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1075         pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1076         /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1077         pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1078         /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1079         /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1080         pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1081         pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1082         pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1083         pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1084         pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1085         pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1086         pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1087 }
1088
1089 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1090 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1091 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1092 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1093 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1094 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1095 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1096 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1097 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1098 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1099 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1100 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1101 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1102 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1103 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1104
1105 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1106 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1107 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1108 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1109
1110 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1111 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1112 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1113 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1114 /// reserve.
1115 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1116 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1117 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1118 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1119 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1120
1121 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1122 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1123 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1124 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1125
1126 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1127 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1128 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1129 ///
1130 ///   * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1131 ///   * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1132 ///      for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1133 ///   * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1134 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1135
1136 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1137 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1138 /// them.
1139 ///
1140 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1141 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1142
1143 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1144 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1145 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1146 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1147
1148 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1149 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1150
1151 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1152         update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1153 }
1154
1155 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1156         (0, update, required),
1157 });
1158
1159 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1160 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1161 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1162         UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1163         UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1164         Funded(Channel<SP>),
1165 }
1166
1167 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1168         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1169         <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1170 {
1171         pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1172                 match self {
1173                         ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1174                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1175                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1176                 }
1177         }
1178
1179         pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1180                 match self {
1181                         ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1182                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1183                         ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1184                 }
1185         }
1186 }
1187
1188 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1189 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1190         /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1191         /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1192         /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1193         ///
1194         /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1195         /// in a timely manner.
1196         unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1197 }
1198
1199 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1200         /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1201         /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1202         ///
1203         /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1204         pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1205                 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1206                 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1207         }
1208 }
1209
1210 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1211 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1212         config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1213
1214         // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1215         // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1216         // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1217         prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1218
1219         inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1220
1221         user_id: u128,
1222
1223         /// The current channel ID.
1224         channel_id: ChannelId,
1225         /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1226         /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1227         temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1228         channel_state: ChannelState,
1229
1230         // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1231         // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1232         // next connect.
1233         // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1234         // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1235         // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1236         // many tests.
1237         #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1238         pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1239         #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1240         announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1241
1242         secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1243         channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1244
1245         latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1246
1247         holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1248         shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1249         destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1250
1251         // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1252         // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1253         // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1254
1255         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1256         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1257         value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1258         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1259         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1260         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1261
1262         /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1263         /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1264         /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1265         /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1266         /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1267         /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1268         /// send it first.
1269         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1270
1271         monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1272         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1273         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1274
1275         // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1276         // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1277         // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1278         // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1279         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1280         monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1281         monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1282
1283         /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1284         /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1285         /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1286         ///
1287         /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1288         /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1289         signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1290         /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1291         /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1292         /// outbound or inbound.
1293         signer_pending_funding: bool,
1294
1295         // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1296         //
1297         // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1298         // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1299         // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1300         // HTLCs with similar state.
1301         pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1302         // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1303         // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1304         // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1305         // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1306         // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1307         holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1308         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1309         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1310         feerate_per_kw: u32,
1311
1312         /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1313         /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1314         /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1315         /// time.
1316         update_time_counter: u32,
1317
1318         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1319         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1320         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1321         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1322         /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1323         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1324
1325         last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1326         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1327
1328         /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1329         /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1330         /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1331         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1332
1333         /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1334         /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1335         #[cfg(test)]
1336         pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1337         #[cfg(not(test))]
1338         closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1339
1340         /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1341         /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1342         /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1343         /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1344         /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1345         ///
1346         /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1347         /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1348         ///
1349         /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1350         /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1351         expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1352
1353         /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1354         funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1355         funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1356         short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1357         /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1358         /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1359         /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1360         channel_creation_height: u32,
1361
1362         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1363
1364         #[cfg(test)]
1365         pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1366         #[cfg(not(test))]
1367         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1368
1369         #[cfg(test)]
1370         pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1371         #[cfg(not(test))]
1372         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1373
1374         #[cfg(test)]
1375         pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1376         #[cfg(not(test))]
1377         holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1378
1379         /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1380         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1381
1382         #[cfg(test)]
1383         pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1384         #[cfg(not(test))]
1385         holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1386
1387         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1388         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1389         #[cfg(test)]
1390         pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1391         #[cfg(not(test))]
1392         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1393         holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1394         minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1395
1396         counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1397
1398         pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1399         funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1400         is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1401
1402         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1403         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1404         counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1405
1406         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1407
1408         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1409
1410         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1411         /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1412         /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1413         /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1414         /// to DoS us.
1415         /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1416         /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1417         closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1418
1419         /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1420         /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1421         announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1422
1423         // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1424         // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1425         // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1426         // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1427         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1428         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1429         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1430         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1431
1432         /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1433         /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1434         /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1435         /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1436         /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1437         ///
1438         /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1439         pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1440
1441         /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1442         /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1443         /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1444         /// unblock the state machine.
1445         ///
1446         /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1447         /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1448         /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1449         ///
1450         /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1451         /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1452         sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1453
1454         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1455         // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1456         // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1457         // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1458         // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1459         // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1460         // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1461         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1462
1463         /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1464         channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1465
1466         // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1467         // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1468         // the channel's funding UTXO.
1469         //
1470         // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1471         // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1472         // associated channel mapping.
1473         //
1474         // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1475         // to store all of them.
1476         latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1477
1478         // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1479         // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1480         // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1481         // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1482         outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1483
1484         // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1485         channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1486
1487         // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1488         channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1489
1490         /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1491         local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1492
1493         /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1494         /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1495         #[cfg(not(test))]
1496         channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1497         #[cfg(test)]
1498         pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1499
1500         /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1501         /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1502         blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1503 }
1504
1505 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider  {
1506         fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1507                 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1508                 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1509                 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1510                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1511                 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1512                 user_id: u128,
1513                 config: &'a UserConfig,
1514                 current_chain_height: u32,
1515                 logger: &'a L,
1516                 is_0conf: bool,
1517                 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1518                 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1519                 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1520                 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1521                 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1522                 msg_push_msat: u64,
1523                 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1524         ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1525                 where
1526                         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1527                         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1528                         L::Target: Logger,
1529                         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1530         {
1531                 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id));
1532                 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1533
1534                 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1535
1536                 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1537                 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1538                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1539
1540                 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1541                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1542                 }
1543
1544                 // Check sanity of message fields:
1545                 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1546                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1547                                 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1548                                 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1549                                 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1550                 }
1551                 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1552                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1553                 }
1554                 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1555                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1556                 }
1557                 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1558                 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1559                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1560                 }
1561                 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1562                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1563                 }
1564                 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1565                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1566                 }
1567                 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1568
1569                 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1570                 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1571                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1572                 }
1573                 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1574                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1575                 }
1576                 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1577                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1578                 }
1579
1580                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1581                 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1582                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1583                 }
1584                 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1585                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1586                 }
1587                 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1588                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1589                 }
1590                 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1591                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1592                 }
1593                 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1594                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1595                 }
1596                 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1597                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1598                 }
1599                 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis >  MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1600                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1601                 }
1602
1603                 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1604
1605                 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1606                         if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1607                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1608                         }
1609                 }
1610
1611                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1612                         // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1613                         // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1614                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1615                 }
1616                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1617                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1618                 }
1619                 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1620                         log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1621                                 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1622                 }
1623                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1624                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1625                 }
1626
1627                 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1628                 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1629                 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1630                         ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1631                 } else {
1632                         0
1633                 };
1634                 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1635                 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1636                 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1637                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1638                 }
1639
1640                 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1641                 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1642                 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1643                 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1644                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1645                 }
1646
1647                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1648                         match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1649                                 &Some(ref script) => {
1650                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1651                                         if script.len() == 0 {
1652                                                 None
1653                                         } else {
1654                                                 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1655                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1656                                                 }
1657                                                 Some(script.clone())
1658                                         }
1659                                 },
1660                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1661                                 &None => {
1662                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1663                                 }
1664                         }
1665                 } else { None };
1666
1667                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1668                         match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1669                                 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1670                                 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1671                         }
1672                 } else { None };
1673
1674                 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1675                         if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1676                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1677                         }
1678                 }
1679
1680                 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1681                         Ok(script) => script,
1682                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1683                 };
1684
1685                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1686                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1687
1688                 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1689                         Some(0)
1690                 } else {
1691                         Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1692                 };
1693
1694                 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1695
1696                 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1697
1698                 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1699                         user_id,
1700
1701                         config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1702                                 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1703                                 announced_channel,
1704                                 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1705                         },
1706
1707                         prev_config: None,
1708
1709                         inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1710
1711                         temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1712                         channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1713                         channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1714                                 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1715                         ),
1716                         announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1717                         secp_ctx,
1718
1719                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1720
1721                         holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1722                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1723                         destination_script,
1724
1725                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1726                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1727                         value_to_self_msat,
1728
1729                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1730                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1731                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1732                         pending_update_fee: None,
1733                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1734                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1735                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1736                         update_time_counter: 1,
1737
1738                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1739
1740                         monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1741                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1742                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1743                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1744                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1745                         monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1746
1747                         signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1748                         signer_pending_funding: false,
1749
1750
1751                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1752                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1753                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1754                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1755
1756                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1757                         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1758                         expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1759                         closing_fee_limits: None,
1760                         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1761
1762                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1763                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1764                         short_channel_id: None,
1765                         channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1766
1767                         feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1768                         channel_value_satoshis,
1769                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1770                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1771                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1772                         holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1773                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1774                         holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1775                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1776                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1777                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1778                         holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1779                         minimum_depth,
1780
1781                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1782
1783                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1784                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1785                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1786                                 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1787                                 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1788                                         selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1789                                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1790                                 }),
1791                                 funding_outpoint: None,
1792                                 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1793                         },
1794                         funding_transaction: None,
1795                         is_batch_funding: None,
1796
1797                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1798                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1799                         counterparty_node_id,
1800
1801                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1802
1803                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1804
1805                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1806                         closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1807
1808                         announcement_sigs: None,
1809
1810                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1811                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1812                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1813                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1814
1815                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1816                         sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1817
1818                         latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1819                         outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1820
1821                         channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1822                         channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1823
1824                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1825                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1826
1827                         channel_type,
1828                         channel_keys_id,
1829
1830                         local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1831
1832                         blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1833                 };
1834
1835                 Ok(channel_context)
1836         }
1837
1838         fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1839                 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1840                 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1841                 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1842                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1843                 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1844                 funding_satoshis: u64,
1845                 push_msat: u64,
1846                 user_id: u128,
1847                 config: &'a UserConfig,
1848                 current_chain_height: u32,
1849                 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1850                 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1851                 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1852                 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1853                 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1854                 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1855         ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1856                 where
1857                         ES::Target: EntropySource,
1858                         F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1859                         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1860         {
1861                 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1862                 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1863
1864                 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1865
1866                 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1867                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1868                 }
1869                 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1870                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1871                 }
1872                 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1873                 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1874                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1875                 }
1876                 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1877                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1878                 }
1879
1880                 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1881                 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1882
1883                 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat)  = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1884                         (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1885                 } else {
1886                         (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1887                 };
1888                 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1889
1890                 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1891                 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1892                 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1893                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1894                 }
1895
1896                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1897                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1898
1899                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1900                         match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1901                                 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1902                                 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1903                         }
1904                 } else { None };
1905
1906                 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1907                         if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1908                                 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1909                         }
1910                 }
1911
1912                 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1913                         Ok(script) => script,
1914                         Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1915                 };
1916
1917                 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1918
1919                 Ok(Self {
1920                         user_id,
1921
1922                         config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1923                                 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1924                                 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1925                                 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1926                         },
1927
1928                         prev_config: None,
1929
1930                         inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1931
1932                         channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1933                         temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1934                         channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1935                         announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1936                         secp_ctx,
1937                         // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1938                         channel_value_satoshis,
1939
1940                         latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1941
1942                         holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1943                         shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1944                         destination_script,
1945
1946                         cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1947                         cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1948                         value_to_self_msat,
1949
1950                         pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1951                         pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1952                         holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1953                         pending_update_fee: None,
1954                         holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1955                         next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1956                         next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1957                         update_time_counter: 1,
1958
1959                         resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1960
1961                         monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1962                         monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1963                         monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1964                         monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1965                         monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1966                         monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1967
1968                         signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1969                         signer_pending_funding: false,
1970
1971                         // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
1972                         // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1973                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1974                         holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1975                         #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1976                         counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1977
1978                         last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1979                         pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1980                         expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1981                         closing_fee_limits: None,
1982                         target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1983
1984                         funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1985                         funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1986                         short_channel_id: None,
1987                         channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1988
1989                         feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
1990                         counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1991                         holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1992                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1993                         // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
1994                         // receive `accept_channel2`.
1995                         holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1996                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1997                         holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1998                         counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1999                         holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2000                         counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
2001                         holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2002                         minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2003
2004                         counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2005
2006                         channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2007                                 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2008                                 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2009                                 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2010                                 counterparty_parameters: None,
2011                                 funding_outpoint: None,
2012                                 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
2013                         },
2014                         funding_transaction: None,
2015                         is_batch_funding: None,
2016
2017                         counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
2018                         counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2019                         counterparty_node_id,
2020
2021                         counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2022
2023                         commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2024
2025                         channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2026                         closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2027
2028                         announcement_sigs: None,
2029
2030                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2031                         next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2032                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2033                         next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2034
2035                         workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2036                         sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2037
2038                         latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2039                         outbound_scid_alias,
2040
2041                         channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2042                         channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2043
2044                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2045                         historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
2046
2047                         channel_type,
2048                         channel_keys_id,
2049
2050                         blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2051                         local_initiated_shutdown: None,
2052                 })
2053         }
2054
2055         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2056         pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2057                 self.update_time_counter
2058         }
2059
2060         pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2061                 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2062         }
2063
2064         pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2065                 self.config.announced_channel
2066         }
2067
2068         pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2069                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2070         }
2071
2072         /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2073         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2074         pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2075                 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2076         }
2077
2078         /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2079         pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2080                 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2081         }
2082
2083         /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2084         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2085         pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2086                 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2087                         !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2088                         !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2089                         !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2090         }
2091
2092         /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2093         pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2094                 match self.channel_state {
2095                         ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2096                                 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2097                                         ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2098                                 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2099                                         ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2100                                 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2101                                         ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2102                                 } else {
2103                                         ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2104                                 },
2105                         ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2106                         _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2107                 }
2108         }
2109
2110         fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2111                 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2112                         ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2113                                 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2114                         ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2115                                 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2116                         _ => false,
2117                 };
2118                 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2119                         self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2120                         self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2121                         is_ready_to_close
2122         }
2123
2124         /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2125         /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2126         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2127         pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2128                 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2129         }
2130
2131         // Public utilities:
2132
2133         pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2134                 self.channel_id
2135         }
2136
2137         // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2138         //
2139         // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2140         pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2141                 self.temporary_channel_id
2142         }
2143
2144         pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2145                 self.minimum_depth
2146         }
2147
2148         /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2149         /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2150         pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2151                 self.user_id
2152         }
2153
2154         /// Gets the channel's type
2155         pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2156                 &self.channel_type
2157         }
2158
2159         /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2160         ///
2161         /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2162         pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2163                 self.short_channel_id
2164         }
2165
2166         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2167         pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2168                 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2169         }
2170
2171         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2172         pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2173                 self.outbound_scid_alias
2174         }
2175
2176         /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2177         #[cfg(test)]
2178         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2179                 return &self.holder_signer
2180         }
2181
2182         /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2183         /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2184         /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2185         pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2186                 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2187                 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2188         }
2189
2190         /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2191         /// get_funding_created.
2192         pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2193                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2194         }
2195
2196         /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2197         pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2198                 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2199                 if conf_height > 0 {
2200                         Some(conf_height)
2201                 } else {
2202                         None
2203                 }
2204         }
2205
2206         /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2207         pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2208                 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2209         }
2210
2211         /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2212         pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2213                 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2214                         // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2215                         return 0;
2216                 }
2217
2218                 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2219         }
2220
2221         fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2222                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2223         }
2224
2225         fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2226                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2227         }
2228
2229         pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2230                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2231                         .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2232         }
2233
2234         fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2235                 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2236         }
2237
2238         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2239         pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2240                 self.counterparty_node_id
2241         }
2242
2243         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2244         pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2245                 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2246         }
2247
2248         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2249         pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2250                 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2251         }
2252
2253         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2254         pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2255                 return cmp::min(
2256                         // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2257                         // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2258                         // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2259                         self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2260
2261                         self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2262                 );
2263         }
2264
2265         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2266         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2267                 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2268         }
2269
2270         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2271         pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2272                 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2273         }
2274
2275         fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2276                 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2277                         let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2278                         cmp::min(
2279                                 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2280                                 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2281                         )
2282                 })
2283         }
2284
2285         pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2286                 self.channel_value_satoshis
2287         }
2288
2289         pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2290                 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2291         }
2292
2293         pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2294                 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2295         }
2296
2297         pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
2298                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
2299         where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2300         {
2301                 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2302                         MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2303                                 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
2304                                         ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
2305                                 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
2306                         },
2307                         MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2308                 }
2309         }
2310
2311         /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2312         pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2313                 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2314         }
2315
2316         // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2317         pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2318                 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2319         }
2320
2321         // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2322         pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2323                 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2324         }
2325
2326         // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2327         pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2328                 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2329         }
2330
2331         // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2332         pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2333                 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2334         }
2335
2336         // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2337         pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2338                 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2339         }
2340
2341         /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2342         /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2343         /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2344         pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2345                 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2346                         return;
2347                 }
2348                 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2349                 prev_config.1 += 1;
2350                 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2351                         self.prev_config = None;
2352                 }
2353         }
2354
2355         /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2356         pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2357                 self.config.options
2358         }
2359
2360         /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2361         /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2362         pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2363                 let did_channel_update =
2364                         self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2365                         self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2366                         self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2367                 if did_channel_update {
2368                         self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2369                         // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2370                         // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2371                         self.update_time_counter += 1;
2372                 }
2373                 self.config.options = *config;
2374                 did_channel_update
2375         }
2376
2377         /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2378         /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2379         pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2380                 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2381                         !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2382         }
2383
2384         /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2385         /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2386         /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2387         /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2388         /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2389         /// an HTLC to a).
2390         /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2391         /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2392         /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2393         /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2394         /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2395         /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2396         /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2397         #[inline]
2398         fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2399                 where L::Target: Logger
2400         {
2401                 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2402                 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2403                 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2404
2405                 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2406                 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2407                 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2408                 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2409
2410                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2411                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2412                         if match update_state {
2413                                 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2414                                 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2415                                 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2416                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2417                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound());  generated_by_local },
2418                         } {
2419                                 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2420                         }
2421                 }
2422
2423                 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2424                         commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2425                         get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2426                         &self.channel_id,
2427                         if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2428
2429                 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2430                         ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2431                                 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2432                                         offered: $offered,
2433                                         amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2434                                         cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2435                                         payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2436                                         transaction_output_index: None
2437                                 }
2438                         }
2439                 }
2440
2441                 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2442                         ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2443                                 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2444                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2445                                         let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2446                                                 0
2447                                         } else {
2448                                                 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2449                                         };
2450                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2451                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2452                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2453                                         } else {
2454                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2455                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2456                                         }
2457                                 } else {
2458                                         let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2459                                         let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2460                                                 0
2461                                         } else {
2462                                                 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2463                                         };
2464                                         if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2465                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2466                                                 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2467                                         } else {
2468                                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2469                                                 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2470                                         }
2471                                 }
2472                         }
2473                 }
2474
2475                 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2476
2477                 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2478                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2479                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2480                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2481                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2482                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2483                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2484                         };
2485
2486                         if include {
2487                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2488                                 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2489                         } else {
2490                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2491                                 match &htlc.state {
2492                                         &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2493                                                 if generated_by_local {
2494                                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2495                                                                 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2496                                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2497                                                         }
2498                                                 }
2499                                         },
2500                                         _ => {},
2501                                 }
2502                         }
2503                 }
2504
2505
2506                 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2507
2508                 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2509                         let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2510                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2511                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2512                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2513                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2514                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2515                         };
2516
2517                         let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2518                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2519                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2520                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2521                                 _ => None,
2522                         };
2523
2524                         if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2525                                 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2526                         }
2527
2528                         if include {
2529                                 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2530                                 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2531                         } else {
2532                                 log_trace!(logger, "   ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2533                                 match htlc.state {
2534                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2535                                                 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2536                                         },
2537                                         OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2538                                                 if !generated_by_local {
2539                                                         value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2540                                                 }
2541                                         },
2542                                         _ => {},
2543                                 }
2544                         }
2545                 }
2546
2547                 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2548                 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2549                 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2550                 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2551                 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2552                 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2553                 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2554                 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2555
2556                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2557                 {
2558                         // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2559                         // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2560                         let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2561                                 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2562                         } else {
2563                                 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2564                         };
2565                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2566                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2567                         debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2568                         broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2569                 }
2570
2571                 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2572                 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2573                 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2574                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2575                 } else {
2576                         (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2577                 };
2578
2579                 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2580                 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2581                 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2582                         (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2583                 } else {
2584                         (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2585                 };
2586
2587                 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2588                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2589                 } else {
2590                         value_to_a = 0;
2591                 }
2592
2593                 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2594                         log_trace!(logger, "   ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2595                 } else {
2596                         value_to_b = 0;
2597                 }
2598
2599                 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2600
2601                 let channel_parameters =
2602                         if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2603                         else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2604                 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2605                                                                              value_to_a as u64,
2606                                                                              value_to_b as u64,
2607                                                                              funding_pubkey_a,
2608                                                                              funding_pubkey_b,
2609                                                                              keys.clone(),
2610                                                                              feerate_per_kw,
2611                                                                              &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2612                                                                              &channel_parameters
2613                 );
2614                 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2615                 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2616                 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2617                 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2618
2619                 CommitmentStats {
2620                         tx,
2621                         feerate_per_kw,
2622                         total_fee_sat,
2623                         num_nondust_htlcs,
2624                         htlcs_included,
2625                         local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2626                         remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2627                         inbound_htlc_preimages,
2628                         outbound_htlc_preimages,
2629                 }
2630         }
2631
2632         #[inline]
2633         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2634         /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2635         /// our counterparty!)
2636         /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2637         /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2638         fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2639                 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2640                 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2641                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2642                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2643
2644                 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2645         }
2646
2647         #[inline]
2648         /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2649         /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2650         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2651         fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2652                 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2653                 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2654                 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2655
2656                 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2657         }
2658
2659         /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2660         /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2661         /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2662         pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2663                 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2664         }
2665
2666         fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2667                 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2668         }
2669
2670         pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2671                 self.feerate_per_kw
2672         }
2673
2674         pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2675                 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2676                 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2677                 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2678                 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2679                 // which are near the dust limit.
2680                 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2681                 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2682                 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2683                 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2684                         feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2685                 }
2686                 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2687                         feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2688                 }
2689                 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2690                 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2691         }
2692
2693         /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2694         pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2695                 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2696         }
2697
2698         /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2699         fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2700                 let context = self;
2701                 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2702                         pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2703                         pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2704                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2705                         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2706                         holding_cell_msat: 0,
2707                         on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2708                 };
2709
2710                 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2711                         (0, 0)
2712                 } else {
2713                         let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2714                         (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2715                                 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2716                 };
2717                 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2718                 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2719                 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2720                         stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2721                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2722                                 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2723                         }
2724                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2725                                 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2726                         }
2727                 }
2728                 stats
2729         }
2730
2731         /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2732         fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2733                 let context = self;
2734                 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2735                         pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2736                         pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2737                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2738                         on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2739                         holding_cell_msat: 0,
2740                         on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2741                 };
2742
2743                 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2744                         (0, 0)
2745                 } else {
2746                         let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2747                         (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2748                                 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2749                 };
2750                 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2751                 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2752                 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2753                         stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2754                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2755                                 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2756                         }
2757                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2758                                 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2759                         }
2760                 }
2761
2762                 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2763                         if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2764                                 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2765                                 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2766                                 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2767                                 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2768                                         stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2769                                 }
2770                                 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2771                                         stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2772                                 } else {
2773                                         stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2774                                 }
2775                         }
2776                 }
2777                 stats
2778         }
2779
2780         /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2781         pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2782                 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2783                 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2784                         match holding_cell_update {
2785                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2786                                         holding_cell_states.insert(
2787                                                 htlc_id,
2788                                                 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2789                                         );
2790                                 },
2791                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2792                                         holding_cell_states.insert(
2793                                                 htlc_id,
2794                                                 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2795                                         );
2796                                 },
2797                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2798                                         holding_cell_states.insert(
2799                                                 htlc_id,
2800                                                 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2801                                         );
2802                                 },
2803                                 // Outbound HTLC.
2804                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2805                         }
2806                 }
2807                 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2808                 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2809                         0
2810                 } else {
2811                         let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2812                         dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2813                 };
2814                 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2815                 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2816                         if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2817                                 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2818                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2819                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2820                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2821                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2822                                         state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2823                                         is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2824                                 });
2825                         }
2826                 }
2827                 inbound_details
2828         }
2829
2830         /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2831         pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2832                 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2833                 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2834                         0
2835                 } else {
2836                         let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2837                         dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2838                 };
2839                 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2840                 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2841                         outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2842                                 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2843                                 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2844                                 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2845                                 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2846                                 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2847                                 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2848                                 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2849                         });
2850                 }
2851                 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2852                         if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2853                                 amount_msat,
2854                                 cltv_expiry,
2855                                 payment_hash,
2856                                 skimmed_fee_msat,
2857                                 ..
2858                         } = *holding_cell_update {
2859                                 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2860                                         htlc_id: None,
2861                                         amount_msat: amount_msat,
2862                                         cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2863                                         payment_hash: payment_hash,
2864                                         skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2865                                         state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2866                                         is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2867                                 });
2868                         }
2869                 }
2870                 outbound_details
2871         }
2872
2873         /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2874         /// Doesn't bother handling the
2875         /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2876         /// corner case properly.
2877         pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2878         -> AvailableBalances
2879         where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2880         {
2881                 let context = &self;
2882                 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2883                 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2884                 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2885
2886                 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2887                 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2888                         if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2889                                 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2890                         }
2891                 }
2892                 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2893
2894                 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2895                                 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2896                                 .saturating_sub(
2897                                         context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2898
2899                 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2900
2901                 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2902                         ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2903                 } else {
2904                         0
2905                 };
2906                 if context.is_outbound() {
2907                         // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2908                         // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2909                         //
2910                         // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2911                         // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself â€” making it a circular
2912                         // dependency.
2913                         // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2914                         let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2915                         if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2916                                 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2917                         }
2918
2919                         let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2920                         let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2921                         let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2922                         let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2923                         if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2924                                 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2925                                 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2926                         }
2927
2928                         // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2929                         // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2930                         // match the value to right-below-dust.
2931                         let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2932                                 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2933                         if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2934                                 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2935                                 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2936                                 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2937                                 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2938                                 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2939                         } else {
2940                                 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2941                         }
2942                 } else {
2943                         // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2944                         // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2945                         let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2946                         if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2947                                 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2948                         }
2949
2950                         let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2951                         let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2952
2953                         let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2954                         let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2955                                 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2956
2957                         if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2958                                 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2959                                 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2960                                 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2961                         }
2962                 }
2963
2964                 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2965
2966                 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2967                 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2968                 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2969                 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2970                 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2971                 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2972                 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2973
2974                 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2975                         (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2976                 } else {
2977                         let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2978                         (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2979                          context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis       + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2980                 };
2981                 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2982                 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2983                         remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2984                                 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2985                         dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2986                 }
2987
2988                 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2989                 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2990                         remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2991                                 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2992                                 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2993                         dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2994                 }
2995
2996                 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2997                         if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2998                                 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2999                         } else {
3000                                 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3001                         }
3002                 }
3003
3004                 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3005                         context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
3006
3007                 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3008                         available_capacity_msat = 0;
3009                 }
3010
3011                 AvailableBalances {
3012                         inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3013                                         - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3014                                         - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3015                                         - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3016                                 0) as u64,
3017                         outbound_capacity_msat,
3018                         next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3019                         next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3020                         balance_msat,
3021                 }
3022         }
3023
3024         pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3025                 let context = &self;
3026                 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3027         }
3028
3029         /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3030         /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3031         ///
3032         /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3033         /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3034         ///
3035         /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3036         /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3037         ///
3038         /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3039         fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3040                 let context = &self;
3041                 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3042
3043                 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3044                         (0, 0)
3045                 } else {
3046                         (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3047                                 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3048                 };
3049                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3050                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3051
3052                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3053                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3054                 match htlc.origin {
3055                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3056                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3057                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
3058                                 }
3059                         },
3060                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3061                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3062                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
3063                                 }
3064                         }
3065                 }
3066
3067                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3068                 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3069                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3070                                 continue
3071                         }
3072                         // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3073                         // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3074                         included_htlcs += 1;
3075                 }
3076
3077                 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3078                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3079                                 continue
3080                         }
3081                         match htlc.state {
3082                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3083                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3084                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3085                                 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3086                                 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3087                                 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3088                                 _ => {},
3089                         }
3090                 }
3091
3092                 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3093                         match htlc {
3094                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3095                                         if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3096                                                 continue
3097                                         }
3098                                         included_htlcs += 1
3099                                 },
3100                                 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3101                                          // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3102                         }
3103                 }
3104
3105                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3106                 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3107                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3108                 {
3109                         let mut fee = res;
3110                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3111                                 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3112                         }
3113                         let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3114                                 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3115                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3116                                 fee,
3117                                 total_pending_htlcs,
3118                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3119                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3120                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3121                                 },
3122                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3123                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3124                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3125                                 },
3126                                 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3127                         };
3128                         *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3129                 }
3130                 res
3131         }
3132
3133         /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3134         /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3135         ///
3136         /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3137         /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3138         ///
3139         /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3140         /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3141         ///
3142         /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3143         fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3144                 let context = &self;
3145                 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3146
3147                 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3148                         (0, 0)
3149                 } else {
3150                         (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3151                                 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3152                 };
3153                 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3154                 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3155
3156                 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3157                 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3158                 match htlc.origin {
3159                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3160                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3161                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
3162                                 }
3163                         },
3164                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3165                                 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3166                                         addl_htlcs += 1;
3167                                 }
3168                         }
3169                 }
3170
3171                 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3172                 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3173                 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3174                 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3175                 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3176                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3177                                 continue
3178                         }
3179                         included_htlcs += 1;
3180                 }
3181
3182                 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3183                         if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3184                                 continue
3185                         }
3186                         // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3187                         // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3188                         match htlc.state {
3189                                 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3190                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3191                                 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3192                                 _ => {},
3193                         }
3194                 }
3195
3196                 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3197                 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3198                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3199                 {
3200                         let mut fee = res;
3201                         if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3202                                 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3203                         }
3204                         let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3205                         let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3206                                 fee,
3207                                 total_pending_htlcs,
3208                                 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3209                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3210                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3211                                 },
3212                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3213                                         HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3214                                         HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3215                                 },
3216                                 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3217                         };
3218                         *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3219                 }
3220                 res
3221         }
3222
3223         fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3224                 match self.channel_state {
3225                         ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3226                         ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3227                                 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3228                                         flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3229                                 {
3230                                         f()
3231                                 } else {
3232                                         None
3233                                 },
3234                         _ => None,
3235                 }
3236         }
3237
3238         /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3239         /// broadcast.
3240         pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3241                 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3242         }
3243
3244         /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3245         /// broadcast.
3246         pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3247                 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3248                         self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3249                 )
3250         }
3251
3252         /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3253         pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3254                 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3255         }
3256
3257         /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3258         /// broadcast.
3259         pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3260                 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3261         }
3262
3263         /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3264         /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3265         /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3266         /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3267         /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3268         pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3269                 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3270                 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3271                 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3272                 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3273                 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3274
3275                 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3276                 // return them to fail the payment.
3277                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3278                 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3279                 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3280                         match htlc_update {
3281                                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3282                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3283                                 },
3284                                 _ => {}
3285                         }
3286                 }
3287                 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3288                         // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3289                         // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3290                         // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3291                         // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3292                         // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3293                         // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3294                         // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3295                         if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3296                                 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3297                                 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3298                                         update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3299                                         counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3300                                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3301                                         channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3302                                 }))
3303                         } else { None }
3304                 } else { None };
3305                 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3306                 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3307
3308                 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3309                 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3310                 ShutdownResult {
3311                         closure_reason,
3312                         monitor_update,
3313                         dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3314                         unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3315                         channel_id: self.channel_id,
3316                         user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3317                         channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3318                         counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3319                         unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3320                         channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3321                 }
3322         }
3323
3324         /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3325         fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3326                 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3327                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3328
3329                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3330                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3331                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3332                         &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3333
3334                 match &self.holder_signer {
3335                         // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3336                         ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3337                                 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3338                                         .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3339                                                 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3340                                                 signature,
3341                                                 #[cfg(taproot)]
3342                                                 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3343                                         })
3344                                         .ok();
3345
3346                                 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3347                                         #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3348                                                 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3349                                         }
3350                                         #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3351                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3352                                                 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3353                                         }
3354                                 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3355                                         log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3356                                         self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3357                                 }
3358
3359                                 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3360                                 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3361                         },
3362                         // TODO (taproot|arik)
3363                         #[cfg(taproot)]
3364                         _ => todo!()
3365                 }
3366         }
3367
3368         /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3369         /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3370         /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3371         pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3372                 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3373         ) -> Result<(), ()>
3374         where
3375                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3376         {
3377                 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3378                         !matches!(
3379                                 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3380                                 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3381                         )
3382                 {
3383                         return Err(());
3384                 }
3385                 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3386                         // We've exhausted our options
3387                         return Err(());
3388                 }
3389                 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3390                 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3391                 // accepted one.
3392                 //
3393                 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3394                 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3395                 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3396                 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3397                 // whatever reason.
3398                 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3399                         self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3400                         self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3401                         assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3402                 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3403                         self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3404                 } else {
3405                         self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3406                 }
3407                 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3408                 Ok(())
3409         }
3410 }
3411
3412 // Internal utility functions for channels
3413
3414 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3415 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3416 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3417 ///
3418 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3419 ///
3420 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3421 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3422         let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3423                 1
3424         } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3425                 100
3426         } else {
3427                 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3428         };
3429         channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3430 }
3431
3432 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3433 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3434 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3435 ///
3436 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3437 ///
3438 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3439 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3440 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3441         let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3442         cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3443 }
3444
3445 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3446 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3447 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3448 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3449 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3450         let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3451         cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3452 }
3453
3454 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3455 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3456 ///
3457 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3458 ///
3459 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3460 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3461 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3462 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3463         // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3464         let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3465         cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3466 }
3467
3468 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3469 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3470 #[inline]
3471 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3472         feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3473 }
3474
3475 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3476 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3477 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3478         // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3479         // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3480         (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3481 }
3482
3483 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3484 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3485 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3486         /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3487         pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3488         /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3489         pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3490         /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3491         /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3492         pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3493         /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3494         pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3495 }
3496
3497 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3498 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3499 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3500         pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3501         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
3502         pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3503 }
3504
3505 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3506 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3507         fee: u64,
3508         total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3509         next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3510         next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3511         feerate: u32,
3512 }
3513
3514 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3515 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3516 trait FailHTLCContents {
3517         type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3518         fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3519         fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3520         fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3521 }
3522 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3523         type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3524         fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3525                 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3526         }
3527         fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3528                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3529         }
3530         fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3531                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3532         }
3533 }
3534 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3535         type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3536         fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3537                 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3538                         htlc_id,
3539                         channel_id,
3540                         sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3541                         failure_code: self.1
3542                 }
3543         }
3544         fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3545                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3546         }
3547         fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3548                 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3549                         htlc_id,
3550                         sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3551                         failure_code: self.1
3552                 }
3553         }
3554 }
3555
3556 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3557         fn name() -> &'static str;
3558 }
3559 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3560         fn name() -> &'static str {
3561                 "update_fail_htlc"
3562         }
3563 }
3564 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3565         fn name() -> &'static str {
3566                 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3567         }
3568 }
3569
3570 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3571         SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3572         <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
3573 {
3574         fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3575                 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3576                 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3577         ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3578         {
3579                 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3580                         ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3581                 } else {
3582                         ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3583                 };
3584                 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3585                 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3586                         if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3587                                 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3588                                         log_warn!(logger,
3589                                                 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3590                                                 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3591                                         return Ok(());
3592                                 }
3593                         }
3594                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3595                 }
3596                 Ok(())
3597         }
3598
3599         #[inline]
3600         fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3601                 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3602                 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3603                 // outside of those situations will fail.
3604                 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3605         }
3606
3607         #[inline]
3608         fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3609                 let mut ret =
3610                 (4 +                                                   // version
3611                  1 +                                                   // input count
3612                  36 +                                                  // prevout
3613                  1 +                                                   // script length (0)
3614                  4 +                                                   // sequence
3615                  1 +                                                   // output count
3616                  4                                                     // lock time
3617                  )*4 +                                                 // * 4 for non-witness parts
3618                 2 +                                                    // witness marker and flag
3619                 1 +                                                    // witness element count
3620                 4 +                                                    // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3621                 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3622                 2*(1 + 71);                                            // two signatures + sighash type flags
3623                 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3624                         ret += ((8+1) +                                    // output values and script length
3625                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                         // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3626                 }
3627                 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3628                         ret += ((8+1) +                                    // output values and script length
3629                                 spk.len() as u64) * 4;                         // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3630                 }
3631                 ret
3632         }
3633
3634         #[inline]
3635         fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3636                 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3637                 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3638                 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3639
3640                 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3641                 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3642                 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3643
3644                 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3645                         assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3646                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3647                 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3648                         assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3649                         total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3650                 }
3651
3652                 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3653                         value_to_counterparty = 0;
3654                 }
3655
3656                 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3657                         value_to_holder = 0;
3658                 }
3659
3660                 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3661                 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3662                 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3663                 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3664
3665                 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3666                 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3667         }
3668
3669         fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3670                 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3671         }
3672
3673         /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3674         /// entirely.
3675         ///
3676         /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3677         /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3678         ///
3679         /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3680         /// disconnected).
3681         pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3682                 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3683         where L::Target: Logger {
3684                 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3685                 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3686                 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3687                 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3688                 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3689                 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3690                 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3691                         assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3692                 }
3693         }
3694
3695         fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3696                 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3697                 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3698                 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3699                 // either.
3700                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3701                         panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3702                 }
3703
3704                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3705                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3706                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3707
3708                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3709                 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3710                 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3711                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3712                                 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3713                                 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3714                                         htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3715                                 match htlc.state {
3716                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3717                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3718                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3719                                                 } else {
3720                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3721                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3722                                                 }
3723                                                 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3724                                         },
3725                                         _ => {
3726                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3727                                                 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3728                                         }
3729                                 }
3730                                 pending_idx = idx;
3731                                 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3732                                 break;
3733                         }
3734                 }
3735                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3736                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3737                         // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3738                         // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3739                         debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3740                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3741                 }
3742
3743                 // Now update local state:
3744                 //
3745                 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3746                 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3747                 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3748                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3749                         update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3750                         counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3751                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3752                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3753                         }],
3754                         channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3755                 };
3756
3757                 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3758                         // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3759                         // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3760                         // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3761                         // do not not get into this branch.
3762                         for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3763                                 match pending_update {
3764                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3765                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3766                                                         // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3767                                                         self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3768                                                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3769                                                         debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3770                                                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3771                                                 }
3772                                         },
3773                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3774                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3775                                         {
3776                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3777                                                         log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3778                                                         // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3779                                                         // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3780                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3781                                                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3782                                                 }
3783                                         },
3784                                         _ => {}
3785                                 }
3786                         }
3787                         log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3788                         self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3789                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3790                         });
3791                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3792                         self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3793                         return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3794                 }
3795                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3796                 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3797
3798                 {
3799                         let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3800                         if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3801                         } else {
3802                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3803                                 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3804                         }
3805                         log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3806                         htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3807                 }
3808
3809                 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3810                         monitor_update,
3811                         htlc_value_msat,
3812                         msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3813                                 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3814                                 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3815                                 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3816                         }),
3817                 }
3818         }
3819
3820         pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3821                 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3822                 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3823                         UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3824                                 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3825                                 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3826                                 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3827                                 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3828                                 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3829                                 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3830                                         let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3831                                         // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3832                                         // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3833                                         self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3834                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3835                                 } else {
3836                                         let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3837                                                 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3838                                         monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3839                                         for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3840                                                 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3841                                         }
3842                                         if msg.is_some() {
3843                                                 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3844                                                 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3845                                                 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3846                                                         update,
3847                                                 });
3848                                         }
3849                                 }
3850
3851                                 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3852                                 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3853                         },
3854                         UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3855                 }
3856         }
3857
3858         /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3859         /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3860         /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3861         /// before we fail backwards.
3862         ///
3863         /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3864         /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3865         /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3866         pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3867         -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3868                 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3869                         .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3870         }
3871
3872         /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3873         /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3874         ///
3875         /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3876         pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3877                 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3878         ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3879                 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3880                         .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3881         }
3882
3883         /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3884         /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3885         /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3886         /// before we fail backwards.
3887         ///
3888         /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3889         /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3890         /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3891         fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3892                 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3893                 logger: &L
3894         ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3895                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3896                         panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3897                 }
3898
3899                 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3900                 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3901                 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3902
3903                 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3904                 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3905                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3906                                 match htlc.state {
3907                                         InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3908                                         InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3909                                                 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3910                                                 } else {
3911                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3912                                                 }
3913                                                 return Ok(None);
3914                                         },
3915                                         _ => {
3916                                                 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3917                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3918                                         }
3919                                 }
3920                                 pending_idx = idx;
3921                         }
3922                 }
3923                 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3924                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3925                         // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3926                         // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3927                         debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3928                         return Ok(None);
3929                 }
3930
3931                 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3932                         debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3933                         force_holding_cell = true;
3934                 }
3935
3936                 // Now update local state:
3937                 if force_holding_cell {
3938                         for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3939                                 match pending_update {
3940                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3941                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3942                                                         #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3943                                                         debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3944                                                         return Ok(None);
3945                                                 }
3946                                         },
3947                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3948                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3949                                         {
3950                                                 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3951                                                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3952                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3953                                                 }
3954                                         },
3955                                         _ => {}
3956                                 }
3957                         }
3958                         log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3959                         self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3960                         return Ok(None);
3961                 }
3962
3963                 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3964                         E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3965                 {
3966                         let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3967                         htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3968                 }
3969
3970                 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3971         }
3972
3973         // Message handlers:
3974         /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3975         /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3976         /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3977         /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3978         pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3979                 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3980                 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3981         }
3982
3983         /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3984         ///
3985         /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3986         ///
3987         /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3988         /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3989         pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3990                 debug_assert!(matches!(
3991                         self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3992                 ));
3993                 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3994                 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3995         }
3996
3997         /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3998         /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3999         /// reply with.
4000         pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4001                 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4002                 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4003         ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4004         where
4005                 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4006                 L::Target: Logger
4007         {
4008                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4009                         self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4010                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4011                 }
4012
4013                 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4014                         if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4015                                 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4016                                 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4017                                 // when routing outbound payments.
4018                                 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4019                         }
4020                 }
4021
4022                 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4023                 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4024                 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4025                 match &self.context.channel_state {
4026                         ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4027                                 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4028                                 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4029                                 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4030                                         // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4031                                         check_reconnection = true;
4032                                 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4033                                         self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4034                                 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4035                                         self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4036                                         self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4037                                 } else {
4038                                         // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4039                                         debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4040                                 }
4041                         }
4042                         // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4043                         ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4044                         _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4045                 }
4046                 if check_reconnection {
4047                         // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4048                         // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4049                         let expected_point =
4050                                 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4051                                         // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4052                                         // the current one.
4053                                         self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4054                                 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4055                                         // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4056                                         // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4057                                         debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4058                                         self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4059                                 } else {
4060                                         // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4061                                         // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4062                                         Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4063                                                         &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4064                                                 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4065                                 };
4066                         if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4067                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4068                         }
4069                         return Ok(None);
4070                 }
4071
4072                 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4073                 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4074
4075                 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4076
4077                 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
4078         }
4079
4080         pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
4081                 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4082                 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
4083         ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4084         where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
4085                 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4086         {
4087                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4088                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4089                 }
4090                 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
4091                 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4092                         pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
4093                 }
4094                 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4095                 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4096                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4097                 }
4098                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4099                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4100                 }
4101                 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4102                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4103                 }
4104                 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4105                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4106                 }
4107                 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4108                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4109                 }
4110
4111                 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4112                 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4113                 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
4114                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4115                 }
4116                 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4117                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4118                 }
4119
4120                 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4121                 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4122                 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4123                 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4124                 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4125                 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4126                 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4127                 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4128                 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4129                 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4130                 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4131                 // transaction).
4132                 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4133                 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4134                         if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4135                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4136                         } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4137                                 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4138                         }
4139                 }
4140
4141                 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4142                 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4143                         (0, 0)
4144                 } else {
4145                         let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
4146                         (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
4147                                 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
4148                 };
4149                 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
4150                 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
4151                         let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
4152                         if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4153                                 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
4154                                         on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
4155                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
4156                         }
4157                 }
4158
4159                 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
4160                 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
4161                         let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
4162                         if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4163                                 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
4164                                         on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
4165                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
4166                         }
4167                 }
4168
4169                 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4170                         self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4171                 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4172                         self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4173                 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4174                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4175                 }
4176
4177                 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4178                 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4179                 {
4180                         let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4181                                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4182                                 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4183                         };
4184                         let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4185                                 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4186                         } else {
4187                                 0
4188                         };
4189                         if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4190                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4191                         };
4192                         if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4193                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4194                         }
4195                 }
4196
4197                 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4198                         ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4199                 } else {
4200                         0
4201                 };
4202                 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4203                         // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
4204                         // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
4205                         // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
4206                         // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
4207                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4208                         let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
4209                         if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4210                                 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
4211                         }
4212                         if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
4213                                 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
4214                                 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
4215                                 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
4216                                 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
4217                         }
4218                 } else {
4219                         // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4220                         let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4221                         let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4222                         if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4223                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4224                         }
4225                 }
4226                 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4227                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4228                 }
4229                 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4230                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4231                 }
4232
4233                 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4234                         if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4235                                 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4236                         }
4237                 }
4238
4239                 // Now update local state:
4240                 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4241                 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4242                         htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4243                         amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4244                         payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4245                         cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4246                         state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
4247                 });
4248                 Ok(())
4249         }
4250
4251         /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4252         #[inline]
4253         fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4254                 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4255                 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4256                         if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4257                                 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4258                                         None => fail_reason.into(),
4259                                         Some(payment_preimage) => {
4260                                                 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4261                                                 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4262                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4263                                                 }
4264                                                 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4265                                         }
4266                                 };
4267                                 match htlc.state {
4268                                         OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4269                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4270                                         OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4271                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4272                                         },
4273                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4274                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4275                                 }
4276                                 return Ok(htlc);
4277                         }
4278                 }
4279                 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4280         }
4281
4282         pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4283                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4284                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4285                 }
4286                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4287                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4288                 }
4289
4290                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4291         }
4292
4293         pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4294                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4295                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4296                 }
4297                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4298                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4299                 }
4300
4301                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4302                 Ok(())
4303         }
4304
4305         pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4306                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4307                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4308                 }
4309                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4310                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4311                 }
4312
4313                 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4314                 Ok(())
4315         }
4316
4317         pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4318                 where L::Target: Logger
4319         {
4320                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4321                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4322                 }
4323                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4324                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4325                 }
4326                 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4327                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4328                 }
4329
4330                 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4331
4332                 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4333
4334                 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4335                 let commitment_txid = {
4336                         let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4337                         let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4338                         let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4339
4340                         log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4341                                 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4342                                 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4343                                 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4344                         if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4345                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4346                         }
4347                         bitcoin_tx.txid
4348                 };
4349                 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4350
4351                 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4352                 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4353                 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4354                         update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4355                 } else { false };
4356                 if update_fee {
4357                         debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4358                         let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4359                         if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4360                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4361                         }
4362                 }
4363                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4364                 {
4365                         if self.context.is_outbound() {
4366                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4367                                 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4368                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4369                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4370                                                 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4371                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4372                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4373                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4374                                                 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4375                                                         assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4376                                                 }
4377                                 }
4378                         }
4379                 }
4380
4381                 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4382                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4383                 }
4384
4385                 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4386                 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4387                 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4388                 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4389                 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4390                 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4391                 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4392                 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4393                 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4394                         use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4395                         // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4396                         let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4397                         separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4398                 }
4399
4400                 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4401                 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4402                 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4403                         if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4404                                 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4405                                         self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4406                                         &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4407
4408                                 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4409                                 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4410                                 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4411                                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4412                                         log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4413                                         encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4414                                 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4415                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4416                                 }
4417                                 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4418                                         htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4419                                 }
4420                         } else {
4421                                 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4422                         }
4423                         if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4424                                 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4425                                         nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4426                                 }
4427                         }
4428                         debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4429                 }
4430
4431                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4432                         commitment_stats.tx,
4433                         msg.signature,
4434                         msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4435                         &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4436                         self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4437                 );
4438
4439                 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4440                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4441
4442                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4443                 let mut need_commitment = false;
4444                 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4445                         if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4446                                 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4447                                 need_commitment = true;
4448                         }
4449                 }
4450
4451                 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4452                         let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
4453                                 Some(forward_info.clone())
4454                         } else { None };
4455                         if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
4456                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4457                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4458                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
4459                                 need_commitment = true;
4460                         }
4461                 }
4462                 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4463                 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4464                         if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4465                                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4466                                         &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4467                                 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4468                                 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4469                                 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4470                                 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4471                                         // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4472                                         // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4473                                         // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4474                                         // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4475                                         // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4476                                         // claim anyway.
4477                                         claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4478                                 }
4479                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4480                                 need_commitment = true;
4481                         }
4482                 }
4483
4484                 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4485                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4486                         update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4487                         counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4488                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4489                                 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4490                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4491                                 claimed_htlcs,
4492                                 nondust_htlc_sources,
4493                         }],
4494                         channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4495                 };
4496
4497                 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4498                 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4499                 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4500                 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4501                 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4502
4503                 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4504                         // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4505                         // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4506                         self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4507                         if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4508                                 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4509                                 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4510                                 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4511                                 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4512                                 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4513                                 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4514                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4515                                 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4516                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4517                         }
4518                         log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4519                                 &self.context.channel_id);
4520                         return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4521                 }
4522
4523                 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4524                         // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4525                         // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4526                         // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4527                         let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4528                         // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4529                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4530                         self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4531                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4532                         true
4533                 } else { false };
4534
4535                 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4536                         &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4537                 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4538                 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4539         }
4540
4541         /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4542         /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4543         /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4544         pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4545                 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4546         ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4547         where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4548         {
4549                 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4550                         self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4551                 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4552         }
4553
4554         /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4555         /// for our counterparty.
4556         fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4557                 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4558         ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4559         where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4560         {
4561                 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4562                 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4563                         log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4564                                 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4565
4566                         let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4567                                 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4568                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4569                                 updates: Vec::new(),
4570                                 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4571                         };
4572
4573                         let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4574                         mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4575                         let mut update_add_count = 0;
4576                         let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4577                         let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4578                         let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4579                         for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4580                                 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4581                                 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4582                                 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4583                                 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4584                                 // to rebalance channels.
4585                                 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4586                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4587                                                 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4588                                                 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4589                                         } => {
4590                                                 match self.send_htlc(
4591                                                         amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4592                                                         false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4593                                                 ) {
4594                                                         Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4595                                                         Err(e) => {
4596                                                                 match e {
4597                                                                         ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4598                                                                                 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4599                                                                                 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4600                                                                                 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4601                                                                                 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4602                                                                                 // into the holding cell without ever being
4603                                                                                 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4604                                                                                 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4605                                                                                 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4606                                                                         },
4607                                                                         _ => {
4608                                                                                 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4609                                                                         },
4610                                                                 }
4611                                                         }
4612                                                 }
4613                                                 None
4614                                         },
4615                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4616                                                 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4617                                                 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4618                                                 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4619                                                 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4620                                                 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4621                                                 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4622                                                         if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4623                                                                 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4624                                                         { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4625                                                 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4626                                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4627                                                 None
4628                                         },
4629                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4630                                                 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4631                                                  .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4632                                         },
4633                                         &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4634                                                 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4635                                                  .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4636                                         }
4637                                 };
4638                                 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4639                                         match res {
4640                                                 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4641                                                         // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4642                                                         // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4643                                                         // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4644                                                         // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4645                                                         // for a full revocation before failing.
4646                                                         debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4647                                                         update_fail_count += 1;
4648                                                 },
4649                                                 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4650                                                 Err(_) => {
4651                                                         panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4652                                                 },
4653                                         }
4654                                 }
4655                         }
4656                         if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4657                                 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4658                         }
4659                         let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4660                                 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4661                         } else {
4662                                 None
4663                         };
4664
4665                         let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4666                         // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4667                         // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4668                         self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4669                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4670
4671                         log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4672                                 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4673                                 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4674
4675                         self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4676                         (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4677                 } else {
4678                         (None, Vec::new())
4679                 }
4680         }
4681
4682         /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4683         /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4684         /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4685         /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4686         /// revoke_and_ack message.
4687         pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4688                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4689         ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4690         where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4691         {
4692                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4693                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4694                 }
4695                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4696                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4697                 }
4698                 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4699                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4700                 }
4701
4702                 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4703
4704                 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4705                         if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4706                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4707                         }
4708                 }
4709
4710                 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4711                         // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4712                         // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4713                         // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4714                         // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4715                         // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4716                         // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4717                         // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4718                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4719                 }
4720
4721                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4722                 {
4723                         *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4724                         *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4725                 }
4726
4727                 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4728                         ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4729                                 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4730                                         self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4731                                         &secret
4732                                 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4733                         },
4734                         // TODO (taproot|arik)
4735                         #[cfg(taproot)]
4736                         _ => todo!()
4737                 };
4738
4739                 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4740                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4741                 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4742                 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4743                         update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4744                         counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4745                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4746                                 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4747                                 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4748                         }],
4749                         channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4750                 };
4751
4752                 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4753                 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4754                 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4755                 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4756                 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4757                 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4758                 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4759                 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4760                 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4761
4762                 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4763                         self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4764                 }
4765
4766                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4767                 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4768                 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4769                 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4770                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4771                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4772                 let mut require_commitment = false;
4773                 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4774
4775                 {
4776                         // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4777                         let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4778                         let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4779                         let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4780
4781                         // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4782                         pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4783                                 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4784                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4785                                         if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4786                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4787                                         }
4788                                         *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4789                                         false
4790                                 } else { true }
4791                         });
4792                         pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4793                                 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4794                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4795                                         if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4796                                                 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4797                                         } else {
4798                                                 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4799                                                 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4800                                                 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4801                                         }
4802                                         false
4803                                 } else { true }
4804                         });
4805                         for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4806                                 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4807                                         true
4808                                 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4809                                         true
4810                                 } else { false };
4811                                 if swap {
4812                                         let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4813                                         mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4814
4815                                         if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
4816                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4817                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
4818                                                 require_commitment = true;
4819                                         } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
4820                                                 match forward_info {
4821                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4822                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4823                                                                 require_commitment = true;
4824                                                                 match fail_msg {
4825                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4826                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4827                                                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4828                                                                         },
4829                                                                         HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4830                                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4831                                                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4832                                                                         },
4833                                                                 }
4834                                                         },
4835                                                         PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4836                                                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4837                                                                 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4838                                                                 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4839                                                         }
4840                                                 }
4841                                         }
4842                                 }
4843                         }
4844                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4845                                 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4846                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4847                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4848                                         *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4849                                 }
4850                                 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4851                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4852                                         // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4853                                         let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4854                                         mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4855                                         htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4856                                         require_commitment = true;
4857                                 }
4858                         }
4859                 }
4860                 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4861
4862                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4863                         match update_state {
4864                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4865                                         debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4866                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4867                                         self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4868                                         self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4869                                         self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4870                                 },
4871                                 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4872                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4873                                         debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4874                                         log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4875                                         require_commitment = true;
4876                                         self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4877                                         self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4878                                 },
4879                         }
4880                 }
4881
4882                 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4883                 let release_state_str =
4884                         if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4885                 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4886                         ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4887                                 if !release_monitor {
4888                                         self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4889                                                 update: monitor_update,
4890                                         });
4891                                         return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4892                                 } else {
4893                                         return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4894                                 }
4895                         }
4896                 }
4897
4898                 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4899                         // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4900                         // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4901                         if require_commitment {
4902                                 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4903                                 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4904                                 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4905                                 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4906                                 // set it here.
4907                                 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4908                                 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4909                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4910                                 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4911                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4912                         }
4913                         self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4914                         self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4915                         self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4916                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4917                         return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4918                 }
4919
4920                 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4921                         (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4922                                 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4923                                 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4924                                 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4925                                 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4926
4927                                 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4928                                         &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4929
4930                                 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4931                                 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4932                         },
4933                         (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4934                                 if require_commitment {
4935                                         let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4936
4937                                         // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4938                                         // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4939                                         self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4940                                         monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4941
4942                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4943                                                 &self.context.channel_id(),
4944                                                 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4945                                                 release_state_str);
4946
4947                                         self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4948                                         return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4949                                 } else {
4950                                         log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4951                                                 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4952
4953                                         self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4954                                         return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4955                                 }
4956                         }
4957                 }
4958         }
4959
4960         /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4961         /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4962         /// commitment update.
4963         pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4964                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4965         where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4966         {
4967                 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4968                 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4969         }
4970
4971         /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4972         /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4973         /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4974         /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4975         ///
4976         /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4977         /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4978         fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4979                 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4980                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4981         ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4982         where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4983         {
4984                 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4985                         panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4986                 }
4987                 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4988                         panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4989                 }
4990                 if !self.context.is_live() {
4991                         panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4992                 }
4993
4994                 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4995                 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4996                 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4997                 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4998                 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4999                 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
5000                 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5001                 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat  + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
5002                         //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
5003                         log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
5004                         return None;
5005                 }
5006
5007                 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
5008                 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5009                 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5010                 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
5011                 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5012                         log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5013                         return None;
5014                 }
5015                 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5016                         log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5017                         return None;
5018                 }
5019
5020                 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5021                         force_holding_cell = true;
5022                 }
5023
5024                 if force_holding_cell {
5025                         self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
5026                         return None;
5027                 }
5028
5029                 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
5030                 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
5031
5032                 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5033                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5034                         feerate_per_kw,
5035                 })
5036         }
5037
5038         /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5039         /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5040         /// resent.
5041         /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5042         /// completed.
5043         /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5044         pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5045                 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5046                 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5047                         return Err(())
5048                 }
5049
5050                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5051                         // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5052                         // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5053                         return Ok(());
5054                 }
5055
5056                 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5057                         self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5058                 }
5059
5060                 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5061                 // will be retransmitted.
5062                 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5063                 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5064                 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5065
5066                 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5067                 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5068                         match htlc.state {
5069                                 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5070                                         // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5071                                         // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5072                                         // this HTLC accordingly
5073                                         inbound_drop_count += 1;
5074                                         false
5075                                 },
5076                                 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5077                                         // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5078                                         // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5079                                         // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5080                                         true
5081                                 },
5082                                 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5083                                 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5084                                         // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5085                                         // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5086                                         // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5087                                         // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5088                                         true
5089                                 },
5090                         }
5091                 });
5092                 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5093
5094                 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5095                         if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5096                                 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5097                                 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5098                         }
5099                 }
5100
5101                 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5102                         if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5103                                 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5104                                 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5105                                 // the update upon reconnection.
5106                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5107                         }
5108                 }
5109
5110                 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5111
5112                 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5113                 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5114                 Ok(())
5115         }
5116
5117         /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5118         /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5119         /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5120         /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5121         /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5122         /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5123         /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5124         ///
5125         /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5126         /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5127         /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5128         fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5129                 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5130                 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5131                 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5132         ) {
5133                 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5134                 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5135                 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5136                 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5137                 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5138                 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5139                 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5140         }
5141
5142         /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5143         /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5144         /// to the remote side.
5145         pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5146                 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5147                 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5148         ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5149         where
5150                 L::Target: Logger,
5151                 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5152         {
5153                 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5154                 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5155
5156                 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5157                 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5158                 // first received the funding_signed.
5159                 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5160                         if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5161                                 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5162                                 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5163                         {
5164                                 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5165                         } else { None };
5166                 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5167                 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5168                 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5169                         funding_broadcastable = None;
5170                 }
5171
5172                 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5173                 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5174                 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5175                 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5176                 //   the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5177                 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5178                 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5179                         assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5180                                 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5181                         self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5182                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5183                         Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5184                                 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5185                                 next_per_commitment_point,
5186                                 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5187                         })
5188                 } else { None };
5189
5190                 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5191
5192                 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5193                 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5194                 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5195                 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5196                 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5197                 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5198
5199                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5200                         self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5201                         self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5202                         return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5203                                 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5204                                 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5205                         };
5206                 }
5207
5208                 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5209                         Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5210                 } else { None };
5211                 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5212                         self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5213                 } else { None };
5214                 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5215                         self.mark_awaiting_response();
5216                 }
5217
5218                 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5219                 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5220                 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5221                 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5222                         &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5223                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5224                         match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5225                 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5226                         raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5227                 }
5228         }
5229
5230         pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5231                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5232         {
5233                 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5234                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5235                 }
5236                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5237                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5238                 }
5239                 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5240
5241                 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5242                 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5243                 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5244                 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5245                         let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5246                         let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5247                         let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5248                         let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
5249                         let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
5250                         if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5251                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5252                                         msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
5253                         }
5254                         if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5255                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5256                                         msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
5257                         }
5258                 }
5259                 Ok(())
5260         }
5261
5262         /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5263         /// blocked.
5264         #[cfg(async_signing)]
5265         pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5266                 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5267                         self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5268                 } else { None };
5269                 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5270                         self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5271                 } else { None };
5272                 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5273                         self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5274                 } else { None };
5275
5276                 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5277                         if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5278                         if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5279                         if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5280
5281                 SignerResumeUpdates {
5282                         commitment_update,
5283                         funding_signed,
5284                         channel_ready,
5285                 }
5286         }
5287
5288         fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5289                 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5290                 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5291                 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5292                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5293                         per_commitment_secret,
5294                         next_per_commitment_point,
5295                         #[cfg(taproot)]
5296                         next_local_nonce: None,
5297                 }
5298         }
5299
5300         /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5301         fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5302                 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5303                 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5304                 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5305                 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5306
5307                 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5308                         if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5309                                 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5310                                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5311                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5312                                         amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5313                                         payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5314                                         cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5315                                         onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5316                                         skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5317                                         blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5318                                 });
5319                         }
5320                 }
5321
5322                 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5323                         if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5324                                 match reason {
5325                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5326                                                 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5327                                                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5328                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5329                                                         reason: err_packet.clone()
5330                                                 });
5331                                         },
5332                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5333                                                 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5334                                                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5335                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5336                                                         sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5337                                                         failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5338                                                 });
5339                                         },
5340                                         &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5341                                                 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5342                                                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5343                                                         htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5344                                                         payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5345                                                 });
5346                                         },
5347                                 }
5348                         }
5349                 }
5350
5351                 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5352                         Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5353                                 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5354                                 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5355                         })
5356                 } else { None };
5357
5358                 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5359                                 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5360                                 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5361                 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5362                         if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5363                                 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5364                                 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5365                         }
5366                         update
5367                 } else {
5368                         #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5369                                 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5370                         }
5371                         #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5372                                 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5373                                         log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5374                                         self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5375                                 }
5376                                 return Err(());
5377                         }
5378                 };
5379                 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5380                         update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5381                         commitment_signed,
5382                 })
5383         }
5384
5385         /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5386         pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5387                 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5388                         assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5389                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5390                                 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5391                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5392                         })
5393                 } else { None }
5394         }
5395
5396         /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5397         /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5398         ///
5399         /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5400         /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5401         /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5402         /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5403         pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5404                 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5405                 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5406         ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5407         where
5408                 L::Target: Logger,
5409                 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5410         {
5411                 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5412                         // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5413                         // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5414                         // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5415                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5416                 }
5417
5418                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5419                         msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5420                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5421                 }
5422
5423                 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5424                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5425                         let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5426                         let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5427                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5428                         if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5429                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5430                         }
5431                         if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5432                                 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5433                                         ($err_msg: expr) => {
5434                                                 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5435                                                 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5436                                         }
5437                                 }
5438                                 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5439                                         This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5440                                         More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5441                                         If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5442                                         ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5443                                         ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5444                                         Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5445                                         See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5446                         }
5447                 }
5448
5449                 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5450                 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5451                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5452                         return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5453                                 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5454                                 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5455                                 our_commitment_transaction
5456                         )));
5457                 }
5458
5459                 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5460                 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5461                 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5462                 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5463
5464                 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5465
5466                 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
5467
5468                 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5469                         // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5470                         if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5471                                         self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5472                                 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5473                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5474                                 }
5475                                 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5476                                 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5477                                         channel_ready: None,
5478                                         raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5479                                         order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5480                                         shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5481                                 });
5482                         }
5483
5484                         // We have OurChannelReady set!
5485                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5486                         return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5487                                 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5488                                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5489                                         next_per_commitment_point,
5490                                         short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5491                                 }),
5492                                 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5493                                 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5494                                 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5495                         });
5496                 }
5497
5498                 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5499                         // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5500                         // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5501                         None
5502                 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5503                         if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5504                                 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5505                                 None
5506                         } else {
5507                                 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5508                         }
5509                 } else {
5510                         debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5511                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5512                                 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5513                                 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5514                                 our_commitment_transaction
5515                         )));
5516                 };
5517
5518                 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5519                 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5520                 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5521                 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5522                 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5523                 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5524                         self.mark_awaiting_response();
5525                 }
5526                 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5527
5528                 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5529                         // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5530                         let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5531                         Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5532                                 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5533                                 next_per_commitment_point,
5534                                 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5535                         })
5536                 } else { None };
5537
5538                 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5539                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
5540                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5541                         } else {
5542                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5543                         }
5544
5545                         Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5546                                 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5547                                 raa: required_revoke,
5548                                 commitment_update: None,
5549                                 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5550                         })
5551                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5552                         if required_revoke.is_some() {
5553                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5554                         } else {
5555                                 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5556                         }
5557
5558                         if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5559                                 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5560                                 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5561                                         channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5562                                         commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5563                                         order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5564                                 })
5565                         } else {
5566                                 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5567                                         channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5568                                         raa: required_revoke,
5569                                         commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5570                                         order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5571                                 })
5572                         }
5573                 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5574                         Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5575                                 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5576                                 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5577                                 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5578                         )))
5579                 } else {
5580                         Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5581                                 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5582                                 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5583                                 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5584                         )))
5585                 }
5586         }
5587
5588         /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5589         /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5590         /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5591         fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5592                 -> (u64, u64)
5593                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5594         {
5595                 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5596
5597                 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5598                 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5599                 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5600                 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5601                 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5602                 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5603                 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5604                 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5605
5606                 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5607                 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5608                 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5609                 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5610                 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5611
5612                 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5613                         let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5614                         proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5615                         proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5616                 }
5617
5618                 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5619                 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5620                 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5621                 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5622                 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5623                 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5624                 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5625                 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5626                 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5627                 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5628                                 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5629                                 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5630                                 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5631                                 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5632                                         proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5633                         } else {
5634                                 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5635                         };
5636
5637                 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5638                 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5639         }
5640
5641         /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5642         /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5643         /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5644         /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5645         fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5646                 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5647         }
5648
5649         /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5650         /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5651         /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5652         pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5653                 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5654                         if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5655                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5656                         } else {
5657                                 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5658                         }
5659                 }
5660                 Ok(())
5661         }
5662
5663         pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5664                 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5665                 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5666                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5667         {
5668                 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5669                 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5670                 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5671                 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5672                 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5673                         return Ok((None, None, None));
5674                 }
5675
5676                 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5677                         if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5678                                 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5679                         }
5680                         return Ok((None, None, None));
5681                 }
5682
5683                 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5684                 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5685                 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5686                         return Ok((None, None, None));
5687                 }
5688
5689                 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5690
5691                 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5692                 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5693                 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5694                         our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5695
5696                 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5697                         ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5698                                 let sig = ecdsa
5699                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5700                                         .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5701
5702                                 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5703                                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5704                                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5705                                         fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5706                                         signature: sig,
5707                                         fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5708                                                 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5709                                                 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5710                                         }),
5711                                 }), None, None))
5712                         },
5713                         // TODO (taproot|arik)
5714                         #[cfg(taproot)]
5715                         _ => todo!()
5716                 }
5717         }
5718
5719         // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5720         // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5721         // a reconnection.
5722         fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5723                 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5724         }
5725
5726         /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5727         /// within our expected timeframe.
5728         ///
5729         /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5730         pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5731                 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5732                         ticks_elapsed
5733                 } else {
5734                         // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5735                         return false;
5736                 };
5737                 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5738                 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5739         }
5740
5741         pub fn shutdown(
5742                 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5743         ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5744         {
5745                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5746                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5747                 }
5748                 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5749                         // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5750                         // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5751                         // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5752                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5753                 }
5754                 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5755                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5756                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5757                         }
5758                 }
5759                 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5760
5761                 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5762                         return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5763                 }
5764
5765                 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5766                         if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5767                                 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5768                         }
5769                 } else {
5770                         self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5771                 }
5772
5773                 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5774                 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5775                 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5776                 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5777
5778                 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5779                         Some(_) => false,
5780                         None => {
5781                                 assert!(send_shutdown);
5782                                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5783                                         Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5784                                         Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5785                                 };
5786                                 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5787                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5788                                 }
5789                                 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5790                                 true
5791                         },
5792                 };
5793
5794                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5795
5796                 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5797                 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5798
5799                 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5800                         self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5801                         let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5802                                 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5803                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5804                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5805                                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5806                                 }],
5807                                 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5808                         };
5809                         self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5810                         self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5811                 } else { None };
5812                 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5813                         Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5814                                 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5815                                 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5816                         })
5817                 } else { None };
5818
5819                 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5820                 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5821                 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5822                 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5823                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5824                 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5825                         match htlc_update {
5826                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5827                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5828                                         false
5829                                 },
5830                                 _ => true
5831                         }
5832                 });
5833
5834                 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5835                 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5836
5837                 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5838         }
5839
5840         fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5841                 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5842
5843                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5844
5845                 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5846                 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5847                 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5848                 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5849                 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5850                 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5851                 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5852                         tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5853                         tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5854                 } else {
5855                         tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5856                         tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5857                 }
5858
5859                 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5860                 tx
5861         }
5862
5863         pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5864                 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5865                 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5866                 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5867         {
5868                 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5869                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5870                 }
5871                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5872                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5873                 }
5874                 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5875                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5876                 }
5877                 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5878                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5879                 }
5880
5881                 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5882                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5883                 }
5884
5885                 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5886                         self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5887                         return Ok((None, None, None));
5888                 }
5889
5890                 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5891                 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5892                 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5893                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5894                 }
5895                 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5896
5897                 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5898                         Ok(_) => {},
5899                         Err(_e) => {
5900                                 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5901                                 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5902                                 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5903                                 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5904                                 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5905                         },
5906                 };
5907
5908                 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5909                         if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5910                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5911                         }
5912                 }
5913
5914                 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5915                         ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5916                 } else {
5917                         ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5918                 };
5919
5920                 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5921                 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5922                         if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5923                                 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5924                                         closure_reason,
5925                                         monitor_update: None,
5926                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5927                                         unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5928                                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5929                                         user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5930                                         channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5931                                         counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5932                                         unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5933                                         channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5934                                 };
5935                                 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5936                                 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5937                                 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5938                                 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5939                         }
5940                 }
5941
5942                 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5943
5944                 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5945                         ($new_fee: expr) => {
5946                                 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5947                                         (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5948                                 } else {
5949                                         self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5950                                 };
5951
5952                                 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5953                                         ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5954                                                 let sig = ecdsa
5955                                                         .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5956                                                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5957                                                 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5958                                                         let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5959                                                                 closure_reason,
5960                                                                 monitor_update: None,
5961                                                                 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5962                                                                 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5963                                                                 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5964                                                                 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5965                                                                 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5966                                                                 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5967                                                                 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5968                                                                 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5969                                                         };
5970                                                         self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5971                                                         self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5972                                                         let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5973                                                         (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5974                                                 } else {
5975                                                         (None, None)
5976                                                 };
5977
5978                                                 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5979                                                 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5980                                                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5981                                                         fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5982                                                         signature: sig,
5983                                                         fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5984                                                                 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5985                                                                 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5986                                                         }),
5987                                                 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5988                                         },
5989                                         // TODO (taproot|arik)
5990                                         #[cfg(taproot)]
5991                                         _ => todo!()
5992                                 }
5993                         }
5994                 }
5995
5996                 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5997                         if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5998                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5999                         }
6000                         if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6001                                 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6002                         }
6003                         if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6004                                 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6005                         }
6006
6007                         if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6008                                 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
6009                                 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
6010                                 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
6011                                 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
6012                         } else {
6013                                 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6014                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
6015                                                 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
6016                                 }
6017                                 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
6018                                 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6019                         }
6020                 } else {
6021                         // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
6022                         // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
6023                         if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6024                                 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6025                                         if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6026                                                 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6027                                         } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6028                                                 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6029                                         } else {
6030                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6031                                         }
6032                                 } else {
6033                                         if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6034                                                 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6035                                         } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6036                                                 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6037                                         } else {
6038                                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6039                                         }
6040                                 }
6041                         } else {
6042                                 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6043                                         propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6044                                 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6045                                         propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6046                                 } else {
6047                                         propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6048                                 }
6049                         }
6050                 }
6051         }
6052
6053         fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6054                 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6055         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6056                 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6057                         .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6058                 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6059                         (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6060                         return Err((
6061                                 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6062                                 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6063                         ));
6064                 }
6065                 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6066                         return Err((
6067                                 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6068                                 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6069                         ));
6070                 }
6071                 Ok(())
6072         }
6073
6074         /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6075         /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6076         /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6077         pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6078                 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6079         ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6080                 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6081                         .or_else(|err| {
6082                                 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6083                                         self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6084                                 } else {
6085                                         Err(err)
6086                                 }
6087                         })
6088         }
6089
6090         pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6091                 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6092         }
6093
6094         pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6095                 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6096         }
6097
6098         pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6099                 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6100         }
6101
6102         #[cfg(test)]
6103         pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6104                 &self.context.holder_signer
6105         }
6106
6107         #[cfg(test)]
6108         pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6109                 ChannelValueStat {
6110                         value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6111                         channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6112                         channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6113                         pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6114                         pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6115                         holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6116                                 let mut res = 0;
6117                                 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6118                                         match h {
6119                                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6120                                                         res += amount_msat;
6121                                                 }
6122                                                 _ => {}
6123                                         }
6124                                 }
6125                                 res
6126                         },
6127                         counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6128                         counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6129                 }
6130         }
6131
6132         /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6133         /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6134         pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6135                 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6136         }
6137
6138         /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6139         pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6140                 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6141                 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6142         }
6143
6144         /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6145         /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6146         pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6147                 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6148                 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6149                         !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6150         }
6151
6152         /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6153         /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6154         fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6155         -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6156                 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6157                 if !release_monitor {
6158                         self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6159                                 update,
6160                         });
6161                         None
6162                 } else {
6163                         Some(update)
6164                 }
6165         }
6166
6167         pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6168                 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6169         }
6170
6171         /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6172         /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6173         /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6174         /// advanced state.
6175         pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6176                 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6177                 if matches!(
6178                         self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6179                         if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6180                 ) {
6181                         // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6182                         // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6183                         debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6184                         return true;
6185                 }
6186                 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6187                         self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6188                         // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6189                         // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6190                         // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6191                         // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6192                         //
6193                         // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6194                         // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6195                         // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6196                         //
6197                         // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6198                         // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6199                         // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6200                         if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6201                         assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6202                         assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6203                         return true;
6204                 }
6205                 false
6206         }
6207
6208         /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6209         pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6210                 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6211                         matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6212         }
6213
6214         /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6215         pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6216                 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6217         }
6218
6219         /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6220         pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6221                 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6222         }
6223
6224         /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6225         pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6226                 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6227         }
6228
6229         /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6230         /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6231         /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6232         pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6233                 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6234         }
6235
6236         pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6237                 self.context.channel_update_status
6238         }
6239
6240         pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6241                 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6242                 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6243         }
6244
6245         fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6246                 // Called:
6247                 //  * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6248                 //  * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6249                 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6250                         return None;
6251                 }
6252
6253                 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6254                 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6255                         self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6256                 }
6257
6258                 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6259                         return None;
6260                 }
6261
6262                 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6263                 // channel_ready yet.
6264                 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6265                         return None;
6266                 }
6267
6268                 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6269                 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6270                 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6271                         self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6272                         true
6273                 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6274                         self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6275                         self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6276                         true
6277                 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6278                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6279                         false
6280                 } else {
6281                         if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6282                                 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6283                         {
6284                                 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6285                                 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6286                                 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6287                                 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6288                                 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6289                                 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6290                                         Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6291                                         self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6292                         }
6293                         // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6294                         false
6295                 };
6296
6297                 if need_commitment_update {
6298                         if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6299                                 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6300                                         let next_per_commitment_point =
6301                                                 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6302                                         return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6303                                                 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6304                                                 next_per_commitment_point,
6305                                                 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6306                                         });
6307                                 }
6308                         } else {
6309                                 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6310                         }
6311                 }
6312                 None
6313         }
6314
6315         /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6316         /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6317         /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6318         pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6319                 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6320                 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6321         ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6322         where
6323                 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6324                 L::Target: Logger
6325         {
6326                 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6327                 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6328                         for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6329                                 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6330                                 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6331                                 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6332                                         if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6333                                                 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6334                                                 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6335                                                                 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6336                                                         if self.context.is_outbound() {
6337                                                                 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6338                                                                 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6339                                                                 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6340                                                                 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6341                                                                 // channel and move on.
6342                                                                 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6343                                                                 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6344                                                         }
6345                                                         self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6346                                                         let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6347                                                         return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6348                                                 } else {
6349                                                         if self.context.is_outbound() {
6350                                                                 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6351                                                                         for input in tx.input.iter() {
6352                                                                                 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6353                                                                                         // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6354                                                                                         // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6355                                                                                         #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6356                                                                                         panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6357                                                                                 }
6358                                                                         }
6359                                                                 }
6360                                                         }
6361                                                         self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6362                                                         self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6363                                                         self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6364                                                                 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6365                                                                 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6366                                                         }
6367                                                 }
6368                                                 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6369                                                 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6370                                                 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6371                                                         self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6372                                                         self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6373                                                         self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6374                                                 }
6375                                         }
6376                                         // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6377                                         // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6378                                         // may have already happened for this block).
6379                                         if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6380                                                 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6381                                                 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6382                                                 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6383                                         }
6384                                 }
6385                                 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6386                                         if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6387                                                 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6388                                                 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6389                                         }
6390                                 }
6391                         }
6392                 }
6393                 Ok(msgs)
6394         }
6395
6396         /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6397         /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6398         /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6399         /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6400         ///
6401         /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6402         /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6403         /// post-shutdown.
6404         ///
6405         /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6406         /// back.
6407         pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6408                 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6409                 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6410         ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6411         where
6412                 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6413                 L::Target: Logger
6414         {
6415                 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6416         }
6417
6418         fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6419                 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6420                 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6421         ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6422         where
6423                 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6424                 L::Target: Logger
6425         {
6426                 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6427                 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6428                 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6429                 // ~now.
6430                 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6431                 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6432                         match htlc_update {
6433                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6434                                         if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6435                                                 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6436                                                 false
6437                                         } else { true }
6438                                 },
6439                                 _ => true
6440                         }
6441                 });
6442
6443                 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6444
6445                 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6446                         let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6447                                 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6448                         } else { None };
6449                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6450                         return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6451                 }
6452
6453                 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6454                         self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6455                         let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6456                         if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6457                                 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6458                                 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6459                                 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6460                                 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6461                         }
6462
6463                         // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6464                         // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6465                         // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6466                         // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6467                         //
6468                         // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6469                         // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6470                         // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map  being inconsistent, so we currently have
6471                         // to.
6472                         if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6473                                 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6474                                         self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6475                                 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6476                         }
6477                 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6478                                 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6479                         log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6480                         // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6481                         assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6482                         assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6483                         return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6484                 }
6485
6486                 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6487                         self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6488                 } else { None };
6489                 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6490         }
6491
6492         /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6493         /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6494         /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6495         pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6496                 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6497                         // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6498                         // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6499                         let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6500                         // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6501                         // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6502                         // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6503                         let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6504                         match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6505                                 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6506                                         assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6507                                         assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6508                                         assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6509                                         Ok(())
6510                                 },
6511                                 Err(e) => Err(e)
6512                         }
6513                 } else {
6514                         // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6515                         Ok(())
6516                 }
6517         }
6518
6519         // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6520         // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6521
6522         /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6523         /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6524         /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6525         /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6526         ///
6527         /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6528         /// closing).
6529         ///
6530         /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6531         ///
6532         /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6533         fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6534                 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6535         ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6536                 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6537                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6538                 }
6539                 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6540                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6541                 }
6542
6543                 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6544                         .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6545                 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6546                         .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6547                 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6548                 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6549
6550                 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6551                         features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6552                         chain_hash,
6553                         short_channel_id,
6554                         node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6555                         node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6556                         bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6557                         bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6558                         excess_data: Vec::new(),
6559                 };
6560
6561                 Ok(msg)
6562         }
6563
6564         fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6565                 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6566                 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6567         ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6568         where
6569                 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6570                 L::Target: Logger
6571         {
6572                 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6573                         return None;
6574                 }
6575
6576                 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6577                         return None;
6578                 }
6579
6580                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6581                         log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6582                         return None;
6583                 }
6584
6585                 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6586                         return None;
6587                 }
6588
6589                 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6590                 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6591                         Ok(a) => a,
6592                         Err(e) => {
6593                                 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6594                                 return None;
6595                         }
6596                 };
6597                 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6598                         Err(_) => {
6599                                 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6600                                 return None;
6601                         },
6602                         Ok(v) => v
6603                 };
6604                 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6605                         ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6606                                 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6607                                         Err(_) => {
6608                                                 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6609                                                 return None;
6610                                         },
6611                                         Ok(v) => v
6612                                 };
6613                                 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6614                                         Some(scid) => scid,
6615                                         None => return None,
6616                                 };
6617
6618                                 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6619
6620                                 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6621                                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6622                                         short_channel_id,
6623                                         node_signature: our_node_sig,
6624                                         bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6625                                 })
6626                         },
6627                         // TODO (taproot|arik)
6628                         #[cfg(taproot)]
6629                         _ => todo!()
6630                 }
6631         }
6632
6633         /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6634         /// available.
6635         fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6636                 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6637         ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6638                 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6639                         let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6640                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6641                         let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6642
6643                         let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6644                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6645                         match &self.context.holder_signer {
6646                                 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6647                                         let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6648                                                 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6649                                         Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6650                                                 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6651                                                 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6652                                                 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6653                                                 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6654                                                 contents: announcement,
6655                                         })
6656                                 },
6657                                 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6658                                 #[cfg(taproot)]
6659                                 _ => todo!()
6660                         }
6661                 } else {
6662                         Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6663                 }
6664         }
6665
6666         /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6667         /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6668         /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6669         pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6670                 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6671                 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6672         ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6673                 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6674
6675                 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6676
6677                 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6678                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6679                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6680                                  &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6681                 }
6682                 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6683                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6684                                 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6685                                 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6686                 }
6687
6688                 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6689                 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6690                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6691                                 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6692                 }
6693
6694                 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6695         }
6696
6697         /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6698         /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6699         pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6700                 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6701         ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6702                 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6703                         return None;
6704                 }
6705                 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6706                         Ok(res) => res,
6707                         Err(_) => return None,
6708                 };
6709                 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6710                         Ok(res) => Some(res),
6711                         Err(_) => None,
6712                 }
6713         }
6714
6715         /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6716         /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6717         pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6718                 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6719                 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6720                 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6721                 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6722                 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6723                 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6724                 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6725                 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6726                 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6727                 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6728                 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6729                         let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6730                         log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6731                         remote_last_secret
6732                 } else {
6733                         log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6734                         [0;32]
6735                 };
6736                 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6737                 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6738                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6739                         // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6740                         // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6741                         // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6742                         // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6743                         // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6744                         // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6745
6746                         // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6747                         // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6748                         next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6749                         // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6750                         // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6751                         // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6752                         // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6753                         // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6754                         // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6755                         // overflow here.
6756                         next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6757                         your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6758                         my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6759                         // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6760                         // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6761                         // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6762                         next_funding_txid: None,
6763                 }
6764         }
6765
6766
6767         // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6768
6769         /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6770         /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6771         /// commitment update.
6772         ///
6773         /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6774         pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6775                 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6776                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6777                 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6778         ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6779         where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6780         {
6781                 self
6782                         .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6783                                 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6784                         .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6785                         .map_err(|err| {
6786                                 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6787                                 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6788                                 err
6789                         })
6790         }
6791
6792         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6793         /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6794         ///
6795         /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6796         /// the wire:
6797         /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6798         ///   wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6799         ///   awaiting ACK.
6800         /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6801         ///   we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6802         ///   regenerate them.
6803         ///
6804         /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6805         /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6806         ///
6807         /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6808         fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6809                 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6810                 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6811                 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6812                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6813         ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6814         where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6815         {
6816                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6817                         self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6818                         self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6819                 {
6820                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6821                 }
6822                 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6823                 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6824                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6825                 }
6826
6827                 if amount_msat == 0 {
6828                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6829                 }
6830
6831                 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6832                 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6833                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6834                                 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6835                 }
6836
6837                 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6838                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6839                                 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6840                 }
6841
6842                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6843                         // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6844                         // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6845                         // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6846                         // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6847                         // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6848                         // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6849                         return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6850                 }
6851
6852                 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6853                 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6854                         payment_hash, amount_msat,
6855                         if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6856                         else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6857                         else { "to peer" });
6858
6859                 if need_holding_cell {
6860                         force_holding_cell = true;
6861                 }
6862
6863                 // Now update local state:
6864                 if force_holding_cell {
6865                         self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6866                                 amount_msat,
6867                                 payment_hash,
6868                                 cltv_expiry,
6869                                 source,
6870                                 onion_routing_packet,
6871                                 skimmed_fee_msat,
6872                                 blinding_point,
6873                         });
6874                         return Ok(None);
6875                 }
6876
6877                 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6878                         htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6879                         amount_msat,
6880                         payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6881                         cltv_expiry,
6882                         state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6883                         source,
6884                         blinding_point,
6885                         skimmed_fee_msat,
6886                 });
6887
6888                 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6889                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6890                         htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6891                         amount_msat,
6892                         payment_hash,
6893                         cltv_expiry,
6894                         onion_routing_packet,
6895                         skimmed_fee_msat,
6896                         blinding_point,
6897                 };
6898                 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6899
6900                 Ok(Some(res))
6901         }
6902
6903         fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6904                 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6905                 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6906                 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6907                 // is acceptable.
6908                 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6909                         let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6910                                 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6911                         } else { None };
6912                         if let Some(state) = new_state {
6913                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6914                                 htlc.state = state;
6915                         }
6916                 }
6917                 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6918                         if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6919                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6920                                 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6921                                 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6922                                 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6923                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6924                         }
6925                 }
6926                 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6927                         if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6928                                 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6929                                 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6930                                 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6931                                 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6932                         }
6933                 }
6934                 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6935
6936                 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6937                         self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6938                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6939                 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6940                         htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6941
6942                 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6943                         self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6944                 }
6945
6946                 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6947                 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6948                         update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6949                         counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6950                         updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6951                                 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6952                                 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6953                                 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6954                                 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6955                                 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6956                                 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6957                                 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6958                         }],
6959                         channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6960                 };
6961                 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6962                 monitor_update
6963         }
6964
6965         fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6966         -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6967         where L::Target: Logger
6968         {
6969                 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6970                 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6971                 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6972
6973                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6974                 {
6975                         if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6976                                 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6977                                 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6978                                 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6979                                         let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6980                                         if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6981                                                 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6982                                                 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6983                                                 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6984                                                         let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6985                                                         assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6986                                                 }
6987                                 }
6988                         }
6989                 }
6990
6991                 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6992         }
6993
6994         /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6995         /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6996         fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6997                 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6998                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6999                 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7000
7001                 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7002                 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7003                 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7004
7005                 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7006                         ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7007                                 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7008
7009                                 {
7010                                         let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7011                                         for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7012                                                 htlcs.push(htlc);
7013                                         }
7014
7015                                         let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7016                                                         &commitment_stats.tx,
7017                                                         commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7018                                                         commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7019                                                         &self.context.secp_ctx,
7020                                                 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7021                                         signature = res.0;
7022                                         htlc_signatures = res.1;
7023
7024                                         log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7025                                                 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7026                                                 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7027                                                 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7028
7029                                         for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7030                                                 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7031                                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7032                                                         encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7033                                                         log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7034                                                         log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7035                                         }
7036                                 }
7037
7038                                 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7039                                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7040                                         signature,
7041                                         htlc_signatures,
7042                                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7043                                         partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7044                                 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7045                         },
7046                         // TODO (taproot|arik)
7047                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7048                         _ => todo!()
7049                 }
7050         }
7051
7052         /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7053         /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7054         ///
7055         /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7056         /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7057         pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7058                 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7059                 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7060                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7061         ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7062         where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7063         {
7064                 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7065                         onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7066                 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7067                 match send_res? {
7068                         Some(_) => {
7069                                 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7070                                 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7071                                 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7072                         },
7073                         None => Ok(None)
7074                 }
7075         }
7076
7077         /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7078         /// happened.
7079         pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7080                 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7081                         fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7082                         fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7083                         cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7084                 });
7085                 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7086                 if did_change {
7087                         self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7088                 }
7089
7090                 Ok(did_change)
7091         }
7092
7093         /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7094         /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7095         pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7096                 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7097         -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7098         {
7099                 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7100                         if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7101                                 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7102                         }
7103                 }
7104                 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7105                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7106                 }
7107                 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7108                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7109                 }
7110                 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7111                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7112                 }
7113                 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7114                 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7115                         return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7116                 }
7117
7118                 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7119                         Some(_) => false,
7120                         None => {
7121                                 // use override shutdown script if provided
7122                                 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7123                                         Some(script) => script,
7124                                         None => {
7125                                                 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7126                                                 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7127                                                         Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7128                                                         Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7129                                                 }
7130                                         },
7131                                 };
7132                                 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7133                                         return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7134                                 }
7135                                 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7136                                 true
7137                         },
7138                 };
7139
7140                 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7141                 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7142                 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7143                 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7144                 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7145
7146                 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7147                         self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7148                         let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7149                                 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7150                                 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7151                                 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7152                                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7153                                 }],
7154                                 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7155                         };
7156                         self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7157                         self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7158                 } else { None };
7159                 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7160                         channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7161                         scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7162                 };
7163
7164                 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7165                 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7166                 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7167                 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7168                 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7169                         match htlc_update {
7170                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7171                                         dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7172                                         false
7173                                 },
7174                                 _ => true
7175                         }
7176                 });
7177
7178                 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7179                         "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7180
7181                 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7182         }
7183
7184         pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7185                 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7186                         .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7187                                 match htlc_update {
7188                                         HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7189                                                 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7190                                         _ => None,
7191                                 }
7192                         })
7193                         .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7194         }
7195 }
7196
7197 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7198 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7199         pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7200         pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7201 }
7202
7203 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7204         pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7205                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7206                 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7207                 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7208         ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7209         where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7210               F::Target: FeeEstimator
7211         {
7212                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7213                 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7214                         // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7215                         // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7216                         return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7217                                 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7218                 }
7219
7220                 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7221                 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7222                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7223
7224                 let chan = Self {
7225                         context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7226                                 fee_estimator,
7227                                 entropy_source,
7228                                 signer_provider,
7229                                 counterparty_node_id,
7230                                 their_features,
7231                                 channel_value_satoshis,
7232                                 push_msat,
7233                                 user_id,
7234                                 config,
7235                                 current_chain_height,
7236                                 outbound_scid_alias,
7237                                 temporary_channel_id,
7238                                 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7239                                 channel_keys_id,
7240                                 holder_signer,
7241                                 pubkeys,
7242                         )?,
7243                         unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7244                 };
7245                 Ok(chan)
7246         }
7247
7248         /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7249         fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7250                 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7251                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7252                 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7253                         // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7254                         ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7255                                 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7256                                         .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7257                         },
7258                         // TODO (taproot|arik)
7259                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7260                         _ => todo!()
7261                 };
7262
7263                 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7264                         log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7265                         self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7266                 }
7267
7268                 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7269                         temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7270                         funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7271                         funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7272                         signature,
7273                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7274                         partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7275                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7276                         next_local_nonce: None,
7277                 })
7278         }
7279
7280         /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7281         /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7282         /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7283         /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7284         /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7285         /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7286         /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7287         pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7288         -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7289                 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7290                         panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7291                 }
7292                 if !matches!(
7293                         self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7294                         if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7295                 ) {
7296                         panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7297                 }
7298                 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7299                                 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7300                                 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7301                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7302                 }
7303
7304                 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7305                 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7306
7307                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7308
7309                 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7310                 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7311
7312                 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7313                 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7314                 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7315                         self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7316                         self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7317                         self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7318                 }
7319
7320                 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7321                 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7322
7323                 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7324                 if funding_created.is_none() {
7325                         #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7326                                 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7327                         }
7328                         #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7329                                 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7330                                         log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7331                                         self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7332                                 }
7333                         }
7334                 }
7335
7336                 Ok(funding_created)
7337         }
7338
7339         /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7340         /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7341         /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7342         pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7343                 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7344         ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7345         where
7346                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7347         {
7348                 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7349                 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7350         }
7351
7352         pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7353                 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7354                         panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7355                 }
7356                 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7357                         panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7358                 }
7359
7360                 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7361                         panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7362                 }
7363
7364                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7365                 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7366
7367                 msgs::OpenChannel {
7368                         common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7369                                 chain_hash,
7370                                 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7371                                 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7372                                 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7373                                 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7374                                 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7375                                 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7376                                 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7377                                 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7378                                 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7379                                 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7380                                 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7381                                 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7382                                 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7383                                 first_per_commitment_point,
7384                                 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7385                                 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7386                                         Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7387                                         None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7388                                 }),
7389                                 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7390                         },
7391                         push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7392                         channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7393                 }
7394         }
7395
7396         // Message handlers
7397         pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7398                 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7399
7400                 // Check sanity of message fields:
7401                 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7402                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7403                 }
7404                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7405                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7406                 }
7407                 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7408                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7409                 }
7410                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7411                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7412                 }
7413                 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7414                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7415                 }
7416                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7417                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7418                                 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7419                 }
7420                 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7421                 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7422                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7423                 }
7424                 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7425                 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7426                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7427                 }
7428                 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7429                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7430                 }
7431                 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7432                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7433                 }
7434
7435                 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7436                 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7437                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7438                 }
7439                 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7440                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7441                 }
7442                 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7443                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7444                 }
7445                 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7446                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7447                 }
7448                 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7449                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7450                 }
7451                 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7452                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7453                 }
7454                 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7455                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7456                 }
7457
7458                 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7459                         if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7460                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7461                         }
7462                 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7463                         // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7464                 } else {
7465                         let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7466                         if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7467                                 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7468                         }
7469                         self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7470                         self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7471                 }
7472
7473                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7474                         match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7475                                 &Some(ref script) => {
7476                                         // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7477                                         if script.len() == 0 {
7478                                                 None
7479                                         } else {
7480                                                 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7481                                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7482                                                 }
7483                                                 Some(script.clone())
7484                                         }
7485                                 },
7486                                 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7487                                 &None => {
7488                                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7489                                 }
7490                         }
7491                 } else { None };
7492
7493                 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7494                 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7495                 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7496                 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7497                 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7498
7499                 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7500                         self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7501                 } else {
7502                         self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7503                 }
7504
7505                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7506                         funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7507                         revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7508                         payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7509                         delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7510                         htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7511                 };
7512
7513                 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7514                         selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7515                         pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7516                 });
7517
7518                 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7519                 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7520
7521                 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7522                         NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7523                 );
7524                 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7525
7526                 Ok(())
7527         }
7528
7529         /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7530         /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7531         pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7532                 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7533         ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7534         where
7535                 L::Target: Logger
7536         {
7537                 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7538                         return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7539                 }
7540                 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7541                         return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7542                 }
7543                 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7544                                 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7545                                 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7546                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7547                 }
7548
7549                 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7550
7551                 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7552                 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7553                 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7554                 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7555
7556                 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7557                         &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7558
7559                 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7560                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7561                 {
7562                         let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7563                         let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7564                         let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7565                         // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7566                         if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7567                                 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7568                         }
7569                 }
7570
7571                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7572                         initial_commitment_tx,
7573                         msg.signature,
7574                         Vec::new(),
7575                         &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7576                         self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7577                 );
7578
7579                 let validated =
7580                         self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7581                 if validated.is_err() {
7582                         return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7583                 }
7584
7585                 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7586                 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7587                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7588                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7589                 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7590                 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7591                 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7592                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7593                                                           shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7594                                                           &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7595                                                           &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7596                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7597                                                           obscure_factor,
7598                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7599                 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7600                         counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7601                         self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7602                         self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7603                         counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7604                         counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7605                         counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7606
7607                 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7608                 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7609                         self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7610                 } else {
7611                         self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7612                 }
7613                 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7614                 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7615
7616                 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7617
7618                 let mut channel = Channel {
7619                         context: self.context,
7620                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7621                         dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7622                 };
7623
7624                 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7625                 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7626                 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7627         }
7628
7629         /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7630         /// blocked.
7631         #[cfg(async_signing)]
7632         pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7633                 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7634                         log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7635                         self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7636                 } else { None }
7637         }
7638 }
7639
7640 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7641 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7642         pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7643         pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7644 }
7645
7646 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7647 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7648 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7649         common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7650         our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7651 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7652         if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7653                 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7654                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7655                 }
7656
7657                 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7658                 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7659                 // `static_remote_key`.
7660                 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7661                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7662                 }
7663                 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7664                 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7665                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7666                 }
7667                 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7668                 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7669                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7670                 }
7671                 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7672         } else {
7673                 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7674                 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7675                         return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7676                 }
7677                 Ok(channel_type)
7678         }
7679 }
7680
7681 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7682         /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7683         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7684         pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7685                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7686                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7687                 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7688                 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7689         ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7690                 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7691                           F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7692                           L::Target: Logger,
7693         {
7694                 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7695
7696                 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7697                 // support this channel type.
7698                 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7699
7700                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7701                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7702                         funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7703                         revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7704                         payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7705                         delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7706                         htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7707                 };
7708
7709                 let chan = Self {
7710                         context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7711                                 fee_estimator,
7712                                 entropy_source,
7713                                 signer_provider,
7714                                 counterparty_node_id,
7715                                 their_features,
7716                                 user_id,
7717                                 config,
7718                                 current_chain_height,
7719                                 &&logger,
7720                                 is_0conf,
7721                                 0,
7722
7723                                 counterparty_pubkeys,
7724                                 channel_type,
7725                                 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7726                                 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7727                                 msg.push_msat,
7728                                 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7729                         )?,
7730                         unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7731                 };
7732                 Ok(chan)
7733         }
7734
7735         /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7736         /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7737         ///
7738         /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7739         pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7740                 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7741                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7742                 }
7743                 if !matches!(
7744                         self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7745                         if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7746                 ) {
7747                         panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7748                 }
7749                 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7750                         panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7751                 }
7752
7753                 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7754         }
7755
7756         /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7757         /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7758         /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7759         ///
7760         /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7761         fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7762                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7763                 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7764
7765                 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7766                         common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7767                                 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7768                                 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7769                                 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7770                                 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7771                                 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7772                                 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7773                                 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7774                                 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7775                                 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7776                                 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7777                                 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7778                                 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7779                                 first_per_commitment_point,
7780                                 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7781                                         Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7782                                         None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7783                                 }),
7784                                 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7785                         },
7786                         channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7787                         #[cfg(taproot)]
7788                         next_local_nonce: None,
7789                 }
7790         }
7791
7792         /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7793         /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7794         ///
7795         /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7796         #[cfg(test)]
7797         pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7798                 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7799         }
7800
7801         fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7802                 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7803
7804                 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7805                 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7806                 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7807                 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7808                 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7809                 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7810                 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7811                         log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7812                         encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7813                         encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7814                 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7815
7816                 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7817         }
7818
7819         pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7820                 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7821         ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7822         where
7823                 L::Target: Logger
7824         {
7825                 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7826                         return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7827                 }
7828                 if !matches!(
7829                         self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7830                         if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7831                 ) {
7832                         // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7833                         // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7834                         // channel.
7835                         return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7836                 }
7837                 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7838                                 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7839                                 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7840                         panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7841                 }
7842
7843                 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7844                 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7845                 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks.  In particular
7846                 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7847                 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7848
7849                 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7850                         Ok(res) => res,
7851                         Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7852                                 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7853                                 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7854                         },
7855                         Err(e) => {
7856                                 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7857                                 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7858                                 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7859                         }
7860                 };
7861
7862                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7863                         initial_commitment_tx,
7864                         msg.signature,
7865                         Vec::new(),
7866                         &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7867                         self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7868                 );
7869
7870                 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7871                         return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7872                 }
7873
7874                 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7875
7876                 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7877                 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7878                 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7879                 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7880
7881                 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7882
7883                 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7884                 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7885                 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7886                 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7887                 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7888                 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7889                 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7890                                                           shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7891                                                           &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7892                                                           &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7893                                                           funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7894                                                           obscure_factor,
7895                                                           holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7896                 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7897                         counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7898                         self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7899                         self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7900                         counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7901                         counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7902
7903                 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7904                         if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7905
7906                 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7907                 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7908                 let mut channel = Channel {
7909                         context: self.context,
7910                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7911                         dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7912                 };
7913                 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7914                 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7915
7916                 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7917         }
7918 }
7919
7920 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
7921 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7922 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7923         pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7924         pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7925         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7926         pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
7927 }
7928
7929 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
7930 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7931         pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7932                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7933                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
7934                 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
7935                 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
7936         ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
7937         where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7938               F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7939         {
7940                 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
7941                 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7942                 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7943
7944                 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
7945
7946                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
7947                         funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7948
7949                 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
7950                 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
7951
7952                 let chan = Self {
7953                         context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7954                                 fee_estimator,
7955                                 entropy_source,
7956                                 signer_provider,
7957                                 counterparty_node_id,
7958                                 their_features,
7959                                 funding_satoshis,
7960                                 0,
7961                                 user_id,
7962                                 config,
7963                                 current_chain_height,
7964                                 outbound_scid_alias,
7965                                 temporary_channel_id,
7966                                 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7967                                 channel_keys_id,
7968                                 holder_signer,
7969                                 pubkeys,
7970                         )?,
7971                         unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
7972                         dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
7973                                 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
7974                                 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
7975                                 funding_tx_locktime,
7976                                 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7977                         }
7978                 };
7979                 Ok(chan)
7980         }
7981
7982         /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7983         /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7984         /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7985         pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7986                 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7987         ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
7988         where
7989                 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7990         {
7991                 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7992                 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
7993         }
7994
7995         pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
7996                 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7997                         debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
7998                 }
7999
8000                 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8001                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8002                 }
8003
8004                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8005                         .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8006                                 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8007                 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8008                         .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8009                                 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8010                 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8011
8012                 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8013                         common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8014                                 chain_hash,
8015                                 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8016                                 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8017                                 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8018                                 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8019                                 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8020                                 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8021                                 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8022                                 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8023                                 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8024                                 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8025                                 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8026                                 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8027                                 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8028                                 first_per_commitment_point,
8029                                 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8030                                 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8031                                         Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8032                                         None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8033                                 }),
8034                                 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8035                         },
8036                         funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8037                         second_per_commitment_point,
8038                         locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8039                         require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8040                 }
8041         }
8042 }
8043
8044 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8045 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8046 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8047         pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8048         pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8049         pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8050 }
8051
8052 #[cfg(dual_funding)]
8053 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8054         /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8055         /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8056         pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8057                 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8058                 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8059                 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8060                 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8061         ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8062                 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8063                           F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8064                           L::Target: Logger,
8065         {
8066                 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8067                 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8068                         channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8069                 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8070                         channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8071
8072                 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8073                 // support this channel type.
8074                 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8075                         return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8076                                 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8077                 }
8078                 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8079
8080                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8081                         funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8082                         revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8083                         payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8084                         delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8085                         htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8086                 };
8087
8088                 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8089                         fee_estimator,
8090                         entropy_source,
8091                         signer_provider,
8092                         counterparty_node_id,
8093                         their_features,
8094                         user_id,
8095                         config,
8096                         current_chain_height,
8097                         logger,
8098                         false,
8099
8100                         funding_satoshis,
8101
8102                         counterparty_pubkeys,
8103                         channel_type,
8104                         holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8105                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8106                         0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8107                         msg.common_fields.clone(),
8108                 )?;
8109                 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8110                         &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8111                         &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8112                 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8113
8114                 let chan = Self {
8115                         context,
8116                         unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8117                         dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8118                                 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8119                                 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8120                                 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8121                                 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8122                         }
8123                 };
8124
8125                 Ok(chan)
8126         }
8127
8128         /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8129         /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8130         ///
8131         /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8132         pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8133                 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8134                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8135                 }
8136                 if !matches!(
8137                         self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8138                         if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8139                 ) {
8140                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8141                 }
8142                 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8143                         debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8144                 }
8145
8146                 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8147         }
8148
8149         /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8150         /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8151         /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8152         ///
8153         /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8154         fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8155                 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8156                         self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8157                 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8158                         self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8159                 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8160
8161                 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8162                         common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8163                                 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8164                                 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8165                                 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8166                                 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8167                                 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8168                                 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8169                                 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8170                                 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8171                                 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8172                                 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8173                                 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8174                                 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8175                                 first_per_commitment_point,
8176                                 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8177                                         Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8178                                         None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8179                                 }),
8180                                 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8181                         },
8182                         funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8183                         second_per_commitment_point,
8184                         require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8185                 }
8186         }
8187
8188         /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8189         /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8190         ///
8191         /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8192         #[cfg(test)]
8193         pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8194                 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8195         }
8196 }
8197
8198 // Unfunded channel utilities
8199
8200 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8201         // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8202         // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8203         // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8204         // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8205         let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8206         if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8207                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8208                 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8209                 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8210         }
8211
8212         // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8213         // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8214         // `only_static_remotekey`.
8215         if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8216                 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8217                 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8218         }
8219
8220         ret
8221 }
8222
8223 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8224 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8225
8226 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8227         (0, FailRelay),
8228         (1, FailMalformed),
8229         (2, Fulfill),
8230 );
8231
8232 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8233         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8234                 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8235                 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8236                 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8237                 match self {
8238                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8239                         ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8240                         ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8241                         ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8242                 }
8243                 Ok(())
8244         }
8245 }
8246
8247 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8248         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8249                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8250                         0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8251                         1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8252                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8253                 })
8254         }
8255 }
8256
8257 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8258         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8259                 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8260                 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8261                 match self {
8262                         AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8263                         AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8264                         AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8265                         AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8266                 }
8267         }
8268 }
8269
8270 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8271         fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8272                 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8273                         0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8274                         1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8275                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8276                 })
8277         }
8278 }
8279
8280 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8281         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8282                 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8283                 // called.
8284
8285                 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8286
8287                 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8288                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8289                 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8290                 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8291                 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8292
8293                 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8294                 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8295                 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8296                 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8297
8298                 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8299                 {
8300                         let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8301                         if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8302                                 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8303                         } else {
8304                                 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8305                         }
8306                         channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8307                 }
8308                 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8309
8310                 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8311
8312                 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8313                 // deserialized from that format.
8314                 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8315                         Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8316                         None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8317                 }
8318                 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8319
8320                 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8321                 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8322                 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8323
8324                 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8325                 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8326                         if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8327                                 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8328                         }
8329                 }
8330                 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8331                 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8332                         if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8333                                 continue; // Drop
8334                         }
8335                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8336                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8337                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8338                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8339                         match &htlc.state {
8340                                 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8341                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
8342                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
8343                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
8344                                 },
8345                                 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
8346                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
8347                                         htlc_state.write(writer)?;
8348                                 },
8349                                 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8350                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
8351                                 },
8352                                 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8353                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
8354                                         removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8355                                 },
8356                         }
8357                 }
8358
8359                 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8360                 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8361                 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8362
8363                 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8364                 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8365                         htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8366                         htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8367                         htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8368                         htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8369                         htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8370                         match &htlc.state {
8371                                 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8372                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
8373                                         onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8374                                 },
8375                                 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8376                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
8377                                 },
8378                                 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8379                                         // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8380                                         // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8381                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
8382                                 },
8383                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8384                                         3u8.write(writer)?;
8385                                         if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8386                                                 preimages.push(preimage);
8387                                         }
8388                                         let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8389                                         reason.write(writer)?;
8390                                 }
8391                                 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8392                                         4u8.write(writer)?;
8393                                         if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8394                                                 preimages.push(preimage);
8395                                         }
8396                                         let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8397                                         reason.write(writer)?;
8398                                 }
8399                         }
8400                         pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8401                         pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8402                 }
8403
8404                 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8405                 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8406                 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8407                 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8408                 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8409                 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8410                         match update {
8411                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8412                                         ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8413                                         blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8414                                 } => {
8415                                         0u8.write(writer)?;
8416                                         amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8417                                         cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8418                                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8419                                         source.write(writer)?;
8420                                         onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8421
8422                                         holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8423                                         holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8424                                 },
8425                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8426                                         1u8.write(writer)?;
8427                                         payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8428                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8429                                 },
8430                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8431                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
8432                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8433                                         err_packet.write(writer)?;
8434                                 }
8435                                 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8436                                         htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8437                                 } => {
8438                                         // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8439                                         // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8440                                         malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8441
8442                                         let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8443                                         2u8.write(writer)?;
8444                                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8445                                         dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8446                                 }
8447                         }
8448                 }
8449
8450                 match self.context.resend_order {
8451                         RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8452                         RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8453                 }
8454
8455                 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8456                 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8457                 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8458
8459                 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8460                 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8461                         pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8462                         htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8463                 }
8464
8465                 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8466                 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8467                         htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8468                         payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8469                         fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8470                 }
8471
8472                 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8473                         self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8474                 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8475                         Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8476                 } else {
8477                         // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8478                         // commitment_signed, drop it.
8479                         None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8480                 }
8481                 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8482
8483                 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8484                 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8485                 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8486                 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8487
8488                 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8489                 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8490                 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8491                 // consider the stale state on reload.
8492                 0u8.write(writer)?;
8493
8494                 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8495                 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8496                 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8497
8498                 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8499                 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8500                 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8501
8502                 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8503                 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8504
8505                 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8506                 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8507                 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8508
8509                 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8510                 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8511
8512                 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8513                         Some(info) => {
8514                                 1u8.write(writer)?;
8515                                 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8516                                 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8517                                 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8518                         },
8519                         None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8520                 }
8521
8522                 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8523                 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8524
8525                 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8526                 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8527                 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8528
8529                 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8530
8531                 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8532
8533                 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8534
8535                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8536                 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8537                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8538                 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8539                         htlc.write(writer)?;
8540                 }
8541
8542                 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8543                 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8544                 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8545                 // out at all.
8546                 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8547                         Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8548
8549                 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8550                 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8551                 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8552                 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8553                 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8554                         if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8555                         { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8556
8557                 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8558                 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8559                 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8560                         if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8561                         { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8562
8563                 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8564                 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8565
8566                 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8567                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8568                 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8569                 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8570
8571                 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8572
8573                 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8574                         (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8575                         // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8576                         // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8577                         // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8578                         // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8579                         // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8580                         // override that.
8581                         (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8582                         (2, chan_type, option),
8583                         (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8584                         (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8585                         (5, self.context.config, required),
8586                         (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8587                         (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8588                         (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8589                         (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8590                         (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8591                         (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8592                         (15, preimages, required_vec),
8593                         (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8594                         (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8595                         (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8596                         (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8597                         (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8598                         (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8599                         (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8600                         (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8601                         (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8602                         (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8603                         (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8604                         (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8605                         (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8606                         (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8607                         (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8608                         (45, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8609                 });
8610
8611                 Ok(())
8612         }
8613 }
8614
8615 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8616 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8617                 where
8618                         ES::Target: EntropySource,
8619                         SP::Target: SignerProvider
8620 {
8621         fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8622                 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8623                 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8624
8625                 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8626                 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8627                 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8628                 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8629
8630                 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8631                 if ver == 1 {
8632                         // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8633                         config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8634                         config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8635                         config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8636                         config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8637                 } else {
8638                         // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8639                         let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8640                 }
8641
8642                 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8643                 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8644                 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8645
8646                 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8647
8648                 let mut keys_data = None;
8649                 if ver <= 2 {
8650                         // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8651                         // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8652                         let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8653                         keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8654                         while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8655                                 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8656                                 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8657                                 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8658                                 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8659                                 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8660                         }
8661                 }
8662
8663                 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8664                 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8665                         Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8666                         Err(_) => None,
8667                 };
8668                 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8669
8670                 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8671                 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8672                 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8673
8674                 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8675
8676                 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8677                 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8678                         pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8679                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8680                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8681                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8682                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8683                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8684                                         1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
8685                                         2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
8686                                         3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8687                                         4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8688                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8689                                 },
8690                         });
8691                 }
8692
8693                 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8694                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8695                 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8696                         pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8697                                 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8698                                 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8699                                 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8700                                 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8701                                 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8702                                 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8703                                         0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8704                                         1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8705                                         2 => {
8706                                                 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8707                                                 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8708                                         },
8709                                         3 => {
8710                                                 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8711                                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8712                                         },
8713                                         4 => {
8714                                                 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8715                                                 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8716                                         },
8717                                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8718                                 },
8719                                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8720                                 blinding_point: None,
8721                         });
8722                 }
8723
8724                 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8725                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8726                 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8727                         holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8728                                 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8729                                         amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8730                                         cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8731                                         payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8732                                         source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8733                                         onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8734                                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8735                                         blinding_point: None,
8736                                 },
8737                                 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8738                                         payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8739                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8740                                 },
8741                                 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8742                                         htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8743                                         err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8744                                 },
8745                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8746                         });
8747                 }
8748
8749                 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8750                         0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8751                         1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8752                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8753                 };
8754
8755                 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8756                 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8757                 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8758
8759                 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8760                 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8761                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8762                         monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8763                 }
8764
8765                 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8766                 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8767                 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8768                         monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8769                 }
8770
8771                 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8772
8773                 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8774
8775                 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8776                 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8777                 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8778                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8779
8780                 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8781                 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8782                 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8783                 // consider the stale state on reload.
8784                 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8785                         0 => {},
8786                         1 => {
8787                                 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8788                                 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8789                                 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8790                         },
8791                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8792                 }
8793
8794                 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8795                 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8796                 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8797
8798                 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8799                 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8800                 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8801                 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8802                 if ver == 1 {
8803                         // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8804                         counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8805                 } else {
8806                         // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8807                         let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8808                 }
8809                 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8810                 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8811                 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8812
8813                 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8814                 if ver == 1 {
8815                         // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8816                         minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8817                 } else {
8818                         // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8819                         let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8820                 }
8821
8822                 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8823                         0 => None,
8824                         1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8825                                 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8826                                 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8827                                 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8828                         }),
8829                         _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8830                 };
8831
8832                 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8833                 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8834
8835                 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8836
8837                 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8838                 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8839
8840                 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8841                 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8842
8843                 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8844
8845                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8846                 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8847                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8848                 {
8849                         let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8850                         for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8851                                 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8852                         }
8853                 }
8854
8855                 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8856                         Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8857                                 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8858                         } else {
8859                                 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8860                         }))
8861                 } else {
8862                         None
8863                 };
8864
8865                 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8866                 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8867                 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8868                 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8869                 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8870                 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8871                 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8872                 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8873                 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8874                 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8875
8876                 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8877                 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8878                 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8879                 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8880                 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8881                 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8882                 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8883
8884                 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8885                 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8886                 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8887                 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8888
8889                 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8890
8891                 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8892                 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8893
8894                 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8895
8896                 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8897
8898                 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8899                 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8900
8901                 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8902
8903                 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8904                         (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8905                         (1, minimum_depth, option),
8906                         (2, channel_type, option),
8907                         (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8908                         (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8909                         (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8910                         (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8911                         (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8912                         (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8913                         (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8914                         (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8915                         (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8916                         (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8917                         (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8918                         (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8919                         (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8920                         (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8921                         (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8922                         (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8923                         (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8924                         (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8925                         (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8926                         (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8927                         (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8928                         (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8929                         (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8930                         (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8931                         (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8932                         (45, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
8933                 });
8934
8935                 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8936                         let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8937                         // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8938                         // required channel parameters.
8939                         if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8940                                 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8941                         }
8942                         (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8943                 } else {
8944                         // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8945                         let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8946                         let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8947                         (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8948                 };
8949
8950                 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8951                         let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8952                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8953                                 match &htlc.state {
8954                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8955                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8956                                         }
8957                                         OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8958                                                 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8959                                         }
8960                                         _ => {}
8961                                 }
8962                         }
8963                         // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8964                         if iter.next().is_some() {
8965                                 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8966                         }
8967                 }
8968
8969                 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8970                 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8971                         // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8972                         // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8973                         return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8974                 }
8975
8976                 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8977                 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8978                 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8979
8980                 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8981                 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8982
8983                 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8984                 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8985                 // separate u64 values.
8986                 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8987
8988                 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8989
8990                 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8991                         let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8992                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8993                                 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8994                         }
8995                         // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8996                         if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8997                 }
8998                 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8999                         let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9000                         for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9001                                 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9002                                         *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9003                                 }
9004                         }
9005                         // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9006                         if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9007                 }
9008                 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9009                         let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9010                         for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9011                                 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9012                         }
9013                         // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9014                         if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9015                 }
9016                 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9017                         let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9018                         for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9019                                 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9020                                         *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9021                                 }
9022                         }
9023                         // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9024                         if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9025                 }
9026
9027                 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9028                         for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9029                                 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9030                                         if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9031                                                 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9032                                                 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9033                                                 matches
9034                                         } else { false }
9035                                 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9036                                 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9037                                         htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9038                                 };
9039                                 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9040                         }
9041                 }
9042
9043                 Ok(Channel {
9044                         context: ChannelContext {
9045                                 user_id,
9046
9047                                 config: config.unwrap(),
9048
9049                                 prev_config: None,
9050
9051                                 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9052                                 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9053                                 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9054
9055                                 channel_id,
9056                                 temporary_channel_id,
9057                                 channel_state,
9058                                 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9059                                 secp_ctx,
9060                                 channel_value_satoshis,
9061
9062                                 latest_monitor_update_id,
9063
9064                                 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9065                                 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9066                                 destination_script,
9067
9068                                 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9069                                 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9070                                 value_to_self_msat,
9071
9072                                 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9073                                 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9074                                 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9075                                 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9076
9077                                 resend_order,
9078
9079                                 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9080                                 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9081                                 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9082                                 monitor_pending_forwards,
9083                                 monitor_pending_failures,
9084                                 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9085
9086                                 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9087                                 signer_pending_funding: false,
9088
9089                                 pending_update_fee,
9090                                 holding_cell_update_fee,
9091                                 next_holder_htlc_id,
9092                                 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9093                                 update_time_counter,
9094                                 feerate_per_kw,
9095
9096                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9097                                 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9098                                 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9099                                 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9100
9101                                 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9102                                 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9103                                 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9104                                 closing_fee_limits: None,
9105                                 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9106
9107                                 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9108                                 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9109                                 short_channel_id,
9110                                 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9111
9112                                 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9113                                 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9114                                 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9115                                 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9116                                 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9117                                 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9118                                 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9119                                 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9120                                 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9121                                 minimum_depth,
9122
9123                                 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9124
9125                                 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9126                                 funding_transaction,
9127                                 is_batch_funding,
9128
9129                                 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9130                                 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9131                                 counterparty_node_id,
9132
9133                                 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9134
9135                                 commitment_secrets,
9136
9137                                 channel_update_status,
9138                                 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9139
9140                                 announcement_sigs,
9141
9142                                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9143                                 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9144                                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9145                                 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9146
9147                                 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9148                                 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9149
9150                                 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9151                                 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9152                                 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9153
9154                                 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9155                                 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9156
9157                                 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9158                                 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9159
9160                                 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9161                                 channel_keys_id,
9162
9163                                 local_initiated_shutdown,
9164
9165                                 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9166                         },
9167                         #[cfg(dual_funding)]
9168                         dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9169                 })
9170         }
9171 }
9172
9173 #[cfg(test)]
9174 mod tests {
9175         use std::cmp;
9176         use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9177         use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9178         use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
9179         use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9180         use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
9181         use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9182         use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9183         use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9184         use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9185         use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9186         use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9187         use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9188         use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9189         use crate::ln::msgs;
9190         use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9191         use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9192         use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9193         use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9194         use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9195         use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9196         use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9197         use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9198         use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9199         use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9200         use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9201         use crate::util::test_utils;
9202         use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9203         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9204         use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9205         use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9206         use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9207         use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9208         use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9209         use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
9210         use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9211         use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
9212         use crate::prelude::*;
9213
9214         #[test]
9215         fn test_channel_state_order() {
9216                 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9217                 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9218                 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9219
9220                 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9221                 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9222                 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9223                 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9224         }
9225
9226         struct TestFeeEstimator {
9227                 fee_est: u32
9228         }
9229         impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9230                 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9231                         self.fee_est
9232                 }
9233         }
9234
9235         #[test]
9236         fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9237                 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9238                 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9239                         "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9240         }
9241
9242         struct Keys {
9243                 signer: InMemorySigner,
9244         }
9245
9246         impl EntropySource for Keys {
9247                 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9248         }
9249
9250         impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9251                 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9252                 #[cfg(taproot)]
9253                 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9254
9255                 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9256                         self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9257                 }
9258
9259                 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9260                         self.signer.clone()
9261                 }
9262
9263                 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9264
9265                 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9266                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9267                         let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9268                         let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9269                         Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9270                 }
9271
9272                 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9273                         let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9274                         let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9275                         Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9276                 }
9277         }
9278
9279         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9280         fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9281                 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9282         }
9283
9284         #[test]
9285         fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9286                 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9287                 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9288                         &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9289                 ).unwrap();
9290
9291                 let seed = [42; 32];
9292                 let network = Network::Testnet;
9293                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9294                 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9295                         returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9296                 });
9297
9298                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9299                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9300                 let config = UserConfig::default();
9301                 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9302                         Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9303                                 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9304                         },
9305                         Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9306                         Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9307                 }
9308         }
9309
9310         // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9311         // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9312         #[test]
9313         fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9314                 let original_fee = 253;
9315                 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9316                 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9317                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9318                 let seed = [42; 32];
9319                 let network = Network::Testnet;
9320                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9321
9322                 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9323                 let config = UserConfig::default();
9324                 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9325
9326                 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9327                 // same as the old fee.
9328                 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9329                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9330                 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9331         }
9332
9333         #[test]
9334         fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9335                 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9336                 // dust limits are used.
9337                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9338                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9339                 let seed = [42; 32];
9340                 let network = Network::Testnet;
9341                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9342                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9343                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9344
9345                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9346                 // they have different dust limits.
9347
9348                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9349                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9350                 let config = UserConfig::default();
9351                 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9352
9353                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9354                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9355                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9356                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9357                 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9358
9359                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9360                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9361                 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9362                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9363                 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9364
9365                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9366                 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9367                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9368                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9369                 }]};
9370                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9371                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9372                 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9373
9374                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9375                 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9376                 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9377
9378                 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9379                 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9380                 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9381                         htlc_id: 0,
9382                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9383                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9384                         cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9385                         state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9386                 });
9387
9388                 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9389                         htlc_id: 1,
9390                         amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9391                         payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9392                         cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9393                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9394                         source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9395                                 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9396                                 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9397                                 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9398                                 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9399                         },
9400                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9401                         blinding_point: None,
9402                 });
9403
9404                 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9405                 // the dust limit check.
9406                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9407                 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9408                 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9409                 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9410
9411                 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9412                 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9413                 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9414                 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9415                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9416                 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9417                 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9418         }
9419
9420         #[test]
9421         fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9422                 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9423                 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9424                 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9425                 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9426                 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9427                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9428                 let seed = [42; 32];
9429                 let network = Network::Testnet;
9430                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9431
9432                 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9433                 let config = UserConfig::default();
9434                 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9435
9436                 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9437                 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9438
9439                 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9440                 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9441                 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9442                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9443                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9444                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9445
9446                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9447                 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9448                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9449                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9450                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9451
9452                 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9453
9454                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9455                 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9456                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9457                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9458                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9459
9460                 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9461                 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9462                 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9463                 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9464                 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9465         }
9466
9467         #[test]
9468         fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9469                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9470                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9471                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9472                 let seed = [42; 32];
9473                 let network = Network::Testnet;
9474                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9475                 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9476                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9477
9478                 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9479
9480                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9481                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9482                 let config = UserConfig::default();
9483                 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9484
9485                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9486                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9487                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9488                 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9489
9490                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9491                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9492                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9493
9494                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9495                 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9496                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9497                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9498                 }]};
9499                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9500                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9501                 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9502
9503                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9504                 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9505                 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9506
9507                 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9508                 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9509                 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9510                 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9511                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9512                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9513                 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9514
9515                 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9516                 // is sane.
9517                 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9518                 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9519                 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9520                 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9521                 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9522         }
9523
9524         #[test]
9525         fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9526                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9527                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9528                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9529                 let seed = [42; 32];
9530                 let network = Network::Testnet;
9531                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9532                 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9533                 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9534
9535                 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9536                 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9537                 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9538                 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9539                 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9540                 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9541                 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9542                 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9543
9544                 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9545                 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9546                 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9547                 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9548                 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9549                 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9550
9551                 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9552                 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9553                 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9554                 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9555
9556                 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9557
9558                 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9559                 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9560                 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9561                 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9562                 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9563                 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9564
9565                 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9566                 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9567                 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9568                 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9569
9570                 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9571                 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9572                 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9573                 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9574                 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9575
9576                 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9577                 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9578                 // than 100.
9579                 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9580                 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9581                 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9582
9583                 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9584                 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9585                 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9586                 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9587                 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9588
9589                 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9590                 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9591                 // than 100.
9592                 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9593                 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9594                 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9595         }
9596
9597         #[test]
9598         fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9599
9600                 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9601                 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9602                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9603
9604                 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9605                 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9606                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9607                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9608
9609                 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9610                 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9611                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9612
9613                 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9614                 // to channel value
9615                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9616                 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9617         }
9618
9619         fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9620                 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9621                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9622                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9623                 let seed = [42; 32];
9624                 let network = Network::Testnet;
9625                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9626                 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9627                 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9628
9629
9630                 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9631                 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9632                 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9633
9634                 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9635                 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9636
9637                 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9638                 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9639                 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9640
9641                 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9642                         let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9643
9644                         let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9645
9646                         assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9647                         assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9648                 } else {
9649                         // Channel Negotiations failed
9650                         let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9651                         assert!(result.is_err());
9652                 }
9653         }
9654
9655         #[test]
9656         fn channel_update() {
9657                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9658                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9659                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9660                 let seed = [42; 32];
9661                 let network = Network::Testnet;
9662                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9663                 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9664                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9665
9666                 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9667                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9668                 let config = UserConfig::default();
9669                 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9670
9671                 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9672                 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9673                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9674                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9675                 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9676
9677                 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9678                 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9679                 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9680                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9681                 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9682
9683                 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9684                 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9685                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9686                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9687                 }]};
9688                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9689                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9690                 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9691
9692                 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9693                 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9694                 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9695
9696                 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9697                 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9698                         contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9699                                 chain_hash,
9700                                 short_channel_id: 0,
9701                                 timestamp: 0,
9702                                 flags: 0,
9703                                 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9704                                 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9705                                 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9706                                 fee_base_msat: 110,
9707                                 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9708                                 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9709                         },
9710                         signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9711                 };
9712                 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9713
9714                 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9715                 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9716                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9717                 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9718                         Some(info) => {
9719                                 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9720                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9721                                 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9722                         },
9723                         None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9724                 }
9725
9726                 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9727         }
9728
9729         #[test]
9730         fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9731                 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9732                 // properly.
9733                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9734                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9735                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9736                 let seed = [42; 32];
9737                 let network = Network::Testnet;
9738                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9739                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9740
9741                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9742                 let config = UserConfig::default();
9743                 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9744                 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9745                         &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9746                 ).unwrap();
9747                 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9748                         &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9749                         &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9750                 ).unwrap();
9751                 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9752                 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9753                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9754                 }]};
9755                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9756                 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9757                 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9758                         Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9759                         Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9760                 };
9761
9762                 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9763                         path: Path {
9764                                 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9765                                         pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9766                                         node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9767                                         cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9768                                 }],
9769                                 blinded_tail: None
9770                         },
9771                         session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9772                         first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9773                         payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9774                 };
9775                 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9776                         htlc_id: 0,
9777                         amount_msat: 0,
9778                         payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9779                         cltv_expiry: 0,
9780                         state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9781                         source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9782                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9783                         blinding_point: None,
9784                 };
9785                 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9786                 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9787                         if idx % 2 == 0 {
9788                                 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9789                         }
9790                         if idx % 3 == 0 {
9791                                 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9792                         }
9793                 }
9794                 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9795
9796                 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9797                         amount_msat: 0,
9798                         cltv_expiry: 0,
9799                         payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9800                         source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9801                         onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9802                                 version: 0,
9803                                 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9804                                 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9805                                 hmac: [0; 32]
9806                         },
9807                         skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9808                         blinding_point: None,
9809                 };
9810                 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9811                         payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9812                         htlc_id: 0,
9813                 };
9814                 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9815                         htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9816                 };
9817                 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9818                         htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9819                 };
9820                 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9821                 for i in 0..12 {
9822                         if i % 5 == 0 {
9823                                 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9824                         } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9825                                 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9826                         } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9827                                 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9828                                 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9829                                         ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9830                                 } = &mut dummy_add {
9831                                         *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9832                                         *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9833                                 } else { panic!() }
9834                                 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9835                         } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9836                                 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9837                         } else {
9838                                 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9839                         }
9840                 }
9841                 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9842
9843                 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9844                 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9845                 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9846                 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9847                 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9848                 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9849                 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9850                 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9851         }
9852
9853         #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9854         #[test]
9855         fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9856                 use bitcoin::sighash;
9857                 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9858                 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9859                 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9860                 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9861                 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9862                 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9863                 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9864                 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9865                 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9866                 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9867                 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9868                 use crate::sync::Arc;
9869                 use core::str::FromStr;
9870                 use hex::DisplayHex;
9871
9872                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9873                 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9874                 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9875                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9876
9877                 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9878                         &secp_ctx,
9879                         SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9880                         SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9881                         SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9882                         SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9883                         SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9884
9885                         // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9886                         [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9887                         10_000_000,
9888                         [0; 32],
9889                         [0; 32],
9890                 );
9891
9892                 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9893                                 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9894                 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9895
9896                 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9897                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9898                 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9899                 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9900                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9901                 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9902
9903                 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9904
9905                 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9906                         funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9907                         revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9908                         payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9909                         delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9910                         htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9911                 };
9912                 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9913                         CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9914                                 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9915                                 selected_contest_delay: 144
9916                         });
9917                 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9918                 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9919
9920                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9921                            <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9922
9923                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9924                            <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9925
9926                 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9927                            <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9928
9929                 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9930                 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9931                 // build_commitment_transaction.
9932                 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9933                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9934                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9935                 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9936                 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9937
9938                 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9939                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9940                                 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9941                                 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9942                         };
9943                 }
9944
9945                 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9946                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9947                                 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9948                                 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9949                         };
9950                 }
9951
9952                 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9953                         ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9954                                 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9955                         } ) => { {
9956                                 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9957                                         let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9958
9959                                         let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9960                                                 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9961                                                 .collect();
9962                                         (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9963                                 };
9964                                 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9965                                 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9966                                 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9967                                 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9968                                 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9969                                 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9970                                 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9971
9972                                 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9973                                 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9974                                 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9975                                 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9976                                 $({
9977                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9978                                         per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9979                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9980                                 })*
9981                                 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9982
9983                                 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9984                                         commitment_tx.clone(),
9985                                         counterparty_signature,
9986                                         counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9987                                         &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9988                                         chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9989                                 );
9990                                 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9991                                 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9992
9993                                 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9994                                 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9995                                 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9996
9997                                 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9998                                 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9999
10000                                 $({
10001                                         log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10002                                         let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10003
10004                                         let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10005                                         let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10006                                                 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10007                                                 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10008                                         let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10009                                         let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10010                                         let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10011                                         assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10012
10013                                         let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10014                                         if !htlc.offered {
10015                                                 for i in 0..5 {
10016                                                         let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10017                                                         if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10018                                                                 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10019                                                         }
10020                                                 }
10021
10022                                                 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10023                                         }
10024
10025                                         let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10026                                         let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10027                                                 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10028                                                         value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10029                                                         keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10030                                                         transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10031                                                 },
10032                                                 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10033                                                 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10034                                                 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10035                                                 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10036                                                 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10037                                                 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10038                                                 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10039                                         }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10040                                         let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10041                                         assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10042
10043                                         let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10044                                         assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10045                                         let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10046                                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10047                                         log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10048                                         assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10049                                 })*
10050                                 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10051                         } }
10052                 }
10053
10054                 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10055                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10056                                                  "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10057                                                  "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", {});
10058
10059                 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10060                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10061
10062                 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10063                                                  "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10064                                                  "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", {});
10065
10066                 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10067                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10068                                                  "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10069                                                  "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", {});
10070
10071                 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10072                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10073                                 htlc_id: 0,
10074                                 amount_msat: 1000000,
10075                                 cltv_expiry: 500,
10076                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10077                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10078                         };
10079                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10080                         out
10081                 });
10082                 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10083                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10084                                 htlc_id: 1,
10085                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
10086                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
10087                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10088                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10089                         };
10090                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10091                         out
10092                 });
10093                 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10094                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10095                                 htlc_id: 2,
10096                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
10097                                 cltv_expiry: 502,
10098                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10099                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10100                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10101                                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10102                                 blinding_point: None,
10103                         };
10104                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10105                         out
10106                 });
10107                 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10108                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10109                                 htlc_id: 3,
10110                                 amount_msat: 3000000,
10111                                 cltv_expiry: 503,
10112                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10113                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10114                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10115                                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10116                                 blinding_point: None,
10117                         };
10118                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10119                         out
10120                 });
10121                 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10122                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10123                                 htlc_id: 4,
10124                                 amount_msat: 4000000,
10125                                 cltv_expiry: 504,
10126                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10127                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10128                         };
10129                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10130                         out
10131                 });
10132
10133                 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10134                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10135                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10136
10137                 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10138                                  "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10139                                  "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", {
10140
10141                                   { 0,
10142                                   "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10143                                   "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10144                                   "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" },
10145
10146                                   { 1,
10147                                   "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10148                                   "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10149                                   "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" },
10150
10151                                   { 2,
10152                                   "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10153                                   "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10154                                   "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" },
10155
10156                                   { 3,
10157                                   "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10158                                   "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10159                                   "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" },
10160
10161                                   { 4,
10162                                   "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10163                                   "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10164                                   "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" }
10165                 } );
10166
10167                 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10168                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10169                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10170
10171                 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10172                                  "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10173                                  "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", {
10174
10175                                   { 0,
10176                                   "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10177                                   "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10178                                   "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" },
10179
10180                                   { 1,
10181                                   "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10182                                   "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10183                                   "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10184
10185                                   { 2,
10186                                   "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10187                                   "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10188                                   "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" },
10189
10190                                   { 3,
10191                                   "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10192                                   "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10193                                   "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" },
10194
10195                                   { 4,
10196                                   "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10197                                   "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10198                                   "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" }
10199                 } );
10200
10201                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10202                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10203                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10204
10205                 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10206                                  "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10207                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10208
10209                                   { 0,
10210                                   "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10211                                   "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10212                                   "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" },
10213
10214                                   { 1,
10215                                   "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10216                                   "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10217                                   "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d38412401473044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
10218
10219                                   { 2,
10220                                   "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10221                                   "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10222                                   "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" },
10223
10224                                   { 3,
10225                                   "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10226                                   "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10227                                   "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" }
10228                 } );
10229
10230                 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10231                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10232                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10233                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10234
10235                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10236                                  "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10237                                  "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", {
10238
10239                                   { 0,
10240                                   "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10241                                   "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10242                                   "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
10243
10244                                   { 1,
10245                                   "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10246                                   "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10247                                   "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" },
10248
10249                                   { 2,
10250                                   "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10251                                   "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10252                                   "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" },
10253
10254                                   { 3,
10255                                   "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10256                                   "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10257                                   "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" }
10258                 } );
10259
10260                 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10261                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10262                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10263                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10264
10265                 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10266                                  "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10267                                  "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", {
10268
10269                                   { 0,
10270                                   "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10271                                   "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10272                                   "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" },
10273
10274                                   { 1,
10275                                   "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10276                                   "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10277                                   "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" },
10278
10279                                   { 2,
10280                                   "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10281                                   "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10282                                   "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" },
10283
10284                                   { 3,
10285                                   "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10286                                   "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10287                                   "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" }
10288                 } );
10289
10290                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10291                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10292                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10293
10294                 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10295                                  "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10296                                  "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", {
10297
10298                                   { 0,
10299                                   "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10300                                   "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10301                                   "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" },
10302
10303                                   { 1,
10304                                   "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10305                                   "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10306                                   "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" },
10307
10308                                   { 2,
10309                                   "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10310                                   "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10311                                   "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" }
10312                 } );
10313
10314                 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10315                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10316                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10317
10318                 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10319                                  "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10320                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10321
10322                                   { 0,
10323                                   "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10324                                   "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10325                                   "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" },
10326
10327                                   { 1,
10328                                   "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10329                                   "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10330                                   "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" },
10331
10332                                   { 2,
10333                                   "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10334                                   "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10335                                   "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" }
10336                 } );
10337
10338                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10339                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10340                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10341
10342                 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10343                                  "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10344                                  "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", {
10345
10346                                   { 0,
10347                                   "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10348                                   "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10349                                   "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" },
10350
10351                                   { 1,
10352                                   "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10353                                   "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10354                                   "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" }
10355                 } );
10356
10357                 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10358                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10359                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10360                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10361                 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10362                 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10363
10364                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10365                                  "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10366                                  "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", {
10367
10368                                   { 0,
10369                                   "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10370                                   "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10371                                   "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" },
10372
10373                                   { 1,
10374                                   "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10375                                   "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10376                                   "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" }
10377                 } );
10378
10379                 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10380                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10381                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10382                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10383                 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10384
10385                 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10386                                  "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10387                                  "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", {
10388
10389                                   { 0,
10390                                   "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10391                                   "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10392                                   "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" },
10393
10394                                   { 1,
10395                                   "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10396                                   "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10397                                   "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" }
10398                 } );
10399
10400                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10401                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10402                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10403
10404                 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10405                                  "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10406                                  "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", {
10407
10408                                   { 0,
10409                                   "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10410                                   "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10411                                   "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" }
10412                 } );
10413
10414                 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10415                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10416                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10417                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10418                 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10419
10420                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10421                                  "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10422                                  "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", {
10423
10424                                   { 0,
10425                                   "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10426                                   "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10427                                   "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" }
10428                 } );
10429
10430                 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10431                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10432                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10433                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10434                 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10435
10436                 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10437                                  "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10438                                  "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", {
10439
10440                                   { 0,
10441                                   "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10442                                   "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10443                                   "02000000000101a9172908eace869cc35128c31fc2ab502f72e4dff31aab23e0244c4b04b11ab00000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374014730440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10444                 } );
10445
10446                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10447                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10448                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10449                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10450
10451                 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10452                                  "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10453                                  "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", {});
10454
10455                 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10456                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10457                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10458                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10459                 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10460
10461                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10462                                  "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10463                                  "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", {});
10464
10465                 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10466                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10467                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10468                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10469                 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10470
10471                 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10472                                  "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10473                                  "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", {});
10474
10475                 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10476                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10477                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10478
10479                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10480                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10481                                  "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", {});
10482
10483                 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10484                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10485                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10486                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10487                 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10488
10489                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10490                                  "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10491                                  "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", {});
10492
10493                 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10494                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10495                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10496                 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10497                 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10498
10499                 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10500                                  "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10501                                  "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", {});
10502
10503                 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10504                 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10505                 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10506                 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10507                 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10508                         let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10509                                 htlc_id: 1,
10510                                 amount_msat: 2000000,
10511                                 cltv_expiry: 501,
10512                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10513                                 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10514                         };
10515                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10516                         out
10517                 });
10518                 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10519                 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10520                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10521                                 htlc_id: 6,
10522                                 amount_msat: 5000001,
10523                                 cltv_expiry: 506,
10524                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10525                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10526                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10527                                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10528                                 blinding_point: None,
10529                         };
10530                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10531                         out
10532                 });
10533                 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10534                         let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10535                                 htlc_id: 5,
10536                                 amount_msat: 5000000,
10537                                 cltv_expiry: 505,
10538                                 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10539                                 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10540                                 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10541                                 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10542                                 blinding_point: None,
10543                         };
10544                         out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10545                         out
10546                 });
10547
10548                 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10549                                  "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10550                                  "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", {
10551
10552                                   { 0,
10553                                   "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10554                                   "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10555                                   "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" },
10556                                   { 1,
10557                                   "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10558                                   "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10559                                   "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" },
10560                                   { 2,
10561                                   "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10562                                   "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10563                                   "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" }
10564                 } );
10565
10566                 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10567                 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10568                                  "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10569                                  "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10570
10571                                   { 0,
10572                                   "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10573                                   "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10574                                   "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" },
10575                                   { 1,
10576                                   "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10577                                   "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10578                                   "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" },
10579                                   { 2,
10580                                   "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10581                                   "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10582                                   "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" }
10583                 } );
10584         }
10585
10586         #[test]
10587         fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10588                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10589
10590                 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10591                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10592                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10593                            <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10594
10595                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10596                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10597                            <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10598
10599                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10600                            <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10601
10602                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10603                            <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10604
10605                 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10606                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10607                            <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10608         }
10609
10610         #[test]
10611         fn test_key_derivation() {
10612                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10613                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10614
10615                 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10616                 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10617
10618                 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10619                 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10620
10621                 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10622                 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10623
10624                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10625                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10626
10627                 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10628                                 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10629
10630                 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10631                                 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10632         }
10633
10634         #[test]
10635         fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10636                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10637                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10638                 let seed = [42; 32];
10639                 let network = Network::Testnet;
10640                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10641                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10642
10643                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10644                 let config = UserConfig::default();
10645                 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10646                         node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10647
10648                 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10649                 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10650
10651                 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10652                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10653                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10654                 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10655                         node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10656                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10657                 assert!(res.is_ok());
10658         }
10659
10660         #[test]
10661         fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10662                 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10663                 // resulting `channel_type`.
10664                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10665                 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10666                 let network = Network::Testnet;
10667                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10668                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10669
10670                 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10671                 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10672
10673                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10674                 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10675
10676                 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10677                 // need to signal it.
10678                 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10679                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10680                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10681                         &config, 0, 42, None
10682                 ).unwrap();
10683                 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10684
10685                 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10686                 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10687                 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10688
10689                 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10690                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10691                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10692                         None
10693                 ).unwrap();
10694
10695                 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10696                 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10697                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10698                         &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10699                         &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10700                 ).unwrap();
10701
10702                 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10703                 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10704         }
10705
10706         #[test]
10707         fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10708                 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10709                 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10710                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10711                 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10712                 let network = Network::Testnet;
10713                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10714                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10715
10716                 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10717                 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10718
10719                 let config = UserConfig::default();
10720
10721                 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10722                 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10723                 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10724                 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10725                 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10726
10727                 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10728                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10729                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10730                         None
10731                 ).unwrap();
10732
10733                 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10734                 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10735                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10736
10737                 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10738                 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10739                 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10740                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10741                         &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10742                         &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10743                 );
10744                 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10745         }
10746
10747         #[test]
10748         fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10749                 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10750                 // it is rejected.
10751                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10752                 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10753                 let network = Network::Testnet;
10754                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10755                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10756
10757                 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10758                 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10759
10760                 let config = UserConfig::default();
10761
10762                 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10763                 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10764                 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10765                 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10766                 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10767                 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10768                 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10769                 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10770
10771                 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10772                 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10773                 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10774                 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10775                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10776                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10777                         None
10778                 ).unwrap();
10779
10780                 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10781                 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10782
10783                 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10784                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10785                         &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10786                         &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10787                 );
10788                 assert!(res.is_err());
10789
10790                 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10791                 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10792                 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10793                 // LDK.
10794                 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10795                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10796                         10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10797                 ).unwrap();
10798
10799                 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10800
10801                 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10802                         &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10803                         &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10804                         &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10805                 ).unwrap();
10806
10807                 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10808                 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10809
10810                 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10811                         &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10812                 );
10813                 assert!(res.is_err());
10814         }
10815
10816         #[test]
10817         fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10818                 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10819                 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10820                 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10821                 let seed = [42; 32];
10822                 let network = Network::Testnet;
10823                 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10824                 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10825                 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10826
10827                 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10828                 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10829                 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10830                 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10831
10832                 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10833                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10834                 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10835                         &feeest,
10836                         &&keys_provider,
10837                         &&keys_provider,
10838                         node_b_node_id,
10839                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10840                         10000000,
10841                         100000,
10842                         42,
10843                         &config,
10844                         0,
10845                         42,
10846                         None
10847                 ).unwrap();
10848
10849                 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10850                 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10851                 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10852                         &feeest,
10853                         &&keys_provider,
10854                         &&keys_provider,
10855                         node_b_node_id,
10856                         &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10857                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10858                         &open_channel_msg,
10859                         7,
10860                         &config,
10861                         0,
10862                         &&logger,
10863                         true,  // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10864                 ).unwrap();
10865
10866                 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10867                 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10868                         &accept_channel_msg,
10869                         &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10870                         &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10871                 ).unwrap();
10872
10873                 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10874                 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10875                 let tx = Transaction {
10876                         version: 1,
10877                         lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10878                         input: Vec::new(),
10879                         output: vec![
10880                                 TxOut {
10881                                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10882                                 },
10883                                 TxOut {
10884                                         value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10885                                 },
10886                         ]};
10887                 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10888                 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10889                         tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10890                 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10891                 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10892                         &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10893                         best_block,
10894                         &&keys_provider,
10895                         &&logger,
10896                 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10897                 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10898                         &&logger,
10899                         &&keys_provider,
10900                         chain_hash,
10901                         &config,
10902                         0,
10903                 );
10904
10905                 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10906                 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10907                 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10908                         &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10909                 );
10910                 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10911                 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10912                         &&logger,
10913                         &&keys_provider,
10914                         chain_hash,
10915                         &config,
10916                         0,
10917                 );
10918                 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10919                 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10920                 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10921                 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10922                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10923
10924                 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10925                 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10926                         &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10927                         &&keys_provider,
10928                         chain_hash,
10929                         &config,
10930                         &best_block,
10931                         &&logger,
10932                 ).unwrap();
10933                 assert_eq!(
10934                         node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10935                         ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10936                 );
10937
10938                 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10939                 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10940                 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10941                 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());
10942         }
10943 }